Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/6/q/bon-sent-IV-d6-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *In what the character is as in a subject.*

Thirdly it is asked, in what the character is as in a subject. And that it is in the *whole soul*, it seems:

1. Because the character distinguishes the sheep of Christ from the non-sheep, and the member of Christ from the non-member; but the soul is not called a sheep nor a member with respect to a power, but with respect to substance: therefore the character distinguishes with respect to substance.

2. Likewise, that to which a disposition belongs, also a habit; but the character disposes to grace and to the remission of original [sin], which regards the whole soul: therefore the character is in the substance of the soul.

But that it is only in the *cognitive power*, it seems:

3. Because everything in the soul pertaining to cognition is in the cognitive power; but the character pertains to cognition, since it is a sign: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in one soul there is one character through one Sacrament; but every habit is in a power as in a subject: therefore, since an accident is in one subject, the character is in one power. But the power to which this most belongs is the cognitive: therefore etc.

But that it is in the *whole image*, it seems:

1. The character is a certain configuration; but the soul is said to be configured to the Trinity according to the three powers, not one alone: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the character disposes principally to the reformation of the image; but the reformation of the image is observed with respect to the information of the powers themselves, as they are turned toward God: therefore etc.

### Conclusio

> The character is in the soul according to the whole image, yet it is appropriated to the cognitive power.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there have been three opinions.

Some have said that the character is in the *whole soul* for the aforesaid reasons, because it distinguishes the sheep from the [other] sheep, or from that which is not a sheep: and this regards the substance of the soul.

Some [have said] that it is in the *cognitive* [power] by reason of signifying, and because a sign, which is a ground of knowing, regards the cognitive power.

Some [have said] that it is in the *whole image* by reason of configuring. And because the act of the character, from which it takes its name, and its principal [act], is *to configure*: therefore this third [opinion] is better, that it is in the soul according to the *image*, according to *property* and *truth*. But because the image, although it is in the three, nevertheless *is appropriated to the cognitive* [power], according to what is said in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, that « the *image* is in the power of knowing, the *likeness* in the power of loving »: therefore by *appropriation* it is in the cognitive power.

**To the arguments:**

1. *To that* therefore which is objected, that it distinguishes the soul: therefore it is in the soul; it is true, but it is not necessary that it be in the *whole* soul, just as color does not tinge the [whole] body, yet in the primary mode it is in the surface.

2. *To that* which is objected: that to which a disposition belongs, also a habit; it must be said that this is true of that disposition which becomes a habit; but not so of another, because the habit of one power disposes to the habit of another, as the habit of faith [disposes] to the habit of charity.

3. *To that* which is objected, that it regards cognition; it must be said that this is true, if it be a *habit* of knowing. And *moreover*, it regards not only cognition, but also grace reforming the whole image.

4. *To that* which is objected, that it is one thing in one soul; it can be said in two ways: that one accident is in many [things], as one grace [is] in many powers, and one health in many members, when an accident does not regard determinately one power, but [regards] them according as they are founded in one. — Or otherwise: the image is one, and yet [is] in the three powers, because it bespeaks a relation to one; likewise it can be said of the character. For since the image implies distinction, therefore it is compared to many [things] as to one subject. And there is an example in number: for the number three is one in three men, and is one, although those [men] are several in themselves, who are the one subject of the three, and none of them by itself alone is the subject. So also in the character it must be understood that it bespeaks, as was touched on before, a certain configuration of the soul to the blessed Trinity, intermediate between the configuration of the soul with respect to nature, and the configuration of the same with respect to grace making [one] pleasing.