Dist. 6, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/6/q/bon-sent-IV-d6-p2-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the intention of the one baptizing.*

As to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the intention of the one baptizing, and concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether intention is necessary for baptism. Second it is asked whether right intention belongs to the integrity of baptism.

### Question I. *Whether intention in the one conferring is necessary for baptism.*

And as to the first, that intention is necessary for baptism is shown:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Master in the text: «In this and in the other Sacraments, just as the form must be observed, so the intention of conferring it must be had»; but the form is necessary: therefore the intention also.

2. *Likewise*, the form of words is necessary, not insofar as they are thought, but insofar as they are spoken; but *to speak* is to utter with intention: therefore intention is necessary for baptism. *If you say* that from this it does not follow that one must have this or that intention, but that it suffices that he intend something, as for instance to play; it is shown that it is necessary to have the intention of giving the Sacrament: because works that are according to art or reason, insofar as it is reason, receive their denomination from his intention — for if he intends to play, it is play — therefore if he does not intend to administer the Sacrament, it is not a Sacrament.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine says, and it was treated above in the third distinction: «When the word is joined to the element, the Sacrament comes to be»: therefore if these two are present, the Sacrament is complete, especially since in the giving of the form intention is not touched upon.

2. *Likewise*, faith concurs in baptism, since it is the Sacrament of faith; but the faith of the Church suffices, since the one baptizing is an unbeliever: therefore it seems likewise that the intention of the Church supplies for the intention of the one baptizing.

3. *Likewise*, baptism regards the recipient just as it does the giver; but intention is not necessary in the recipient, as is clear in an infant and a madman: therefore neither in the giver; and so on.

4. *Likewise*, we see spiritual works which the Lord performs through ministers intending something else, as for instance He proves the just through demons, who do not intend the proving; likewise in bodily works, one who strikes with a lethal wound, even if he does not intend to kill, commits homicide: therefore it seems likewise in the matter at hand, that although someone does not intend to baptize, nevertheless if he does what is required for baptism, he baptizes.

5. *Likewise*, if intention is necessary, then everyone is uncertain whether he is baptized: therefore, if he ought not to commit himself to danger: he is always bound to be rebaptized, since he can never be made certain of the intention of the one baptizing.

### Conclusion.

> *Intention is required for the conferring of every Sacrament.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in every Sacrament intention is necessary. — Now the reason for this is that a Sacrament does not have its *being* from nature, but from *institution*; whence if before its institution someone had immersed another in water under the form of words, it would not be a Sacrament.

Some, then, say, like master Hugh of Saint Victor, that the Sacraments were instituted so that they should be done *reasonably* and from intention; and therefore, if there be no intention, there is no Sacrament. For he speaks thus: «The Sacraments of God were not so instituted that they should admit no rational account in their working, but should proceed to their effect by a certain turbulent and violent and irrational obstinacy without any intention or will of those operating». «See therefore and consider that the work of the ministers of God ought to be rational, nor on account of the form alone should it prejudge where there is no intention of acting».

Yet another reason can also be assigned: namely, that for a Sacrament both *intention and institution* are necessary. For in order that there be a Sacrament, it is necessary that the form and the element be ordered to one thing; but this is not so *of itself*, since form and element are indifferent to many things; therefore *the institution of Christ* supervenes, which ordered and signified the form and the element to some effect. But yet the *institution*, although it *ordered* the words to one thing, did not however *restrict* them, since they can be and are taken to other uses; and therefore, in order that they be *ordered*, it is necessary that the intention of the minister intervene, by which he intends by that act and word to give such an effect, or at least to do what the Church does, or at least to dispense what Christ instituted; otherwise word and element, as disjoined, or joined to something else, do not make a Sacrament.

1. To that, then, which is objected first: *the word is joined to the element*, etc.; it must be said that the one is not joined to the other unless there be present an intention uniting them.

2. To that which is objected concerning faith, that the faith of the Church suffices; it must be said that *faith* is like a *universal* agent; but *intention* is a *particular* agent, applying faith to this or to that: and therefore *faith* is preserved in the generality of the Church, but *intention* is necessary, by which that act of the Church's faith is joined, as a particular and actual act in the minister. Therefore the *power* of the Sacrament is from the faith of the Church, but the *dispensation* is from the action of the minister; and since the ministration regards the intention of the giver, therefore *faith* is not so required in the dispenser as *intention*.

3. To that which is objected concerning the recipient, it must be said that if the recipient be an adult and in no way intend that there be done to him what the Church does, but rather a jest; I do not believe that he would receive the Sacrament, if he intend nothing but to play and to wash.

From this is clear that which is wont to be asked, whether any *pretense* impedes the reception of the Sacrament. For if that pretense does not remove this intention, namely of receiving what the Church gives or intends to give; however great the pretense be, it does not impede the reception of the Sacrament. But if he be so feigning that he does not have the intention of receiving or of having done about himself what the Church does or intends to do, but only intends to play or to mock others; I do not see how this man receives the Sacrament, or its reality.

4. To that which is objected concerning works, it must be said that those works are *of themselves* ordered to that end, as a grievous blow to killing and the punishment of the good to proving; but ablution and the invocation of the Trinity are ordered to many things: and therefore they do not make a Sacrament without intention. And so that is clear.

5. To that which is objected, that one must always be rebaptized, since the intention of the one baptizing is not established; it must be said that this is not necessary, because he did what was in his power and applied due diligence; and therefore he is no longer bound, especially since the defect of intention could not be known from any sign.

But whether he is *baptized*, or *not*; here there is a twofold opinion. One is that God reputes him as baptized, not only the Church. And the reason for this they take from that word of Isidore: «By whatever artifice of words one may err, God accepts it just as he who is sworn understands it». — But that is to be understood as to *guilt*, not as to *the account of the vow or of the Sacrament*, and this is manifest in matrimony and in a vow.

And therefore others say that it is not a Sacrament, although the words be there: because, as Gregory says in the *Morals*, «the intention ought not to serve the words, but the words the intention», and this has place especially in a Sacrament. And therefore he is not baptized, as far as concerns that which was performed by man.

If you ask whether he is *saved* otherwise; it must be said that if an *adult* is baptized, as he ought to be, the interior faith supplies: if an *infant*, it is pious to believe that the supreme Priest supplies; if nevertheless He does not do so, He does what is just; and He willed us to be uncertain of salvation in order to lay aside pride and to stir up diligence, so that we should seek more attentively and from worthier and safer persons; I believe nevertheless either that God reveals it, or supplies it entirely, unless our sins impede. — This therefore is to be held as a rule for all that follows, that for the dispensation of all the Sacraments it is necessary to have intention either in act or in habit, either implicitly or explicitly.