Cap. 1, Vers. 8-11
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/15/d/1/q/bon-eccl-c1-v8-11
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#### Secondly the vanity of the mutability of things is considered according to the being which they have in the human understanding, and this is proved by a threefold reason.

*All things are hard* etc. Above there was determined the vanity in things according to the *being* which they have in the *universe*; here is determined the vanity according to the *being* which they have in the *human understanding*; and vanity is shown in them in three ways: first, because they do not *lie open*; secondly, because they do not *fill*, there: *The eye is not filled with seeing*; thirdly, because they do not *remain*, there: *There is no remembrance of former things.* They do not lie open for interpreting or for teaching; they do not fill so as to refresh and to give rest to the learner; they do not remain so as to be remembered. And these three acts look to a threefold power in us: the interpretative, the cognitive and the memorative.

(V. 8.). First, therefore, it is noted that they do not *lie open* to be explained; therefore he says: *All things are hard*, namely for finding out their reason; whence Wisdom the ninth chapter: « Hardly do we guess aright at the things that are upon earth; and with labour do we find the things that are before us »; below in the eighth chapter: « I understood that man can find no reason of the works of God » etc.; and therefore, because they are hard, *man cannot explain them by word*; Job the thirty-eighth chapter: « Who shall declare the reason of the heavens »? Ecclesiasticus the forty-third chapter: « We shall say many things, and shall fail in words; the consummation of our words is he himself ».

(V. 8, 9, 10.). *The eye is not filled* etc. Here, secondly, it is touched upon that they do not *fill* so as to refresh the learner; and because we learn most of all by two senses, namely by sight and by hearing; he shows that in neither is there satiety; and therefore he says: *The eye is not filled with seeing*; Proverbs the twenty-seventh chapter: « For the eyes of men are insatiable ». *Neither is the ear filled with hearing*, since there is in it an itching to hear things new and curious; second to Timothy, the fourth chapter: « According to their own desires they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears ». And the reason of this is that that in which there is true satiety, neither hath eye seen nor ear perceived; first to the Corinthians, the second chapter: « Neither hath eye seen, nor ear heard » etc.

And that in these earthly things one cannot be refreshed, he shows, because eye and ear will perceive new things; but nothing remains in newness: therefore ear and eye are filled in nothing. He supposes the *major*, and it is made plain in Acts the seventeenth chapter: « The Athenians were free for nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing »; but here he proposes the *minor*, because nothing has newness, neither as to *being* nor as to *becoming*. — Therefore he says: *What is it that hath been?* He asks, and he himself answers: *The same thing that shall be*: therefore by a simple conversion: what shall be hath been. In like manner there follows: *What is it that hath been done?* He answers: *The same that is to be done*: therefore by a simple conversion: what is to be done hath been done. — And from this he concludes: *Nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new*: therefore neither to tell nor to hear anything new. And he repeats the proof: *For it hath already gone before in the ages that were before us*; second of Peter, the third chapter: « Since the time that our fathers slept, all things continue so ».

(V. 11.). *There is no remembrance of former things.* Here, thirdly, it is touched upon that things do not *remain* to be remembered, because all things are handed over to oblivion; whence he says: *There is no remembrance of former things*, namely among us who come after; Wisdom the second chapter: « Our name shall be forgotten in time, and no man shall have any remembrance of our works ». And so it is in things past and in things to come; whence he adds: *But neither indeed of those things which hereafter are to come shall there be any remembrance with them that shall be in the latter end*, that is: those who come after will not be mindful of those who went before, and this on account of time, which brings in oblivion; below in the second chapter: « The times to come shall cover all things with oblivion ».

### Questions.

I. It is asked concerning that which he says: *All things are hard.*

**Contra:** 1. There are many things the knowledge of which is common to us and to brutes: therefore it is not hard for a man to know what a beast knows.

2. Likewise, there are certain things in which it does not happen that one errs, as in the knowledge of sensible things — because sense is not deceived about its proper object — and of intelligible principles, such as the axioms; and such things it is easy to know.

3. Likewise, what is it that he says: *Man cannot explain them by word?* It is easier for a man to speak than for any creature to work easily: therefore if it is easy for any creature to work, then it is easy for a man to explain its operation.

I respond: it must be said that there is a knowing *half-fully*, as when a thing is known according to its accidents, or according to some operation. There is again a knowing *perfectly*, and he knows perfectly who fully knows the substance, the power and the operation and the causes and the reasons of these. And because power is hidden, and substance remote from the senses; therefore all things are hard for us.

1. As to the objection, then, that we know some things along with the brutes, it is true in a certain way, as that this is bitter; but a brute knows nothing fully.

2. In like manner the second is clear: because, according as a thing is sensible, it is manifest.

3. Through this also the following is clear: because it is one thing to *tell* something and another to *explain* it; for to *explain* is to bring out the hidden and enfolded reasons that are within; and this no one can do save he who understands; and this is arduous and belongs to few.

II. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *The eye is not filled with seeing* etc.

1. It is asked why he does not bring in the other senses, since it likewise happens that we know through them?

2. Likewise, what is it that he says: *It is not filled?* For a thing is then said to be *filled* when it wills no more of that which it was desiring; but it happens sometimes that a man wills not to see or to hear more, but rather to rest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it is not filled, then the desire of them never rests: therefore since a desire that has no rest is frustrated of its end; and every such thing is idle: therefore the desire of sight is idle.

I respond: it must be said that he mentions these two senses alone for this reason, that he is speaking of the senses according as they are a way into knowledge and are referred to sensual pleasantness. And there is a twofold word by which we recognize all things: namely the *divine* word and the *human* word. The *divine* word is every creature, because it speaks God; this word the eye perceives. The *human* word is the voice uttered, and this the ear perceives. — Or because knowledge is twofold: by

*finding out* and by *teaching*; for the first looks to sight, but the second looks to hearing.

1. 2. As to what is objected concerning satiety; I say that he is speaking of the satiety of these senses according as they are organs of the heart and of the will or appetite; and because the heart is not filled, neither are these two senses. Whence Hugh: « All the beauty, all the pleasantness, all the sweetness of created things can affect the human heart, but cannot satisfy it save that sweetness alone for which it was made ».

3. As to what he objects, then: that it is *frustrated*, it is false, because it is terminated elsewhere.

2. As to what he objects, that a man wills no more; this is because he is wearied and is disgusted, not because he is filled.

III. It is asked concerning that which he says: *Nothing under the sun is new.*

The contrary seems true: 1. Jeremias the thirty-first chapter: *The Lord shall make a new thing upon the earth.*

2. Likewise, the Apocalypse the twenty-first chapter: *I saw a new heaven and a new earth.*

3. Likewise, from this word the error seems to be confirmed that there is in things a circulation according to their going forth, so that the same things are that once were, and this through the following text: *It hath already gone before in the ages that were before us*; and thus that error seems to be verified which holds that, after the great year, which contains fifteen thousand years, all things are renewed.

I respond: it must be said that there is the operation of founding, of conserving, of repairing, of glorifying; any one of these operations is above nature, and therefore it will not be *under the sun* or under time, but above it, apart from propagation; whence he understands it of this alone.

And thus the others are clear. — Concerning this it is to be noted that he calls that *new* whose like has not gone before; and thus there is nothing new according to *propagation*, because there it is always like from like; but he objects as if he were speaking of the same thing; and that it is thus impossible to understand, because, if every form that is corrupted and again generated differs in number, it cannot be understood of the same in number.

IV. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *There is no remembrance of former things.*

**Contra:** It is said in the Psalm: *I remembered thy works, O Lord.*

I respond: to this some say that that is understood of evil things, not of good. — But this is still false, because many evil things too are in the memory. — And therefore it must be said that this proposition is not to be understood as universally true, but as true in the greater number of cases, because oblivion belongs to more things than memory does; yet very many of the things that have been done are in our memory.

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