Cap. 4, Vers. 1-6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/15/d/4/q/bon-eccl-c4-v1-6
----------------------------------------
### Chapter IV.

#### Secondly, on the vanity of malice in subjects according to a threefold difference.

*I turned myself to other things* etc. Above he treated of the vanity of malice in prelates; here in *subjects.* Now the vanity of malice is touched on here as to a threefold difference: first of *calumny,* in harming maliciously; secondly of *envy,* in grieving maliciously, at: *Again I considered;* thirdly of *acedia,* in departing from good work; and this is touched on at: *The fool foldeth.*

(Vers. 1. 2. 3.). He describes, then, the vanity of *calumny;* and as to the *consideration of calumny* he says: *I turned myself to other things,* supply: to be considered; *and I saw the calumnies that are done under the sun,* that is, in this world; Ezechiel, the twenty-second chapter: « The people of the land practised calumny and committed robbery with violence; they afflicted the needy and the poor, and they oppressed the stranger by calumny without judgement ». And *calumny* is called the violent extortion of goods, as though by justice, but by malice. — And he adds the *aggravation of misery,* on account of the calamity of the oppressed, since they are oppressed *unjustly, without consolation, without remedy.* — Because *unjustly,* he says: *And the tears of the innocent,* namely for calumnies of this kind; Job, the thirty-fifth chapter: « By reason of the multitude of calumniators they shall cry out, and they shall wail for the violence of the arm of tyrants ». — Because *without consolation: and they had no comforter,* which indeed aggravates the cruelty; hence Lamentations, the first chapter: « There is none to comfort her among all them that were dear to her ». On the contrary, Ecclesiasticus, the seventh chapter: « Be not wanting to them that weep in comforting, and walk with them that mourn »; — And not only does he lack consolation, but also *remedy;* hence he also adds: *And they were not able to resist their violence, being destitute of help from any,* supply: I saw. Of this malice it is said in Proverbs, the twenty-second chapter: « Do no violence to the poor, because he is poor, neither crush the needy in the gate ». Therefore, II Paralipomenon, the twentieth chapter: « In us there is not so great strength that we can resist this multitude which rusheth upon us ». — But as to the *detestation of fault* he adds: *And I praised the dead rather than the living,* namely in this, that they do not see these evils and cruelties, which no good man can see and not grieve; III Kings, the nineteenth chapter, Elias said: « It is enough for me, Lord, take away my soul; for I am no better than my fathers ». — *And I judged him happier than them both,* namely than the dead and the living, *that is not yet born, nor hath seen the evils that are under the sun;* as though to see these evils, or to have seen them, were a great misery; I Machabees, the second chapter: « Woe is me, said Mathathias, wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and the ruin

of the holy city, and to sit there »? — Thus, then, there is noted here the *consideration of calumny,* the *aggravation of misery,* since they are oppressed, desolate, destitute of help, and then the *detestation of fault.*

(Vers. 4.). *Again I considered* etc. Here secondly is touched the vanity of *envy,* in grieving maliciously over the good and prosperity of one's neighbour, which he also saw; hence he adds: *Again I considered.* This contemplation is a free and clear-sighted and fixed gaze. *I considered,* I say, *all the labours and industries of men; labours,* as to the body; *and industries of men,* as to the soul. — Or: *labours and industries,* that is, virtues; hence another translation: *All the virtue of the work;* above, the second chapter: « I detested all my industry wherewith I laboured most studiously under the sun ». *And I remarked,* that is, I perceived in my mind; *that they lie open,* that is, are exposed; *to the envy of the neighbour,* because on seeing good things the envious man grieves at once; Ecclesiasticus, the fourteenth chapter: « The eye of the envious is wicked, and he turneth away his face, and despiseth his own soul ». *And in this therefore vanity,* namely of malice; Proverbs, the twenty-eighth chapter: « A man that maketh haste to be rich, and envieth others » etc. *And superfluous care,* namely of punishment, since, when he ought to think of his own goods, he thinks always of other men's; hence Proverbs, the twenty-third chapter: « Eat not with an envious man, and desire not his meats, because like a soothsayer he esteemeth that which he knoweth not ».

(Vers. 5. 6.). *The fool foldeth* etc. Here thirdly is touched the vanity of *acedia,* on account of which a man is rendered weary and sluggish towards every good, and through this a fool. Therefore he says: *The fool foldeth his hands together;* therefore a *fool,* because *sluggish;* Proverbs, the twelfth chapter: « He that pursueth idleness is very foolish »; Proverbs, the sixth chapter: « Go to the ant, O sluggard, and learn wisdom ». This *fool foldeth his hands,* because he refuses to work; Proverbs, the twenty-sixth chapter: « The sluggard hideth his hands under his armpit, and it is a labour to him if he turn them to his mouth ». And from this, that he refuses to work, he is made poor and lean through the want of need; hence he says: *And eateth his own flesh, saying;* it is said hyperbolically, in that he is made lean, not having food; Proverbs, the twenty-first chapter: « Desires kill the sluggard, for his hands have refused to work at all ». — But in this sluggishness of acedia he seems to himself to have the excuse of wisdom; hence he also adds, saying: *Better is a handful with rest than both hands full with labour and vexation of mind.* This is the sentence of the sluggard, by which he excuses himself; hence it is said in Proverbs, the twenty-sixth chapter: « The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences ». — And thus there is intimated in the sluggard the *torpor of acedia,* since *he foldeth his hands;* the *endurance of penury,* since *he eateth his flesh;* the *excuse of ignorance,* since he praises rest.

### Questions

I. Here it is asked concerning that which he says: *I praised the dead rather than the living.*

**Contra:** 1. Below, the ninth chapter: *Better is a living dog than a dead lion.*

2. Likewise, this seems so *by reason:* since a habit is better than a privation, therefore life than death: therefore, *from conjugates*, the living are better than the dead.

I respond: it must be said that to praise one thing more than another, or to prefer it, can be in two ways: either *simply,* or *as to some condition.* Speaking *simply,* the living is preferred to the dead, unless the condition of beatitude is added; but *as to something* the dead is preferred to the living: first, because he has not so many occasions of sinning; hence the Apostle said, to the Romans, the seventh chapter: *Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the servitude of this body?* Secondly, because he has not so many occasions of sorrowing, since he does not see so many evils; Jonas, the last chapter: *It is better for me to die than to live.* And as to that condition the dead is preferred to the living, in exaggeration of present malices and miseries.

II. Likewise it is asked concerning that which is said: *I judged him happier than them both, that is not yet born.*

**Contra:** 1. He has nothing of good: therefore he is not happier.

2. Likewise, everything that has in any way the character of happiness is to be desired; but no one can desire *non-being,* as Augustine says: therefore he who is not born is in no way happy.

III. Likewise it is asked whether anyone can will this, namely *non-being* rather than punishment, with an ordered

appetite. — That *he can:* Matthew, the twenty-sixth chapter: « It were better for him, if he had not been born »: therefore if everything better is to be desired and chosen before, this also.

That *he cannot,* it seems, since it takes away all good: therefore nothing is worse than that.

I respond: it must be said that happiness is in a thing in two ways: *truly* and *in estimation.* *Truly* it is in one alone; *in estimation* in many, according to divers opinions and considerations, and according as its conditions are found in divers things. For because it is a most delightful good, therefore Epicurus places it in pleasures, and so of the others. Since, then, the *happy man* is troubled by no malice or misery, and this condition is found in him who is not yet born: by reason of this condition he says: *I esteemed him happier* etc. I say also that by reason of that condition it is desired by many who are afflicted.

As to what is asked, whether it ought to be desired or chosen before; it must be said that punishment is twofold: *temporal* and *eternal;* neither punishment takes away the *whole,* but yet the eternal takes away *always;* whereas corruption into *non-being* takes away the *whole,* but *once.* If, then, such corruption into *non-being* is compared to *temporal* punishment, it is simply worse; but if to *eternal,* they stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded, since the one exceeds in the taking away, the other in the continuation. And since the one is infinite in duration, but the other momentary, in this it exceeds, and can more reasonably be fled and spurned.

IV. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *I remarked that all things lie open to the envy of the neighbour.* I ask whether a man ought to cease from a good work on account of his envy. — That he ought, it seems: since one's neighbour is more to be loved than any present usefulness: therefore if one's neighbour perishes by envying, that work ought to be left off.

**Contra:** A good work gives a good example and stirs up to good: therefore if the good is to be disclosed for praise, a man ought not to hide it on account of his neighbour's envy.

I respond: either that work is one of *necessity,* or of *usefulness.* If of *necessity,* it is by no means left off; if of *usefulness*, either it *can* be done equally well in his absence as in his presence, or *not;* if *so,* a man ought to remove that work from his eyes, so as to take away the occasion, when he probably conjectures that the other envies; but if it *cannot,* he ought to do it, and he does not give the occasion, but the other takes it.

---