Cap. 9, Vers. 11-12
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/15/d/9/q/bon-eccl-c9-v11-12
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#### Secondly, security arises from the appearance of a failure in the government of providence; which appearance is shown in two ways.

*I turned me to another thing* etc. As was said above, security is in the evil, first, because the retribution of justice seems to fail; secondly, because the government of providence seems to fail. It has been treated of the failure that appears to be in the retribution of justice; here, secondly, it is treated of the failure that appears to be in regard to the *government*

*of providence,* for these things do not seem to be governed in an orderly way, but by chance. And this part has two, because first the failure of order is shown in common; secondly in particular, there: *This wisdom also I have seen* etc., in regard to the disorder of prelacy.

#### First the failure of order is shown in general.

Concerning the first he proceeds thus. First he shows disorder and chance, as it seems to be with regard to *the conduct of life;* secondly, as it seems to be with regard to *the ending of death,* there: *Man knoweth not his own end.*

(Vers. 11.). With regard, then, to *the conduct of life* he shows disorder, because things are not fitted to those things for which they have fitness. On account of which he says: *I turned me to another thing,* because above he considered *retribution,* here he turns himself to considering *order. And I saw under the sun,* and he enumerates five gifts freely given, which are defrauded of their acts; *that the race is not to the swift,* though they are fit for running; Amos, the second: « Flight shall perish from the swift ». *Nor the battle to the strong,* though they are fit for fighting; the second of Kings, the first: « The valiant have fallen, and the weapons of war have perished ». *Nor bread to the wise,* though they are fit for distributing food; Isaias, the third: « I am no physician, and in my house there is no bread ». *Nor riches to the learned,* though they are fit for possessing all gifts; below, in the same: « There was found in it a poor man ». *Nor favour to the skilful,* though they are fit for doing pleasing works; Isaias, the twentieth: « All are confounded that wrought well ». *But time and chance in all,* as if all things came by chance, and temporal things varied; above, the third: « All things have their season, and pass away in their spaces ». And the aforesaid gifts are distinguished, because the first two regard *the body:* agility, for attaining what is desired, strength for resisting evil inflicted; the three following *the soul,* namely wisdom in the heart, teaching in the mouth, art in the work.

(Vers. 12.). *Man knoweth not his own end* etc. Here the second is touched upon, namely the failure of government with regard to *the ending of death,* because it is determined for no one, neither when nor how he must die. And it seems that such or such a death comes about by chance. And therefore he says: *Man knoweth not his own end,* that is, the day of death; Matthew, the twenty-fourth: « Watch ye therefore, because ye know not at what hour your Lord will come ». And he gives an example of how there is disorder and uncertainty, saying: *But as fishes are taken with the hook,* namely unknowingly, *and as birds are caught with the snare,* namely through fraud; Ecclesiasticus, the eleventh: « As the partridge is brought into the cage, and as the roe into the snare; so also is the heart of the proud ». *So men are taken in the evil time;* the first to the Thessalonians, the fifth: « When they shall say: Peace and security, sudden destruction shall come upon them ». *When it shall suddenly come upon them,* that is, all at once; Isaias, the thirtieth: « Suddenly, when it is not looked for, shall come the breaking thereof, and it shall be broken as the potter's vessel ».

*Spiritually* there is here intimated *the heavenly election of the good,* and afterwards *the hidden damnation of the evil.* So then, that he may attribute the whole working of the good to God, he says first: *That the race is not to the swift;* because it is not from themselves that they run, but from God; to the Romans, the ninth: « It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy ». *Nor the battle to the strong,* because in the Psalm: « The king is not saved by a great power ». *Nor bread to the wise,* from themselves, but from God; John, the sixth: « My Father giveth you the true bread from heaven ». *Nor riches to the learned,* namely of wisdom and of knowledge, from themselves, but from God; the first to the Corinthians, the first: « In all things you are made rich in him », namely in Christ. *Nor favour to the skilful,* from themselves, but from God; the Psalm: « God loveth mercy and truth; the Lord will give grace and glory ».

But with regard to *the hidden damnation of the evil* he says: *Man knoweth not his own end;* because « the way of the wicked is darksome » etc. *As fishes with the hook,* that is, the voluptuous, who are taken with the hook of pleasure; Habacuc, the first: « He lifted up all with his hook ». *And as birds with the snare,* that is, the ambitious with the snare of honour; the first to Timothy, the third: « Not a neophyte, lest, being puffed up with pride, he fall into the judgement of the devil ». *So men are taken,* that is, the avaricious, *in the evil time;* Job, the twenty-seventh: « The rich man, when he shall sleep, shall take away nothing with him ».

### Questions.

I. It can be doubted about what he says, that *he saw time and chance in all.* — Then according to this it seems that all things come about by chance.

**On the contrary.** It seems that not all things come about by chance:

1. Because things that come about according to purpose do not come about by chance; but many things are done from purpose: then not all things by chance.

2. Moreover it seems that in nothing is there chance, because, as Plato says, « there is nothing besides the first cause whose rise a legitimate cause has not preceded »: then according to this nothing is done by chance, but all things proceed from a determinate cause.

3. Likewise, in every operation God is the principal agent; but whatever God does principally, he does both knowingly and from purpose, and nothing such is done by chance: then nothing at all is done by chance.

**I respond:** It must be said that *chance* and *fortune* are causes *per accidens*, not because they are other causes than the causes *per se,* but because, when nature and understanding do something to which they are directly ordered, this they do per se, and there is no chance there; but when from their operation something comes about to which they are not directly ordered, on account of the concurrence of another cause; there there is chance; as is plain in the case of the creditor found in the market-place and of the stone falling upon the head. I say therefore that if the outcomes of things are compared to *the first cause,* which is God; since God foresees all things, nothing is by chance according to the ordinance of the divine foreknowledge. But if we speak by comparison to *created causes,* either regarding *the immutable,* as it is regarding the motion of the higher bodies, or regarding *the mutable,* as are the lower causes, which are under the sun; in the disposition of these *mutable* causes it scarcely happens that some effect not intended does not concur, nay rather beyond intention; and therefore chance is found in all, not that all things come about by chance, but because in regard to every mutable creature something comes about by chance.

3. What is objected concerning the divine foreknowledge is already plain. For chance is not spoken of in comparison to the divine foreknowledge.

2. What is objected secondly, that all things have a cause; it must be said that it is true that all things have a legitimate cause, namely *nature* or *understanding*; but nevertheless by this it is not excluded that they can do or may do something beyond the order, God excepted.

II. It is asked about what he says: *As fishes are taken with the hook;* whether the catching of fishes is from chance, or not. That it is, it seems:

1. Because that this fish comes rather than another, this is not through nature nor through reason: then through chance.

2. Likewise, that one man catches, another not, this is not through the reason of nature or of art: then from chance.

**On the contrary:** If someone, intending to find gold, were to dig, it would not be chance: then since he who fishes intends to catch, there is not chance there.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the catching by comparison to *those who catch,* and so it is not from chance; one can also speak by comparison to *the fishes,* which go to the hook; and because they go for the sake of food, and something else comes about, as regards them there is chance there.

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