site: migne

title: Homiliae in Ecclesiasten

languages: en la

source_edition: Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 175, coll. 113C–256C

source_text:
## QUARUM HAEC SUNT ARGUMENTA:

- *In hom. XIX in Ecclesiasten de varia sacrae Scripturae expositione, et de Salomonis intentione. Praefatio.*
- *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus libri, de vanitatum explanatione. Homilia I.*
- *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, et earum quae fuerunt oblivionem. Hom. II.*
- *Quomodo Ecclesiastes probet per sua opera omnia hominum opera esse vana, cum praedictorum epilogo. Hom. III.*
- *De triplici rerum vanitate, et hominum occupatione pessima. Hom. IV.*
- *De verborum Ecclesiastae littera litterali, et morali expositione. Homil. V.*
- *Quid sit distendi in occupatione pessima. Hom. VI.*
- *Quod perversi difficile corrigantur,* etc. *Hom. VII.*
- *Quod homo a veritate aufugit: ut Adam in paradiso fugit, et abscondit se. Hom. VIII.*
- *De diversis Ecclesiastae vanis conatibus. Hom. IX.*
- *De reliquis usque in eum locum: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat. » Hom. X.*
- *Quomodo sapientia attigit a fine usque ad finem fortiter,* etc. *Hom. XI.*
- *In illud secundum aliam translationem, « Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae, » ubi nostra habet: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat, » et in reliq. capit. secundi. Hom. XII.*
- *Quomodo omnia tempus suum habeant. Hom. XIII.*
- *Reliquorum quae tempus suum habent declaratio, et dictorum repetitio. Hom. XIV.*
- *De tempore et tempori subjectis, per aliam interpretationem. Hom. XV.*
- *De spirituali intelligentia eorum quae de tempore dicta sunt. Hom. XVI.*
- *De animorum confusione ex temporum transitu. Hom. XVII.*
- *De perversis hominum moribus, et quid ex eis censuerit Ecclesiastes. Hom. XVIII.*
- *De innocentium oppressione et derelictione, et vano ac stulto impiorum de hac vita judicio. Hom. XIX.*

## PRAEFATIO. *De varia sacrae Scripturae expositione, et de Salomonis intentione.*

[0113C]

Quae de libro Salomonis, qui Ecclesiastes dicitur, [0114C] nuper vobis coram disserui: breviter nunc perstringens (quia, quaedam ibi digna memoria videbantur) stylo signavi. Omnis Scriptura secundum propriam interpretationem exposita, et clarius elucescit, [0115A] et ad intelligendam se faciliorem legentibus pandit accessum. Multi virtutem Scripturarum non intelligentes, expositionibus peregrinis decorem ac pulchritudinem earum obnubilant; et cum occulta reserare debuerint, etiam manifesta obscurant. Mihi vero simili culpae subjacere videntur, vel qui in sacra Scriptura mysticam intelligentiam et allegoriarum profunditatem, vel inquirendam pertinaciter negant, ubi est; vel apponendam superstitiose contendunt, ubi non est. Quapropter in hoc opere non multum ego laborandum existimo tropologiis, sive mysticis allegoriarum sensibus per totam duntaxat narrationis ejus seriem perquirendis: praecipue cum ipse auctor hic non tam motibus instruendis, vel mysteriis enarrandis intendat, quam in cor humanum [0115B] ad rerum mundanarum contemptum manifesta rationum veritate atque exhortatione evidenti commoveat. Neque hoc tamen nego, multa huic narrationi mystica incerta, quae propriam explanationem requirant . praecipue in consequentibus, sicut semper in procursu narrationis secundum contemplationis incrementum magis ac magis spiritualia attingit, et a visibilibus sustollitur. Sed aliud est, quo tota scribentis intentio totaque narrationis series ducitur attendere; atque aliud quaedam ex accidenti mystice dicta, et spiritualiter intelligenda non negligenter praetereunda putare. Nunc itaque narrationis superficiem, quae tanta eloquii ac sententiarum venustate pollet explanandam suscipimus, ut ea, quae scripta nunc legitis (hac qualicunque lucubratiuncula, [0115C] iter ad intelligentiam praebente) amodo non solum vobis scripta, sed a vobis intellecta gaudeatis.

## HOMILIA PRIMA. *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus operis, de vanitatum explanatione.*

*[n: (ECCLE. I.)] Verba Ecclesiastae filii David, regis Hierusalem.* Titulus libri est iste: in quo breviter, et qualitas exprimitur sequentis operis, et pariter persona commendatur auctoris. Nam in eo, quod dictum est, verba; multiplex disputatio signatur, et ad diversas deducta sententias. Quia enim in hoc libro multorum mores, studia, et opera describuntur: [0115D] propterea necesse est loquentem multorum voces assumere, multorum opiniones in suo sermone exprimere, ut valeat multorum personas (cum ipse tamen nonnisi unus sit, qui loquitur) in sua persona praesentare. Nam circa finem libri multis locutum se, et in se multos fuisse testatur, dicens: Finem loquendi omnes pariter audiamus. *Deum time, et mandata ejus observa: hoc est omnis homo.* Hoc est etiam cur se in hoc opere Ecclesiasten nominari voluit; quia videlicet sermo ejus hic non ad unum aliquem specialiter, sed ad totam Ecclesiam, id est concionem, sive multitudinem populi dirigitur, et multorum moribus exprimendis simul, et informandis ejus in hoc libro oratio famulatur. Tribus sane [0116A] vocabulis Salomonem appellatum legimus Idida, quod interpretatur *dilectus,* et Coeleth, quod Graece *Ecclesiastes,* Latine *concionator* dicitur, et Salomon, quod sonat *pacificum.* Porro Ecclesiastes, vel concionator dici potest: qui Ecclesiam sive concionem, id est multitudinem populi instruit, sicut ipse in hoc libro fecisse manifeste monstratur. Dilectum autem a Domino Salomonem, et pace magna in regno suo perfruitum usque ad novissima tempora vitae suae, quando pactum et legem Domini praevaricatus est, manifeste regnum pandit historia. Itaque secundum tria vocabula tria composuit volumina. Primum cui titulus Parabolae, sive Proverbia Salomonis. Secundum, quod nunc in manibus habemus, quod Ecclesiastes dicitur. Tertium, quod Canticum canticorum [0116B] appellatur. In primo quasi ex paterno affectu dilectum filium alloquitur, eumque crebra admonitione ad vitia declinanda, et ad consectandas virtutes exhortatur. In secundo provectum, et maturae aetatis virum admonet, ne quidquam in mundi rebus putet esse perpetuum. Ad extremum vero jam consummatum, et calcato saeculo expeditum in Canticis canticorum sponsi jungit amplexibus. Haud longe sane ab hoc genere tractationis etiam gentilium philosophi auditores suos informare consueverant, primum ethicam, deinde physicam, postremo theologiam proponentes instruendis.

His ad aperiendam dicendorum intelligentiam praemissis, nunc ad ipsam libri seriem accedamus. Materia Salomonis in hoc opere, sunt omnia vanitati [0116C] subjecta, id est caduca et transitoria. Intentio est mundi contemptum persuadere. Modus tractandi est talis. Ostendit secundum triplicem vanitatem, omnia esse vanitati subjecta, id est caduca et transitoria, videlicet et quae propter homines facta sunt, et quae ab hominibus facta sunt, et quae in hominibus facta sunt. In his, quae propter homines facta sunt, vanitas est mutabilitatis. In his quae ab hominibus facta sunt, vanitas est curiositatis. In his, quae in hominibus facta sunt, vanitas mortalitatis et omnia vanitas. Et de his quidem latius postmodum disseremus, si prius quae dicenda sunt, tractaverimus, de ipso contemplationis genere. In quo mens speculantis sublevata, tam nova, et tam miranda de [0116D] humani status conditione, vel videre potuit, vel enarrare. Videamus enim quid ait:

*Vanitas vanitatum, dixit Ecclesiastes,* etc. Ubi autem putatis mens erat hujus hominis cum haec diceret? Homo erat, sed supra hominem erat. Quia nisi hominem excederet, omnem hominem mendacem esse non videret. Propterea de consideratione hujus consideratio prius nobis habenda est, et distinguenda sunt genera speculationum spiritualium. Tres sunt animae rationalis visiones, cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio. Cogitatio est, cum mens notione rerum transitorie tangitur cum ipsa res, sua imagine animo subito praesentatur, vel per sensum ingrediens, vel a memoria exsurgens. Meditatio est assidua et sagax retractatio cogitationis, aliquid, vel [0117A] involutum explicare nitens, vel scrutans penetrare occultum. Contemplatio est perspicax, et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas usquequaque diffusus. Inter meditationem et contemplationem hoc interesse videtur. Quod meditatio semper est de rebus ab intelligentia nostra occultis. Contemplatio vero de rebus, vel secundum suam naturam, vel secundum capacitatem nostram manifestis. Et quod meditatio semper circa unum aliquid rimandum occupatur; contemplatio ad multa, vel etiam ad universa comprehendenda diffunditur. Meditatio itaque est quaedam vis mentis curiosa; et sagax nitens obscura investigare, et perplexa evolvere. Contemplatio est vivacitas illa intelligentiae quae cuncta in palam habens, manifesta visione comprehendit. Et ita [0117B] quodammodo id quod meditatio quaerit, contemplatio possidet. Contemplationis autem duo sunt genera: unum quod et prius est, et incipientium: in creaturarum consideratione; alterum quod posterius, et perfectorum est: in contemplatione Creatoris. In Proverbiis Salomon quasi meditando incessit. In Ecclesiaste ad primum gradum contemplationis ascendit. In Canticis canticorum ad supremum se transtulit. In meditatione quasi quaedam lucta est ignorantiae cum scientia, et lumen veritatis quodammodo in media caligine erroris emicat, velut ignis in ligno viridi primo quidem difficile apprehendit, sed cum flatu vehementiori excitatus fuerit, et acrius in subjectam materiam exardescere coeperit, tunc magnos quosdam fumosae caliginis globos [0117C] exsurgere, et ipsam adhuc modicae scintillationis flammam rarius interlucentem obvolvere videmus, donec tandem paulatim crescente incendio vapore omni exhausto, et caligine disjecta, splendor serenus appareat. Tunc victrix flamma, in omnem crepitantis rogi congeriem discurrens, libere dominatur, subjectamque materiam circumvolitans, ac molli attactu perstringens lambendo exurit ac penetrat; nec prius quiescit, quam intima penetrando succedens totum quodammodo traxerit in se, quod invenit praeter se. Postquam autem incendio id quod exurendum est concrematum a sua quodammodo natura totum in ignis similitudinem proprietatemque transierit, tunc omnis fragor decidit, et strepitus [0117D] sopitur, atque illa flammarum spicula e medio sublata tolluntur, saevusque ille, et vorax ignis cunctis sibi subjectis, et amica quadam similitudine concorporatis, in alta se pace silentioque componit; quia jam non invenit nec diversum aliquid praeter se, nec adversum contra se. Primum ergo visus est ignis cum flamma, et fumo, deinde ignis cum flamma sive fumo, postremo ignis purus sine flamma, et fumo. Sic nimirum carnale cor quasi lignum viride, et necdum ab humore carnalis concupiscentiae exsiccatum, si quando aliquam divini timoris seu dilectionis scintillam conceperit, primum quidem pravis desideriis reluctantibus passionum et perturbationum fumus exoritur; deinde roborata mente cum flamma amoris, et validius ardere et clarius [0118A] splendere coeperit, mox omnis perturbationum caligo evanescit: et jam pura mente animus ad contemplationem veritatis se diffundit. Novissime autem postquam assidua veritatis contemplatione cor penetratum fuerit, et ad ipsum summae veritatis fontem medullitus toto animae affectu intraverit, tunc in idipsum dulcedinis quasi totum ignitum, et in ignem amoris conversum, ab omni strepitu et perturbatione pacatissimum requiescit. Primum ergo, quia inter pericula tentationum consilium quaeritur, quasi in meditatione fumus cum flamma est. Secundo quia mente pura cor ad contemplationem veritatis diffunditur, quasi in principio contemplationis flamma sine fumo est. Tertio, quia jam inventa veritate et perfecta charitate, nihil ultra id [0118B] quod unicum est, quaeritur; in solo amoris igne, summa tranquillitate et felicitate suaviter repulsatur. Tunc corde toto in ignem amoris converso, vere Deus omnia in omnibus esse sentitur, cum tam intima dilectione suscipitur, ut praeter illum etiam de semetipso cordi nihil relinquatur. Ut igitur tria haec propriis vocabulis distinguamus. Prima est meditatio; secunda, speculatio; tertia, contemplatio. In meditatione, mentem pia devotione succensam perturbatio passionum carnalium importune exsurgens obnubilat. In speculatione, novitas insolitae visionis in admirationem sublevat. In contemplatione, mirae dulcedinis gustus totam in gaudium, et jucunditatem commutat. Igitur in meditatione est sollicitudo; in speculatione, admiratio; in contemplatione, dulcedo. [0118C] Solet tamen etiam speculatio ipsa spiritalis, magna animum jucunditate reficere, dum post luctam tentationum, et caliginem erroris, subito insperata pace componit, et insolita claritate perfundit. In hanc igitur iste supra omnia caduca et transitoria, mente raptus, vidit universorum nihil esse quod maneat, et quasi stupore novae hujus atque insolitae visionis territus exclamavit: Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas. Universitatem enim intuebatur, et totam vanitati subjectam, ejusque vanitatem, omnium vanitatum vanitatem, id est omnem vanitatem in se continentem, quasi genus omnium generum (eo quod omnia in se rerum genera contineat) appellavit. Omnia enim vanitas, et ex omnibus [0118D] universitas, et universa vanitas. Nunc autem, quia de ipso contemplationis genere quo ista mens humana de homine, sive de humanis perspicere potuit, quantum ad praesens videbatur, jam diximus. Ad propositum revertemur, et consequenter genera vanitatum omnium quas ipsa contemplatione illuminatus, rebus caducis inesse deprehendit, distinguemus; quia in eo quod ipsam operis totius materiam primum dilucide explicare nitimur; textum quoque ejus legentibus manifestius aperimus. De vanitate enim rerum temporalium tota ejus narratio contexta est.

## HOMILIA PRIMA. *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus operis, de vanitatum explanatione.* (cont.)

Tria igitur sunt genera vanitatum, quas liber iste specialiter prosequitur, in quibus omnem vanitatem complectitur: et omnia, quae sub sole fiunt, his [0119A] subjacere testatur. Prima est vanitas mutabilitatis, quae omnibus rebus caducis inest per conditionem. Secunda est vanitas curiositatis sive cupiditatis, quae mentibus hominum inest per rerum transeuntium et vanarum inordinatam dilectionem. Tertia est vanitas mortalitatis quae corporibus humanis inest per poenalitatem. Prima ergo vanitas naturalis est, et apta sive congrua. Secunda vanitas culpabilis, quia perversa. Tertia vanitas, poenalis, et misera. Propterea vero naturalem vanitatem, id est mutabilitatem aptam dicimus, quod ex ordinata vicissitudine rerum transeuntium, major universitatis pulchritudo constat, majorique commodo ejus instabilitas dispensatur; quia in eo et fastidium rerum varietate mentibus humanis tollitur, et decor, ut dictum est, [0119B] universitatis augetur. Corporea enim natura, cujus pulchritudo secundum species, et formas diversas perficitur, ex ipsa sua mutabilitate ampliori decore adornatur, dum per intervalla temporum, et alterationem tempore transeuntium ac tempore succedentium capit, quod simul capere non potuit; quia species ejus per successionem adveniunt, quae illi pariter inesse non potuerunt. Porro illa vanitas, quae mentibus pravis dominatur, caeteris tanto deformior existit, quantum a spirituali substantia mutabilitas non solum per gratiam sed etiam per naturam aliena fuit. Propterea sola haec in caeteris omnibus arguitur, et prae caeteris omnibus sola haec iniqua atque perversa demonstratur. Poenalis autem vanitas, quae est in corporibus humanis per mortalitatem, idcirco [0119C] misera dicitur, quoniam homo nunc ex poena peccati hoc habet, ut conditioni rerum temporaliter transeuntium subjaceat, qui prius in creatione sui supra omnium visibilium conditionem stare acceperat. Conditio quippe rerum transeuntium est, ut omnia orta occidant, et aucta senescant. Natura autem hominis de corruptibilis quidem materia sumpta, sed per gratiam supra corruptionem elevata, et contra corruptionem confirmata: hoc in dono acceperat, ut ortum quidem cum caeteris haberet, occasum autem non haberet; et in nascituris, sed non morituris per incrementa aetatis susciperet augmentum, non pateretur defectum. Hanc dignitatem homo per peccatum praevaricationis perdidit, quando immortalitatis stola exutus, et ad suae originis conditionem [0119D] relapsus, ex sententia Creatoris audivit: *Terra es, et in terram ibis [n: (Gen. III)]*. Huic ergo vanitati (quae caeteris nata est subjacere) soli homini deputatur ad poenam; quia solus homo supra illam stare acceperat per gratiam. Cum igitur tres vanitates distinxerimus, prima quidem, id est vanitas mutabilitatis, causa est peccati; secunda, id est vanitas cupiditatis, peccatum; tertia vero, id est vanitas mortalitatis, poena peccati. Vanitas ergo cupiditatis in vanitate mutabilitatis arguitur. In vanitate mortalitatis punitur. Quia sicut dicit Psalmista: *Homo cum in honore esset non intellexit; sed comparatus est jumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis [n: (Psal. XLVIII)]*. Nisi enim prius ipse per inordinatam [0120A] concupiscentiam carnis ad ea quae sunt jumentorum se inclinasset, nequaquam per mortalitatem carnis jumentis similis factus fuisset. Nunc autem, quia per desiderium mentis mutabilibus inniti coepit, ipse quoque in eo quod fuerat, stabilis esse non potuit. Possumus adhuc alia divisione has vanitates distinguere, ut idipsum quo multiplicius exponitur tanto evidentius agnoscatur. Vanitas alia est in rebus conditis. Alia in operibus humanis, alia in corporibus, alia in mentibus. Prima est mutabilitatis; secunda curiositatis; tertia mortalitatis; quarta iniquitatis. Vanitas mutabilitatis duobus modis in rebus consideratur: sive quia inanes sunt; sive quia transitoriae sunt. In illo vanae sunt, quia ostendunt, quod non habent; in isto vanae sunt, quia non permanent [0120B] in eo quod habent. Ibi vanae sunt, quia solam formam habent, essentiam non habent. Hic vanae sunt, quia etsi aliquam habent essentiam, tamen substantiam nullam habent. Illic vanae sunt, quia sine veritate speciem opponunt. Hic vanae sunt, quia statum praetendunt et transeunt. Sic sunt omnia caduca et transitoria, falsa et fallentia: qui vana diligunt, et in vanitate confidunt, et pro eo non solum vani, sed vanitas ipsa ex vanitate facti deficiunt.

Vanitas cupiditatis in tribus constat, in concupiscentia scilicet oculorum, in concupiscentia carnis et in superbia vitae. In omnibus enim istis vanitas est. Quia omnia, quae ad carnem pertinent, sive bona, sive mala videantur; nec vera mala, nec vera bona sunt; nec possunt semper esse, sive bona, sive mala [0120C] sint, id quod sunt. Propterea tam vanum est in iis quae bona videntur spem ponere, quam ea quae mala putantur formidare. Quid enim facit concupiscentia oculorum? Videte quid facit, et invenietis quanta lateat vanitas palliata sub hoc velo. Fallaces rerum fucos, et lubricos captat aspectus. Oblita sui foras funditur, ac totam se curiositati dedens circuit omnia, lustrat universa, si qua forte nova, si qua insolita, si qua mira occurrant, quid sibi illa vel illa velint, quam habeant speciem singula, vel quam praetendant significationem. Ad omnes rerum motus semper altera, semper praeceps, temeraria, procax, instabilis, petulans, impatiens et lubrica; saepe vana spe exsultans, saepe inani timore trepidans, nullam [0120D] interius radicem habens, sed semper suspecta ad exteriores rerum pendens motus. Ante periculum nutat, ante discrimen trepidat; omne quod evenire potest in utramque partem, sive bonum sive malum, sit metuens, et cupiens utrumque vane sola suspicione declinat. Uritur more impatientis, exspectans videre quod futurum est; ad instantia dissolvitur, ad consistentia hebetatur, et ad omnem rerum vicissitudinem, sive tristia sive laeta fuerint, inconstanti mentis fluctuatione variatur. Hoc autem quam vanum sit, considerate. Certe omnis creatura talis est homini, qualis ipse est illi, ut ab iis, quae foris sunt, nec bona mens laedi possit, nec mala juvari. Igitur haec omnia nec ad malum bono, nec ad bonum malo esse possunt, [0121A] nisi quantum ipse animus vel ista aspernando proficit, vel deficit perverse amando, aut metuendo vane. Quanta ergo vanitas est, haec quasi alicujus sint momenti, sive ad dandam, sive ad tollendam salutem tanta sollicitudine ac curiositate prospicere, et ea in quibus vera salus constat interiora bona aut non attendere aut dissimulare? Quid de concupiscentia carnis dicam? Quam sit vana, cum ipsa carnis delectatio quantacunque fuerit, nec praeterita juvare possit, nec praesens permanere? Quid prodest carnem morituram deliciarum luxu, et voluptatum affluentia contra corruptionem tanto adnisu defendere, cum nemo sit qui possit eam a corruptione custodire? Nam superbia vitae, sive de divitiis, sive dignitatibus gloriari velit, quid vanius esse potest? [0121B] Quis enim non vane glorietur amplius se caeteris oneratum esse? Hoc profecto divitiae, hoc dignitates suis possessoribus solum conferunt, ut quod in eis plus aliis accipere videntur, inde plus aliis onerati inveniantur; quos certe pro eisdem acquirendis vel conservandis plus semper vel labore atterunt vel cura affligunt. Sed in his omnibus vanitas magna est, et cura superflua. Vanitas mortalitatis, quae in duobus constat, in poena videlicet quae atterit, et in poena quae dissolvit. Poena quae atterit, primum nos facit per defectum vitae senescere. Poena quae dissolvit, postmodum compellit in putredinem ire, et in pulverem de quo sumpti fuimus per carnem, reverti per carnis corruptionem. Hinc ergo perpendat homo; in qua vanitate vivat omnis homo, qui nolens, [0121C] carnis corruptionem patitur, quia volens mentis corruptionem operatur. Totus ergo vanitati subjectus est qui et carne per mortalitatem defluit, et mente per iniquitatem. Sed alterum suum est ex ipso, alterum suum contra ipsum, et totum in ipso. Haec tria genera vanitatum mox in principio libri sui auctor distinguit, quae postea per omnem operis sui seriem singillatim prosequendo copiosa disputat one extendit, ubique in tribus quartum illud genus vanitatis, quod mentibus pravis inesse diximus, arguens, et solum hoc culpae obnoxium, et poenae debitum ostendens. Vanitatem, quae rebus conditis per mutabilitatem inest, primum proponit. Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas. Deinde secundo loco [0121D] vanitatem, quae est in operibus humanis, adjungit. Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole? Tertio loco illam vanitatem, quae corporibus humanis per mortalitatem inest, subdit dicens: *Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit.* Et secundum has tres distinctiones, totam quoque sequentis operis seriem in tres partes dividit, singulis singulas tribuens portiones. In prima parte cujus initium est: *Oritur sol, et occidit,* disputat de vanitate mutabilitatis. In secunda parte, quae sic incipit: *Ego Ecclesiastes fui rex Israel in Hierusalem.* Persequitur latissime vanitatem humanae cupiditatis. In tertia parte (quae quasi clausula loco novissimo in disputatione collocatur, cujus initium est: *Memento Creatoris tui in diebus juventutis tuae* ) vanitatem [0122A] mortalitatis commemorat, ut quasi hoc animus humanus in fine audiat, quod magis necesse est intenta consideratione percipere, et saepius ad memoriam revocare. Haec nos pro captu intelligentiae nostrae in Ecclesiasten, qui secundus est librorum Salomonis aperiendum ingredientibus ejus lectionem praeparavimus. Caeterum totam ejus latitudinem digne explanare supra vires nostras fatemur esse: magis in rebus hujusmodi alta profunditate tectis, doctorem audire quaerentes, quam doctoris vicem arripere. Magis enim bonum est, ut ait Plato, aliena verecunde discere, quam sua ingerere impudenter. Quod si qua super hoc convenienter valuerimus dicere, praeter spem sit, et existimationem. Si qua utiliter, non praeter intentionem. Primum quasi [0122B] prooemium quoddam praemittit libro suo: in quo eam quam commemoravimus sequentis operis triplicem materiam distinguit, de qua postmodum latius ingreditur disputationem. Prooemium igitur est: *Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas,* usque: *Oritur sol, et occidit.* Abinde prima pars libri inchoatur, et caetera sicut diximus. Nunc ipsa litterae verba consideremus, si quid in eis ex iis, quae supra dicta sunt, comprehendere valeamus.

## HOMILIA PRIMA. *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus operis, de vanitatum explanatione.* (cont.)

*Vanitas vanitatum (dixit Ecclesiastes), vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas.* Cum pondere pronuntiandum est quod de se quasi de alio loquitur, dixit Ecclesiastes. Nam quia pro auctoritate suam personam apposuit; convenienter se non quasi se, sed quasi alium dixit, ut quia magnum aliquem se prout res [0122C] postulabat dicere habuit, decentius ac maturius hoc diceret de se in alio, quam in se. Sic Balaam de se loquens, ait: *Dixit auditor sermonum Dei, qui visiones Omnipotentis intuitus est, qui cadit et apertos habet oculos [n: (Num. XXIV)]*. Et Joannes in Evangelio suo. Ipse de se quasi de alio loquitur, dicens: *Hic est discipulus ille quem diligebat Jesus, qui testimonium perhibet de his, et scimus quia verum est testimonium ejus [n: (Joan. XXI)]*. Et Paulus, de se quasi de alio Corinthiis loquitur, dicens: *Scio hominem in Christo sive in corpore, sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit, raptum ejusmodi usque ad tertium coelum et raptum ejusmodi in paradisum, et audisse arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui [n: (II Cor. XII)]*. Sed hoc genus [0122D] locutionis quoties in Scriptura assumitur, vel humilitatis causa fit, vel admirationis, ut scilicet cum magna dicere volumus, haec potius quasi aliis ascribamus, ne vel superbum vel nimium videatur, si nobis ea tribuamus. Nam, et magna propter humilitatem a nobis removere debemus, et mirabilia propter admirationem quasi de longe ostendere. Minus enim mira sunt quae magis ad cognitionem accedunt. Ut ergo omnium animi ad futuram dictionem erigantur, et quasi miraculo quodam novitatis evigilent, dicitur recte: Dixit Ecclesiastes. Ac si diceretur: Quod tantus ac talis dixit, vanum esse non potuit, etiamsi de vanitate dixit. Communis doctor, et omnium eruditor Ecclesiastes ipse dixit. Quid dixit? Audite quid dixit et intendite. Non enim parva sunt, [0123A] quae dicuntur: Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas. Si omnia vanitas, ergo et ipse vanitas, qui hoc dixit. Et quomodo constabit non esse vanum, quod vanitas dixit de vanitate? Quod si verum est, quia vanum est quod dixit, audiendum non est, sed respuendum. Quid ergo dicemus? Aut non omnia vanitas, ut dixit, et falsum dixit, aut omnia vanitas, ut dixit, et ipse vanitas, vanum dixit. Sed profecto ut ipse dixit: Omnia vanitas, et ipse, qui dixit, vanitas; et non solum vanitas, sed etiam universa vanitas: et tamen, quod dixit, non est vanitas, sed veritas; quia in eo, quod dixit, ipse non erat vanitas, quia contra vanitatem dixit, quod de vanitate dixit; et constat, quod contrarius vanitati esse non potuit in eo quod vanitas [0123B] fuit. Aliquid ergo in ipso fuit, quod vanitas non fuit, et id contra vanitatem non vane loqui potuit. Sed quid erat hoc, aut ubi erat? Certe si corpus hoc fuisse dixerimus, aut in corpore aliquid, quod sine vanitate locutum sit de vanitate: ergo corpus quod corrumpitur vanitati subjectum, et ad vanitatem natum aliquando sine vanitate esse potuit, quod totum in vanitate vivit? Meminimus dictum Psalmistae: *Universa vanitas omnis homo vivens [n: (Psal. XXXVIII)]*. Quod enim moritur, ipsum est quod vivit: quod ut vivat nascitur, et vivit ut moriatur. Quid autem est quod moritur, nisi id quod vita privatur? Ipsum ergo moritur in homine quod a vita exstinguitur. Et quid hoc est, nisi corpus et sensus corporeus? Ipsum enim post animal non est, [0123C] ex quo ipsum est animal, et cum sensibile esse desinit, desinit esse sensus. Ergo quod moritur in homine, ipsum est quod vivit in homine; quod ideo vanitati subjectum est, quia obnoxium est mortalitati. Ergo sensus corporeus non potuit vanitatem arguere, in quo nihil reperiri potest liberum ac purum a vanitate. Quid ergo dicendum est illud fuisse? Nunquid anima? Nonne, et illam superius vanitati subjectam esse ostendimus. In ea namque vanitatem posuimus iniquitatis: quae caeteris rebus omnibus eo deformior existit; quod ex ea tantum caeterae habent, vel quod noxiae sunt, vel quod omnino sunt. Sine hac namque vanitate, nec vanitas mortalitatis esset, nec vanitas mutabilitatis noxia [0123D] esset. Quomodo ergo anima, quae tantae vanitati subjecta est, vanitatem veraciter arguere potest? An aliquid in ea superstes invenitur liberum a vanitate, et sine causa dictum est: Universa vanitas omnis homo vivens? Universa quippe vanitas homo est, quia corpore et mente vanitati subjectus est. Quis homo? *Omnis homo vivens.* Non omnis homo vita, sed omnis homo vivens. Nam, et vita est homo, et vivens est homo. Ubi vita, et ubi vivens. Vita in eo, quod vivificat; vivens in eo, quod vivificatur. Vivit autem, et caro ex anima, et anima ex carne: et utrumque vivit, sed caro ex anima totum habet quod vivit? anima in carne non totum habet quod vivit. Nam vivit etiam in Deo, et utinam vivat? Quod vivit in carne, vanum est. Quod vivit in Deo [0124A] non vanum est, sed verum est, quia ex veritate est. In ea igitur parte, qua ex veritate vivit, veraciter vanitatem arguit, et invenitur quomodo vanitas arguit vanitatem, non per vanitatem sed per veritatem. Recte ergo Ecclesiastes, qui mente elevatus erat supra omnem vanitatem et ad ipsam pervenerat veritatem, in eadem veritate sublimiter vidit quod de arguenda vanitate veraciter dixit: Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas. Inculcatio verborum cum affectu loquentis, et rei magnitudinem, et admirationis significat novitatem. Et est cum exaggeratione prolata sententia. Nam sunt gradus quidam; et quasi quaedam progressiones, et in melius, et in deterius eunti. Sic enim Canticum canticorum dicitur, et saeculum saeculorum [0124B] quemadmodum nunc hic dictum est: Vanitas vanitatum, ut quadam parili distantia et differentia consimili tantum super excellere intelligatur Canticum canticorum a cantico quantum canticum a verbo, et deinceps verbum a silentio. Et tantum saeculum saeculorum a saeculo, quantum saeculum solum a momento, vel item momentum a nihilo. Similique progressione hic per contrarium facta: Tanto vanitas vanitatum deterior esse a simplici vanitate, quanto simplex vanitas ab essentia solida et permanente. Sic per inculcationem legi potest sententia. Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas, ut in omnibus omnimoda vanitas exprimatur, et ex omnibus summa quaedam confici intelligatur, quae omnem contineat vanitatem, ut quasi singula [0124C] quaeque, per se vanitas sint et universitas ex omnibus collecta, vanitas vanitatum. Sic in creatione rerum, cum opera sua compleret Deus unumquodque opus per se *bonum [n: (Gen. I)]* dicitur, et novissime universitas perfectis omnibus *valde bona* nominatur. Nam si id quod in parte bonum est in toto melius invenitur, id quoque quod in parte malum est in toto deterius esse necesse est. Ergo vanitas est vanitatum, et vanitas omnium vanitatum universa vanitas, et vanitatis universitas omnia vanitas. Vel vanitas illa mentium humanarum hic per comparationem aliarum vanitatum arguitur: quae velut ex aliis vanitatibus orta, et cunctas vanitates, vanitatis comparatione supergressa, merito vanitas [0124D] vanitatum appellatur. Potest etiam non incongrue trina haec vanitatis repetitio ad tria vanitatum genera supra memorata referri, ut quasi una vanitatum sit opus hominis, alia natura mortalis, tertia mundus hic totus cum sua universitate mutabilis. Consideravit enim iste opera mortalium, et vidit singula quaeque, quod cum labore et dolore ad effectum veniunt. Facta brevi tempore subsistunt; transeuntia autem fructum post se non relinquunt. Vidit quanta affectione ac miseria quotidie sine cessatione vita humana atteritur, etiam in iis quae pro sui consolatione operatur, et quemadmodum semper fere plus detrimenti patitur in quaerendo remedio, quam recipiat consolationis in percipiendo fomento. Et in his omnibus, quam vane conturbetur omnis homo vivens, admirans, et stupens [0125A] ait: Vanitas vanitatum. Deinde conditionem ipsam mortalium attendens, et in ea majorem ac miserabiliorem vanitatem inveniens, vidit quod si magna vanitas existimatur dum praeterit id quod homo facit: illa prorsus dolenda et miseranda sit vanitas, dum stare non potest id quod homo est. In hanc ergo, rursus ingeminans exclamavit et dixit: Vanitas vanitatum. Postremo omnium mutabilium rerum, et ad occasum properantium inconstantinam et fluctuationem intuens, quasi in summa concludens adjunxit, et ait: Omnia vanitas.

## HOMILIA PRIMA. *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus operis, de vanitatum explanatione.* (cont.)

*Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole?* Quid habet amplius, subauditur, quam id quod de omnibus dictum est: Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas? ac [0125B] si diceret: Si omnia vanitati subjecta sunt, opera hominum a vanitate aliena esse quomodo possunt? Si secundum aliquid vanum est quod Deus creavit, quomodo non multo magis vanum est, quod homo facit? Si temporale est quod fecit Aeternus, quod temporalis facit, quid est? Ergo quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo, quo laborat sub sole? Laborat sub sole, scilicet vel agens, vel patiens. Duo haec distinguite, agens et patiens laborat sub sole; uterque laborat, et agens laborat, et patiens laborat. Sed hoc interest, quod alter quasi invitus laborat, alter voluntarius. Agens enim laborat, et facit ipse unde laborat. Patiens autem laborat, et non facit ipse, sed sustinet, unde laborat. Haec duo genera hominum in hoc mundo vivunt, scilicet laborantium [0125C] et agentium, laborantium et patientium. Qui sunt laborantes, et agentes? Audi Psalmistam: *Verumtamen universa vanitas omnis homo vivens. Verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo; sed et frustra conturbatur. Thesaurizat, et ignorat cui congregabit ea [n: (Psal. XXXVIII)]*. Qui sunt laborantes, et patientes? Paulum apostolum audi: *Vanitati,* inquit, *subjecta est creatura non volens; sed propter eum qui subjecit eam in spe [n: (Rom. VIII)]*. Ergo utrique laborant, et ii videlicet quibus haec vita dulcis est, et ii quibus amara est haec vita. Illi laborant ejus delectationibus perfrui; isti laborant ab ejus miseria liberari. Illi laborant metuentes, ne cito hinc exeant; isti laborant timentes ne diu hic permaneant. Labor illorum pro vana sollicitudine arguitur. Labor [0125D] istorum pro patientia coronatur. Illis dicitur: *Sufficit diei malitia sua [n: (Matth. VI)]*. Et illud: *Nolite solliciti esse, dicentes: Quid manducabimus, aut quid bibemus, aut quo operiemur? [n: (Ibid.)]* Istis dicitur: *Patientes estote confirmantes corda vestra [n: (Jac. V)]*. Et illud: *Si compatimur, conregnabimus. Si commorimur, credimus quia et simul vivemus cum illo [n: (II Tim. II)]*. Illis dicitur: *Filii hominum usquequo gravi corde, ut quid diligitis vanitatem, et quaeritis, mendacium? [n: (Psal. IV.)]* Istis dicitur: *Beati omnes qui timent Dominum, qui ambulant in viis ejus. Labores manuum tuarum, quia manducabis, beatus es, et bene tibi erit [n: (Psal. CXXVII)]*. Ergo labor illorum poenam habet in opere, et poenam in retributione. [0126A] Labor autem istorum poenam, quidem habet in opere, sed praemium in retributione. In illorum labore vera miseria est. In fructu laboris, falsa et vana consolatio. In labore istorum, temporalis et transitoria afflictio. In fructu laboris, aeterna beatitudo. Propterea labor illorum fructu inanis est, miseria verus. Labor istorum poena transitorius, fructu aeternus. Illic vero malo, quod boni inesse videtur, vanum est; horum malum quod apparet quasi vanum est, quia transitorium est; bonum vero quod non apparet, perpetuum. Non ergo mirum videatur quod malos in hac vita laborantes, et agentes; bonos vero laborantes tantum, et patientes dicimus, quia si propius veritatem intuemur, semper malos agendo laborare, et bonos semper patiendo inveniemus. [0126B] Nam, sicut malos tunc etiam cum quieti videntur incontinentia exagitat, ita bonos in laboribus quoque constitutos tranquillos patientia servat. Unde miro quodam modo boni quique, et justi cum semetipsos propter Deum spontanea afflictione macerant, tunc etiam patiendo laborant; quia se contra se statuentes, quod foris per districtionem saevientes irrogant, intus quieti ac sine perturbatione permanentes in patientia portant. Sed perversi quique et vitae carnalis amatores, etiam tunc cum mala foris per alienam violentiam illata sustinent; quia semetipsos intus furoris, et impatientiae stimulis perturbant, ipsi potius faciunt unde laborant. Ergo boni in hac vita laborant, mali vero etiam pro hac vita laborant; quia temporales labores quibus pravi [0126C] et perversi quique se subdunt pro adipiscenda temporali dulcedine, boni patienter tolerant pro aeterna consolatione. Quia vero vita haec mortalis in qua et pro quo laboratur, per spatia vivendi quotidie ad vitae finem tendit, recte omnis labor hominis in numero vanitatum computatur, cum dicitur: Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole? [n: (Subauditur praeter vanitatem.)]

## HOMILIA PRIMA. *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus operis, de vanitatum explanatione.* (cont.)

Notandum tamen est, quod non ait: Quid amplius est labor hominis? Sed: Quid habet, inquit, amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole? Unde constat quod hic non tam de labore hominis, quam de fructu et emolumento agitur humani laboris; quia non quid sit aut qualis labor [0126D] hominis quaeritur, sed quem homo fructum de labore suo omni, quo laborat sub sole consequatur. Et hic fructus omnis non aliud quam vanitas esse perhibetur, cum dicitur: Quid habet amplius? Ac si diceretur: Nihil amplius habet quam vanitatem homo de labore suo. Ergo vanitas totus est fructus laboris hominis, et in vanum laborat omnis homo, nihil accepturus praeter vanitatem de universo labore suo. Ergo vanus fuit, et labor sanctorum qui Deo fideliter servierunt, et pro ejus amore tot supplicia ac tormentorum genera passi sunt? Quis hoc dicere praesumat? Nam quomodo vanus fuit illorum labor, qui in modico quidem vexati, per dolores transitorios ad gaudia mansura pervenerunt, et per mortem temporalem, vitam adepti sunt sempiternam? [0127A] Aut nunquid vanus dicendus est labor ille propterea, quia transiit quod passi sunt: et secundum aliquid tamen non vanus, quia permanet quod acceperunt. Vanum etenim esse, et ipsum justorum laborem, quantum scilicet ad poenam transitoriam, et hanc quasi imaginariam speciem miseriae spectat, Psalmista innuere videtur, cum dicit: *Qui fingis laborem in praecepto [n: (Psal. XCIII)]*. Quasi enim electis suis Deus laborem fingit, cum eis exterius velut iratus per judicium temporalem poenam irrogat, quibus intus per providentiam misericordiae suae, aeternae beatitudinis praemia servat. Quia igitur Psalmista laborem justorum et hunc imaginarium dolorem, quia speciem miseriae habet, veram miseriam non habet; fictum nominat; ipsum profecto eumdem, [0127B] secundum aliquid etiam vanum non inconvenienter dici posse demonstrat. Ecce ergo pertransit labor operis. Pertransit quod vanum fuit; quod transitorium fuit, pertransiit: pertransiit labor, pertransiit dolor. Nunquid pertransiit fructus operis aut merces laboris? Propterea licet: ecce secundum aliquem dicendi modum labor ipse et dolor temporalis vanus non inconvenienter dicitur. Nunquid tamen merces laboris ipsius vanitas unquam recte dicetur? Absit! Quomodo ergo stabit quod dictum est? Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo? De praemio enim laboris et non de ipso labore; de utilitate, non de opere, hoc dictum est: Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo? Ecce amplius habet homo et multo amplius habet, [0127C] et tu dicis: Quid amplius habet? Propterea adjunxit et ait: Quo laborat sub sole. Ecce habemus solutam quaestionis hujus difficultatem. Nam hic aperte ostendit quos labores arguat vanitatis. Qui fiunt, inquit, sub sole. Quid est, fiunt sub sole? Fortassis simpliciter accipiendum est quod ait, sub sole; quia homines in hac mundi parte inferiori degentes, desuper solis lumen accipiunt, et ad agenda opera usibus humanis necessaria illuminantur ut videant. Propterea namque vitae humanae tempora per divinam providentiam alternis vicibus sic distributa sunt, ut aegra corpora actionum suarum nimia protensione fessa, ipsa alternantium temporum vicissitudo repararet. Ideo nox et dies incessanter mutua [0127D] sibi parilitate succedunt, ut per diem ab ortu ad occasum sol cursu suo desuper pertransiens, lumen suum usquequaque in subjecta diffundat, et humanos oculos sua praesentia illustrans, caeterorumque animantium terrae ad exercitationem agendi excitet, et simul operandi praebeat facultatem. Nocte vero se humanis aspectibus subducens, et quasi quibusdam pannis infantiae, velamine tenebrarum oppanso, lumina mortalium contegens, fessos artus ad quietem foveat et soporem, ut iterum reparatos labori atque exercitationi diurnae, alacriores restituat. Hanc admirabilem divinae dispensationis ordinem Psalmista intuens cum ejus opera commendaret, hoc inter caetera quasi excellens aliquod et non parva laude dignum commemorat, dicens: *Fecit [0128A] lunam in tempora; sol cognovit occasum suum. Posuit tenebras, et facta est nox: in ipsa pertransibunt omnes bestiae silvae. Catuli leonum rugientes ut rapiant, et quaerant a Deo escam sibi. Ortus est sol et congregati sunt, et in cubilibus suis collocabuntur. Exibit homo od opus suum, et ad operationem suam usque ad vesperam [n: (Psal. CIII)]*. Hinc etiam est illud quod Deus Noe egredienti de arca post diluvium quasi pro magno aliquo signo pietatis suae, ac munere largitionis repromittit, dicens: *Cunctis diebus sementis, et messis, frigus et aestus, aestas et hiems, nox et dies non requiescent [n: (Gen. VIII)]*. Pulchre igitur homines in hac mundi arca deorsum per varios discursus occupationum vitae mortalis distentos sub sole laborantes dixit, ut hoc etiam ad vanitatem [0128B] operis humani pertineat, quod hominem ad operandum pertransiens et tenebris finiendum desuper lumen illustrat. Consideravit quippe quam abjecta et misera sit mortalium conditio, qui in terrae superficie quasi vermes, quidam vana curiositate reptantes, subito lumine desuper infuso quasi ad illusionem excitantur captare, quod vane appetunt, et eodem post modicum subtracto subita rursum caecitate obvolvuntur, et nequaquam ultra in effectum prodire possunt. Ideo et ipsum lumen quo illuminantur, eminus ac procul desuper et homini in accessum ostenditur, ut ipsum nequaquam in hominis consistere potestate probetur; quatenus ex eo tantum homo accipiat, quantum permiserit largientis et cuncta ordinantis Dei gratias, non quantum appetit [0128C] cupiditati serviens hominis voluntas perversa. Magna ergo vanitas laborare sub sole, et parva fiducia laborare sub sole: cujus lumen quamvis jucundum aspectu et visu sit delectabile, non semper tamen humanis aspectibus adesse potest nec prodesse. Quod si altius adhuc considerationem promovere et subtilius rem inspicere libeat, possumus nomine solis tempus significatum accipere, ut quod dixit, sub sole, idem sit ac si dixisset, sub tempore. Nam quia per solem praecipue et temporum cursus distinguitur, et temporalium natura variatur: congrue per solem tempus ipsum exprimitur, cum dicitur sub sole idem est enim ac si dixisset, sub tempore. Sed nunquid etiam in hoc nobis aliquid in nuere voluit, quod non ait in tempore vel cum tempore, [0128D] sed sub tempore: et discretio nobis habenda est, ut intelligamus alia esse, quae quasi cum tempore facta sunt; alia vero illa quae vel in tempore facta, vel sub tempore fiunt? Discernamus ergo, si possumus, si forte causam invenire valeamus, quare potius sub tempore quam vel cum tempore, vel in tempore, facta dixit vana esse opera hominum. Omnia quae facta sunt, vel cum tempore facta sunt, vel in tempore. Cum tempore enim facta sunt, quorum ortum tempus non praecessit: qualis est angelica natura, et illa informis materia rerum visibilium, quam in principio creavit Deus. In tempore facta sunt, quorum ortum tempus praecessit, sicut illa sex dierum opera in quibus Deus perfecit atque complevit [0129A] hujus sensibilis mundi fabricam; sed et illa quae postmodum formaliter, sive essentialiter facta sunt, omnia in tempore facta sunt. Rursus eorum quae fiunt in tempore, alia fiunt in tempore et sub tempore, alia fiunt in tempore tantum, non sub tempore. In tempore fiunt et non sub tempore, quae tempore quidem incipiunt, sed tempore non finiuntur. In tempore et sub tempore fiunt, quae simul et in tempore incipiunt, et in tempore finiuntur. Item eorum quae sub tempore fiunt, alia fiunt pro tempore, alia fiunt pro aeternitate. Quae ergo pro tempore fiunt, et actu, et fructu vana sunt. Quae vero pro aeternitate fiunt, actu quidem vana sunt; sed fructu vana non sunt, quia, etsi transeunt in opere, permanent tamen in retributione. Bonum enim opus [0129B] non hoc solum est quod foris transitorium apparet; quia et actione visibili constat, et invisibili devotione. Nam, sicut homo ex vivente constat et vita et vivens quidem moritur, sed vita non moritur; ita nimirum bonum et actionem in se visibilem habet, et invisibilem devotionem. Visibilis actio quasi corpus est; interior devotio, quasi spiritus est. Actio per devotionem vivit, sicut corpus per animam. Devotio autem actionem vivificat, sicut anima corpus. Omnis enim actio quae sine devotione est, mortua est. Visibilis igitur actio, ipsa quasi vivit, et invisibilis devotio, ipsa vita est. Quod autem vivit hoc moritur; sed quod vita est ipsum non moritur. Quia actio transitoria sicut ex tempore initium habet, ita enim finitur in tempore. Quod ergo moritur [0129C] quod finitur, quod transit, quod mutabilitati deditum est, ipsum obnoxium est vanitati. Quod autem vita est, quod permanet, quod finem aut corruptionem non recipit, ipsum vanitatem non admittit. Dicatur ergo: Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole? [n: (subauditur praeter vanitatem.)] Nihil amplius, quia vana sunt omnia quae sub sole fiunt. Et quid de vanis haberet nisi vanitatem. Quod ergo? Bona opera quae sub sole fiunt, nihil amplius conferre poterunt suis operariis nisi vanitatem? Et quomodo superius quaestionem hanc solutam diximus per id quod ait, sub sole? Ecce nobis iterum eadem oboritur non minus quam supra difficilis, quia et bona opera sub sole, id est sub tempore fieri secundum id quod [0129D] supra expositum est, negare non possumus; et tamen ex eis nihil praeter vanitatem consequi, dicere non audemus. Et ecce manifeste liber dicit: Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole? Sed si diligentius verba ipsa considerare volumus, manifeste ostenditur quae sint illa opera quae vana esse arguuntur. Non enim dixit: Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo qui fit, vel qui factus est sub sole? Sed ait potius, quem ipse homo laborat sub sole. Non ergo tam laborem quam laborantem arguit esse sub sole. Ut quia ipse homo sub sole positus laborat: idcirco vanum sit quod laborat. Sed quis est qui sub sole laborat? Qui rerum temporalium et transitoriarum [0130A] amore pressus, pro eisdem adipiscendis, si non habet, vel conservandis, si habet, laborat. Iste sub sole positus laborat, et iste in vanum laborat. Qui autem pro spe et desiderio aeternorum bona opera exercet, iste sub sole non laborat, etiamsi sub sole est labor in quo laborat; quia licet temporale sit opus quod peragit, ipse tamen omnia temporalia et caduca, mente ac devotione transcendit. Iste ergo in vanum non laborat, etiamsi vanum est in quo laborat; quia vanum non est pro quo laborat. Et dum transierit quod vanum est in quo laborat, paratum habet quod vanitas non est pro quo laborat. Non ergo iste ejusmodi ad hanc sententiam pertinet, qua dictum est: Quid habet amplius homo de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole? Quia non [0130B] laborat sub sole, sed supra solem, qui laboris sui mercedem non constituit in rebus volubilibus et tempore transeuntibus.

## HOMILIA PRIMA. *De titulo operis, Salomonis nominibus, et libris, et principiis hujus operis, de vanitatum explanatione.* (cont.)

*Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit.* Ecce vanitas. Generatio praeterit et generatio advenit. Hanc humana natura in prima radice sui generis vitiata concepit, et in omnem propaginem posteritatis cum hac eadem seminata pullulavit. Primus enim generis humani parens ut audivit: Terra es et in terram ibis; exinde mortalis factus; quia a statu incorruptionis cecidit, quasi a vita ad mortem per mortalitatem transire coepit. Hanc ergo viam omnes homines post ipsum pertranseunt, qui ab ipso per carnis nativitatem descendunt. Haec est illa vanitas, de qua Psalmista locutus est, dicens: *Verumtamen [0130C] universa vanitas omnis homo vivens. Verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo [n: (Psal. XXXVIII)]*. Hanc ergo vanitatem quasi caeteris majorem et humanis animis propter diram mortis necessitatem magis horribilem novissimo loco adjunxit, ut hoc ad extremum homo audiat, in quo evidentius miseriam conditionis suae agnoscat. Prima enim vanitas nec in nomine est; nec refertur ad hominem. Secunda vanitas in homine quidem non est; sed tamen refertur ad hominem. Tertia vanitas et in homine est, et refertur ad hominem. Proinde quasi per gradus quosdam semper ad altiora progrediens, primum posuit illam vanitatem quae nec poena hominis est, nec culpa. Deinde illam vanitatem adjunxit, quae poena hominis non est, sed culpa. Postremo illam quae culpa non est, sed poena: [0130D] licet tamen nec talis culpa sine poena unquam esse possit, nec talis poena in iis duntaxat quibus sacramentum salutis non subvenit, a culpa prorsus libera sit. Sed illam culpam hominis dixi, non poenam, et hanc poenam, non culpam; quia in illa meritum hominis cernitur, et in ista judicium invenitur. Hanc ergo poenam quasi caeteris graviorem et immaniorem novissime apposuit: quae licet culpa nequior non sit, molestior tamen carni est et ad excitandas carnales mentes efficacior. Dicat ergo: Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit. Ac si diceret: Si negligendum putatis quod vanum est omne quod agitis, nunquid vel hoc negligendum est quod ipsi vanitas estis? Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit. Si morientes [0131A] discedunt et morituri succedunt, quod gaudium est? Videtur quidem dolor viventium in nascentibus consolationem accipere; sed unde finiri putatur ut non sit, inde accipit ut semper sit. Quod enim morientes discedunt dolor est. Quae consolatio sequitur quod morituri adveniunt? Consolatio quae luctu terminatur. Et quid in utroque vanius esse potest? Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit. Si paucos vel non universos saltem lamentabilis casus involveret, tolerabile videretur, nunc autem saeva lues omnes secum ad interitum trahit. Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit. Si praeterit, quo vadit? Si advenit, unde venit? Heu dira sors! Quomodo securus esse potes, o homo, tantis tenebris involutus? Ecce scis quod vivendo tendis ad mortem. Sed nunquid scire [0131B] potes qualis aut ubi futurus sis post mortem? Considera ergo in quanta vanitate vivis, quis quotidie cernis praeterire quod es; nec tamen scire ulla ratione potes quale sit quod futurus es. Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit.

*Terra autem in aeternum stat.* Ausculta homo, et erubesce. Terra in aeternum stat. Quare terra stat, et tu stare non potes, propter quem facta est terra. Fortassis dices, quia ad consolationem tui stat. Stat ut venientes mittat, pertranseuntes portet, discedentes recipiat. Nascentes enim de terra veniunt per carnis originem, et viventes super terram pertranseunt, per carnis mutabilitatem et morientes in terram redeunt, per carnis corruptionem. Ergo stat ad consolationem tui; imo vero ad confusionem tui [0131C] stat. Quomodo? Vide qualis stat, qualis portat, et quales portat, et de quali portat. Qualis ergo portat? Audi qualis: *Maledicta terra in opere tuo spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi [n: (Gen. III)]*. Quales autem portat? Rursus audi: *Maledictus es super terram [n: (Gen. IV)]*. Et de quali portat: *In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane tuo; et comedes herbas terrae? [n: (Gen. III.)]* Ergo maledicta maledictos portat. Et tamen portat. Sed unde portat, habet aliquid ad consolationem tui et aliquid ad poenam tuam. Quod ad consolationem tui, est cum labore tuo; quod ad poenam tuam, est per laborem tuum. Habet panem, habet et spinas. Panem cum labore tuo ad consolationem tui; spinas per laborem tuum, ad poenam tuam. In sudore vultus [0131D] tui vesceris pane tuo: hoc ad consolationem tui cum labore tuo. Cum operatus fueris, terra non dabit tibi fructum suum, sed spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi. Hoc ad poenam tuam per laborem tuum. Ergo non solum stat ad consolationem tui, sed multo magis stat ad confusionem tui. Stat non solum ad levamen miseriae tuae, sed stat in testimonium et poenam culpae tuae. Terra stat, et tu super terram stas. Stabilis ipsa est quae portet, et tu corruis qui portaris. Quare hoc? Nunquid et tu terra non es? Quid ergo dictum est tibi: Terra es, et in terram ibis? Ergo terra es, et super terram es, et de terra es. Quare ergo non stas in aeternum? Nunquid tu infirmior factus es terra illa de qua sumptus es? Quid ergo operata est manus artificis si non provexit [0132A] opus suum in melius? Ergo scientia non erat apud ipsum, aut infirmus inventus est, ut in manibus ejus bona illa materia deterior efficeretur? Absit! Imo vero multo meliorem te fecit, quam illud fuerat unde te fecit; quia terram fecerat stabilem, te autem de terra fecit immortalem. Ergo meliorem te fecit, quam fuerat unde te fecit. Non ergo ex artifice processit corruptio tui, qui tanta potestate et tali bonitate te fecit, ut nihil posset a perfecto minus, nihil ab optimo vellet deterius. Itaque optimus artifex plasma bonum fecit, cujus aeterna incorruptio et bonitas immortalis nec vitium gignit, nec vitium recipit.

Sed forte materia culpanda sit, quae talis erat de qua aliud fieri non poterat. Terra enim erat materia, et exivit vas testeum. Quid? Mirum hoc est. [0132B] Hoc ergo tu dicens respicere debueras, quia, si vas testeum es, ergo de molli luto in testam solidatus es, et gleba tua, si naturam non habuit firmitatis, habuit tamen naturam confirmationis. Si non habuit ut hoc esset ex natura, habuit tamen ex natura ut hoc esse posset ex gratia. Ergo materia tua nihil tibi nocuit quae et hoc integrum conservat quod natura contulit, et quod gratia dedit, ipsa non minuit. Nam terra in aeternum stat. Quid est stat? Perseverat in eo quod facta est; servat naturam suam; conditionem suam non deserit; quod accepit, hoc retinet incorruptum. Terra facta est, et terra permanet, nunquam aliud est quam quod est. Et cum aliud est, non ex defectu corruptionis aliud est, sed ex provectu sublimationis. Quemadmodum et in te [0132C] aliud effecta est, et aliud futura est, quam nata est; sed sublimatione, non corruptione. Et cum in quibusdam terrenis se de alio transferre videtur in aliud, nunquam tamen aliud est, quam est; quia terra est, et semper terra est, et id quod transit terra est et in quod transit terra est; et cum hoc in illud, vel in illud transit, non transit tamen quod terra est, quod in hoc et illo idem est. Ergo terra intra naturae suae gremium moveri habet, et operari habet de illo quod est, hoc quod est: extra terminos naturae suae transire non habet de eo quod est in id, quod non est: et idcirco, terra in aeternum stat in eo quod non est. Quare igitur, et tu non stetisti in eo, quod factus es super terram, sicut et [0132D] terra stat in eo, quod facta est? Quare degenerasti, ut non saltem imiteris materiam tuam, quae in tantum servat quod est, ut et tu cum terra factus fueris, non possis aliud esse quam terra est? Usque ad illam defluis vitio tuo; ultra progredi non permitteris natura ejus. Ecce quantum custodit quod est, ut et te fluentem et instabilem cum exceperit, non sinat ultra transire in aliud quod ipsa non est. Unde ergo tibi fluere? Quaere diligenter, et cogita. Neque artifex tuus neque materia tua hoc tibi fecit; quia, et illa stando in aeternum, et in te servat, quod ipsa est, et ille te ad aeternitatem faciendo, et amplius dedit, quam ipsa est. Unde igitur tibi hoc nisi vitio tuo ex quo tibi nunc poena est, ut revertaris in illam, cui hoc ex gratia datum erat, ut stares semper [0133A] supra illam? Igitur tu transis, et terra stat in testimonium contra te, ut mortalem arguens, et morientem excipiens, prius te convincat quam puniat. Propterea terra in aeternum stat. Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit; terra autem in aeternum stat.

Haec secundum parvitatem vel exiguitatem sensus nostri diximus in exordium libri Salomonis, qui Ecclesiastes dicitur, nequaquam praesumentes nos dixisse, quod potissimum dicendum erat, cum hoc tantum nobis magnum sit nihil dixisse, quod dicendum non erat. Caeterum sciendum est hunc librum novum quoddam expositionis genus requirere; quia cum totus ad commovendos affectus cordis humani intendat, saepius in eo quasi colloquendo quam exponendo sermonem formare oportet. Unde [0133B] necesse est in iis etiam aliquando, quae plana et aperta videntur, diutius verbis immorari, ut ipsa locutionis inculcatio validius tangat et efficacius penetret cor audientis. Qui aliter hanc Scripturam tractare voluerit, etiamsi commode intelligentiae audientium servit, vim tamen proprietatemque non retinens, minus fortassis proficit ad aedificationem.

## HOMILIA II. *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, successionem, et eorum, quae fuerunt oblivionem.*

Verba Ecclesiastes, quae cuncta sub sole vana esse testantur, nescio quo pacto, modo cum legerentur dulcia facta sunt in auribus nostris. Et ecce coepimus libenter audire mala nostra, et quae non diligimus [0133C] tamen audire diligimus. Mala enim nostra non diligimus, et mala nostra audire diligimus; quia audiendo mala quae non diligimus, bonorum recordamur quae diligimus. Et ipsa haec bonorum recordatio (etiam inter mala) dulcis animo est, et tanto utique dulcior quanto amariora sunt ipsa mala, quae vel audiendo, vel sentiendo agnoscimus longe esse ab iis bonis ad quae, vel saltem per recordationem suspiramus. Hoc totum erat, quod in hac relatione nobis modo tantum sapuisse miramur, in qua exsilii nostri nobis aerumna describitur, et nostra miseria atque calamitas qualis ac quanta sit declaratur. Mens enim nostra in auditu malorum suorum quasi de quodam somno pristini temporis evigilans subito [0133D] agnovit ubi esset, stupensque et mirans tantum ruinae barathrum, simul etiam considerare coepit de quanta sublimitate in hoc ipsum miseriae profundum cecidisset, et ad illam quia necdum effectu potuit miro quodam ardoris intimi desiderio suspiravit. Hoc ergo erat quod in illis verbis, quae nostram recitabant miseriam, nostrum traxit affectum. Hoc fecit ut mala nostra sic nobis semper audire libeat, nec possit amarum esse quidquid illud est, quod cum eo percipitur quod tam dulce est. Hoc quotidie miseris lamenta ipsa dulcia facit, et inter suspiria ac gemitus lacrymis delectabiliter pascit afflictos; quia eorum quae diliguntur inter adversa recordatio suavior est, et ipse animus desiderio absentium amplius inardescit, praeteritorum memoria dulcius tangitur, [0134A] dilatione futurorum validius inflammatur. Hoc noster Ecclesiastes optime noverat, qui in omni narratione sua tam diligenter exsequitur vanitatem rerum transeuntium, ut ex ejus consideratione cor humanum admoneat coelestia meditari et evigilare in desiderio aeternorum. Scivit enim quod quanto evidentius eorum, quae temporaliter praetereunt vanitas agnoscitur, tanto sublimius intus mentis oculus ad statum aeternitatis aperitur. Incipiens ergo, in hac prima parte operis sui, ostendit omnia vana esse, quae sub sole sunt, id est, quaecunque visibilia sunt corruptioni subjecta esse, vel obnoxia mutabilitati. Ostendit enim neque in coelo, neque sub coelo, neque super terram, neque in terra aliquid esse perpetuum, quod vicissitudinem non patiatur nec [0134B] transeat in alterationem. Ideoque nihil vere esse ex omnibus iis, quae semper sine cessatione in id trahuntur quod non sunt, et quod sunt, stabile vel incorruptum servare non possunt.

*Oritur sol, et occidit, et ad locum suum revertitur: ibique renascens gyrat per meridiem, et flectitur ad aquilonem.* Hoc per se distinguendum est. Deinde sequitur:

*Lustrans universa in circuitu pergit spiritus, et in circulos suos revertitur.* Et hoc per se ponendum est. Postea sequitur:

*Omnia flumina intrant in mare, et mare non redundat: ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur, ut iterum fluant.* Et hoc simul conjungendum est.

Tria ergo quaedam proponere videtur in argumentum [0134C] mutabilitatis omnium, solem, spiritum, flumina, id est ignem, aerem, humorem, ut per solem quidem ignem, per spiritum aerem, per flumina humorem, velut a parte totum significatum intelligatur. Superius namque terram quasi fundamentum immobile medio loco constituit. Nunc caetera tria elementa, id est ignem, aerem, aquam circa ipsam motu instabili fluctuantia disponit, ut in procreandis mutabilibus, his tribus elementis motum agendi, et quodammodo vicem artificis attributam ostendat. Terram vero quasi materiam quamdam procreandorum omnium immobilem subjacere; impotentem quidem agendi, sed aptam tantummodo, ut ex ea caeteris operantibus formentur, quae creanda [0134D] sunt. Per haec igitur tria elementa in illo quarto vim suam natura exercet, quae circa illud, et in illo discurrentia lege mirabili, et se invicem contemperantia, tam innumerabiles formas et species rerum ex ea producunt, quot annuis menstruis, diurnis temporum vicissitudinibus in eorum accessu et recessu jugiter sine cessatione alternantibus demonstrantur. Quia igitur cuncta nascentia quae de terra oriuntur et ex terra substantiam nutrimentumque accipiunt, ab his tribus elementis vitalis motus naturam sortiuntur, recte in eis, et mutabilitatis originem posuit, et mutabilium omnium naturam proprietatemque expressit, ut in his pariter videamus et unde sit quod stare non potest, quidquid sub tempore oritur, et qua via adesse prodeat quod non est, vel quod [0135A] est, ad non esse revertatur. Oritur sol, et occidit, et ad locum suum revertitur, ibique renascens gyrat per meridiem, et flectitur ad aquilonem. Paucis verbis rem magnam comprehendit: de quibus aliqua nos pro tempore dicere oportet, non tamen animum auditoris diutius in ejusmodi detinere, ne videamur contra propositum nostrum sacram expositionem relinquentes, ad describendos siderum cursus devolvi. Omnia quidem haec ob id solummodo dicta sunt, ut humanus animus earum rerum quas novit relatione, commodius excitetur, et ut per haec ad cogitanda ea, quae non novit, evigilet: et idcirco non nobis pigrum esse debet, aut indignum videri, ad ea diligenter intendere, quae nobis divinus sermo studuit diligenter enarrare. Demonstrat ergo quali via [0135B] luminare hoc magnum, quod sua praesentia universa illustrat, incessabili agitatione in hoc mundi sensilis globo circumferatur, suoque accessu et recessu varias rerum mutationes efficiat. Oritur sol, et occidit, et ad locum suum revertitur. Primum ostendit eum circularem habere motum, et ad id semper unde progreditur reverti, ut, quia in circulo finis non potest inveniri, cursus ejus perpetuus demonstretur. Oritur sol, et occidit, et ad locum suum revertitur. Deinde anfractus progressionis ejus describit, dicens: Gyrat per meridiem, et flectitur ad aquilonem, ut idipsum ad magnam rerum mutationem pertineat, quod non semper eodem modo neque in directum cursum suum dirigit incedens. Oritur sol, et occidit. Oritur quotidie, quando emergens [0135C] humanis praesentatur aspectibus. Occidit, quando descendens ad inferiores partes secundum convexitatem circum actionis suae oculis nostris se abducit. Revertitur ad locum suum; quia impellente volubilitate subtus rursum ad ortum revocatur. Post ortum vero ad occasum tendens, primum flectitur ad meridiem, quia obliquo ductu praecipue cum in aestivalibus commoratur signis, ab ortu ad lineam meridianam conscendit. Deinde autem ad occasum descendens, rursum obliqua progressione ad aquilonem inclinatur. Potest alia adhuc in his verbis expositio satis conveniens adhiberi, scilicet ut haec omnia non de diuturno, sed de annuo cursu solis dicta accipiamus. Oritur quippe nobis sol, quando [0135D] per vernale aequinoctium ingrediens ad nostrum polum consurgit. Occidit autem, quando per autumnale aequinoctium exiens ad inferiora descendit. Gyrat per meridiem, quando in hiemalibus signis commoratur. Flectitur ad aquilonem, quando in aestivis signis, quae polo boreali viciniora sunt, circumfertur. Oritur ergo sol, et ipso oriente omnia pariter, oriuntur, quae ex ejus calore reviviscunt. Occidit, et statim igne vitali subducto universa occumbunt, quae ex ejus praesentia viguerunt. Gyrat per meridiem, ut aestiva incendia algor temperet hiemalis. Flectitur ad aquilonem, ut quae brumae gelu, et torpor glacialis astrinxerat, aestivis ardoribus rursum calefacta animentur. Vides igitur unum corpus quantas secum trahat rerum mutationes.

## HOMILIA II. *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, successionem, et eorum, quae fuerunt oblivionem.* (cont.)

[0136A]Lustrans universa in circuitu pergit spiritus, et in circulos suos revertitur. Si per spiritum, aerem accepimus, congruo ordine, postquam instabilitatem coelestis elementi descripserat, eamdem quoque inferiora legem pati demonstrat, dicens: Lustrans universa in circuitu pergit spiritus. Ac si diceret: Si ea quae in coelo sunt vis naturae stare non patitur, necesse est ut ea quoque quae sub coelo sunt eadem conditio mutabilitatis moderetur. Sane quemadmodum soli? ita quoque aeri orbicularem tribuit motum, ut ejus agitatio perpetua esse demonstretur. Quod autem pluraliter subjungit: In circulos suos revertitur: hoc significare potest quod motus aeris non semper ubique idem est, sed cum alibi vehementius, alibi moderatius agitetur, ipsa ejus fluctuatio [0136B] versa vice in semetipsam refusa dissimiliter moveatur; et non uniformiter conquiescat, ut non cogamur motum semel coeptum usque ad extrema extendere, ut singulae motiones impulsionesque quasi in se factae; et paulatim spatio motu languente quiescant. Sed, et illud quod ait: Lustrans, apte huic elemento tribuitur, quod sordes universas sua mobilitate ubicunque aspersas sive collectas purget ac dissipet. Sive quod sua subtilitate cuncta penetrans ubique se diffundat. Vel ad superiorem hoc verbum sententiam copulatur sic: Oritur sol, et occidit, et ad locum suum revertitur; ibique renascens gyrat per meridiem, et flectitur ad aquilonem, lustrans universa in circuitu. Et hic distinctione facta, deinde sequens sententia subinfertur ita: Pergit [0136C] spiritus, etc. Sol enim cursu suo universa in circuitu lustrat; quia omnes partes mundi per diversa signa oriens, vel occidens attingit. In cancro enim oriens, et occidens, aquilonem tangit. In capricorno, meridiem. In libra, et ariete, per orientem, et occidentem medium pertransit. Sequitur: Pergit spiritus, et in circulos suos revertitur. Secundum praecedentem expositionem, spiritum nunc non incovenienter accipere possumus igneam vim quae ab ipso sole procedens, per cuncta se diffundit, et universa invisibiliter penetrans vegetat et movet. Unde et veteres naturam esse dixerunt. Ignem artificem procedentem in res sensibiles procreandas. Vitalis enim motus, et vegetationis sensibilis in cunctis nascentibus [0136D] ignea vis origo est: quae rebus omnibus incrementum subjicit, et invisibili eas nutrimento alens ac fovens, ad invisibilem tandem producit substantiam. Hanc autem occultam naturae vim cuncta moventem, et alentem poeta quoque spiritum nominavit: et nota sunt ejus verba: *Principio coelum ac terras, camposque liquentes,*
*Lucentemque globum lunae, titaniaque astra,*
*Spiritus intus alit: totamque infusa per artus,*
*Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.*
[n: (Aeneid. VI, 688.)] Quamvis in his verbis illum potius errorem probare videatur, qui mundum hunc sensilem quasi anima constans ex anima et corpore, ipsamque ejus animam spiritum esse cuncta moventem asseveret. Sed [0137A] quomodolibet opinio errantium exponatur, nos sano intellectu spiritum pergentem in omnia, et in circulos suos revertentem occultam naturae vim accipere possumus, quae universa invisibiliter nutrit et vegetat, et unumquodque ad certum finem legitimumque terminum perducit. Hic ergo spiritus, id est, occulta naturae vis omnia lustrat; quia per omnes rerum partes invisibiliter se diffundens, unicuique secundum suae naturae capacitatem, propriam qualitatem distribuit. Pergit, et revertitur quia universa, qui oriuntur in tempore prius per incrementum provehit, ac deinde senescentia ad originem suam reducit. Pergit enim quia in nascentibus egreditur, in crescentibus usque ad certam mensuram procedit. Revertitur, quia in senescentibus, et per defectum [0137B] naturae suae retro labentibus, usque ad originis suae principium revocatur. Sic igitur singularum rerum cursus et progressiones, quasi circulos quosdam et orbes in semetipsos recurrentes recte accipimus; quia omnia temporaliter orta illuc tandem per occasum redeunt, unde per nativitatis principium exiverunt. Et unumquodque quidem secundum propriam mensuram, et tempus quo subsistit, differentem ab alio, id est, majorem minoremve excursum habere probatur. Omnia autem sicut originem unam, sic et finem unum habere noscuntur; quia omnia per occasum ad terram redeunt, quae in ortus sui principio de terra exiverunt. Sicut ergo sol oritur et occidit, et ad locum suum revertitur, sic spiritus pergit, et in circulos suos revertitur. Quia [0137C] sicut in corpore solis localiter ignis progrediens, ad ortus sui principium reducitur, sic etiam naturaliter in cunctis nascentibus, motum quem per incrementum rerum erexit, per defectum et occasum earumdem ad originem suam reducit.

Sequitur tertia clausula in qua tractatur de elemento aquae, quod in ordine rerum, tertium post ignem ponitur in procreatione secundum sociatur. Quantum enim attinet ad dispositionem et ordinem rerum, primum et supremum locum ignis possidet; aer secundum igni proximum. Postea aqua tertium vendicat locum; novissimo et imo loco terra residet. In his quatuor ignis et aqua, natura quidem maxime repugnantia confoederatione [0137D] tamen aequabili amica, omnium nascentium origo sunt. Et ideo si locum vel naturam attendimus, a se invicem duo haec disparata cernimus. Si efficientiam respicimus, proxima sibi utraque et amica invenimus. Igitur de elemento aquae, quod alterum cum igne fomentum vitale praebet nascentibus, quasi post ignem, et aerem tertio, vel cum igne secundo inter rerum mutabilium naturas tacendum non fuit. Et idcirco hujus quoque circuitum, et excursum in res sensibiles procreandas describit, dicens: Omnia flumina intrant in mare, et mare non redundat. Et causam statim adjungit, quare non redundet mare omnibus in se fluminibus receptis: Quia scilicet rursum ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur, ut iterum fluant. Ductus enim aquarum per omne [0138A] corpus terrae intrinsecus, et deforis in modum venarum humorem trahunt, ut aequabiliter irrigatio in omnem partem diffundatur. Haec autem infusio ut jugis et perpetua esse possit, idcirco aquarum cursus in orbem dispositus est, et in illa perenni circuitione, ut nunquam deficiat quod desuper infunditur; quantum in parte altera deorsum fluit, tantum in altera parte per occultos meatus ad ortum revocatur. Sic et cibus corporis quodam circuitu fertur, et primum a palato in alvum descendens, ac deinde in secessum pertransiens, et in ipso ejus transitu, quasi quadam instillatione naturae, deficienti nutrimentum subjicitur, quo evaporato et exinanito, necesse est rursum ut membris fatiscentibus reparandis edendi subsidio concurratur. Quasi ergo circulus [0138B] renascentis semper indigentiae in suam originem recurrens ducitur; quia dum sine cessatione quod sumptum est praeterit, semper iterato sumi necesse est, quod supplendo defectui substantiam ministrare possit. Quale ergo nutrimentum substantia cibi assidua iteratione alendo corpori subjicit: tale omnino elementorum refluxio nutrimentum in terrae corpore procreandis fetibus seminibusque vivificandis infundit. Hoc ignis, hoc aqua, hoc aer perpeti accessu et recessu sine intermissione agere non cessant, ut semper accidentia repleant et recedentia evacuent ut quia subsistere non potest vigor infusionis praeteritae ex necessitate denuo iteretur irrigatio plenitudinis reparandae. Quam ergo rerum alimenta fiduciam perpetis subsistentiae praestare poterunt, [0138C] cum in rebus omnibus sic semper sine cessatione, et reparantia transeant, et deficiant reparata? Licet enim huic defectui qualemcunque consolationem praestare videatur repetita infusio; magna tamen est miseria semper ad indigentiam accipere, et nunquam indigentia accipiendi posse carere. Unde manifestum est quod omnia transitoria, et caduca vana sunt, quae a sui status soliditate jugiter, vel transitu vel defectu inanescunt. Magnum ergo hic spectaculum sanctis mentibus praeparatum est, quae norunt ex visibilibus trahere invisibilium cognitionem. Quae norunt dicere Creatori suo: *Omnia in sapientia fecisti, Domine [n: (Psal. CIII)]*. *Delectasti me, Domine, in factura tua, et in operibus manuum tuarum [0138D] exsultabo. Quam magnificata sunt opera tua, Domine, nimis profundae factae sunt cogitationes tuae [n: (Psal. XCI)]*.

## HOMILIA II. *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, successionem, et eorum, quae fuerunt oblivionem.* (cont.)

Ecce enim quomodo in circuitu feruntur omnia transitoria et vanitati subjecta. Et scimus quia circulus finem non habet. Quae ergo in circuitu currunt, currunt quidem, sed ad finem nunquam perveniunt. Quae ergo requies sperari potest, ubi status nullus esse potest? Ubi enim perpetuus cursus est, status nullus est. Ubi autem circuitus via est, ubi cursus certe finem habere possit, non est. Quae ergo in circuitu currunt, semper currunt et nunquam ad statum perveniunt. Semper transeunt, et nunquam subsistunt. Semper finiuntur, et finem invenire non possunt. Cum praeterierint, futura sunt; cum supervenerint, [0139A] non subsistunt. Haec est via omnium mutabilium, et via omnium mutabilia amantium, et mutabilia sequentium. Nam et de impiis dictum est: *In circuitu impii ambulant [n: (Psal. XI)]*. Et iterum: *Caput circuitus eorum [n: (Psal. CXXXIX)]*, *et pone illos ut rotam, Domine [n: (Psal. LXXXII)]*. Caput quoque impiorum omnium de se testatur, dicens: *Circuivi terram, et perambulavi eam [n: (Job I)]*. Et de ipso apostolus ait: *Circuit tanquam leo rugiens quaerens quem devoret [n: (I Petr. V)]*. Vides ergo quemadmodum perversi semper circuitum diligunt, et a circuitu non recedunt. Idcirco quae a perversis perverse amantur, etiam ipsa in circuitu omnia currunt in testimonium illis, quod circuitum sequuntur, et ipsi. Econtrario amator aeternorum dicit: *Pes meus stetit in directo* [0139B] [n: (Psal. XXVII)]. Et iterum: *Dirige me in semitam mandatorum tuorum, quia ipsam volui [n: (Psal. CXVIII)]*. Et iterum: *Rectus est callis justi [n: (Isai. XXVI)]*. Et alibi rursum: *Ibunt,* inquit, *directe emissiones; et ad certum locum deducet eos Dominus Deus noster [n: (Sap. V)]*. O via recta, o circuitus, quo ducis tu. Et tu quo ducis? Tu ducis, et perducis. Tu vero ducis, et seducis; quia quos ducis, perdis, non perducis. O circuitus, quomodo involvis, quomodo complecteris sequaces tuos? Tu currentibus per te, neque exitum tribuis a te, nec in te perventionem. Ergo omnia transitoria et caduca per circuitus volvuntur dum transeunt, ut in eis bonum aeternitatis non quaeramus, quae cernimus semper, et sic advenire ut transeant, et sic transire ut non subsistant. Videamus [0139C] ergo adhuc circuitus istos vanitatis. Dei enim sapientia, ut jam dictum est, hoc mirabiliter providit, ut rerum omnium motus in orbem ageretur, quatenus corporea natura, quae effluendo aliquando defectum sentire potuisset, semper in suam recurrendo originem dum sine intermissione recipit quod effudit, sine defectu effundat quod recipit, et sit defectus sine defectu; nec unquam desit quod possit deficere, ut semper deficiat. Unde in una eademque re, et miserum est, quod est; et mirabile quod factum est, quia in eodem opere et fragilis invenitur materia, et ratio artificis admiranda. Et contemptum quidem mundi suadet natura corruptibilis, sed succumbit mens admiratione in contemplatione rationis. [0139D] Ad hanc ergo rationem intuendam post explicitum cursum rerum mutabilium noster Ecclesiastes se convertit, ut in ea mentis aciem per contemplationem exerceat; quia eam scientia sufficienter non valet comprehendere, digna studet venerari admiratione. Nam, quia mutabilitatem omnium, in tribus rerum generibus igne, aere et aqua, secundum motum moventem explicuit quam inexplicabilis eadem sit secundum motum qui movetur per singula quaeque orientia et occidentia in universitate subsequenter ostendit.

*Cunctae res difficiles non valet eas homo explicare sermone: non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu.* Cum res quaelibet in superficie sua cernitur, nondum adhuc vel causa ejus occulta, vel [0140A] natura penetratur. Videtur namque quod est, sed quale sit illud quod videtur, vel quam in occulto (quo sensus corporeus accedere non potest) retineat qualitatem: cur etiam sic sit ut videtur, vel unde sic sit, vel ad quid sit, quis hominum (non dicam in rebus omnibus, sed nec in una qualibet re) ad plenum comprehendere valet? Quantis ergo tenebris homo involvitur; quanta ignorantiae caecitate coarctatur, cujus sensus vix etiam superficie tenus pauca rerum potest attingere? Qui etsi cuncta, quae sunt secundum speciem exteriorem, cerneret, nondum tamen vim latentem rerum, invisibilemque naturam penetraret. Ergo universitas rerum utroque modo homini incomprehensibilis est; videlicet et secundum exteriorem speciem, et secundum interiorem [0140B] qualitatem. Singulae autem rerum, aliae quidem ex parte foras specie ad sensum veniunt, aliae prorsus absconduntur, vel quia localiter remotae sunt, vel quia etiam loco praesentes, subtilitate sui tarditatem sensus humani excedunt. Vix ergo aliqua sensus humanus in rebus attingere sufficit; nihil autem universorum, perfecte ut est, comprehendit. Ergo cunctae res difficiles sunt: et secundum universitatem videlicet, ut nec valeant attingi, et secundum singula quaeque difficiles, quia nullo sensu possunt vel intellectu plene comprehendi. Quae si ratione perfecte investigari non possunt, multo minus sermone possunt explicari. Nam hoc ipsum in rebus magis omnibus ineffabile est, quod in tanta mutabilitatis confusione nusquam bene consideranti [0140C] ratio evidens et manifesta deest: quod tam bene disponitur id etiam quod in rebus bonum non est, ut quodammodo singulorum corruptio, universorum sit pulchritudo. Propterea sensus humanus in consideratione horum succumbens suaviter ex defectu suo reficitur; quia in eo quod secundum corruptionem displicet, in ordinatissima pulchritudine universitatis, etiam ipsa corruptio pulchra est et placet. Sic miro et ineffabili modo, Conditor in creatura sua simul et per corruptionem rerum punit malitiam, et per pulchritudinem delectat naturam, ut agnoscat homo in poena sua quid per culpam meruit, et in delectatione quid amisit. Quantam enim in Creatore rerum dulcedinis affluentiam esse credimus, si [0140D] tam miram in creaturarum pulchritudine suavitatem invenimus? Propterea cum dixisset in tam multiplici et perplexa variaque rerum profunditate defectum humanae intelligentiae, subdit statim in pulchritudine earumdem jucunditatem naturae.

Non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Cum omnes sensus corporei in rebus conditis oblectamenta sua, et quasi proprias quasdam delicias singuli praeparatas inveniant, utpote visus speciem, auditus melodiae dulcedinem, olfactus odorem, saporem gustus et tactus lenitatem. Caeteri quidem omnes corporeae necessitati, vel etiam voluptati serviunt. Hi vero duo sensus, id est visus et auditus alimenta sua magis ad spiritalem jucunditatem trahunt. Unde et illorum refectio defaecationem [0141A] non habet, quia cum perceptione dulcedinis nullam trahunt massam corruptionis. Propter quod illorum refectio ad dulcedinis satietatem non pervenit; quia a percipienda dulcedine appetitum illorum nec percurrens difficultas tardat, neque succedens molestia ulla restringit. Purum ergo atque sincerum hoc alimentum sine omni mole corporea totum in refectionem animae transit; quia licet a specie corporali emanet et per corporis sensum transeat, non potest tamen retineri a corpore, quia corporeum nihil habet, nec ingerit corpulentum. Idcirco ergo visus et auditus quasi excellentiores caeteris et nihil ponderis deprimentis habentes, sublimiorem in corpore sedem sortiti sunt, ut libere et sine obstaculo ad suas delectationes effluant, vel [0141B] influentes, in se sine difficultate admittant. Sane duo sunt, quae ex rerum specie per visum intrant ad animum. Et duo item, quae ex vocum perceptione ingrediuntur per auditum. Per visum namque ad animi cognitionem ex rebus pervenit substantia et forma. Ex vocibus per auditum, significatio et melodia. Et idem operatur in animo per visum substantia ex rebus, quod per auditum significatio ex vocibus. Itemque idem facit per visum in animo forma ex rebus, quod per auditum melodia ex vocibus. Duo quippe sunt, quibus animae rationalis natura tota disponitur, videlicet cognitio et affectus, id est sapientia et amor. Quae duo si anima perfecte obtineat et legitime disponat, beata est. Si vero vel in his quantum natura expetit obtinendis [0141C] deficiat, vel obtenta, contra naturam pervertat, in ea procul dubio parte qua vel defectum vel confusionem horum patitur, misera, necesse est, efficiatur. Tota ergo animae rationalis substantia his duobus regitur, id est cognitione et affectu, ut per sapientiam quidem veritatem inveniat, per amorem autem amplectatur virtutem. Ut igitur ob beatitudinem rationali animae etiam exteriora servirent, posita sunt in corpore humano haec duo instrumenta sensuum, ut per ea ad animam notiones visibilium ingrederentur atque in ipsa sapientiam sive virtutem, vel si omnino non esset, efficerent, vel si minus esset augerent. Ergo essentia rerum per visum ad animam ingrediens, et vocum significatio per auditum scientiam pariunt. Forma vero rerum per visum [0141D] intrans, et melodia vocum per auditum ad jucunditatem animum accendunt. Quoties enim foris sive rerum specie visus afficitur, sive auditus vocum dulcedine demulcetur, evigilat animus intus miris affectibus, illi quo exterius tactum se sentit, respondens. Et fit nonnunquam, ut per eam quam sensu corporeo trahit dulcedinem, redeat ad invisibilium bonorum recordationem et quodammodo ex similitudine, admonitus inenarrabili desiderio illud incipiat concupiscere: cujus quasi umbram et imaginem in affectu corporali se sentit percepisse.

## HOMILIA II. *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, successionem, et eorum, quae fuerunt oblivionem.* (cont.)

Dicat ergo Ecclesiastes: Non saturatur oculus visu nec auris impletur auditu. Quia per hos sensus, visibilium pulchritudo, dum animum jucunditate in [0142A] sui contemplatione afficit, inenarrabilem in eo concupiscentiam invisibilium bonorum accendit. Quae videlicet concupiscentia ineffabilem dulcedinem sitiens, visu vel auditu corporeo quo excitatur quantamcunque jucunditatem afferant, irritari potest potius quam expleri, et sermone humano quantumlibet profusus fuerit vel disertus, etsi tenuiter vix dicitur, nunquam perfecte explicatur. A specie enim visibilium rerum, quasi quaedam tantummodo rationalis animus semina concipit gaudiorum; sed excrescente mox in immensum desiderio parturit ipse et non se capit in tanta jucunditate. Nemo ergo visibilium rerum aspectum castis mentibus noxium putet; quia, si videre opera Dei omnino noxium foret, nequaquam ab ipso videndi usus [0142B] creatus fuisset. Opus enim Dei quasi verbum illius est, per quod nobis loquitur, et ipsi oculi quasi instrumenta sunt quibus per contemplationem verba Dei percipiuntur. Sicut ergo auris instrumentum est ad percipiendum verbum hominis, sic oculus instrumentum est ad percipiendum verbum hominis, sic oculus instrumentum est ad percipiendum verbum Creatoris. Propterea congrue in humano corpore, et oculi coram positi sunt, et aures a latere constitutae, quasi per hoc nobis significetur quod nostra intentio secundario dirigi debeat ad proximum, principaliter ad Deum. Recte ergo ut ostenderetur qualiter ex consideratione rerum visibilium, nascitur in animo desiderium aeternorum, soli oculi et aures commemorantur. Quia his solis fere sapientiae [0142C] et virtuti via patet ad animum, quia, dum visibilium pulchritudinem prae caeteris sensibus meram percipiunt, soli interius amorem invisibilium bonorum sincerius accendunt. Cunctae res difficiles non valet eas homo explicare sermone.

Non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Mirum est. Cor humanum toti mundo non sufficit, et totus mundus cordi humano non sufficit. Quare cor humanum toti mundo non sufficit? Quia cunctae res difficiles nec valet eas homo explicare sermone. Quare cordi humano totus mundus non sufficit? Quia non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Ergo scientia succumbit, affectus transcendit. Tendit se scientia quantum potest, et totum capere non potest; amor vero totum haurit, [0142D] et adhuc satiari non potest. Quare hoc? Quia scientiae charitas supereminet, nec dicit: Sufficit cor humanum, donec ad illum pervenerit, et illum invenerit a quo factum est ut esset, et ad quem factum est ut in illo beatum esset. Omnis jucunditas, omnis suavitas, omnis pulchritudo rerum conditarum afficere cor humanum potest; satiare non potest, nisi sola illa dulcedo ad quam factum est. Nam species rerum visibilium quasi venae tantummodo quaedam sunt, per quas invisibilis pulchritudo se manifestans ad nos usque emanat. Et ideo, cum ista sensum nostrum atque affectum in se naturaliter provocant, non quidem desiderium replent, sed ad inquirendam Conditoris speciem et ejus pulchritudinem [0143A] concupiscendam irritant. Ergo ista omnia quae foris videntur ad provocandum affectum humanum, non ad satiandum facta sunt, ut ab eis excitatus surgat et ea auctus transcendat. Quapropter non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Quia delectat quidem quod pulchrum factum cernimus, sed non sufficit, nisi illum qui fecit, inveniamus.

Vel sic intelligi potest quod dicit: Non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Quia enim praemiserat cunctas res esse difficiles, nec posse hominem eas explicare sermone. Ne forte putaretur vel scientia eas comprehendere posse, adjunxit: Non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Ac si diceret: Non est mirum si homo rerum difficultatem [0143B] cultatem sermone explicare non potest: qui nec sensu earum profunditatem capere vel pervestigare potest. Sive enim persemetipsum invenienda quaerat, sive ab alio jam inventa audiat, infra plenitudinis satietatem est omne quod capere potest. Nam, si per semetipsum contemplari incipiat, non saturatur oculus visu. Si erudiri quaerat ab altero, non impletur auris auditu. Angustiae enim corporalium instrumentorum, si se foras effundant, profunditati rerum sive immensitati explicandae non sufficiunt. Si autem se infundant, capacitatem cordis humani implere non possunt. Quia enim cor hominis peccati tenebris caecatum intus oculum non habet, quo lumen veritatis plene videat, nec aurem qua Dei verbum intrinsecus sonans percipiat, ad ariditatem [0143C] ignorantiae suae rigandam corporeos oculos et aures aperire cogitur, ut foris aliquam saltem in rerum specie veritatis stillam hauriat, qua sitis ejus licet non valeat omnino exstingui, vel ad modicum valeat temperari. Hoc est enim quod Dominus per prophetam populo suo improperat, dicens: *Duo peccata fecit populus meus. Me dereliquerunt fontem aquae vivae, et foderunt sibi cisternas dissipatas, et non valentes aquas continere [n: (Jer. II)]*. Scimus namque quia cisterna idcirco foditur, ut aqua extrinsecus collecta in eam defluat, et ex ea rursum in usus hominum transitura hauriatur. Sed haec quia venam vivam non habet, quantumlibet magna et aquarum collectione redundans videatur, aliquando exhauriri potest [0143D] et exsiccari; quia, cum sublatum fuerit, et consumptum quod aliunde infunditur, nihil ei de suo superest unde reparetur. Sed fons qui vivam habet venam etiamsi modicus est, deficere tamen omnino non potest, neque effusionis suae defectum aliquando sentit, cui sine defectu semper de proprio incrementum accedit. Corporales igitur oculi et aures, licet praecipua sint instrumenta, quibus via disciplinis aperitur ad animum, quia tamen intus a fonte veritatis non veniunt notiones rerum visibilium, ad cor hominis per angustos suae capacitatis ductus et quasi aquas sparsim collectas in cisternam deducunt. Et quia in eisdem rebus quas percipiunt, neque universitatem comprehendere, neque intima penetrare valent, recte nunc dicitur: Non satiatur oculus [0144A] visu, nec auris impletur auditu. Quia humanus animus vel vivendo vel audiendo, etiamsi aliquid quantulumcunque de veritate percipit: longe tamen ab ejus plenitudine, suae eum conditio infirmitatis repellit. Non ergo mirum est si humani sermonis ariditas ad explicandam rerum difficultatem non sufficit; quia sensus etiam humanus in ejus consideratione succumbit. Ideoque cunctae res difficiles, nec valet eas homo explicare sermone: non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu.

*Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod faciendum est. Nihil sub sole novum; nec valet quisquam dicere: Ecce hoc recens est. Jam enim praecessit in saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos.* Existimet fortassis aliquis errorem [0144B] hic illum confirmari, quo philosophi gentilium de saeculorum revolutione, et rerum omnium recursu in idipsum, mira dementia temporum aeternitatem astruere conati sunt. Dixerunt quippe rerum mutabilium seriem ab aeterno eodem ordine quo nunc cernitur cucurrisse, et sine fine, lege eadem, mundo in sua universitate nec principium nec finem habente, per saecula quaedam sibi succedentia cursuram. Saeculum magnum autem in quindecim millibus annorum constare (quem annum appellant) quo expleto, omnibus sideribus ad locum suum unde singula quaeque ab initio saeculi progressa fuerant revocatis, rursusque in exordium alterius saeculi simili ratione ac modo motum inchoantibus, subjectamque naturam simili itidem ratione moventibus: rursus eadem [0144C] prorsus omnia, quem in saeculis praecedentibus ordine praecessissent, eodem nihilominus ordine, eadem essentia, eadem forma, eisdem omnino et locis et temporibus, iterato consurgere, cursumque suum ac fatum simile priori atque idem peragere: eamdem quoque legem pati, fortunamque subire; ita ut eosdem homines nasci, itidem eosdem filios gignere, eadem fortuna vivere, eadem sorte mori contingat: eumdem rerum eventum, eamdem prorsus qualitatem, eumdemque statum et procursum omnium, quae praeterita prioris saeculi tempora tenuissent. Talem autem rerum omnium revolutionem atque iterationem, in idipsum semper fuisse semperque futuram esse sine fine, ut quemadmodum [0144D] recursu unius sideris per singulos annos, ad pristinum ista tum renovantur omnia; ita recursu omnium siderum totiusque naturae ad ortum per singula saecula et magnos annos ad primam conditionem reparentur universa. Hic vero error quantus sit, facile arguet ratio manifesta. Nam tempora aeterna esse non posse in hoc evidentissime comprobatur: quod omne tempus initium habuit; et sine contradictione constat quod omne quod initium habuit, aliquando non fuit. Amplius omne tempus praeteritum, aliquando praesens fuit. Omne autem tempus quod aliquando praesens fuit, antequam praesens esset, nondum fuit. Alioquin si semper praesens fuit, non jam tempus fuit, sed aeternitas. Si ergo omne tempus praeteritum aliquando non [0145A] fuit, fuit quando nullum tempus fuit. Itaque, tempora aeterna esse non potuerunt; sed erat ante tempora aeternitas sine tempore, quam tempora quidem nec auxerunt cum inciperent, nec cum finientur, consument. Liquet ergo falsam esse assertionem eorum qui saeculorum aeternitatem praedicaverunt, et mutabilitatis principium sine principio fuisse testati sunt. Sed, ne forte in hoc loco error hujusmodi confirmari videatur, cum dicitur: Nihil novum sub sole; neque valet quisquam dicere: Ecce hoc recens est. Jam enim praecessit in saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos. Quo intellectu id accipiendum sit: statim subsequentibus verbis ostendit, dicens:

## HOMILIA II. *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, successionem, et eorum, quae fuerunt oblivionem.* (cont.)

*Non est priorum memoria; sed nec eorum quidem, qui postea futuri sunt, erit recordatio apud eos, qui [0145B] futuri sunt in novissimo.* Nam, si priora et novissima cum praesentibus prorsus eadem essent; nequaquam praesentes homines a prioribus, et a futuris in novissimo alios diceret; nec diceret, apud eos qui post nos futuri sunt in novissimo, sed diceret, apud nos qui futuri sumus in novissimo. Nisi forte primos et novissimos ad principium et finem ejusdem saeculi referendum quis dicat, alioquin nec primos esse nec novissimos qui sine principio fuerunt, et sine fine futuri sunt. Sed primos et novissimos ad principium et finem ejusdem saeculi referre prohibet, quod ait: Jam praecessit in saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos. Quia, dum alia saecula praecedentium, atque alia subsequentium dicit nequaquam se primos et novissimos ejusdem saeculi significasse ostendit. [0145C] Ergo, quia non solum a catholica veritate, sed a ratione quoque sententia abhorret, nos dictum hoc referamus ad rerum similitudinem, quae in suis generibus sic a principio institutae sunt, ut unumquodque secundum similitudinem et formam primam originis suae propaginem extendat et nihil sit quod terminum primae dispositionis in suo genere excedat. Sic in ipsis elementis mundi, sic in iis, quae ex ipsis procreata sunt vel procreantur, omnibus natura primam dispositionem custodit, ut nihil a primo alterum, id est diversum, aut dissimile inveniri possit sub sole. Ut verbi gratia, ab initio coelum sursum, et terra deorsum. Ab initio luminaria in coelo, sol, luna et stellae, aves in aere, pisces in aqua, bestiae in terra. Ab initio volatus avibus, natatus [0145D] piscibus, gressus hominibus, et bestiis quibusdam reptatus, et tractus serpentibus. Et haec omnia sicut fuerunt, sic sunt, sic permanent. Et si quando forte miraculo aliquo praeter usitatum naturae cursum accidente, aliud fiunt quam semper sunt; non tamen in toto fiunt, nec semper fiunt, ut prima illa institutio etsi aliquando intermitti videatur, nunquam tamen videatur dissolvi. Ergo et hanc confusionem regit sapientia Dei. Et quod nobis confusum est, ipsi non est. Et ideo sub sole nihil novum est; quia ab illo qui est supra solem quod temporaliter transit, ab aeterno ordinatum est. Atque ideo singula quaeque, quia in semetipsis per immutabilitatem stare non possunt, in suo tamen genere [0146A] per similitudinem statum custodiunt, ut licet quod sunt, semper esse non possint singula; nunquam tamen inveniuntur aliud esse universa, quam singula. Ergo nihil novum sub sole. Quanto magis supra solem? Nam et ideo nihil novum sub sole; quia aeternum est supra solem. Sub sole et luna novum non est; nec est tamen aeternum. Aeternum enim non est sub sole aliquid, quia omne quod sub sole est, in semetipso praeterit; tamen novum non est, quia in similitudinem sui generis subsistit. Ergo sub sole nihil novum est, et nihil aeternum. Quia enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos, ideo novum non est: et quia non est praeteritorum memoria, ideo aeternum non est. Ideoque quia omne quod venit, praeterit et non subsistit, aut permanet [0146B] quidquam sub sole; non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu; quia, dum intrat elabitur, et fugit, omne dum teneri putatur; et completur sententia: Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas. Quid ergo quia sub sole non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu? Supra solem eat ubi non solum novum non est aliquid, sed nec transitorium; ubi et priorum memoria et praesentia futurorum, imo omnia praeterita et futura praesentia sunt; quia nec praeteritum nec futurum aliquid ibi est, ubi praesens est omne quod est, et omne quod est ibi est. Ibi ergo et oculus visu satiari et auris auditu impleri potest: ubi consummata et plena perfectio percipitur, et percepta plenitudine aeternitas non evacuatur. Sic ergo tota haec sententia, qua sub sole nec novum [0146C] aliquid nec aeternum esse dicitur, ad hoc spectare videtur, ut agnoscat homo quid vel fugere debeat vel sequi. In eo enim quod sub sole nihil novum est aeterna dispositio ostenditur. In eo autem quod nihil sub sole permanens esse potest, in iis quae sub sole sunt aeternitatem quidem significari, non tamen esse demonstratur. In ipsis ergo quae sub sole sunt, simul agnoscimus, et in eo quod nihil aeternum est, fugiendum esse quod sunt. In eo autem quod nihil novum, sequendum esse quod non sunt. Quapropter recurrat ad summam sententiam, ut quia in iis quae sub sole sunt oculi satiari, et aures impleri nec scientia possunt, quia non comprehendunt totum quod est; nec desiderio possunt; quia, etsi comprehendant, non sufficit totum quod est, [0146D] nec quantum possunt permanet quod praesens est. Sciunt vanitatem esse omne quod sub sole est, et quod nihil de universo labore suo, quo laborat sub sole, homo amplius habere potest.

Dicat ergo: Cunctae res difficiles, ut comprehendantur ab humano sensu, quae nec numerari possunt multitudine, nec comprehendi quantitate, nec profunditate pervestigari. Et ideo non mirum est si sermo deficit, ubi intelligentia succumbit; et ob hoc non valet eas homo explicare sermone, ut rationem reddat de singulis quia omnia non novit: Non enim saturatur oculus visu cum per se considerat; nec auris impletur auditu, cum eruditur ab altero, ut vel intentio exiens ad inquisitionem rerum quantum extra [0147A] est, totum comprehendat, vel cognitio ingrediens quantum intus est, totum repleat. Ergo oculus et auris nec toti mundo sufficiunt, ut totum capiant; nec toti animo, ut totum impleant. Et tamen per ea quae foris sunt, admonentur ut pergant illuc ubi vita est, ubi totum inveniant, et totum capiant, quia omnia *in ipso vita erant, et vita erat lux hominum [n: (Joan. I)]*. Illuc ergo pergant ubi simul totum inveniant, et totum capiant totumque possideant ubi in aeterna dispositione jam facta sunt, quae sunt futura in tempore. Nam quid est quod fuit? Ipsum enim idem, et non aliud futurum est in tempore quam quod fuit ante tempora, in aeterna Dei dispositione. Nec aliud subsequens in rerum ordine explicatur mutabile, quam quod fixum et permanens [0147B] semper fuit in illa rata et invariabili divina dispositione. Et ut manifeste patescat quod subsequens rerum effectus cum providentia concordat, ideo etiam in ipsa rerum serie, futurum a praeterito non discordat. Quid est enim quod factum est? ipsum quod faciendum est. Ergo quod fuit in providentia semper, aliquando futurum est in re; et quod factum est jam in re, per similitudinem adhuc est faciendum. Sed non praetereundum mihi videtur quod non ait. Quid est quod futurum est, ut deinde subjungeret. Ipsum quod fuit, cum praeterita magis certa sint futuris, et quia etsi non sunt, fuerunt tamen aliquando et visa sunt. Futura autem nunquam fuerunt.

Et ideo magis in quaestione ponendum videretur [0147C] quod minus certum est. In responsione autem, quod magis notum esse constat. Sed notandum quod effectus rerum secundum causam, providentia posterior est; in nostra cognitione, prior. Quia donec in actu suo rem cernimus, quid de ipsa in aeterna providentia dispositum sit prorsus ignoramus. Atque ideo recte cum quaereret, dicens: Quid est quod fuit? (quia ipsa per se providentia occulta est) statim ad intelligendam eam auditores ad actum rerum mittit, dicens: Ipsum quod futurum est; quia scire non possumus quid in praescientia praecedat, donec viderimus quid in effectu rerum subsequatur. Sed et in rebus ipsis, praeteritorum qualitatem quae non vidimus, ex futurorum comparatione [0147D] cum supervenerint colligemus. Dicat ergo: Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quia sicut dictum quod praecedit in providentia: hoc idem et non aliud in effectu rerum subsequitur. Et deinceps: Quid est quod factum est? ipsum quod faciendum est. Quia eadem rerum natura in singulis generibus eamdem similitudinem actu exhibuit in praeteritis, quam producet supervenerint in futuris. Et ideo nihil novum est in rerum generibus sub sole, cujus similitudo non praecessit. Nec valet quisquam dicere: Hoc recens est, quantum ad similitudinem generis sui. Jam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos in genere suo, cujus ipsum est. Et tamen fluunt omnia, nec permanet quidquam sub sole. Et quae in dispositione ordinantis fixa [0148A] sunt a nostra praesentia simul et a memoria in semetipsis transeuntia recedunt. Nam prius a praesentia nostra subtrahuntur, ut non subsistant per speciem; deinde etiam a memoria oblivione delentur, ut nec subsistant saltem per recordationem. Et ne forte dura corda hominum transitus praeteritorum ad contemptum rerum visibilium trahere non sufficeret, si illis sublatis ii qui praesentes sunt de statu suo fiduciam habere potuissent. Ideo postquam illorum transitum commemorando ait: Non est priorum memoria, statim istorum etiam interitum demonstrat, dicens: Sed nec eorum qui post nos futuri sunt. Nam si post nos futuri sunt, alii profecto constat quod nos qui modo subsistimus, cum venerint qui post nos futuri sunt, et nos quoque eadem [0148B] forte sublati, etiam in recordationem viventium tunc nequaquam veniemus. Quid ergo nobis prodest, quod illis qui per mortem sublati sunt, in hanc vitam successimus; quia et nos quoque cum tempus nostrum advenerit descendentes, alios successores relinquemus. Si ergo scire volumus quales erimus apud eos qui post nos futuri sunt, consideremus quales modo apud nos sint qui nos ab hac vita jam olim sublati praecesserunt. Et ut omnis improbis mentibus spes praesentium tollatur, ii quoque qui post nos futuri sunt non permansuri dicuntur; nec in recordationem apud suos posteros venturi, ne vel hoc in consolationem pravis mentibus veniat, si is qui in semetipso stare non potest, saltem in suo haerede aut successore subsistat. Propterea, [0148C] praeteritorum, praesentium ac futurorum omnium unum ostendit interitum. Non est priorum memoria; sed nec eorum qui post nos futuri sunt erit recordatio, apud eos qui futuri sunt in novissimo, ut omnia vanitati subjiciat, et humanum animum ab amore eorum, quae sub sole videntur, ad desiderium aeternorum convertat.

## HOMILIA II. *De probatione vanitatis omnium sub coelo: per elementorum corruptionem, per rerum generationem, successionem, et eorum, quae fuerunt oblivionem.* (cont.)

Si quis autem simplici expositione contentus esse non velit, habet aliud quod in his verbis, quae supra exposita sunt, convenienter satis et forte manifestius intelligere possit. Quia enim dixerat nec oculum visu satiari, nec aurem impleri auditu, confestim causam adjungit, quare nec oculum visus, nec aurem possit implere auditus; quia videlicet [0148D] rerum transitoriarum species per sensum quidem advenientes, concupiscentiam excitant, sed cito fugientes transitu desiderium fraudant. De hoc enim transitu sententiam subjungit, dicens: Quid est quod fuit? Jam non est: praeteriit enim, et jam non est. Ipsum idem tale erit et id quod futurum est: nam et ipsum cum venerit pertransibit, et cum pertransierit amplius non erit. Quid est quod factum est? Etiam ipsum jam pertransiit, et non est ipsum. Ergo idem tale erit et illud quod faciendum est; quia et ipsum cum factum fuerit, pertransibit, et amplius non erit. Sed quaeri potest quare praeterita solum et futura commemoravit, cum praesentium rerum potius contemptum persuadere intendat? Sed hoc ipsum ad magnum contemptum pertinet eorum quae [0149A] videntur, quod ea solum in numero eorum commemorare voluit, quae sola sensus carnis praesentia comprehendit, quasi illa solum non esse videat, quae sola esse videntur, ut ne dicere quidem possit, quod est. Quod est, dum est, pene nihil est: nam praesentium momenta ita cursu festino et veloci elapsu fugiunt, ut etiam de se loquentium sermones exspectare non possint. Nam etsi aliquando ab interrogante secundum quid recte dici possit, est, a respondente tamen semper verius dicitur, fuit, et non est. Sic ipsa interrogatio responsionem quidem quaerit, quae nondum est. Sed responsio veniens interrogationem non invenit, quae jam non est. In vera igitur consideratione hoc solum quasi non esse vidit, quod solum esse videtur. Quia dum simul et [0149B] esse incipit ex eo quod nondum est, et esse desinit in id quod jam non est; pene nihil est, quod est. Et idcirco nequaquam interroga, quid sit quod est? quia et ipsum interrogantis est respondenti quantumvis proximo, fuit jam, et non est. Recte ergo dicitur: Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod faciendum est. Ac si diceret: Ex praeteritorum consideratione perpendite, quid debeatis de supervenientibus exspectare, idem enim est utrumque. Et quod fuit, et quod futurum est. Quod factum est, et quod faciendum est. Idem est, non per essentiam, sed per consimilem naturam. Quod enim fuit (quantum ad res), et quod factum est (quantum ad actiones) utrumque pertransiit. Et non est jam vel quod factum [0149C] est. Similiter quod futurum est in rebus, et quod faciendum est in actionibus, totum pertransibit, et non erit aliquid sub sole perpetuum. Unde hoc? Quia eadem est conditio praeteritorum, et eorum quae futura sunt, et natura consimilis. Nihil enim novum est sub sole, nec valet quisquam dicere: Ecce hoc recens est. Jam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos. Et quia similis conditio est; ergo sicut praeterita, sic et futura. Et qualia sunt putas ipsa praeterita? Audi qualia: Non est, inquit, priorum memoria. Ergo non solum praesentia eorum interitu sublata est, sed memoria quoque oblivione deleta est. Magna ruina. Talia sunt et ipsa, quae futura sunt. Nam et eorum qui post nos futuri [0149D] sunt, non erit recordatio apud eos qui futuri sunt in novissimo. Veraque sententia est: Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas.

## HOMILIA III. *Quomodo Ecclesiastes probet per sua opera omnia hominum opera vana, cum praedictorum epilogo.*

*Ego Ecclesiastes fui rex Israel in Hierusalem: et proposui in animo meo quaerere et investigare sapienter de omnibus quae fiunt sub sole.* Sermones sapientium et aenigmata eorum scrutari, et eam quae intrinsecus abscondita est sapientiae dulcedinem ad gustum elicere, speciemque ejus in lucem proferre quis potens est? Scriba doctus in regno coelorum *qui profert de thesauro suo nova et vetera [n: (Matth. XIII)]*, si nobis adveniat, ecce ille qui dedit Deus sapientiam [0150A] et intelligentiam adaperire eam et manifestare, ut sciant homines, quoniam in ipsa est vita. Sed nos quid sumus? tenebrae ad lucem ut comprehendere cogitemus quod abscondit Deus ab oculis hominum, amicis suis revelare secretum sapientiae suae. Quid facimus nos? Ergo non meditabimur in mandatis ejus, neque investigabimus semitas illius, et requiescere poterit cor nostrum donec inveniat illam. Tantum ipsis sermonibus persequamur illam: et si forte inventio differatur, pascat interim nos inquisitio illius super omnia; si inventam non possumus, tamen quaesitam doceamus. Ecce Ecclesiastes noster hucusque de rerum mutabilium vanitate disputans brevi sermone tam multa complexus est, ut in illis ejus verbis hoc nobis mirabile appareat, quo pacto [0150B] totum et de toto totum, ita dictum sit, ut ad brevitatem quidem nihil minus; ad evidentiam vero nihil amplius dicendum videatur. Sed hoc sapientia fecit quae in toto tota est, et in singulis tota. Nec in singulis tota contrahitur, nec in toto tota dilatatur; sed tanta in singulis quanta in toto, et in toto talis qualis tota in singulis, quia nec unitas minor se esse potest, nec immensitas major. Ipsa ergo sapientia in hoc brevi sermonis corpore totam universitatis effigiem expressit, ut parvi in parvo magnum videamus, quia in seipso totum non possumus. Et vidimus illic totum mundum, et agnovimus vere universorum nihil esse quod maneat, sed fluere ac pertransire omnia quae sub sole sunt, veramque constare sententiam, quod omnia vanitas. Nunc ergo [0150C] postquam nobis demonstravit qualia sint ea quae nobiscum facta sunt, transit ut doceat nos quid sentire debeamus, aut exspectare de iis quae a nobis fiunt. Quia si id quoque vanitati subjectum est quod Deus fecit, dubitari non potest omnino vanum esse, et multo magis vanum, quod homo vanitas facit. Hoc est quod modo ingreditur demonstrare omnia videlicet opera hominum quae sub sole fiunt vana esse, et nihil amplius habere hominem de universo labore suo quo laborat sub sole. Ut autem suae assertioni fidem faciat, seipsum in exemplum proponit omnium quae dicturus est, asserens se cuncta quae loquitur experimento didicisse ac probasse vera. Et idcirco talem proponit suam personam, [0150D] ut non incredibile videatur harum rerum omnium eum experimentum habere potuisse. Propterea potentiam et dignitatem suam demonstrat rex Israel in Hierusalem. Sapientiam quoque ostendit. Et praecessi sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem. Divitias enumerat, domos, vineas, hortos, pomaria, piscinas, servos, ancillas, armenta, greges, aurum, argentum. Postremo ne quid defuisse putetur, luxum quoque et voluptatem adjungit. Cantores, cantatrices et delicias filiorum hominum: et omnia, inquit, quae desideraverunt oculi mei non negavi eis, nec prohibui cor meum quin omni voluntate sua frueretur in iis quae paraveram. Et in iis omnibus per omnia rerum experimenta cucurrisse, nihilque se praeter vanitatem et [0151A] spiritus afflictionem curamque superfluam invenisse testatur in cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Quae autem sint illa quae fiunt sub sole, supra jam dictum est. Sed ut competentius sermo ad ea quae sunt dicenda transeat, breviter nunc et summatim repetemus quae dicta sunt.

Per solem namque tempus significari ostendimus, propterea quia per solem praecipue omnis temporum mutabilitas atque vicissitudo distinguitur, ut idem intelligatur per id quod dictum est, sub sole, ac si dictum fuisset sub tempore. Rursum, ut evidentius pateret quae essent illa quae sub tempore facta auctor vanitatis argueret, distinximus alia esse quae facta sunt cum tempore, alia quae facta sunt in tempore. Eorum item quae facta sunt in tempore, [0151B] alia facta sunt in tempore, non sub tempore, alia in tempore, et sub tempore. Et ea quidem quae facta sunt sub tempore, magis subjecta sunt tempori, et obnoxia mutabilitati, quia in tempore coeperunt et pariter finientur in tempore, atque ideo ne se ad aeternitatem aliquatenus extendant quodammodo tempore concluduntur; quia eorum tempus et praecessit initium, et subsequitur finem. Tamen in his ne prorsus vanitas dominetur, et non inveniat veritas sub sole ubi caput reclinet [n: (Matth. VIII)], excepimus quaedam ex his quae fiunt sub tempore, et eis si vanitatem prorsus non tollimus, servire tamen vanitati prohibemus. Eorum quippe quae fiunt sub tempore, alia fiunt pro tempore, alia fiunt pro aeternitate. Et ea quae sub tempore fiunt pro tempore, [0151C] actu et fructu vana sunt. Ea vero quae sub tempore pro aeternitate fiunt, actu quodammodo vana sunt, sed fructu non sunt; quoniam et si transeant in opere, permanent tamen in retributione. Quapropter ejusmodi etsi plene vanitatem non evaserunt, non tamen vanitati sed veritati serviunt; neque in eis omnino vanum est quod sunt, quia vanitas non est pro quo sunt. Illa vero quae sub tempore et pro tempore fiunt, prorsus vanitati subjecta sunt; quia, et quod in illis est vanum est, et vanitas pariter quod ex illis est. Et haec sunt illa de quibus in praesenti agitur. In quibus sub sole nihil praeter vanitatem et afflictionem spiritus, vel cum fiunt, vel cum facta sunt: ab eis, qui transitoria diligunt, invenitur.

## HOMILIA IV. *De rerum vanitate, et hominum occupatione pessima.*

[0151D]

Et tamen in his ipsa vanitas quasi per quosdam gradus ad incrementum consurgit, et corruptio velut a modico excrescens, paulatim aucta semper in pejus procedit. Nam in eis prima origo vanitatis invenitur, curiositas, deinde cupiditas, postremo voluptas. Inter quas prima quidem ad concupiscentiam oculorum pertinet; secunda ad ambitionem saeculi; tertia ad concupiscentiam carnis. Per quas videlicet vanitates humanus animus a summa veritate defluens in tantum praecipitatur, ut carnalibus tandem desideriis pressus totusque voluptatum illecebris [0152A] devinctus suae originis non solum per se reminisci non valeat, sed nec admonitus quidem velle possit aut non esse quod male est, aut esse quod male non est. Nam quod est, male est, et quod esse deberet, male non est. Et quod vult aut non esse, quod est, aut esse quod non est: hoc utroque pejus est. Hoc igitur noster Ecclesiastes exemplo sui demonstrare hic incipit, scilicet qualiter humanus animus per hos errorum gradus a summa veritate in vanitatem corruat, et ipso suo vitio se propellente semper in deterius eat. Veritati enim inhaerere, et ipsam propter se diligere veritatem, verum bonum ejus esse debuerat. Cum ergo veritatem deserit et se ab illa, adversionem mentis deflectit, hanc primum repulsus, erroris sui poenam patitur, ut [0152B] ipsam quam in se, et propter se amare noluit veritatem, jam pro vanitate quaerere incipiat, et quia desiit illud unum contemplari in quo omnia videret, modo non tam veritatem quam novitatem affectans, multa scire concupiscat. Quia enim illam in qua vera mentis refectio est internam contemplationem perdidit, in earum, quae foris sunt rerum cognitione quasi cibum intelligentiae esuriendo requirit. Sed quia in eis, quae extrinsecus apparent universis nequaquam perfecta cognitio veritatis inveniri potest, incipit miser defectus sui aerumna languens, quasi quodam fastidio de aliis semper ad alia appetenda discurrere, et priora abjiciens quasi vacua, et sterilia sperat se desiderii sui effectum in iis quae supersunt posse obtinere, tam stultus et caecus, ut cum [0152C] se in iis semper frustrari videat, nec unquam ad desiderii finem pertingere, nequaquam tamen haec aliquando quasi vana et infructuosa cesset ambiri. Sed hujus tam impudentis desiderii et stultae curiositatis, qua se in cognitione visibilium rerum supervacue extendit, et sui Creatoris cognitionem in qua sola vera beatitudo constat, aut habitam negligit, aut non habitam quaerere dissimulat, justa tamen poena subsequitur; quoniam ibidem ubi perverse delectationem quaerit, nihil praeter dolorem et spiritus afflictionem invenit. In tanta enim occupatione majorem viribus difficultatem reperiens, quasi quodam pondere anxietatis suae opprimitur, quia dum eum ad quaerendam in hujusmodi sapientiam ubi inveniri non potest, desiderium impellit, multitudine pariter [0152D] distrahitur et profunditate reverberatur. Hic est ergo labor et afflictio spiritus, quo mens stulta et impudens merito pro sua temeritate atteritur, dum non solum Creatorem suum obliviscens, sed semetipsam quoque negligens, in rebus infimis, quae ad salutem non pertinent, investigandis occupatur. Et tamen aliquando scientia tali vanitate quaesita, tantoque labore ex parte quantulacunque inventa, animum per superbiam inflat, et de curiositate ad elationem quasi de vanitate ad vanitatem praecipitat. Quae videlicet elatio ambitionem saeculi inducens, dum laudis cupidum efficit, ad amorem pompae et gloriam divitiarum animum accendit, ut dum de boni interioris gloria ad appetitum exterioris labitur, semper [0153A] ad deteriorem vanitatem praecipitetur. Sed neque hic stare potest semel coepta corruptio. Nam bona carnis sicut prius dum non habentur, ut quaeri debeant, cupido blandiuntur per speciem; ita postea dum possidentur fractum enerviter, et emollitum usu illiciunt ad voluptatem. Sicque miser animus post amorem vanae laudis, post ardorem magis vanae cupiditatis, novissimae ad appetitum voluptatis inflammatur, ut jam etiam in carne vanitatem seminare incipiat, ut post de carne caro factus fructum vanitatis in corruptione metat. Hic est enim fructus vanitatis, ut mens misera tandem carnalibus desideriis obruta, et voluptate carnalium desideriorum sopita, intantum obdormiat ut jam nunc sapientiam non solum veritate, sed nec specie quidem requirat. [0153B] Tantoque avidius totam se ad carnis voluptatem male dulcem experiendam effundat quanto magis interius fatigata, et ab inquisitionis suae intentione repulsa, de invenienda veritate desperat. Et quia supra se tendens per inquisitionem labore se atque difficultate nimia succubuisse considerat ad aliam se, et quae sine labore haberi valeat consolationem tota aviditate relaxat, sed, et ibi quoque vanitatem inveniens, requiescere non sinitur; quia in carnis voluptate fugientem delectationem nec cum praesens est retinere potest, nec cum praeterierit revocare. Sicque undique fatigata et dissipata procella vanitatis suae concutitur, ut per idipsum quo male delectata abiit, salubriter tandem afflicta redire compellatur. Et saepe gravis quaedam sit lucta in animo, ut dum [0153C] se in infimis delectari pariter, et affligi considerat, magno desiderio amore libertatis dilecta etiam, si fieri possit, deserere concupiscat. Hanc igitur luctam, et tumultuationem humanae mentis per varia vitae mortalis studia, in verbis sequentibus omnium causam in se per sententiam transumens Ecclesiastes exprimet: et qualiter de vanitate curiositatis ad vanitatem pompae, et ambitionis, ac deinde ad vanitatem voluptatis corruat, ostendet sicut in serie libri ac ordine demonstratur. Sed quia, quae in praefatione dicenda erant, explevimus: nunc ad exponenda verba narrationis ejus revertamur.

## HOMILIA V. *De dictorum verborum Ecclesiastae litterali et morali expositione.*

[0153D]

*Ego Ecclesiastes fui rex Israel in Hierusalem.* Primum mihi hoc nequaquam praetereundum videtur, quod quidam hunc librum Salomonem in poenitentia existimant conscripsisse: et quod idcirco in eo vanitatem mundanarum rerum, et maxime carnalis voluptatis tam studiose arguat; quoniam ipse experimento cuncta didicerit deliciarum luxu corruptus, et blandimentis seductus mulierum. Et quod idcirco noluit dicere: Rex sum Israel in Hierusalem; quia deposita regni purpura, de solio suo jam descenderat, contemptaque quam male tenuerat potestate, in habitu poenitentiae reatum suum plangebat, ideoque ait: rex fuit in Hierusalem. Atque utinam hoc verum esse constaret, et tam certum de [0154A] poenitentia illius, quam non dubium de culpa testimonium haberemus! Nunc autem, quia dubia pro certis affirmare non possumus; illa quae dubia non sunt prosequamur. Ego Ecclesiastes. Seipsum, ut diximus, in exemplum proponit omnium, quae dicturus est, quatenus verbis illius eo citius auditores fidem adhibeant, quod cum non audiendo solum, sed experiendo intelligunt didicisse, quae docuit. Ac si diceret. Ego qui vos doceo expertus sum universa quae dico. Nam, quae sit vanitas in culmine terrenae potestatis, quis scire melius potuit? Ego quippe fui rex Israel in Hierusalem. Satis magna sublimitas in tanto populo, et in tam nobili ac famosa civitate regnare, seque in regni solio videre cunctis, et potestate Dominum, et honore praelatum. Et haec quorsum? [0154B] Fui, inquit. Quasi dicat: Jam non sum; quia etsi sum, idipsum jam nihil esse agnosco quod sum. Et quomodo ad id pervenerit ut nihil se esse agnosceret, deinde prosequitur dicens:

*Proposui in animo meo quaerere, et investigare prudenter de omnibus, quae fiunt sub sole.* Quasi diceret: Ego exterius potestate tumidus et interius scientia inflatus, altiora me quaerere conatus sum. Sed ubi inaniter praesumendo supra me tumui, ibi deficiendo veraciter directionem mei agnovi. Proposui in animo meo quaerere et investigare sapienter de omnibus, quae fiunt sub sole. Magnum propositum si ad effectum venire potuisset, sed mens humana quomodo ad tanta sufficeret? Magna igitur superbia mortalem hominem de tam multis praesumere, et [0154C] rursum magna curiositas tam multa appetere. Proposui, inquit. Videte quomodo elationem sonant omnia. Non ait, cogitavi; sed proposui, ut saltem venialis fuisset, et humana tentatio si subito ac transitorie, sicut nonnunquam solet, tumida cogitatio animam tangeret: et tamen per consensum recepta, vel approbata non fuisset. Nunc vero non solum elata, verum etiam caeca mens, ad tantum erroris profundum corruit, ut non solum id quod inordinatum erat facere cogitaret, sed etiam id quod impossibile fuerat implere se posse praesumeret. Proposui in animo meo. Ingens conatus. Et quae? Quaerere, et investigare. Quaerere ignota, et investigare profunda. Quomodo? sapienter. O cor insipiens! [0154D] Ergo sapientiam non quaeris, sed tantummodo per sapientiam, quaerere te profiteris: hoc enim dixisti: Proposui in animo meo quaerere, et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Si ergo sapienter quaeras, per sapientiam quaeres. Et dicis: Utique sic; per sapientiam quaeram. Male enim quaererem, si per sapientiam non quaererem. Nam si sine sapientia quaererem, etiamsi sapientiam quaererem, insipienter quaererem. Sapientiam vero insipienter quaerere, idipsum jam sapere non esset, sed desipere. Quapropter sapienter quaeram, et per sapientiam quaeram, et sapientiam quaeram. Dic ergo mihi sapientiam per quam quaeres, ubi quaeres? et per quam sapientiam quaeres sapientiam. Per quam quaeris? Jam, inquit, habeo sapientiam [0155A] per quam quaeram et ideo per sapientiam quam habeo, quaeram; et sapientiam per quam quaeram, non quaeram. Quid quaeres? De cunctis, quae fiunt sub sole. Quid est de cunctis? Quare non dixisti cuncta quae fiunt sub sole? Quia, inquit, majus aliquid, et multo majus proposui. Nam ea quae fiunt sub sole cuncta visibilia sunt, et ideo si magnum est, summum tamen non est quaerere et investigare ea quae oculo comprehendi possunt. Idcirco illa non quaeram, sed de illis quaeram. Quaerere et investigare de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Non illa quae videntur, sed de illis quae videntur illa quae non videntur. Non illa, quae fiunt sub sole, quae videntur; sed de illis, quae fiunt sub sole, rationes et causas eorum, quae non videntur. Haec ergo proposui, [0155B] quaerere, et investigare sapienter de cunctis, quae fiunt sub sole. Magnam profecto sapientiam habes. Quis tibi tantam sapientiam dedit? Homo es tu, et quaeres sapienter de cunctis, quae fiunt sub sole? Unde tibi talis sapientia: Deus, inquis, dedit. Videamus modo. Non enim indiscussus pertransibis. Volumus enim prius scire utrum possis de semetipso rationem reddere, qui cum tanto proposito advenisti, ut putes eorum, quae fiunt sub sole, omnium rationem investigare. Dic ergo in illa sapientia, per quam rationem omnium investigare proponis, tuam saltem possibilitatem adhuc agnoscere potuisti: ego, inquit, nisi sperassem me ipsam rem posse ad effectum perducere, quod omnino impossibile crederem, et si facere cogitarem, nequaquam [0155C] tamen me facturum proponerem. O cor insipiens! Hoc est quod dixi; quia non cognovisti te, idcirco praesumpsisti appetere quod erat supra te, in altero caecum, in altero tumidum, in utroque stultum. Tu ergo investigabis sapienter de cunctis, quae fiunt sub sole. Investiga modo, satage, da operam. Quaere, et invenies. Quid invenies? Sapientiam invenies. Quam sapientiam? Ut cognoscas tuam stultitiam. Quaeres enim et non invenies quod quaeres; laborabis et non proficies, et sola vexatio dabit intellectum auditui.

## HOMILIA V. *De dictorum verborum Ecclesiastae litterali et morali expositione.* (cont.)

*Hanc enim occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut [distendantur] occuparentur in ea.* Recte et juste, ut quia in veritate stare noluerunt [0155D] per multiplicitatem divisi distendantur et occupentur in vanitate. Propterea, inquit, vidi cuncta, quae fiunt sub sole, et ecce universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus, Deo gratias. Modo primum sapere coepisti. Modo video te sapientiam habere, per quam possis quaerere, et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Sapienter enim invenisti et sapienter intellexisti quod universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus. Velim tamen scire unde ista tibi poenitudo tam subita. Magnum quoddam exspectavimus, et illud propositum grande omnes non attentos et exspectantes jam fecerat. Quis enim de tanta promissione exiguum aliquid exire posse putaret? Quaerere, et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Et qui postea: Hanc occupationem pessimam [0156A] dedit Deus filiis hominum, ut distendantur in ea. Quam occupationem dicis? Hanc inquis, ut proponant in animo suo quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Quare ergo tu hanc occupationem pessimam dicis: Quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole? Tolle, ait, sapienter. Non enim occupatio pessima, esset sapienter, quaerere et investigare de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Sed quis hoc potest? Supra hominis sensum est causas investigare omnium et comprehendere rationem universorum quae fiunt sub sole. Ergo proponi potest, fieri non potest quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Multa enim latent et absconduntur plurima et cuncta reservantur in posterum, nec debet investigari [0156B] quod fieri non licet. Ergo quod non potest sapienter fieri, non potest sapienter proponi, etiamsi proponitur sapienter fieri. Ego igitur insipienter proposui quod sapienter facere non potui, quaerere et investigare de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Utrobique insipiens, et dum proposui quod non potui, et dum feci quod non debui, tertia adjuncta insipientia: quod utrumque ignoravi. Quaesivi tamen et investigavi quod quaerere et investigare proposui, quaesivi, et non inveni quod quaesivi. Aliquid tamen inveni: scilicet non posse me quod credidi, et ibi agnovi quod hanc occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut distendantur in ea. Ergo insipientem fuisse profuit; sed tamen insipientia, sapientia non fuit. Data est tamen insipientia, ut ad sapientiam [0156C] erudiat filios hominum. Dimissi sunt sibi, ut agnoscant se, et agnoscentes damnent, et fugiant quod facti sunt ex se. Hanc ergo occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut distendantur in ea. Quia enim mens hominis in illo uno bono stare noluit, in quo potuit feliciter requiescere, et sine distractione vel occupatione, summae veritatis plenitudinem possidere, projecta foras extra semetipsam in multiplicitatem rerum visibilium spargitur, et veritatem quam intus caecata a fonte haurire non potest, quasi per rivulos quosdam visibilium arescentibus praecordiis saltem fugere conatur. Sed quo magis se foras per intentionem ad visibilia fundit tanto magis intus ab invisibilium cognitione tenebrescit; [0156D] quia dum amplius per exteriora spargitur, magis ab interioribus aversa caecatur. Unde bene Cain cum scelus suum detectum cerneret, et majori scelere reprobus, de venia sceleris desperaret, legitur dixisse ad Dominum. *Ecce ejicies me hodie a facie terrae! et a facie tua abscondar: et ero vagus et profugus super terram [n: (Gen. IV)]*. Reproba etenim mens ejecta a facie Domini absconditur, dum se per exteriora spargens, tanto magis ab interni luminis aspectu tegitur, quanto magis in iis quae foris sunt, cogitandis semper occupata tenetur. Unde bene illic dicitur, vagus et profugus. Vagus enim per inordinatam concupiscentiam, et profugus per peccatricem conscientiam, dum se in concupiscentia per cogitationem dividit, et in conscientia per desperationem [0157A] avertit, ipse sibi peccator ne redire valeat, ad se lumen veritatis abscondit. Ergo hanc occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut distendantur in ea. Quare dedit, ut distendantur in ea? Ut se tendant et distendant, laborent et deficiant, et revertantur et sanet eos. Si enim in occupatione sua non distenderentur neque laborarent, dulcis fieret nimis ipsa occupatio, et nollent illam deserere, neque redire amplius, concupiscerent ubi veritas est. Propterea dedit illis occupationem pessimam Deus, ut distendantur in ea. Agamus pietati ejus gratias, quia laborare nos fecit in malo nostro, in aversione nostra; quia sepivit spinis viam nostram ut revertamur et convertamur ad ipsum virum et sponsum et amicum animae nostrae, quia bene erat nobis tunc [0157B] magis quam nunc. Hoc autem non intelleximus nos et putavimus nobis bene esse cum male erat. Et ideo aspersit ipse amaritudinem et absinthium, et fel in poculum dedit super male dulcem et blandientem ad mortem aversionem nostram et occupationem pessimam. Et dedit hanc occupationem pessimam filiis hominum ut distendantur in ea. Occupatio enim est distractio et illigatio mentium quae avertit et dissipat et illaqueat animas ne cogitare pervaleant ea quae salutis sunt, et ideo occupatio. Quare pessima? Quia est et alia mala occupatio, sed non pessima; et ipsa est quae circa necessitates vitae mortalis versatur, et sollicita est erga plurima; et ipsa occupatio mala est; et ut amplius aliquid dicamus, ipsa malitia est, ut de illa recte dictum intelligatur: *Sufficit diei malitia [0157C] sua. [n: (Matth. VI)]*. Haec ergo occupatio miseriae vitae mortalis necessaria est; postea a gloria vitae immortalis absorbenda: et ideo mala est ad miseriam, sed mala non ad culpam; quoniam si poenam habent a beatitudine alienam, culpam non habet justitiae ac veritati contrariam. Occupatio autem curiositatis qua se mens ad illicita extendit, et instat scrutari et investigare quod ei scire aut non convenit, aut noxium est: ipsa est pessima occupatio, quia, dum se dilatat ultra mensuram, aut affectum capit, et animum per inanem scientiam inflat; aut si apprehendere non valet per dilationem et desperationem fatigat.

## HOMILIA VI. *Quid sit distendi in occupatione pessima.*

[0157D] *Hanc ergo occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut distendantur in ea.* Quid est distendantur? Exterius intumescant, interius inanes fiant. Nam quod distenditur foris quidem majus apparet; sed unde extrinsecus incrementum accepisse cernitur, inde veraciter interius soliditatem amisisse comprobatur. Dum enim ultra se pertingere nititur in id quod non est, in semetipso deficere incipit, et inanescere ab eo quod est. Sic nimirum mens humana dum per curiositatem ad inquirenda ea quae extra ipsam sunt, tenditur ne semetipsam considerare valeat, ipsa suae inquisitionis occupatione praepeditur. Hanc ergo occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum ut distendantur in ea. O pessima [0158A] occupatio! o distentio perniciosa! quo trahis animum? Quantum promittis, et quantum tollis? Promittis homini totum quod ipse non est, et tollis totum quod ipse est. Quid si totum dares quod promittis, et totum tolleres, quod tollis? *Quid enim prodest homini si universum mundum lucretur, animae vero suae detrimentum patiatur? [n: (Matth. VI.)]* Quanto magis modo, quia fallaciter totum promittis, et veraciter totum tollis? Pessima es distendens et dissipans, affligens et crucians animos: quibus dominaris illa semper appetenda suggerens, quorum inquisitio aut noxia sit, aut vana; inventio vero multo magis aut inutilis, aut perniciosa. Si ergo dulcis esses, et sine labore animos possidere valeres, quis malitiam tuam unquam deprehenderet? Nunc autem [0158B] ipse labor et afflictio quam mentibus ingeris odiosam te faciunt, et facilius quod promittis vanum esse agnoscitur, dum id quod infers durum esse sentitur. Sic multos erudis ad sapientiam, qui tunc demum plene deprehendunt, quanta post te sequatur vanitas, cum sentire coeperint experiendo quanta in te lateat laborantibus difficultas. Propterea iste adjunxit et ait: *Vidi quae fiunt cuncta sub sole, et ecce universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus [n: (Eccle. I)]*. Vidi, inquit, ubi, vidisti? Quis te docuit? Faciendo, inquit, vidi; experiendo cognovi. Quid fecisti? *Preposui,* ait, *in animo meo quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole [n: (Ibid.)]*. Et ecce quaerere coeperam et investigare, et existimavi me in tam operoso studio exitum aliquem invenire. Extendi [0158C] ergo animum meum quantum potui; cogitationem meam in omnia circumlustranda diffudi. Abstuli somnum ab oculis meis, nec dedi requiem cordi meo nocte ac die donec invenirem quod quaerebat anima mea, ut invenirem rationem de omnibus quae fiunt sub sole. Sed quis finis in tantis conatibus esse potuisset? Feci et defeci, conabar et repellebar, donec contabuit anima mea et sensus contenebrati sunt, quoniam in tanta rerum multitudine et veri latentis profunditate, dum intellectus et spargi inciperet et reverberari, pondus laboris et inextricabilis luctae angustiam ultra sustinere non valui. Tunc in memetipsum reversus et quasi repulsus ab illo cui obniti conabar denso ac immeabili latentis naturae invio; cogitare coepi stultum [0158D] esse et vanum illarum rerum scientiam tam pertinaci studio hominem mortalem quaerere, quae non solum extra ejus naturam factae sunt, sed nec saluti ejus sive sciantur adjicere quidquam possunt, sive nesciantur auferre. Ibi ergo vidi quod hanc occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis hominum; ut distendantur in ea, quia cuncta quae fiunt sub sole, universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus. Nam quia fructum non habent, vana sunt, et quia affligunt, noxia. Possidentes quippe non adjuvant, et quaerentes se affligunt. Sine labore enim quaeri non possunt, sed possunt sine utilitate possideri. Animus namque statim ut cura ac desiderio quaerendi atque inveniendi ea occupatus fuerit, et se per curiositatis [0159A] studium ac sollicitudinem cupiditatis in ea diffuderit digna temeritatis suae poena affligendus; et multiplicitate spargitur, et difficultate reverberatur. Vidi ergo cuncta quae sub sole fiunt, et ecce universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus. Vidi et hoc ipsum vanum fuisse quod proposui in animo meo, quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Vidi vanum esse quod occupantur filii hominum occupatione pessima ut distendantur in ea: et hoc totum vidi cum expertus sum, et vidi quantus labor et afflictio spiritus esset in eo quod proposui in animo meo, quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole. Et vidi quia universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus in omnibus quae fiunt sub sole. Haec ergo vidi. Quare autem similiter [0159B] non vident omnes filii hominum occupationem pessimam, quam dedit eis Deus ut distendantur in ea, ut intelligant et videant vanitatem et afflictionem spiritus, in omnibus quae fiunt sole? Quare laborant et non sentiunt; affliguntur ac dissipantur; et distenduntur in occupatione pessima, et non intelligunt vanitatem suam et afflictionem spiritus in omnibus quae fiunt sub sole? Quia, inquit, perversi difficile corriguntur. De quo dicamus latius.

## HOMILIA VII. *Quod perversi difficile corrigantur,* etc.

*Perversi difficile corriguntur.* Idcirco non possunt intelligere, quia perversi sunt, et ideo laborant et non sentiunt, et delectantur in afflictione sui *(Job [0159C] XXX)*, et putant bene sibi esse, dum male est. In tantum enim perversi sunt, ut judicium veritatis non sit in eis; putantes *bonum* esse quod *malum* est, et quod *bonum* est *malum ponentes tenebras lucem, et lucem tenebras;* existimantesque *amarum dulce; et dulce amarum [n: (Isa. V)]*. Delicias enim esse computant sub sensibus; et idcirco amant dolores suos, et se voluntarios ingerunt ad occupationem pessimam et distenduntur in ea; quia dum caeca mente quod falso delectare videtur, appetunt, quod vere cruciat et affligit, non attendunt. Propterea ergo non vident vanitatem suam et afflictionem spiritus in omnibus quae fiunt sub sole; quia perversi sunt et difficile corriguntur. Et *stultorum infinitus est numerus.* Non solum enim aversi sunt, sed etiam [0159D] perversi. Aversi a Deo; in semetipsis perversi. Et aversi non facile convertuntur, quia perversi difficile corriguntur. Nam si in semetipsis corrigerentur, per semetipsos converterentur. Quia si prius judicium veritatis in semetipsis reciperent, suo postmodum judicio vanitatem fugiendam et veritatem sequendam esse viderent. Nunc autem nec aversi lumen veritatis vident, nec perversi per lumen veritatis vident, et ideo difficile corriguntur, quia rectitudinem et veritatem nec absentem quaerere sciunt, nec praesentem approbare. Ideo perversi difficile corriguntur, et stultorum infinitus est numerus. Tam multi enim non essent si facile corrigi potuissent. Et in hoc manifeste ostenditur quam difficilis sit perversorum correctio quod infinita est [0160A] stultorum multitudo Nunc ergo perversi et stultitam sunt ad correctionem perversitate difficiles, quam multitudine contra veritatem audaces; et ideo perversi difficile corriguntur, et stultorum infinitus est numerus. Vis, inquit, scire quam difficile perversi corrigantur? Cape me. Ego hodie tibi omnium exemplum fiam. Nam et ego aliquando perversus fui et non intellexi ipse perversitatem meam; sed putavi me rectum esse, et recte agere quando *proposui in animo meo quaerere et investigare sapienter de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole;* nec erat tunc aliqua consideratio veritatis in me, quae me corrigeret et cohiberet; ne excedere tentarem mensuram meam, neque appetere praesumerem quae non sunt data hominibus scire et investigare. Descendi ergo in [0160B] *occupationem pessimam* quam *dedit Deus filiis hominum, ut* distendantur *in ea,* et dispersi animum meum in omnia, et cogitatione coepi per cuncta discurrere, ut quaererem et investigarem de cunctis quae fiunt sub sole: at non valui. Et coepi laborare et taedio vehementer affligi; et vidi quod mens mea quocunque se vertebat, dolore et amaritudine et sollicitudine replebatur, et erat labor quaerendi immensus, et inventionis fructus exiguus. Fiebat ergo ut tandem aliquando poena ipsa et afflictio magna, prudentem me facerent. *Et vidi cuncta quae sub sole fiunt et ecce universa vanitas et afflictio spiritus.* Cognovi ergo veritatem, et reprobavi vanitatem, quia sensi afflictionem. Et videbar jam in totum correctus de perversitate mea; sed erat adhuc aliud involumentum; [0160C] et nescivi quod perversi difficile corriguntur. Eram jam tunc correctus, ut de vanitate veritatem cognoscerem, et non eram correctus adhuc ne de veritatis cognitione superbirem. Excussa jam fuerat una erroris palea et restabat adhuc alia magis tenax atque inhaerens palea elationis. Tam difficile enim perversi corriguntur, ut correctionem et purgationem aut non admittant omnino, aut ad perfectum non recipiant. Propterea ego jam corrigi coeperam; sed nondum adhuc perfecte correctus eram; et ideo cognovi laborem praesumptionis meae, sed inventionis meae usum non cognovi. Cognovi vanam esse afflictionem, non profutura saluti quaerere; sed nondum cognovi vanam esse elationem [0160D] de inventis superbire.

Propterea *locutus sum in corde meo dicens: Ecce magnus effectus sum.* Nescivi enim, quoniam inflatione tumueram, et ideo magnus mihi videbar, et dixi in corde meo: Ecce magnus effectus sum. In corde dixi: De corde enim tumui, et ideo in corde dixi; quia in corde vidi unde tumui, ut ibi esset elatio, ubi erat causa elationis. Locutus sum in corde meo: Ecce magnus effectus sum. Quam magnus!

*Praecessi,* ait, *sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem.* Paulatim pergitur in corruptionem, et mens prava excrescente tumore in deterius semper praecipitatur. Primum de se plusquam debuit, sensit; deinde usque ad aliorum contemptum [0161A] venit. Praecessi sapientia omnes qui fuerant ante me in Hierusalem. Propterea ergo tumuisti et inflatus eras; quia praecessisti sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante te in Hierusalem. Et quantum hoc fuit ut ideo cervicem erigeres; quia praecessisti sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante te in Hierusalem? Ne mireris, inquit. Saepe superbia singularitate magis gaudet quam comparatione. Neque enim semper attendere curat elatio quales illi sint, quos in comparatione praecedit; quia hoc solum nonnunquam illi ad exaltationem abundat, quod inter omnes qui fuerunt ante eum in Hierusalem, nullum sibi aequalem agnoscit. Propter hoc igitur et ego videns quod praecessi sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem; et si paucos cernerem fuisse ante me in Hierusalem [0161B] sapientes, vehementer tamen gloriatus sum illis me superiorem in sapientia considerans; quoniam licet nec plurimi, nec magni illi fuerunt ante me, quibus factus sum comparatione praecipuus: vidi tamen multos post me venire posse sapientes in Hierusalem quibus fierem exemplo sapientiae primus. Quod ergo me sapientia praetuli in comparatione praecedentium: ad hoc quoque spectabat quod gloriabar exemplo praecipuo in auctoritatem constitui futurorum, ut praecedentibus quidem summus, subsequentibus vero primus sapientiae auctor invenirer. Et ideo locutus sum in corde meo, dicens: Ecce magnus effectus sum et praecessi sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem.

*Et mens mea contemplata est multa sapienter et [0161C] didici.* Ergo aliquantulum jam correctus eras, quia non dixisti, mens mea contemplata est omnia sapienter, sicut superius proposueras *quaerere et investigare sapienter de omnibus quae fiunt sub sole;* sed moderatius aliquid intulisti, dicens: Mens mea contemplata est multa sapienter, ut ostenderes te eruditum occupatione pessima, et vidisse vanitatem et afflictionem spiritus, ne amplius de universis praesumeres, sed tamen nondum plene correctum ut de plurimis non superbires. Quaerendo igitur omnia invenisti plurima, non omnia, et deficiendo ad omnia intellexisti non debere hominem de omnibus praesumere; sed inveniendo plurima non considerasti non debere hominem etiam de plurimis superbire. Ergo secundum aliquid correctus fuisti, et [0161D] secundum aliquid incorrectus, cum dixisti: Mens mea contemplata est multa sapienter et didici; quia licet multa fuerint ad pauca, et ipsa tamen pauca fuerunt ad omnia. Hoc vero ad humilitatem magis spectabat, ut qui jam defectum tuum expertus fueras erga omnia; inventa tua plurima non ad pauca aliorum plurima; sed pauca potius vocares ad ea, quae non potuisti, omnia. Sed quia temeritas curiositatis jam repressa erat per defectum et afflictionem sui in investigatione omnium; sed tumor elationis creverat in contemplatione plurimorum; ideo adhuc tumuisti et dixisti: Ecce magnus effectus sum, et praecessi sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem et mens mea contemplata est multa sapienter [0162A] et didici. Sed, quaeso te, si praecessisti sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante te in Hierusalem, a quo didicisti ut diceres: Mens mea contemplata est multa sapienter et didici? Si sapientior omnibus fuisti, a quo discere potuisti quod ipse non noveris? An propterea etiam sapientior omnibus fuisti; quia ab omnibus didicisti et omnium sapientia in te uno collecta est, ut inde praecederes sapientia de universis singulos, quod dicens a singulis doctores habuisti universos? An forte non ab hominibus didicisti; sed experimenta rerum te docuerunt quae mens tua contemplata est sapienter, ut inde contemplatio sapientiae rationi certior fieret quod hanc ipse rerum effectus experienti manifeste comprobaret? Neque enim congruere videtur typo tuo ut ab hominibus [0162B] disceres, qui in tantum supra homines aestimatione elevatus fueras, ut non solum multa sapienter, sed et universa quae sub sole fiunt quaerere et investigare putares: ergo contemplatus es et didicisti; quia cogitasti et probasti, quatenus eo majorem vim atque potentiam intelligentiae tuae demonstrares quo cuncta argumenta rationis tuae ad visibilia rerum experimenta evidentius produceres. Et forsitan iste voluntarie in sapientia sua stultus factus est, ut stultos sapientiam doceat. Non enim vias erroris sui tam diligenter nobis exponeret nisi in eodem suo errore nostri eruditionem cogitaret. Propterea ingeminat adhuc et commendat malam illam diligentiam suam, atque eam de qua tumuit, sapientiam qualiter adeptus sit, subjungit, [0162C] dicens:

*Dedique cor meum ut scirem prudentiam atque doctrinam, erroresque et stultitiam.* Quae verba sub eodem sensu duobus modis superioribus conjungi possunt; quia enim primum hanc elationem ostensurus, sic coeperat. Locutus sum in corde meo; ac deinde quid locutus sit subjungit. Ecce magnus effectus sum, et praecessi sapientia omnes, qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem; et mens mea contemplata est multa sapienter et didici; et postea id quod modo proposuimus intulit. Dedique cor meum ut scirem prudentiam atque doctrinam, errores et stultitiam. Potest haec tota series sub una continuatione comprehendi, ut totum hoc in corde suo dixisse intelligatur scilicet quod magnus effectus sit; et quod [0162D] omnes qui ante eum fuerunt in Hierusalem sapientia praecesserit; et quod mens ejus multa sapienter contemplata sit multaque didicerit; et quod cor suum dederit ut sciret prudentiam atque doctrinam, erroresque et stultitiam; et quod post haec omnia cum ita locutus esset in corde suo, et se extulisset de investigatione et consideratione tantarum rerum; tandem resipiscens agnoverit hanc quoque gloriationem vanam, et propter hoc subjungat:

## HOMILIA VII. *Quod perversi difficile corrigantur,* etc. (cont.)

*Et agnovi quod in his esset quoque vanitas et afflictio spiritus: eo quod in multa sapientia multa sit indignatio; et qui addit scientiam, addit et laborem.* Si quis autem distinguere velit sententiam, et hoc quod postremo intulimus seorsum a supradictis partiri, [0163A] potest sic a praecedentibus inferre, ut quasi ea quae supra dicta sunt, omnia locutus sit in corde suo, scilicet quod magnus effectus est, quod praecessit sapientia omnes qui fuerunt ante eum in Hierusalem, quod mens sua contemplata est multa sapienter et didicit; et cum haec omnia dixisset in corde suo, deinde altiora adhuc investiganda testatur; ac si diceret: Haec omnia quae supra dicta sunt locutus sum in corde meo, et cum haec universa locutus essem in corde meo, tunc demum ex praecedenti contemplatione fiduciam sumens dedi cor meum, ut adhuc altiora quaererem, et profundiora investigarem; ut scilicet scirem prudentiam atque doctrinam, erroresque et stultitiam. Quod autem dicit dedisse se cor suum sic intelligendum est, quod liberum illud [0163B] fecit et expeditum ut non per illa aut illa divideretur, sed totum propositae considerationi intenderet. In quo verbo etiam typum superbiae et tumorem elationis exprimit: quod cor suum contemplationi sapientiae dedisse se dicit; quasi illi possibilitas inveniendi verum protinus subesset, si tantum voluntas quaerendi non deesset. Ad quid autem dederit cor suum, exponit dicens: Ut scirem prudentiam atque doctrinam, erroresque et stultitiam. Superius multa se sapienter contemplatum fuisse et didicisse testatus est; nunc autem post haec omnia investigare disponit, ut sciat prudentiam, atque doctrinam, erroresque et stultitiam. Unde patet quod superiora ad rerum naturam referenda sunt; haec vero quae subjungit ad mores hominum, praepostero quidem ordine [0163C] usus; quia prius vita propria corrigenda erat per circumspectionem morum; ac deinde caeteris quae extra propriam naturam fuerunt, studium adhibendum, ut primum interiores cordis oculi mundarentur a vitiis, et postea aperirentur in contemplatione veritatis. Sed elatio quae foris magna apparere voluit, primum exteriora quaesivit, ut prius per exteriorem scientiam viam jactantiae aperiret, deinde etiam interiora sua scrutando ad ostentationem foras projiceret. Unde recte cum dixisset prudentiam se quaesisse, pariter adjunxit etiam doctrinam; quia mens gloriae et ostentationis cupida, nequaquam prudentiam circumspectionis ad bene vivendum, sed ad docendum habere voluit; et ideo scientiam prudentiae sine scientia doctrinae inutilem, sibi et infructuosam [0163D] fore reputavit. Quod autem etiam errores et stultitiam scire se voluisse fatetur: nequaquam ad hoc mala cognoscere voluit, ut cognita vitaret; sed ut et se de malorum cognitione extolleret, et alios de opere damnaret. Error vero est cum per ignorantiam malum committitur, stultitia autem cum malum cognitum non vitatur. Ergo et bona pariter et mala scire voluit, et cum scientia utrorumque doctrinam simul concupivit, ut totum quod mens per scientiam comprehenderet, per doctrinam ad ostentationem manifestare valeret. Sed perversus animus ubique nequitiae suae poenam inveniens, totum quod inordinate propter elationem appetiit, propter laborem et afflictionem spiritus refugit. [0164A] Nam quia hunc pariter, et curiositas ad inquisitionem impellebat, et superbia ad ostentationem; dignum erat ut et tumidum labor premeret, et curiosum occupatio dissiparet, quatenus in poena saltem vitium suum agnosceret, eumque etsi non amor virtutis, vel dolor afflictionis ad mensuram cohiberet. Propterea superius curiosus occupationem invenit; hic vero elatus laborem et afflictionem; quoniam dum mala et bona non ad aedificationem, sed ad elationem scire quaerit: ipsa ei cognitio testimonium fit pravitatis suae, ut ipsa iniquum per conscientiam arguat, quam elatus ad ostentationem quaerebat. Inde enim semetipsum despicere cogitur, unde in oculis aliorum magnus fieri conatur; quia dum amplius scire quaerit quod de veritate aliis insinuet, [0164B] magis in semetipso videt de pravitate quod damnet. Hinc ergo sibi ipsi animus indignatur et rixam quamdam ac luctam sumit contra se, quia turpitudinem vitiorum quam superbia despicit, pravitas defendit. In hac ergo hujusmodi conflictatione grandis superbiae labor nascitur et indignatio; quia, dum subjacere vitiis dedignatur, atque ea a se propellere nititur, ne perficere valeat quod vult, pravis suis desideriis superatur. Inde ergo jam ipsam etiam cognitionem veritatis abominari incipit, ut quia id quod in semetipsa odit, propter infirmitatem, non potest tollere, possit saltem per ignorantiam non videre. Propterea cum dixisset in sua scientia laborem et afflictionem invenisse, atque eadem afflictio et labor unde esset, exposuisset, dicens: Eo quod [0164C] in multa sapientia multa sit indignatio, et qui addit scientiam, addit et laborem, protinus qualiter per eamdem afflictionem spiritus et laborem et indignationem attritus et accidiatus ipsam scientiam superaverit; et animum suum ab inquisitione sapientiae ubi affligebatur ad delicias et voluptatem converterit, subjungit, dicens:

## HOMILIA VIII. *Quod homo a veritate aufugit: ut Adam in paradiso fugit, et abscondit se.*

*[n: (ECCLES. II.)] Dixi ego in corde meo: Vadam et affluam deliciis et fruar bonis.* Ecce qualiter desperata mens totam se in voluptatem projicit, et carnis blandimenta jam solum bona vocat, quia in eis laborem et afflictionem non invenit, quasi malam reputans [0164D] inquisitionem veritatis; in qua prius plus justo per curiositatem se distendens laboravit. Sed haec rursum existimatio, quia manifestam stultitiam praefert, citius deprehenditur; quia carnis voluptas quae appetenti dulcis visa est, statim ab experto reprobatur. Unde continuo infert, dicens:

*Et vidi quod hoc quoque esset vanitas. Risum reputavi errorem et gaudio dixi: Quid frustra deciperis?* Quanta autem vanitas in deliciis carnis sit, me supra dixisse memini. Unde reliqua quae sequuntur consideranda nobis sunt, quia et ipsa licet plana per se videantur, habent tamen fortasse aliquid quod diligens investigatio adjicere possit. Ait ergo: Risum reputavi errorem et gaudio dixi: Frustra deciperis? [0165A] Cunctis liquet quod per risum quodammodo concepta laetitia foras trahitur, et quod de gaudio intus latuit, ruptis velut modestiae claustris, quadam levitate et incontinentia lubricae mentis propalatur. Et idcirco recte risus error dicitur; quia cum mens gaudium suum per ineptam laetitiam foras fundit, quasi ad sinistram pergens rectum iter, quo in Deum gaudendo pergere debuerat, derelinquit. Sed sciendum est quod spiritale gaudium nequaquam animum ad risum dissolvit; sed ea tantum laetitia quae a carnis blandimento concipitur etiam per carnis motum facile aperitur. Nam quia primum ad animum ingrediendo inordinatum gaudium claustra continentiae rupit: eadem postmodum via qua illapsum est, cum introrsum excrescere coeperit, sine [0165B] modestia facile erumpit. Lubrica enim mens semen perversum, quod primum sine modestia concipit, quasi parturiens postmodum sine pudicitia, effundit; nec se continere potest, quin excrescentem intus laetitiam ejiciat, cujus integritatis claustra rupta sunt, quando eam concipiebat. Primum ergo decipitur, quando blandientis mundi illecebras intro ad gaudium suscipit; postea errat, quando conceptum introrsum gaudium ad lasciviam mundi per risum foras effundit. Notandum quod gaudium tantum arguitur, risus vero omnino reprobatur; quia risus omnimodo malus est: gaudium non semper malum est, nisi quando de malo est; et idcirco illum reprobat, hoc castigat, quatenus et id quod prorsus malum est caveatur, et id quod bonum esse potest corrigatur. [0165C] Propterea, inquit: Risum reputavi errorem et gaudio dixi: Quid frustra deciperis? Decipitur ergo, cum delectatur in rebus noxiis; et bene sibi esse putat, cum male est. Decipitur etiam cum praesentium occupatione delectationum involvitur, et ne futura mala considerare valeat, praepeditur.

Sed quare frustra? Frustra decipitur, quia ipse mundi delectationes a consideratione futurorum malorum cor avertere possunt; sed a pressura supervenientium liberare non possunt. Frustra etiam decipitur, quia fallacis boni gaudia in quibus exsultat, tantis amaritudinibus admista sunt ut jure displicere debeant, etiamsi debeant permanere. Frustra ergo utrobique decipitur; videlicet et cum malum non videt quod patitur, et cum non praevidet malum [0165D] quod patietur; quoniam et ratio manifesta est, quae illud bene consideranti judicare valeat; et experientia praesens, quae hoc patienti ostendat. Propterea infert et dicit:

## HOMILIA VIII. *Quod homo a veritate aufugit: ut Adam in paradiso fugit, et abscondit se.* (cont.)

*Cogitavi* ergo *in corde meo abstrahere a vino carnem meam, ut animum meum transferrem ad sapientiam, devitaremque stultitiam, donec viderem quid esset utile filiis hominum: quo facto opus est sub sole numero dierum vitae suae.* O cor humanum, ubi es? quomodo huc venisti, ut hoc nescias quid utile sit filiis hominum, quo facto opus est sub sole numero dierum vitae suae? Ubi es ut hoc ignores? *Ubi es Adam, ubi es? Audivi,* inquit, *vocem tuam et abscondi me [n: (Gen. III)]*. O abscondite, cui abscondisti te? O [0166A] abscondite, ubi es? Quam longe es, et quam prope es? Quam longe es ab illo, et quam prope es illi? Propterea ubi es? Ecce quaerit te Deus tuus et clamat: Ubi es? Tu te avertis ut lateas; et claudis oculos ne videas. Ille autem non videntem videns, et ideo non videntem; quia non videri cupientem: propter tuum affectum, non propter suum defectum clamat et dicit: Adam ubi es? Quaerit ergo te ut tu ipsum invenias, et quaerit te ut et tu ipsum quaeras et dicas: Domine, ubi es? Tu vero quid facis? Nam ipse si perdidit, tamen quaerit; si perdidit, non totum perdidit, quia videt quod perdidit: et ideo quaerit quod perdidit, quia videt quod perdidit. Non enim quaereret nisi videret. Tu autem quid? Adam ubi es? Tu perdidisti et totum; perdidisti, quia et perdidisti [0166B] ne habeas, et videre desisti ne requiras. Nam si vides quod non habeas, intelligis quid requiras. Nunc autem longe es et exsulas a veritate, ut non possis videre unde veneris et quo tibi redeundum sit. Propterea quaeris quid quaerere debeas; quia quid amiseris, ignoras. Quaeris quid utile sit filiis hominum: quo facto opus est sub sole numero dierum vitae suae! Oh! quam scire hoc debuisti! sed nunc absconditus es a veritate, latens sub umbra ignorantiae tuae; quia recessisti longe et noluisti cum illa esse, sine qua esse non potes. Nam, quia sine illa esse non potes, ideo quaeris; et quia aversus es et absconditus, propterea nescis quid quaerere debeas, cum tamen in hoc abscondi ab ea omnino non potuisti, ut non intelligas quaerendum tibi [0166C] esse cum videas et hoc deesse tibi quod quaeras. Intellige ergo te vel in hoc prorsus non esse absconditum; quia illa fugientem sequitur atque averso se ingerit, ac quaerendam docet cui se videndam non praebet. Quamvis et hoc ipsum extra veritatem non videas quod tibi quaerendum esse vides, quod deesse vides, licet hoc quid sit, non videas. Ergo in veritate vides quaerendum tibi esse quod veritatem esse non vides. Quare hoc? quia absconditus es. Nam si absconditus non esses, nihil praeter veritatem quaerendum esse videres; et ipsam veritatem non quaereres, sed haberes. Nunc absconditus es, et non vides; et tamen derelictus non es, quia quaerere admoneris quod non vides. Ideo dicitur tibi: Adam, ubi es? ut ad veritatem redeas, et invenias veritatem. [0166D] Noluisti stare in veritate; modo redi ad veritatem, quia stare non potes extra veritatem. Vagus, et profugus, et instabilis eris omnibus diebus quibus cum ipsa et in ipsa non fueris, nec inveniet cor tuum ubi requiescat, si in ipsa stare noluerit; quia nec stabit extra ipsam ut quaerat, nec inveniet praeter ipsam ut requiescat. Sursum, deorsum, longe et prope, quovis pergat: non inveniet requiem, donec illam inveniet. Quid tumultuaris, infelix? Rides, ploras, foveris, affligeris: quid ad sapientiam? Nam quia in lascivia et voluptate stultus fuisti, in afflictione miser eris. Quid amplius tibi conferre poterunt? *Vanitas vanitatum: vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas [n: (Eccle. I)]*. [0167A] Sed nondum ista cognoveras. Propterea sensu tuo et sapientia tua, quae apud ipsam stultitia est, inflatus magis quam solidus, obniti conabaris, et existimasti te aliquid facturum cum nihil esses. Tentasti omnia, et ubique defecisti. Mollia et dura, laevia et aspera, prospera et adversa; extra veritatem corrumpere possunt, emendare non possunt. Ergo fluctuas et jactaris; cadis et ruis, et impelleris; appetis nec consequeris. Palpando et non videndo frustra ex adverso incedis, quaerens veritatem ubi non est. Et tu ubi es? Illa intus est, et tu foris es; et ideo clamat tibi, et dicit: Adam ubi es? Quaeris ut tuam ignorantiam arguat; ambulat ut instabilitatem tuam ostendat. Cum deambularet Dominus *in paradiso ad horam post meridiem vocavit et dixit: Adam, [0167B] ubi es? [n: (Gen. III.)]* Non ambulavit, sed deambulavit. Quid est deambulavit? Huc et illuc quasi errabundus et vagus in directum non vadens; sed pergens quocunque, hoc est, deambulavit. Et quare ita deambulare voluit? Ut talem se ostenderet foris, qualis intus (esse coeperat). Jam enim mota erat veritas, et fluctuabat, ut recederet a corde peccatoris. Imo veritas stabat, et peccatrix conscientia fluctuabat; et ideo veritas foris deambulabat, quia intus peccator a veritate fluctuabat. Deambulabat tamen et non discedebat, neque abiit indirectum elongans quasi irrevocabilis, nec reversura amplius; sed prope gyrans et juxta deambulans, abiit et non abiit, modo vadens et modo rediens, et magno quodam incerto aestuans: quasi nolens sedem suam deserere nec [0167C] valens pollutam mansionem sustinere. Quid facis Adam? quare siles? Voca discedentem, sequere fugientem; quoniam adhuc prope est et exspectat si forte revocetur, et ideo moram facit et blande minatur abscessum; laesam se dolens et violenter ejectam; ac redire velle indicat, si fors invitetur ut veniat. Idcirco non cito abiisse, sed praestolari adhuc: ituram tamen, et jam, quia non est qui revocet, ituram, et ecce ambulare ut abeat; quoniam nemo est dilectionis memor, qui charitatis recordetur, cui cordi sit societatis affectus. O infelix Adam, ubi est recordatio tua? Ubi fixisti animam tuam ut haec sustineas? Dure, indurate, et obdurate, non te emollire potuit tanta benignitas, tanta flamma, tam ingens ardor dilectionis, ut liquefieres et curreres [0167D] post eam? Tu vero quid facis? *Audivi,* inquit, *vocem tuam et abscondi me.* Quare? *Eo quod nudus essem [n: (ibid.)]*. Ergo fugis veritatem, quia amas pravitatem. Ipsa autem quid facit? Sequitur fugientem quae deseruit discedentem. Quae aversa est iniqua facientem, revocat in iniquitate persistentem. Adam ubi es? Ego, inquit, scio ubi es; tu nescis. Ideo ubi es? Attende ubi es ut corrigas quod factus es, et redeas ad eum a quo factus es. Adam ubi es? Audivi, Domine, vocem tuam, et abscondi me. O abscondite et non abscondite, non videns et vise, cui abscondisti te? Audivi vocem, et faciem non vidisti. Quare? quia absconditus. Hoc enim lucratus es abscondendo te, ut non videres a quo videbaris. Quem quidem [0168A] fugere potuisti, sed effugere non potuisti; quia eum nec absconditus latuisti. Propterea quaesitus inventus es, quia latens absconditus non es. Tu vero malitia tua iterum fugis, et iterum fugis, et inveniris et fugis; et semper fugis, et non effugis. Habitus fugis; quaesitus fugis, requisitus inficiaris. Propterea quaesitus inveniris, inficiatus convinceris, convictus condemnaris. Videamus ergo nunc ne forte sine causa tantum excessum fecerimus. Videamus nostrum Adam antiquum illum, et novum adhuc iterata malitia. Videamus eum vetera adhuc studia renovantem, et transfugam veritatis umbram, ac latebras et tegmina foliorum requirentem, undique convinci, nunquam velle reprehendi. Non posse latere, et semper fugere. Videamus ergo quid facit. [0168B] Quid enim facit? *Vidit* cibum, et contemplatus est; quoniam delectabilis est visu, et suavis *ad vescendum [n: (ibid.)]*; et aperuit fauces, et ait: Vadam, et affluam deliciis, et fruar bonis. Et ecce post tergum ejus sapientia et veritas clamavit et dixit: Adam, ubi es? Ille vero audiens vocem ejus, et convictus a veritate intus clamante, negare non potuit veritatem, et ait: Audivi, Domine, vocem tuam; et vidi vere quod hoc esset vanitas, et ideo risum reputavi errorem, et gaudio dixi: Quid frustra deciperis? Ecce hominem audientem veritatem, et confitentem veritatem. Quis putatis iste est? Magnus videtur omnino, et appropinquans veritati, qui sic profitetur veritatem. Vere magnus, si non absconditus. Audit enim, et non videt veritatem; quia ipse per concupiscentiam [0168C] foris est: veritas autem per sapientiam intus. Et vult eum lucrari veritas, et revocat ad se, et iterum itaque iterum de intus clamat, et dicit: Adam ubi es? Ille vero proditum se sentiens et convictum, uno aditu obstruso, alias fugae latebras quaerit; et coercitus a voluptate ad avaritiam se effundit Etenim prius fructum ad esum expetit, nunc folia ad umbram quaerit; et tanto profundius se a luce veritatis abscondit, quanto nequius sub studio parcimoniae vitium ambitionis tegit. Propterea infert, et dicit: Cogitavi in corde meo abstrahere a vino carnem meam. Quare? Ut animum meum, inquit, transferrem ad sapientiam, devitaremque stultitiam. Bene hoc fecisti. *Nemo enim potest duobus dominis servire [n: (Matth. VI)]*. Idcirco bene fecisti, ut praecideres [0168D] a te nebulosam et tenebrantem conscientiam, delectationem carnis, quatenus invenire posses luminosam, et nihil impuritatis habentem delectationem veritatis. Bene in hoc fecisti, quod abstrahere proposuisti a vino carnem tuam, ut melius inebriares sapientia animam tuam, et eam ad semetipsam introrsum colligeres: ubi sapientia lucet, ubi veritas cognoscitur, et prudentia invenitur. Nam, et hoc ipsum erat devitare stultitiam, non se ad inania, et vana appetenda effundere; sed totam animi intentionem omnesque cordis conatus sub rationis moderamine cohibendo veritati conformare. Hoc ergo bene fecisti. Sed usquequo? Donec, inquit, viderem, quid esset utile filiis hominum: quo facto opus est [0169A] sub sole numero dierum vitae suae. Vide ergo ut perseveres, ut in veritate quaeras et ut perseveranter quaeras; quia non invenitur veritas nisi ab iis qui eam in veritate quaerunt. Qui sunt qui eam in veritate quaerunt? Qui toto corde ad eam accedunt. Qui non dimidii veniunt, et dimidii recedunt; sed toti veniunt, et ex toto veniunt: hi veritatem in veritate quaerunt. Qui autem cor suum alibi colligunt, et alibi dispergunt: isti non toti accedunt, nec ex toto accedunt, et ideo veritatem non inveniunt; quia id quod de veritate alibi lucrati videbantur, alibi perdunt. Qui congregant mercedes, et mittunt *eas in sacculum pertusum [n: (Agg. I)]*. Si parcimonia colligit, et avaritia dispergit, quid prodest? Quid confert si gulam stringens per continentiam voluptatis [0169B] collegisti, et oculos aperiens per ambitionem dispersisti? Attendis quod intrasti; sed quod exivisti, non attendis. Si intras et exis, foris es; quemadmodum si exis et intras, intus es. Si autem foris es, ubicunque es cum veritate non es; quia veritas intus est. Et quid interest ubi sis, si ibi non es ubi veritas est? Undecunque venias et quacunque ingrediaris, si intus es bene es; quia cum veritate es. Et quocunque pergas, quacunque egrediaris, si foris es, male es; quia cum veritate non es. Si ergo in veritate quaeris, totus quaere, totus accede, totus intra; quia veritas intus est. Quare tam diu quaeris, et non invenis quod quaeris? Quia male quaeris, quia ibi quaeris ubi non est quod quaeris. Tu enim foris quaeris, et quod quaeris intus est. Ideo male quaeris, et [0169C] ideo invenire non potes quod quaeris, et propterea non ibi requiem invenire poteris, ubi es? quia veritas ibi non est ubi es. Ubi es? Sub umbra, sub foliis; quia fructum perdidisti, et ideo species fallit te et veritas non est in te. Quocunque perrexerit, fraudaberis: umbra totum est quod vides, et veritas latet. Quae est umbra? Species rerum visibilium umbra est, et tu animam tuam in eas effudisti, et abscondisti te sub foliis ut lateres. Et quomodo lucem quaeris tenebras intrans: in fructu vanitatem conspexisti, et in foliis veritatem esse putas? Si terrena omnia ad fruendum vana sunt: quomodo ad videndum multo magis vana non sunt? Si enim fruentibus verum bonum non conferunt, possidentibus [0169D] nec fruentibus conferre quid possunt? Quare ergo post bonum propositum continentiae, et quaerendae sapientiae studium, tam cito iterum ad occupationem vanam converteris? Quare? nisi quia mens tua foras ejecta est, et vaga ac profuga effecta super terram. Ideoque stare non potest, quia in veritate fixa non est. Idcirco, inquis, *Magnificavi opera mea,* etc.

## HOMILIA IX. *De diversis vanis Ecclesiastae conatibus.*

*Magnificavi opera mea. Quae opera? Aedificavi mihi domos, plantavi vineas, feci hortos, et pomaria, et consevi ea cuncti generis arboribus, et exstruxi mihi piscinas aquarum, ut irrigarem silvam lignorum germinantium.* Hoc est quod dixi. Extra quaeris [0170A] quod intus perdidisti. Magnificas opera tua, quia in temetipso minoratus es. Aedificas domos, quia projectus es de habitaculo conscientiae tuae. Plantas vineas et facis hortos, quia germina sapientiae in corde tuo aruerunt. Exstruis piscinas, qui fontem vitae intus salientis non habes. Silvam irrigas lignorum germinantium, quia umbram quaeris luce veritatis amissa. Quid tibi cum istis delectationibus infelix, et bonorum tuorum oblite? Ubi est nunc quod paulo ante proposuisti a vino abstrahere carnem tuam: qui modo omni lascivia et vanitate inebrias animam tuam? Nunquid ita quaeritur sapientia? Exisse illic videbaris, quomodo tam cito reversus es? Quomodo? nisi quia in circuitu ambulasti, et involuta fuit semita tua, et reduxit te parcimonia [0170B] ubi gula prostraverat. Ecce iterum in voluptatem corruisti, et captivus factus es vanitatis. Quomodo huc venisti, nisi quia audisti vocem ejus et abscondisti te? Haec est enim umbra vanitatis sub qua lates, ne videas veritatem. Quomodo ergo huc venisti? Nonne debueras quaerere sapientiam? Sed mens tua longe exsulans a veritate et viam veritatis ignorans, unde ab uno se vitio voluptatis per continentiam gulae cohibuit: inde licentius in omnem se lasciviam et superstitionem per concupiscentiam oculorum effudit; et eo nequius nunc in toto corrumpitur, quo magis in parte quantulacunque correcta videbatur. Prius enim corrumpebaris et humiliabaris; quoniam vidisti et intellexisti quod patiebaris, nunc sub specie virtutum, vitiorum praeda [0170C] factus es. Intra avaritia sub obtentu parcimoniae, et dum persuadet animo in rebus habitis temperantiam non deserere, facit non profutura servare. Inde multiplicatis divitiis superbia sequitur, dum id quod per ambitionem quaesitum est, ad elationem possidetur. Inde omnia haec portenta vanitatis orta sunt, quod mens stulta in rerum experimentis verum bonum extra existimat inveniendum, non quasi per ea quae foris sunt, verum bonum intus quaerendum sit, sed quasi in eis consistat. Idcirco sine modestia audacter per omnia se diffundit; et quae in abstinentia carnis afflictionem invenerat, alio aditu reperto per concupiscentiam oculorum, carnalem affectum multiplicius pascit. Neque enim lascivientis [0170D] sufficit, ut in rebus quae ad humanam servitutem factae sunt, et jucunditatem delectetur, nisi etiam superbia aequalitatem conditionis transgrediens, hominibus dominetur. Hoc est enim quod post caeteras et inter caeteras superstitiones suas adjungit, dicens.

*Possedi servos et ancillas, multamque familiam habui.* Dominus factus est hominum, qui servus erat vitiorum. Quanto melius esset tibi Dominus, et hic socius? Nam illic dominari, regnantis foret probitas. Hic vero dominari, non repugnantis probitas est, sed prementis iniquitas, et patientis utilitas. Sed gloriae animal speciem attendit exterius, morbum interius non attendit. Putat magnum esse quod inflatum est, et ideo gaudet exterius magnus videri. [0171A] Introrsus autem vacuus et inanis esse non timet. Possedi, inquit, servos et ancillas, multamque familiam habui. Quid multa familia sine possessione multa; et pecunia multa, atque abundantia sumptuum facere potuisset? Propterea adjunxit, et ait:

*Armenta quoque, et magnos ovium greges ultra omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem.* Ecce abundantia. Gloria ubi est? *Coacervavi mihi argentum et aurum, et substantias regum et provinciarum.* Quanta gloria. Et quid sequitur: nisi quod mens procax ad jactantiam cito per lasciviam mollescit et enervatur et dicit:

*Feci cantores mihi et cantatrices et delicias filiorum hominum, scyphos et urcelos [urceos] in ministerio [0171B] ad vina fundenda: et supergressus sum opibus omnes qui fuerunt ante me in Hierusalem. Sapientia quoque perseveravit mecum.* Grandis fiducia. Ideo secure peccasti. Ideo confidenter effudisti cor tuum in delicias voluptatis, et super illecebras pulchritudinum et jucunditatum vanitatis. Quare? quia sapientia perseveraverat tecum. Quare enim tu intus positam quaereres; si ipsa foris vagum non reliquit? Quae tamen est ista sapientia quae ita discursus amat, et secretum fastidit? Vide ne forte similitudo fallat te, et non sit sapientia quod sapientia esse videtur. Cave ne in umbra filiorum decipiaris, ubi latuit pater tuus qui veritatem videre non potuit. Umbra enim obscurum facit; et si requiem habere videtur, lumen non habet. Cave ergo ne et tu dum [0171C] sub umbra, foliorum requiem quaeris, incipias pati caliginem. Nec possis in umbra positus clare discernere; quia imago quae apparet umbra, sola est, non veritas. Hanc ergo umbram foliorum suspectam habe, ne decipiaris. Quae sunt folia? Species rerum visibilium folia sunt; quae modo quidem pulchra et virentia apparent, sed cadent subito cum turbo exierit. Quae sunt folia? Domus, vineae, horti, piscinae, sylva lignorum germinantium, familiae, possessiones, aurum, argentum, substantiae regum et provinciarum; lyrae, citharae, tibiae, organa, scyphi, et urcei, et vasa pretiosa divitiae et pompae, et gloria: omnia haec folia sunt. Quare folia? Quia vana, quia caduca, quia transitoria: ideo folia. Virent quidem [0171D] modico tempore, sed cito arescunt et cadunt. Sed tamen dum stant, umbram faciunt et habent refrigerium suum; sed est obscura umbra et inimica lumini. Carni quidem ad tempus refrigerium praestare videtur, sed oculos caligare facit. Idcirco suspectam habere debemus umbram, nec facile credere iis quae videntur in umbra. Fallunt enim oculos imagines; quia et ipsa umbra imago est, non veritas. Ideo dixi ut suspectam habeas umbram, qui te sub foliis positum confiteris. Sub foliis es, in umbra es, et sapientiam juxta te vides. Vide diligenter ne forte non sit sapientia, sed aliud aliquid latens sub specie illius. Quae est enim sapientia in umbra foliorum? Nam umbra foliorum delectatio est, et jucunditas in specie et pulchritudine rerum transitoriarum. Et [0172A] habet ista sapientiam suam. Sic enim homines vocant sapientiam qua ista requies, et tranquillitas ista carnis callide et astute quaeritur, et prudenter conservatur. Et ista est sapientia, qua *filii hujus saeculi* et filii tenebrarum *prudentiores sunt filiis lucis in generatione sua [n: (Luc. XVI)]*, quae perseverat cum iis qui jacent in umbra foliorum; et lumen verae sapientiae, apud quam stultitia est sapientia ista, videre non possunt. Quia enim ad sola commoda carnis respiciunt, detrimenta animae non attendunt, et quia cauti esse volunt ubi timendum non est; stulti, et imprudentes fiunt tibi, ubi periculum grave est et intolerabile detrimentum. Nam quae est sapientia, carnem fovere et animam negligere? Quae est sapientia id quidem, quod modico tempore molestum [0172B] est carni, tota intentione fugere; et id quod animae semper exitiale esse constat, non cavere? Haec est sapientia de qua iste gloriatur sub umbra foliorum jacens. O folia, et umbra qualis est fructus vester? vide Adam qualia sunt folia tua, et qualis est fructus tuus? Abscondisti te, et folia tua umbraculum praebuerunt ut tectus non videres veritatem. Manducasti, et fructus tuus cibum praestitit, ut corruptus edulio perderes immortalitatem. Recognosce, miser; recognosce malum tuum; recognosce miseriam tuam; recognosce ubi es et qualis factus es. Convertere de umbra ad claritatem luminis, ut non solum verba audias, sed etiam faciem videas veritatis.

## HOMILIA X. *De reliquis vanitatibus usque in eum locum: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat. »*

[0172C]

*Cumque me convertissem ad universa opera, quae fecerant manus meae, et ad labores in quibus frustra sudaveram, vidi in omnibus vanitatem et afflictionem animi, et nihil permanere sub sole.* Audivimus supra, iste quanto studio divitiis congregandis augendisque rebus insudaverit; ac deinde lasciviae, et voluptati experiendae, in iis quas paraverat, rerum affluentiis, quemadmodum animam suam effuderit, ipso testante cognovimus: nunc vero quid post haec omnia subjungat, audiamus. Cum, inquit, me convertissem ad universa opera, quae fecerant manus meae, et ad labores in quibus frustra sudaveram, vidi in [0172D] omnibus vanitatem, et afflictionem animi, et nihil permanere sub sole. Hoc itaque in principio quaestionem nobis ingerit, quomodo nunc primum iste conversum se dicat ad videndum opera sua cum nihil aliud hactenus fecisse videatur, quam his rebus intentionem adhibuisse, et studium? Quando magnificavit opera sua, aedificavit domos, plantavit vineas, et hortos fecit, et pomaria, atque piscinas exstruxit, servos et ancillas habuit, armenta et greges, argentum et aurum, substantias regum et provinciarum, et delicias filiorum hominum. Quando denique non solum opere, sed et mente quoque rerum se suarum amori, et voluptati tantum immerserat, ut hanc partem suam existimaret; neque ob aliud quodam modo se factum crederet, quam ut [0173A] oblectaret se in his omnibus, quae paraverat: nunquid non videbat quod faciebat? Sed vidit speciem, non praevidit corruptionem. Vidit quid esse videbantur, quae stabant, sed non attendit quid facta fuissent, quae perierant. Amor enim praesentium, dum in se totam animi intentionem converteret, et in eorum, quae videbantur fallaci specie per carnis aspectum ingressus cordis quoque oculos occuparet, simul et praeteritorum memoriam abstulit, et futurorum providentiam abscondit. Unde factum est, ut dum ad ea quae videbantur sola respiceret, in ipsis quoque veritatem agnoscere non valeret, simulque in suis operibus, et conversus, quae concupisceretur videret speciem; et aversus, quae caveretur non agnosceret vanitatem. Fit autem nonnunquam ut [0173B] temporalia bona tunc citius vana esse deprehendantur, cum magis abundare coeperint, quae saepe cum non habentur prodesse potuisse existimantur, si adfuerint. Cum vero habita, mentis inopiam, nec in sua affluentia expellere valeant; tunc primum experienti, quam exiguum pro laborantibus fructum conferunt manifestant. Unde convenienter iste post tantam rerum omnium affluentiam, usumque voluptatum; conversum se dicit, ut intelligeret vanitatem suam. Quia cum experiri coepit, quod felicem facere non poterant habita, tunc agnovit quod multo magis miserum fecerant casso labore quaesita. Cum, inquit, me convertissem ad universa opera, quae fecerant manus meae; videlicet respiciens qualis fructus tantos labores sequi potuisset; tunc, ait, inveni [0173C] non aequa lance recompensari mihi fructum laborum meorum, ideoque frustra me laborasse judicavi respiciens labores in quibus frustra sudaveram. In omnibus enim vanitas et afflictio animi. Prius afflictio, postea vanitas, sed et post vanitatem afflictio; et ante vanitatem afflictio; et in vanitate afflictio; et totum vanitas, et totum afflictio. Vana quippe sunt universa, quae suis dilectoribus, et cum sunt, non exhibent, quod promittunt; et cum teneri existimantur pertranseunt. Sed poterat fortassis tolerabile videri, si sola vanitas esset, et afflictio non esset. Nunc autem, et ante vanitatem afflictio, et in vanitate afflictio, et post vanitatem afflictio, quoniam nec sine labore acquiri, nec sine sollicitudine conservari, [0173D] nec sine dolore amitti possunt, quae cum amore possidebantur. Ideoque et totum vanitas, et totum afflictio; quia, et in afflictione vanitas, et in vanitate afflictio. Et propter hoc recte conversus ait: Vidi in omnibus vanitatem, et afflictionem animi: et nihil permanere sub sole. Eruditus namque in propriis, etiam aliena judicare coepit; et quod in parte cognoverat, veraciter de toto pronuntiabat, dicens: Nihil permanere sub sole. Hinc vero colligi potest, quantum in rebus aliis, sive ad bonum sive ad malum conducat homini nosse qualis homo ipse fuerit sibi. Nam secundum aliquid omnia hoc tibi esse incipiunt, quod tu ipse fueris tibi. Si teipsum non vides, nihil bene vides. Si in tui judicio non falleris, facile dirigeris in alieno. Sicut hic quoque [0174A] conversus, et directus cum de suis operibus subjunxisset: Vidit in omnibus vanitatem et afflictionem animi; statim quasi in propriis eruditus, aliena dijudicare incipit, et de judicio suorum operum sententiam format universorum, dicens: Et nihil permanere sub sole. Sed quia ad perfectum non sufficit mala reprobare, nisi etiam bona eligere, quis noverit; subjunxit, et ait:

## HOMILIA X. *De reliquis vanitatibus usque in eum locum: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat. »* (cont.)

*Transivi ad contemplandam sapientiam.* Hebraeus *transiens* interpretatur. Hebraeus ergo factus est iste ad contemplandam sapientiam. Et erat quidem ipse etiam prius Hebraeus secundum carnem, sed hebraeus non fuit secundum veritatem, donec transire coepit ad contemplandam sapientiam. Quemadmodum Judaeus secundum carnem dicitur, et Judaeus [0174B] secundum veritatem, ita alius Hebraeus est secundum carnem, et alius Hebraeus secundum veritatem. Qui autem in manifesto secundum carnem Judaeus est et qui in manifesto secundum carnem Hebraeus est, non vere Judaeus est, et non vero Hebraeus. Sed qui in occulto secundum spiritum Judaeus est, et secundum spiritum Hebraeus est, vere Judaeus est et vere Hebraeus. Nam multi transeunt secundum carnem, et non transeunt secundum veritatem; quia non transeunt ut perveniant ad veritatem. Facilius maria transeant, et longinquas peragant regiones, quam pertingant ad veritatem, et ipsa prope est. *Prope est,* inquit Scriptura, *verbum in ore tuo [n: (Rom. X)]*; et veritas verbi in corde, et ipsum verbum est veritas, quia veritas verbum est. [0174C] Et cum tam prope sit ipsa veritas, nihil tamen longius ab iis qui stultitiam amant. Quid autem stultius quam semper ima respicere, et vultus habere pronos in terram? Hoc enim bestiis datum est, quibus ultra nihil appetere est concessum. Sapientia autem habitat in supernis; ad quam erigi nolunt, qui bestiis comparati sunt et terram intuentur. Haec est ipsa stultitia, de qua transivit iste ad contemplandam sapientiam, cum falsa bona, quae in terra amaverat, despexit, et ad vera bona, quae sursum sunt, contemplanda et amanda se erexit; quia in his quae deorsum sunt sub sole omnibus vanitatem aspexit. Propterea cum vidisset in omnibus vanitatem et afflictionem animi, et nihil permanere sub [0174D] sole, transivit ad contemplandam sapientiam supra solem. O quam difficilis transitus et quam multorum dierum via infirmos gressus habentibus! Et nescio an tota vita hominis sufficere possit ad conficiendum hoc iter. Quis enim in hac mortali vita degens, sapientiam plene apprehendere poterit? Sapientia enim de occultis trahitur et in occultis invenitur; et semper secretum amat sapientia, nec se contemplandam praebet, nisi iis, qui ingrediuntur ad eam. Sed hoc valde grave est infirmis animis, ut dilecta relinquant, et deserant amata; et ad ea transeant appetenda, quae non norunt, nisi doloribus suis erudiantur; et amara esse incipiant, quae ante dulcia fuerunt; et ita quodammodo multi retrahantur, et compellantur intrare, et transire ad contemplandam [0175A] sapientiam. Nam cum gustare coeperint et intelligere suavitatem et jucunditatem sapientiae: tunc jam compelli opus non habent, sed sequuntur volentes; et libenter universa despiciunt, et relinquunt omnia, ut transeant ad contemplandam sapientiam; et tunc cito perveniunt, quia currunt velociter et ardenter requirunt, et incipit prope esse illis sapientia, quia ipsi appropinquant ei, et non elongant ab ea in concupiscentias alienas. Sic cum esset Moyses in deserto pastor animalium, et Aethiopissam haberet uxorem, non noverat adhuc nisi ignem consumentem; propterea mirabatur, quod rubus ardebat, et non comburebatur [n: (Exod. III)]. Quandiu enim animus desideria sua in infimis voluptatibus pascit, et carnali concupiscentia vinctus nondum ad amplexus [0175B] sapientiae pervenit in igne consumente est et devorante usque ad perditionem. Flamma enim libidinis et amor carnis eos quos accendit, consumit. Amor vero sapientiae lumen habet; sed consumptionem non habet, et si accendit frigidos, ardentes tamen non comburit. Propterea Moyses mirabatur quomodo ardebat rubus, et non comburebatur. Nam et ipse ardebat, quia uxorem Aethiopissam habebat; neque hoc ei miraculum fuit, sed ardere et non comburi: quod expertum non fuit, hoc ei miraculum fuit. Et ipsum miraculum trahebat eum, et hortabatur ut transiret et videret visionem maximam, quomodo rubus ardebat, et non comburebatur; et currere coepit in concupiscentiam suaviorem; et oblivisci desideria antiqua ubi ardebat et comburebatur, [0175C] atque Aethiopissae uxoris amorem fastidire; quia nigra erat et formosa non erat; neque similis ad illam Sunamitem, quae senes calefacit et juvenes non urit. Hujus non enim Sunamitis, id est sapientiae, amorem significabat ignis ille quo rubus ardebat et non comburebatur, et ideo Moyses, postquam transivit ad videndam visionem, ac sentire coepit quam suaviter arderet flamma ejus, non amplius teneri potuit Aethiopissae uxoris amore, sed accenso corde meliori igne, usque ad colloquium altissimi pervenit, et missus est in populi salvationem. In igne enim ei Deus loquebatur, et de igne audiebatur, et per ignem intelligebatur. Et erat intus flamma, quae cor succenderat, qua sicut rubus ardebat, et non comburebatur. Mens ipsa in igne Deum [0175D] conceperat: et per ignem Deum cognoscebat. Nisi enim arsisset, non vidisset nec cognovisset; quia ignis ipse dilectio est, et dilectio ipsa cognitio. Cognovit ergo et dilexit, vidit et arsit, gustavit et amavit, et vicit ignis ignem, dilectio superavit delectationem. Contempta est Aethiopissa deformis et nigra; quam sua flamma fuscaverat, et amor ipse suus, non amabilem faciebat. Contempta est in comparatione pulchrioris; neque ultra servire pro illa voluit, qui se cum illa servum semper futurum agnovit. Vita enim carnalis, et concupiscentia carnis ex Patre Deo non est, sed ex patre diabolo, et ipsa amatores suos, patris sui servituti addicit, et subjicit dominationi. Et servit Moyses, et pascit [0176A] pecora; et amorem foedae conjugis turpi famulatu mercatur, nec potest liber esse, donec Deus in igne adveniat, et appareat in dilectione. Tunc enim facile contemnit, quod male amaverat; cum gustare coeperit, quod dulcius concupiscat. Et jam pro Aethiopissa Moyses servire non dignatur; quam et si postea sequentem non abjicit, non suscipit tamen ad dilectionem. Curam enim carnis, amator sapientiae effectus sic admittere debuerat, ut proterve lascivienti se per affectum non subjiceret; sed tamen infirmanti et obsequenti condescenderet per compassionem. Aliud est enim amare ad gaudium, aliud sustinere ad usum. Aliud in societatem dilectionis suscipere atque aliud in parte compassionis sustinere. Vita carnis in necessitate portanda est, sapientia [0176B] in dilectione socianda. Illa propter se appetenda est, ista propter se fugienda propter nos sustinenda. Ideo Moyses post visionem non servit in Madian patri Aethiopissae, neque ipsa amplius parit filios quasi a toro repulsa, ubi locus amoris est et dilectionis; et alia pulchriore atque amabiliore recepta ex cujus consortio non fuscus, sed luminosus fieret vultus Moysi, cujus amor in illo igne monstrabatur; quando rubus ardebat, et non comburebatur. Cucurrit autem Moyses ut transiret, et contemplaretur visionem quia nondum adhuc sapientiae ignem conceperat neque senserat suavitatem. Ideo mirabatur et ipsa admiratione trahebatur, ut appropians calefieret et arderet. Et ignis ipse, qui absentem illuminabat, appropinquantem accendebat. Propterea appropians [0176C] solvit calceamentum, libenter jam carnalibus concupiscentiis abrenuntians, degustata illius amoris dulcedine et agnita suavitate. Quid enim concupiscentia carnis potuisset amori sapientiae comparata? Propterea ergo Moyses festinavit currere et videre visionem, atque transire ad contemplandam sapientiam. Et manifestum factum est, quomodo ille transivit, et quomodo pervenit ad contemplandam sapientiam. Quantum in illa vidit, et quantum de illo agnovit, et quomodo amicus factus est sapientiae, usque in profunda ejus penetrans et conscius secretorum illius. Et quam multi sunt ab initio, qui sic transire voluerunt ad contemplandam sapientiam? Primus Abraham magnus ille pater de igne Chaldaeorum exivit, et transivit ad contemplandam [0176D] sapientiam, et venit in terram visionis, quam monstravit ei Deus et vidit claritatem sapientiae et gavisus est. Et Isaac ad meditandum egressus fuerat, et transivit ad contemplandam sapientiam; et locutus est cum eo Deus. Jacob quoque ad contemplandam sapientiam pergens transivit de Mesopotamia veniens, et vidit Dominum facie ad faciem, et salva facta est anima ejus [n: (Gen. XXXII)]. Post istos, omnes patriarchae et omnes prophetae transiverunt, et omnes sapientiam contemplari voluerunt. Et venit novissime sapientia ipsa, et transivit, et contemplati sunt eam amici ejus; quoniam ad hoc venerat ut videretur, ne incassum quaereretur, si nunquam videretur; et dixit eis, qui transiverant, ut contemplarentur [0177A] eam. *Beati oculi, qui vident quae vos videtis. Multi reges, et multi prophetae voluerunt videre quae vos videtis, et non viderunt; et audire quae auditis, et non audierunt [n: (Matth. XIII)]*. Hoc dixit, et transivit, ut post illam transirent, qui eam contemplari concupiscerent, ne forte jam non quaereretur, si semper videretur. Et secuti sunt post eam alii multi, et pertransiverunt plurimi, et multiplex facta est sapientia. Et multi transire voluerunt, et pervenire non potuerunt; quia viam non tenuerunt. Alii transierunt, et pervenerunt. Alii transire voluerunt et pertransire non potuerunt, quia per se ire putaverunt. Nam etiam gentium philosophi, et ipsi ad contemplandam sapientiam transire voluerunt, sed erraverunt atque evanuerunt, quia semetipsos ducere [0177B] putaverunt. Et tamen transire coeperant, et pervenerant usque ad aliquid et ad viam accesserunt; sed viam non intraverunt, quia in Christum non crediderunt. Vultis scire usquequo pervenerant? In terra erant corpore, et ascenderunt mente et transiverunt terrena omnia, coelestia scrutando. Usque ad lunam et usque ad solem, usque ad sidera coeli, denique usque ad ipsum coelum et usque ad ipsum firmamentum ingenio suo ascenderunt, et intellectu pervenerunt. Et quid erat ultra quo pergere potuissent? Sed sapientia super omnia est, neque inveniri potest intra omnia, per quam omnia facta sunt. Nihil horum est, a quo est omne quod est. Sed ubi illud invenire potuissent? Non videbatur, et tamen quaerebatur; nec latere potuit, ut non loqueretur, [0177C] nec investigari ut inveniretur. Sapientia intus erat, et ipsi foris erant; et ingressi sunt mente post eam, ut transirent ad contemplandam sapientiam. Et investigaverunt, et perscrutati sunt sapienter; et comprehenderunt secreta naturae, et invenerunt occulta multa; et nihil horum sapientia fuit, quia omne hoc per sapientiam factum fuit. Supra omnia quo ascenderunt, intra omnia quo intraverunt; et non erat ultra aliquid ubi sapientiam quaerere potuissent. Et ceciderunt et defecerunt scrutantes scrutationes; et visum est illis divinum aliquod esse supra omnia, et tamen illud non cognoverunt neque intellexerunt; sed videntes amplius caligaverunt, quia infirmis oculis contra lumen splendidum impegerunt. Et coeperunt falsa multa de vero existimare; et Deum [0177D] corde suo perverso comparare, non quod ipse erat, sed quod ipsis videbatur, qui videre non potuerunt quod erat. Illi autem bene videre se existimaverunt, et in cogitationibus suis evanuerunt; et pejus excaecati sunt et inventi sunt profundius errantes, subtilius perscrutantes. Alii autem subtilius moribus sapientiam quaerendam putaverunt; et facti sunt plurimi bonorum suorum contemptores, sed non vitiorum suorum correctores. Et isti quoque usque ad aliquid pervenerunt; quia speciem veritatis habuerunt, sed veritatem non tenuerunt. Abjecerunt pecuniam; sed malitiam retinuerunt. Quod foris erat mundaverunt, et quod intus erat pollutum tenuerunt. Hoc autem sapientia non fuit; quia veritas non [0178A] fuit, sed falsa imago sola. Illi autem putaverunt se per iter virtutum incedere; sed quo tenderent nesciverunt, quia directionem suam et finem non cognoverunt. Et erant adhuc alii qui virtutes quasdam habuerunt et naturali ductu in eas ferebantur; et transierunt et pervenerunt usque ad aliquid; et ex parte quadam naturae, qua non tota corruptioni subjacuit, bonum viderunt et concupierunt. Et datum est eis multa posse de studio virtutum; et affectu probo ad bonitatem proclivi. Quis hoc nescit quantos et illi viros virtutum habuerunt, et quanta illi miranda et imitatione digna fecerunt: sectantes justitiam, pietatem colentes, servantes castimoniam, patientia confirmati, stabiles fidelitate, prudentia circumspecti, et quid dicemus? Nunquid haec omnia [0178B] bona non fuerunt? Fuerunt utique, sed naturae non gratiae; conditionis, non reparationis: bona quae natura conservaverat ne tota corrumperetur, non bona quae gratia dederat, ut natura a corruptione liberaretur. Bona quae naturae quidem gratia primum conditae dederat; postea corruptae reliquerat; sed a corruptione purgandae non superaddiderat. Bona quibus bene conditae naturae pulchritudo probaretur; non quibus glorificandae celsitudo acquireretur. Bona igitur pro parte sua omnia ista fuerunt, sed vera bona non fuerunt; quia mentem per intentionem ad summum bonum non direxerunt. Et his omnibus sapientia inventa non est; quia in veritate non est quaesita; et non appropinquavit, vel illis, ut eorum oculos ad veritatem illuminaret; vel [0178C] istis ut eorum gressus ad virtutem dirigeret. Atque ideo nec caeci eam invenire potuerunt, nec claudi ad eam pervenire. Sed dicat iste noster Hebraeus qui fecerit, quantum transitu suo profecerit; quoniam, et ipse se cum caeteris ad contemplandam sapientiam transire testatur, dicens: Transivi ad contemplandam sapientiam. Hoc est ergo quod considerare debetis. Qui enim ad sapientiam transit stultitiam relinquit. Et quid est quod sequitur?

## HOMILIA X. *De reliquis vanitatibus usque in eum locum: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat. »* (cont.)

*Errores quoque, et stultitiam.* Si ad sapientiam transit qui ad contemplandam sapientiam transit, quomodo a stultitia recedit, vel errorem relinquit, qui ad contemplandos errores et stultitiam transit? Sed sapientia lux est; error autem et stultitia tenebrae sunt. Qui autem in tenebris est, nec tenebras [0178D] videt, nec lucem. Qui vero in luce est, et tenebras videt, et lucem; quia omnia quae arguuntur, arguuntur per lucem. Quoniam igitur tenebras suas videre non potest, quia adhuc ipse in tenebris est, sed a tenebris ad lucem venit, ut videat per lucem, et tenebras, et lucem; non per tenebras tenebras, et per lucem lucem, sed tenebras et lucem per solam lucem. Nemo ad tenebras vadit, ut tenebras videat; sed ad lucem venit ut videat per lucem non solum lucem, sed et tenebras et lucem. Qui ergo videre vult tenebras suas, recedit ab eis, ne in tenebris sit ipse, et nihil videat: et transit ad lucem ut per lucem, et tenebras pariter et lucem videat. Recte igitur ecclesiastes cum ad sapientiam contemplandam [0179A] transit: errores quoque et stultitiam contemplaturus ad ipsam venit, quasi ad lucem, ut in ipsa videat, et tenebras et lucem. Hoc est, ut in ipsa videat, et quod ipsa est sapientia; et per ipsam videat errores, et stultitiam, quod ipsa non sapientia. Nam qui sapientiam videt, videt quod ipsa est sapientia; et qui errores et stultitiam videt, videt quod ipsa non est sapientia; et tamen sapientiam videre, et errores, et stultitiam videre non nisi per ipsam potest, et ipsa est sapientia. Qui ergo ad contemplandos errores et stultitiam contemplandam transit, ad sapientiam transit; quemadmodum, qui ad contemplandam sapientiam transit, ad sapientiam transit. Cum tamen altera id est errores et stultitiam contemplatur ut fugiat; ad alteram vero, hoc [0179B] est ad sapientiam, ut eam contempletur, accedat; quia utrumque sapientia non est, sed utrumque contemplari sapientia est, et qui ad utrumque contemplandum transit, non ad aliud quam ad sapientiam transit: neque aliud quam errores et stultitiam relinquit. Dicat ergo: Transivit ad contemplandam sapientiam erroresque et stultitiam. Quid est error: nescire quod rectum est. Quid est stultitia? scire et non sequi. Quid est sapientia? cognocere et amare bonum. Malum vero cognoscere et odisse, et ipsum est sapientia; et prima sapientia, quia odisse malum, bonum amasse est; et cognovisse malum, rectum intellexisse. Quapropter cognoscere et amare bonum sapientia est, et ipsum est odisse malum et cognovisse. Et hoc totum in sapientia [0179C] cognoscitur, cum sapientia videtur et quo ipsa est ut diligatur; et quod ipsa non est, sed per ipsam manifestum est, ut odiatur. O quam bonus transitus iste est; et quam feliciter migrat, qui ad contemplandam sapientiam migrat! Quid mirum est si Deus Hebraeorum Dominus Deus est, qui tales transitores facit, et ad talia transire facit? *Transite ad me,* inquit Sapientia, *omnes qui concupiscitis me, et a generationibus meis implemini. Spiritus enim meus super mel dulcis: et haereditas mea super mel, et favum. Qui edunt me, adhuc esurient; et qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient; qui elucidant me, vitam aeternam habebunt [n: (Eccli. XXIV)]*. Quoniam doctrinam quasi ante lucanum illumino omnibus; et illuminabo omnes [0179D] sperantes in Domino. Vultis enim scire quomodo illuminat sapientia eos qui ad se contemplandam transierint? Istum ipsum interrogate, qui ad contemplandam sapientiam transivit; et considerate qualiter illuminatus sit, ex quo coepit videre eam. Nam prius quam ad ipsam contemplandam transisset; quam caecus fuerit, satis supra audistis, quando ire putavit ubi homini via non erat; quaerere et investigare universa quae erant sub sole; et magnum aliquid esse credidit illorum investigare naturam, quae extra hominis naturam consistunt; quae, etsi sciantur quantum in ipsis est, nec salutem conferre possunt, neque si nesciantur, auferre. Ibi ergo caecus fuit, non videndo neque cognoscendo in se quod potuit, nec pro se appetendo quod debuit. Sed [0180A] nunc illuminatus a sapientia, quid dicat, intendite.

*Quid est, inquam, homo? Quid est, inquam?* Non quaero quid est quasi admirando dignitatem, sed cognoscendo infirmitatem. Quid est homo? nihil est homo. Non aliquid tale est homo, ut sufficiens inveniatur ad hoc. Ad quid?

*Ut sequi possit regem factorem suum.* Si enim non potest consequi facturam multo magis factorem sequi non potest. Si non potest investigare quod factum est, eum qui fecit, quomodo potest comprehendere? Quid est homo ut sequi possit regem factorem suum? Regem suum et factorem suum. Idem ipse qui rex est, factor est. Factor est, quia creavit; rex, qui gubernat in eo quod creavit, et dirigit [0180B] ad quod creavit. Creavit enim in magno bono, et dirigit ad summum bonum. Quis est qui sequitur factorem suum? Qui vivit, ut factus est. Quis incedit secundum quod institutus est? Qui servat bonum quod creatus accepit, et quod natura contulit impollutum custodit. Iste sequitur factorem suum. Et quis est qui sequitur et regem suum? Qui tendit ad quod dirigitur; qui festinat pervenire quo invitatur; qui legibus bene praesidentis obtemperat; qui jubentis imperio spontanea se ad omnia voluntate inclinat. Iste sequitur regem suum. Sed quis est homo qui Deo respondere possit? Quis sufficiens invenietur reddere vicem Deo? Si ipse praecedit, et ut sequeris: ergo aliud illius est, aliud tuum. Imo si ipse bonum inchoat, tu consummas: quod minus [0180C] est illius est, et quod majus est tuum est. Si Deus praecedit bonum inchoando, tu subsequeris perficiendo; jam non solum aequalis Deo, sed major inveneris. Sed forte ipse praecedit ostendendo, ut sequeris imitando. Et ubi quod dicitur: *Misericordia ejus praeveniet me et subsequetur? [n: (Psal. LVIII.)]* Ubi est: *Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia? [n: (Rom. XI.)]* Ubi est: *Quid habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, ut quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis? [n: (II Cor. IV.)]* Nam si ostendere illius est, tuum sequi: jam aliquid habes, quod non accepisti; neque ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia, sed quaedam hominis sunt quae ex ipso non sunt, si aliqua potest per se homo quae per ipsum non [0180D] sunt. Sed non ad hoc illuminat sapientia, ut sic sentiat homo; aut si dicat quasi ex se aliquid habere possit homo, qui neque hoc a se habere potuit, quod est homo. Quid ergo dicit: Quid est homo, ut sequi possit regem factorem suum? Quod longe enim putas homo est a Deo ut pertingat ubi ille est? Quid enim est pertingere ubi ille est, nisi esse quod ille est? Et quid est Deus? Aut homo quid est? Videte quam longe sunt. Deus justus est et beatus; homo injustus et miser. Videte quantum distant justus et injustus, miser et beatus. Non potest autem esse cum beatitudine miseria, nec ad beatitudinem pervenire injustitia. Justitia via est; beatitudo patria. Peccati autem servus justus esse non potest, nisi fuerit a peccato liberatus. Videte [0181A] ergo quod non potest homo sequi regem factorem suum, nisi prius visitetur a rege factore suo. Non potest homo ad illum ire; sed ille potest, si voluerit, ad hominem venire. Propterea rex, et factor hominis venit ad hominem. Venit ad id quod homo erat, et factus est ipse quod non erat. Factus est homo pro homine, assumens nostram miseriam, retinens suam justitiam. Et apparuit inter Deum et homines mediator Dei et hominum homo Deus, appropians hominibus Deus per miseriam, nec recedens a Deo homo per justitiam. Ita Deus descendit ad unum, et homo ascendit ad unum: et in uno duo inventa sunt, alterum ex nostro, alterum ex suo: erant quippe tria quaedam. Deus erat, justus et beatus, et homo erat miser et injustus: et quia haec convenire [0181B] non potuerunt, posuit se in medio homo Deus conjungens miserum et justum, ut per justitiam miseriam vinceret, et justitiam ad beatitudinem repararet. Igitur cum esset nobiscum Emmanuel per justitiam quam ad nos attulerat, et per miseriam quam a nobis assumpserat, redire coepit unde venerat. Ut in homine per justitiam miseriam vinceret, et hominem cum justitia per miseriam ad beatitudinem revocaret. Tenuit igitur justitiam, et sustinuit miseriam quousque miseriam vinceret, et justitiam coronaret. Et cucurrit, et praecessit nos. *Passus pro nobis, et exemplum relinquens nobis, ut sequamur vestigia ejus [n: (I Petr. II)]*. Liberans nos a servitute peccati, ut et nos in miseria justitiam habeamus, [0181C] et per miseriam cum justitia ad beatitudinem transeamus. Promittens nobis quod accepit, si patimur quod sustinuit; ut regnemus cum ipso, si patimur pro ipso. Ita igitur Verbum incarnatum factor et rex noster, quia sequi ipsum non potuimus in sua majestate, praecessit nos in nostra humilitate, et de nostro viam statuit ut ad sua perveniamus. Sed nec sic quidem sequi eum posset homo, nisi adjutus esset ab ipso; quia nec justus homo per mortem ad vitam curreret, nisi ille qui peccatori dedit justitiam etiam patienti constantiam daret. Recte igitur, qui sapientiam contemplatus fuerat, et quam per se nihil homo agnoverat, dixit: Quid est homo, ut sequatur regem factorem suum? Vere enim iste ad contemplandam sapientiam transiverat, et [0181D] vere a sapientia illuminatus erat: multo magis nunc sapiendo veraciter hominis infirmitatem agnoscens, quam prius inaniter se ultra hominis possibilitatem extendens. Ibi enim elatus est ut deficeret, hic ut proficeret humiliatus. Illic extra se per elationem tumuit, ut in se evacuaretur, hic se per humilitatem ad se collegit, ut soli daretur. Et hoc totum sapientia fecit postquam eam contemplatus est, ostendens illi in luce sua prius tenebras ejus: postea, et lucem suam, et totum in luce sua, et per lucem suam. Et non erant tenebrae lux, nec in luce tenebrae erant; sed per lucem tenebrae videbantur, et a luce dividebantur, et ait:

*Et vidi quia tantum praecederet sapientia stultitiam quantum differt lux a tenebris.* Quomodo hoc videbatur? [0182A] Quia sapientia illuminat, stultitia excaecat. Et unde hoc probari potest, quod sapientia illuminat, stultitia excaecat? Intendite:

## HOMILIA X. *De reliquis vanitatibus usque in eum locum: « Stultus in tenebris ambulat. »* (cont.)

*Sapientis oculi in capite ejus; stultus in tenebris ambulat.* Modo probatum est quod sapientia illuminat, stultitia excaecat. In quo probatum est? Quia sapiens oculos illuminatos habet, stultus nihil videt. Si enim sapiens oculos illuminatos habet, ergo sapientia illuminat. Et sit stultus nihil videt, ergo stultitia excaecat. Nam sapientia lux est, et illuminat. Si habueris oculos quo illa attingit; si autem oculos habes ubi lux non est, oculos habes, sed nihil vides. Et quid prodest hoc? Sint ergo oculi tui ubi lux est, ne efficiaris quasi oculos non habens, si lucem non habes. Ubi autem est lux? Sursum est [0182B] lux ubi est sapientia. Nam sapientia sursum est; et lux sursum, et omnis lux de sursum venit. Et sicut deorsum tenebrae sunt sine luce, ita sursum lux sine tenebris. In medio vero post lucem tenebrae, et post tenebras lux. Propterea sunt dies coeli quos tenebrae non dividunt, neque obscurum interpolat. Et dies terrae sunt quibus tenebrae succedunt. Quia ubi sapientia semper est, semper lux est; et ubi sapientia non semper est, tantum lux est, quantum sapientia est. Et ubi sapientia nunquam est, nunquam lux est. Ergo lux est quo attingit sapientia, et quo non attingit sapientia, lux non est. Et quo non attingit sapientia, si attingit a fine usque ad finem, quid relinquitur extra quo attingere non [0182C] possit, quae totum penetrat et complectitur totum? *Gyrum coeli circuivi sola, et profundum abyssi penetravi, et in fluctibus maris ambulavi [n: (Eccli. XXIV)]*: *attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponens omnia suaviter [n: (Sap. VIII)]*. Magna igitur quaestio est quidnam sit quo non attingit sapientia. Ubi oculi stultorum sunt, qui ambulant in tenebris et non vident. Aliam itaque Scripturam interrogemus, ubi sunt oculi stultorum, qui in tenebris ambulant et non vident. Dicit enim: Oculi sapientis in capite ejus; oculi autem stultorum in finibus terrae. Ergo in finibus terrae tenebrae sunt, et propterea non vident stulti qui ambulant in tenebris, quia oculos habent in finibus terrae. Nam si lumen ibi est ubi oculos habet, non ambulant in tenebris stulti; sed [0182D] illuminatos habent oculos et vident. Si vero stultus in tenebris ambulat, et oculi stultorum sunt in finibus terrae, ibi procul dubio tenebrae sunt, ubi oculi videre non possunt. Et ubi est hoc? In finibus terrae. Ergo procul sunt tenebrae, et lumen prope est. Quare ergo facilius tenebras invenimus quam lumen? Forte, quia nos longe non sumus a finibus terrae et habitamus juxta populum tenebrarum, neque perreximus adhuc a finibus terrae ad audiendam sapientiam Salomonis [n: (III Reg. X)], ubi lumen est: idcirco impingimus in tenebras et caligamus a luce. Ipsa tamen lux prope est et ingerit se; sed lippientes oculi fuscum amant, et converterunt in tenebras. Ergo prope est lux, nos autem longe sumus; et tenebrae longe sunt, et nos propinquamus ad illas.

## HOMILIA XI. *Qui sint fines terrae in quibus sunt oculi stultorum: et quomodo sapientia attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter,* etc.

[0183A]

Ubi tamen sunt tenebrae, et ubi est lux? Et quis est finis? et finis quo attingit sapientia. Et qui sunt fines terrae, ubi sunt oculi stultorum qui ambulant in tenebris, et non vident. Et quod est caput sapientis ubi sunt oculi ejus qui non ambulat in tenebris sicut stultus, sed illuminatos habet oculos? Ne forte ergo et nos in tenebris remaneamus, inquiramus lucem sapientiae, ut intelligamus, ubi ipsa maneat sapientia, et divisionem lucis et tenebrarum. Ubi finiuntur lux et tenebrae, et terminum uniuscujusque. Usquequo ipsa sapientia, et quid ipsa, et quid [0183B] extra ipsam, et quid sine ipsa. Primum, quia duos fines audivimus, alterum a quo et alterum usque ad quem se extendit Sapientia, *attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponens omnia suaviter [n: (Sap. VIII)]*. Et nondum adhuc cognovimus qui sunt isti duo fines, et ubi sunt, et an finem habeant isti fines, et an ultra istos aliud aliquid sit, quo non attingit sapientia. Et si est, quomodo fines sunt qui non perveniunt ad finem? Si autem non est, quomodo fines terrae ubi tenebrae sunt, intra istos fines continentur, et tenebrae esse possunt in luce, quia Sapientia attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter. Primum ergo duo sunt fines rerum omnium. Alter est finis supra quem nihil, et alter sub quo nihil. Finis supra quem nihil, summum [0183C] omnium est. Finis sub quo nihil, infimum. Itaque duo sunt fines omnium, summum et infimum. Et quidquid in universitate est praeter summum et infimum, medium est inter summum et infimum. Et unumquodque quando magis discedit ab altero, tanto magis accedit ad alterum, sive a summo ad infimum, sive ab infimo ad summum. Vis nosse si forte Scriptura manifestius alicubi fines istos commemoret? *Si ascendero,* inquit Psalmista, *in coelum, tu illic es; si descendero ad infernum, ades [n: (Psal. CXXXVIII)]*. Ergo coelum et infernum duos fines constituit excursus sui. Nihil autem altius est coelo, et nihil profundius inferno. Itaque coelum summum omnium est; infernus infimum, supra [0183D] quod nihil et sub quo nihil, et pertingit Sapientia a fine usque ad finem, et implet totum ac penetrat. Si ascendo in coelum, inquit, tu illic es; si descendero ad infernum, ades. Non dixit, in coelo ades. Neque in inferno, illic es. Sed, si ascendero in coelum, illic es; si descendero ad infernum, ades. Ergo in coelo est, in inferno adest; in coelo manens, in infernum adveniens, in coelo exspectat advenientes, in inferno sequitur fugientes. Ascendentes in coelum illic eum inveniunt, descendentes ad infernum illic eum non effugiunt. Si ascendero in coelum, inquit, tu illic es; si descendero ad infernum, ades. Et tamen utrobique es, et ubi es, et ubi ades, pertingens a fine usque ad finem. A fine ubi es, usque ad finem ubi ades, fortiter, et disponens omnia suaviter. Ecce [0184A] modo distinximus duos fines ad quos pertingit sapientia, summum et infimum, quorum alter quasi locus est sapientiae ubi consistit; alter vero velut excursus quidam et, ut ita dicatur, meta porrectionis qua se extendit. Finis ille a quo exit sapientia, caput est, ante quem nihil. Finis vero in quem excurrit, finis ultra quem nihil. Finis ille caput est et finis. Finis iste non caput, sed tantum finis. Caput est ille finis, quia ab ipso, et non supra; finis est, quia usque ad ipsum, et non ultra. Alter autem finis, caput non est; quia ab ipso nihil: sed tamen finis, quia quidquid usque ad ipsum, non ultra ipsum. Ille igitur finis qui sursum est, quasi principium et origo est, supra quem nihil. Finis vero qui deorsum est, quasi meta et terminus ultra quem nihil. Omnium [0184B] enim rerum origo et principium a summo est; terminus autem et finis in infimo. Quapropter finis deorsum finis est, et tantum finis. Finis vero sursum, non solum finis, sed et caput et finis. Si ergo coelum sursum est et infernus deorsum, et nihil altius coelo, et nihil profundius inferno inveniri potest: principium est coelum, et infernus finis. O quam bonum principium, et quam malus finis.

Ideo fortassis oculi sapientis in capite ejus sunt, quia in medio constitutus respicit principium suum, ut ibi finem faciat ubi accepit originem. Non est enim bonum in alium finem finiri, ubi finis est consumptionis non consummationis. Propterea homo qui ad aeternitatem creatus est, solus inter omnia animalia vultum erectum habet, ut coelum contempletur; [0184C] et in finem consummationis tendat; et non solum visibile hoc coelum oculis corporeis suspiciendum existimet, sed mente quoque et cordis visione supra coelum usque ad invisibilia coeli, et spiritalia virtutum, oculos interiores clariore atque perspicaciore intuitu attollens, usque ad finem, qui non habet finem, in lumine aeternitatis contemplatione conscendat. Illud est verum coelum supra omne coelum: quod non solum coelum coeli est, sed coelum coelorum. Non primo secundum; sed primo, et secundo tertium. Propter hoc Paulus usque ad tertium coelum raptum se gloriatur [n: (II Cor. XII)], qui ad summum omnium mente pervenerat: et non solum visibile coelum, quod et humana cogitatio superare [0184D] potest transierat, sed ea quoque, quae invisibilia super hoc visibile totum creata sunt omnia transgressus ad primum principium, et aeternitatis caput inspiciendum elevatus erat. Hoc est coelum tertium. Primum enim coelum visibile est coelum. Secundum coelum est visibilis coeli invisibile coelum. Tertium coelum est coeli visibilis et coeli invisibilis invisibile coelum. Primum coelum tantum est coelum, et terrae coelum. Secundum coelum, coeli coelum. Tertium coelum, coelorum coelum. Et hoc coelum supra se non habet coelum. Primum coelum est supremus status conditionis. Secundum coelum est supra conditionem provectus virtutis. Tertium coelum est sublime contemplationis. Primus infernus est infimus status conditionis. Secundus infernus est [0185A] sub conditione defectus iniquitatis. Tertius infernus est profundum damnationis. Primum coelum et primus infernus, finis et finis. Secundum coelum et secundus infernus, finis et finis. Tertium coelum et tertius infernus, finis et finis. Et ubique Sapientia: Pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. A primo coelo usque ad primum infernum, primus est excursus sapientiae. Incipiens enim a summo deorsum, et a supremo usque ad fundum rerum descendens, comitatur ac fovet cuncta quae operata est, ut non subsistant sine ipsa quae facta et creata sunt ab ipsa. A supremo autem usque ad infimum in universis quae subsistunt, singula quaeque quanto magis a perfecta pulchritudine consummatoque decore summorum degenerant, [0185B] tanto magis quasi fugientia quodammodo a sapientia elongant. Sed ipsa Sapientia fugam rerum a fine usque ad finem sequitur; quia in universis, quae fecit nihil ex toto deserens, singula quaeque a summis usque ad infima proprio convenientique suo generi decore moderando: his quoque se praesentem esse testatur. Eadem enim ipsa quae excellentissima creaturarum in summa et supereminenti pulchritudine disposuit; inferiora quoque consequenter coaptans et dispositione prosequens, usque ad fundum rerum nihil inordinatum relinquit. Pertingit itaque Sapientia ad finem usque ad ea quae in rebus omnibus infima sunt; quia in his etiam aliquid ejus invenitur, quae per infirmitatem conditionis et defectum naturae a summis longe recesserunt. Sed tamen ipsa [0185C] Sapientia in summis quasi permanendo consistit; ad infima vero quasi excurrendo pertingit, quia illa in perfecto decore suo immutabiliter subsistentia nusquam ab ejus similitudine defluunt. Ista vero per defectum fugientia per idipsum tamen, quod in suo genere retinent pulchritudinis, sibi quoque sapientiam adesse ostendunt. Pertingit ergo ubique sapientia, quia in omni quod est, pulchrum aliquid est, et omne quod pulchrum est, sapientiae opus est. Quod vero in eo, quod est, pulchrum non est, Sapientiae opus non est; quia quod pulchrum est in omni quod est, ipsa fecit: quod autem pulchrum non est, ipsa non fecit, sed permisit in eo quod pulchrum fecit. Quare ergo non totum pulchrum fecit in eo quod fecit: et quare non fecit, ut non pulchrum [0185D] nusquam esset in eo, quod fecit? Fortassis fatigata erat priora illa faciendo in quibus summam quamdam perfectamque pulchritudinem effecerat. Et idcirco caetera quomodo potuit, postea prosecuta est, faciendo quidem ut totum pulchrum esset quod in eis fecit, sed non faciendo, ut non pulchrum in eis non esset, quod non fecit sed permisit; quia ut omnino non esset, facere non potuit. Deinde itaque ad alia post alia descendendo, et alia post alia faciendo, tanto minus semper posterioribus operum suorum pulchritudinis ac decoris contulit, quando magis priora faciendo, et vires fortitudinis suae qua amplius posset, et qua sciret amplius, prudentiae suae vim ingeniumque consumpsit. Propterea rerum [0186A] ordo deorsum degeneravit ad infima descendens. Et nisi sapientia sibi prospexisset, ut in his tandem faciendi finem constitueret, non erat fortasse ultra pulchritudinis aliquid quod faciendis conferre potuisset.

## HOMILIA XI. *Qui sint fines terrae in quibus sunt oculi stultorum: et quomodo sapientia attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter,* etc. (cont.)

Quid dicimus? Ergo in faciendo minorata est sapientia Dei? et debilis prosecuta opus suum in finem? Et ubi est pertingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter? Si fortiter pertingit Sapientia a fine usque ad finem: ergo non est defectu opificis, differens pulchritudo conditionis. Quare ergo non aeque pulchra sunt omnia, nisi ut magis pulchra sint simul universa? Nam si non essent differenter pulchra singula, non essent incomparabiliter pulchra universa; quia summa esset pulchritudo in singulis [0186B] quaelibet excellens illa foret, et caeteris omnibus eminentior, non esset omnis pulchritudo in universis. Ergo Sapientia a fine usque ad finem fortiter pertingit; quia sic opera sua usque ad fundum rerum persequitur, ut etiam defectum inferiorum ad universorum pulchritudinem moderetur, ut inde universitas magis pulchra sit, quod in universitate quaedam aliorum comparatione et respectu defectum patiuntur. Nam hoc ipsum, quod in quibusdam ejus operibus pulchris non pulchrum videtur, turpe tamen non est, ubi est; sed minus in parte pulchritudinis habet, quia hoc in toto pulchrum est ad quod est. Ergo in nulla parte turpitudo, sed tamen in quibusdam partibus major, in quibusdam minor pulchritudo est; quia ex eo in toto partium maxima [0186C] est, quod in partibus differens, et multipliciter variata distinctaque omnifariam pulchritudo est. Deinde sequitur, et dicit: Disponens omnia suaviter. Suaviter enim omnia disponit, quia in tam multis tamque diversis rerum generibus singula quaeque ad terminum suum promonens, nihil universitatis concordiam pacemque turbare permittit; sed sic unicuique quod suum est tribuit, ut dissimiliter currentia ad unum finem conducat, et ut unius operatio vim effectumque alterius non impediat. O Sapientia, quam late diffunderis, et tamen non dissiparis. Quam in longinquum porrigis te, et defectum non pateris! Quantus est excursus tuus, a summo usque in infimum! Quantum coelum distat a terra, et infernus [0186D] sub terra ubi est finis terrae, et ultra non est terra; quantum distat summum ab infimo, totum penetrat Sapientia. Et brevis est tamen via haec Sapientiae, et compendiosa porrectio, et modicum putat sibi omne quod est, ut transeat et apprehendat, et penetret; nec longe esse quidquid spatio porrigitur, quod bonitate proximum sit. Multo vero amplius distare a justitia iniquitatem et longinquius duobus, coelo a terra, et inferno sub terra. Justitia enim altior coelo est, et non solum coelo, sed etiam iis qui sunt in coelo. Angeli in coelo sunt, et a principio in coelo sunt; et inde supra id quod facti fuerant per justitiam ascenderunt. Et justitia altior coelo est, iniquitas profundior inferno. Profundior enim est omni, quod in creatura imum est, quia quod per iniquitatem [0187A] lapsum est sub omni creatura est; nec potest esse profundius quidquam eo quo nihil est pejus. Quantum igitur ascendit qui in coelum ascendit; tantum ascendit, qui ad justitiam proficit. Et quantum descendit, qui ad infernum descendit, tantum descendit qui ad iniquitatem cadit. Quantum autem ascendit, qui de inferno ad coelum ascendit, tantum ascendit qui de iniquitate ad justitiam redit. Quantum vero descendit qui de coelo ad infernum descendit, tantum descendit qui de justitia ad iniquitatem ruit.

Et in his omnibus *ascendunt usque ad coelos, et descendunt usque ad abyssos, et anima eorum in malis* tabescat [n: (Psal. CVI)]. Ergo coelum est justitiae, et infernus iniquitatis; et rapiuntur motus animorum [0187B] alterna fluctuatione incessanter quasi contrariis flatibus acti ascendentes, et descendentes; et fiunt exaltationes, et depressiones, et commotiones magnae in illo invisibili salo fluctuantium desideriorum. Venit spiritus bonus, et sursum impellit. Venit spiritus malus, et impellit deorsum: et ascendunt usque ad coelos, et descendunt usque ab abyssos, anima illorum tabescente in incerto malorum suorum. Et quid dicit? Si ascendero in coelum, tu illic es; si descendero ad infernum, ades. Si enim ascendis in coelum justitiae, habes illic tecum sapientiam continentem te ne cadas; si autem descendis ad infernum culpae, adest illic sapientia apprehendens te ne effugias. Sursum dexteram habet, et deorsum [0187C] sinistram, pertingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponens omnia suaviter. Sursum fortis, deorsum fortis, ubique invincibilis. Sursum fortis est ut eos, qui in ipsa confidunt a malo conservet, et eos qui de se praesumunt in malum deserendo praecipitet. Deorsum fortis est, ut contemnentes pro malo condemnet, poenitentes a malo justificet. Ecce quantos in summo conservavit, quantos de summo praecipitavit, quantos de imo erexit, quantos in imo deseruit. Manifesta sunt judicia ejus: et qui seipsum novit, novit quomodo haec omnia quotidie Sapientia operatur in secreto cordis humani semper judicio praesidens: et occulta retributione ac dispensatione invisibili, merita examinando, nunc per gratiam assumit, nunc per justitiam deserit, nunc per lenitatem [0187D] parcit, nunc per districtionem punit. Et cum deseruerit iterum assumit, et cum assumpserit iterum derelinquit, ut nesciat homo finem suum, et sollicitus ambulet omni tempore vitae suae, ut qui jacent non desperent, et qui stant non praesumant. Si in coelo justitiae sunt, timeant ruinam. Si in inferno culpae, quaerant misericordiam. Ideo ipsa justitia primum descendit ad infernum; postea ascendit ad coelum, ut descendens, spem daret liberandis, ascendens viam ostenderet glorificandis. Attingit ergo sapientia a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. Finem enim utriusque comprehendit, et boni videlicet quod est in ipsa; et mali pariter, quod in ipsa non est. Sed in eo quod est ex ipsa defluit ab ipsa, nec tamen omnino sine [0188A] ipsa, quia quod natura non gignit ex suo, coercet potestate in suo. Malum enim propriam sedem non habet, sed natura peregrinum a suo, in alieno commoratur, ut constet quod non est in suo; quia si bona non essent in quibus mala essent, mala omnino non essent. Cum enim malum aliud non sit, quam boni corruptio, et omne quod corrumpitur bonum, aliud est a quo deficit, aliud in quo consistit. Et in quo consistit bonum est, quod deficit autem a quo deficit a bono, malum est: defectus a bono alibi omnino esse non potest, nisi in eo, quod constat in aliquo bono. Igitur si nullum bonum esset, nullum omnino malum esset; quia non esset ubi esse posset malitiam, si non eam in suo pateretur, quae eam non fecit, Sapientia. Non enim Sapientia [0188B] malitiam fecit; sed in eo quod fecit, malitiam esse permisit, ut collata malitiae Sapientia vinceret, et comparata pulchrior appareret. Confert enim se, et commetitur Sapientia malitiae in operibus suis, et vincit eam utrinque, ut attingat a fine usque ad finem; quia Sapientiam malitia ad defectum currens non evadit, sed Sapientia malitiam ad provectum surgens transcendit. Ideo enim malitia ad defectum currens Sapientiam non evadit, quia non potest malitia ipsa, quae corrumpat invenire, nisi in iis quae Sapientia creavit. Sapientia vero propterea malitiam ad provectum surgens transcendit; quia non potest totum malitia corrumpere, quod Sapientia potuit creare. Ut ergo malitia comparetur, nihil per malitiam [0188C] ad non esse deduci potest, quod a Sapientia esse non acceperit; ut autem malitia superetur non totum quod a sapientia factum est, malitia corrumpit.

## HOMILIA XI. *Qui sint fines terrae in quibus sunt oculi stultorum: et quomodo sapientia attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter,* etc. (cont.)

Currit ergo sapientia, ut attingat a fine usque ad finem transcendens malitiam in incorruptis bonis, quo malitia non accedit: et consequens malitiam in iis, quae corrupta sunt, quo malitia non praecedit. Non enim malitia Sapientiam praecedere potest, ut vel ante illius exortum prior inveniatur, vel post illius defectum, posterior quia et prius corruptione invenitur, quod aliquando corruptionem admisit, et posterius corruptione quod totum corrumpi non potuit, et supra corruptionem quo corruptio non accessit. Et propterea Sapientia malitiam vincit, et stultitiam praecedit; quia attingit a fine usque ad [0188D] finem, id est ab exortu omnis boni, ut malitiam transcendat ultra defectum cujusdam boni ut malitiam concludat. In quo enim omne bonum aliquando sine corruptione exstitit prior Sapientia agnoscitur. In quo autem etiam bono quod corrumpitur, post corruptionem aliquid superest boni, quod omnino corrumpi non potest, posterior Sapientia invenitur. Vincit ergo Sapientia malitiam; quia attingit a fine in quo omne bonum, initium accepit, usque ad finem, in quo etiam corruptum bonum post defectum boni in aliquo bono subsistit. Attingit autem a fine usque ad finem fortiter, ut ipsam malitiam potestate ad mensuram cohibeat, et ratione ad ordinem restringat, ne vel in finem se porrigat totum perimens corruptio, vel ad extrema se diffundat, [0189A] totum deformans confusio. Propterea ergo fortiter ubique pertingit subjiciens malitiam dominationi suae: et quidquid illa corruptionis ad confusionem ingerit, haec lege mirabili secretaque dispositione ad decorem operum suorum convertit, ex non pulchro efficiens, ut pulcherrimum fiat quod pulchrum est, et quod bonum per se constat, ex eo quod bonum non est, in consummationem bonitatis consurgat. Attingit ergo a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter. Nihil excipitur a suavitate ejus. Omnia disponit suaviter. Quae omnia? Prava et recta, bona et mala, obnoxia et adversa, omnia disponit suaviter: non solum bona, sed etiam mala; non solum recta, sed etiam prava; non solum obnoxia, sed etiam adversa. Omnia [0189B] disponit suaviter. Quam suaviter? Vultis scire quam suaviter disponit omnia? Sine violentia adversa subjicit; sine tumultuatione prava dirigit, et in pacatissimo regno suo, quod justitia intus tenet, mala quoque et adversantium vitiorum motus, sine coactione secreto ordine sapientissimaque dispositione servire facit. Tam suaviter enim omnia etiam non suavia disponit, ut omnia quae contra ejus voluntatem se erigunt, neque potenter exstinguat, ut nihil sint neque violenter compellat, ut nihil possint; sed esse sinens et posse annuens, currentia contra suam voluntatem manifeste permittit, et occulte conducit ad implendam suam voluntatem. Et cum mali volunt illa contra ipsam, sine ipsa volunt; cum autem possunt quod volunt, ab ipsa possunt. Cum vero faciunt [0189C] quod possunt, putant quidem et volunt facere se quod ipsa non vult; et tamen non aliud faciunt, nec facere queunt quam quod ipsa vult. Manifeste enim permittuntur et occulte conducuntur, ut suaviter disponantur; et pertingit usque ad eos Sapientia fortiter, ut ipsos ad suam dispositionem restringat; et disponit suaviter, ne ipsos contra eorum voluntatem compellat. Sed et si quando exterius violentiam pravis voluntatibus adhibendis, sive plectendis adhibet; nunquam tamen suavitatem suae dispositionis deserit; quia in se tranquilla permanens, unde adversantium pacem male quietam turbat: inde regnum justitiae suae solidius ad pacem componit. Propterea ergo pertingit a fine usque ad [0189D] finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter.

Restat nunc maximus ille et supremus Sapientiae excursus, a fine usque ad finem: qui nullum habent finem. Sursum sublime contemplationis, et deorsum profundum damnationis. Isti enim fines non habent ultra alios fines, quibus ipsi finiri possint; sed omnia usque ad ipsos, quae facta sunt ad ipsos, et ultra ipsos nihil. Ad istos duos fines universorum cursum, incipiens a medio sapientia hinc inde sive promovende, sive deserendo disponens conducit; sursum ascendentibus viam sternens justitiam; deorsum descendentibus viam relinquens iniquitatem, ut per justitiam eatur ab beatitudinem, per iniquitatem vero et injustitiam perveniatur ad damnationem. Quo cum ventum fuerit, sistet universa in finibus [0190A] suis; et fines ipsi nunquam habebunt finem. Et tunc quoque ipsa Sapientia pertinget a fine usque ad finem fortiter, ut amplius nunquam vel a retributione justorum deficiat, vel a poena iniquorum desistat: disponens omnia suaviter hinc ad gaudium, illinc ad supplicium aeternum. Sed, quaeso, quae suavitas in inferis erit? quae suavitas in tormentis aeternis esse poterit, ut dicatur disponens omnia suaviter? An ideo suaviter, quia ipsa suavis permanet quae disponit, licet illi suaves non sint quos disponit, nec illud suave sit in quo disponit? Quomodo tamen suaviter disponit? An ideo suaviter disponit, quia ipsa dispositio suavis est, etiamsi illa suavia non sunt quae disponit: et sicut mala non male, sed bene disponit, ita insuavia et amara suaviter disponit? [0190B] Propterea enim mala sunt, et ab omnipotenti bona mala esse permissa sunt, non ut mala dona fiant; sed ut de malis bonum fiat, et bona ipsa malorum comparatione pulchrius elucescant; non ut bona malis augeantur adjunctis, sed commendentur comparatis. Quis autem sapiens est, ut intelligat haec, quid mala faciant in regno boni: et tamen si nihil facerent in regno sapientiae omnino mala non essent? Ergo aliqui faciunt mala propter quod esse permissa sunt: et bonum faciunt ipsa et mala et non ipsa mala faciunt bonum, sed ex ipsis malis facit bonum: qui et bonis et malis uti novit ad bonum. Hoc autem Sapientia est, quae pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter.

## HOMILIA XII. *In illud, secundum aliam translationem: Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae; ubi nostra habet: Stultus in tenebris ambulat, et in reliqua capitis secundi.*

[0190C]

Diutius fortassis quam tractatus brevitas postularet in his discutiendis immorati sumus; sed non plane quam rei difficultas exigeret. Nunc igitur quia invenimus finem, et finem de quibus Scriptura locuta est, cum diceret Sapientiam pertingere a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponere omnia suaviter; et istos fines quaerere propositum erat propter fines terrae, ubi sunt oculi stultorum, qui ambulant in tenebris, ne forte pertingat Sapientia ad fines [0190D] terrae quae a fine pertingit usque ad finem, et lux in tenebris luceat in finibus terrae, si Sapientia pertingit ad fines terrae, quae pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. Quia igitur istos fines invenimus. Si tamen ea quae de finibus istis diximus, interpretationi Scripturae suam veritatem digne accommodare valeant, et non sit alia excellentior interpretatio cui ista jure concedat, nunc restat inquirere qui sint isti fines terrae, qui commemorati sunt, et ubi sunt, sed et quae sit terra ipsa, et ubi sit, in cujus finibus sunt oculi stultorum, qui non respiciunt ad caput suum ut videant, et non ambulent in tenebris. Primum ergo quaeramus, quae sit terra ista, et ubi sit terra ista. Scimus autem quod in hoc mundo terra est et coelum est, [0191A] et inter terram, et coelum est quidquid in hoc mundo est. Nam in hujus mundi corpore coelum supremum est, et terra infima et sicut supra coelum nihil hujusmodi est, quod in ipso coelo non est, ita sub terra nihil est, nisi forte quod in terra est. Et si dicimus de terra ista, quod in finibus ejus oculi stultorum sunt quomodo hoc stare non poterit. Magis enim perspicaces quam caecos oculos praedicamus, quos usque ad fines terrae visione sua porrectos asserimus. Quis justorum hoc potuit, ut ambitum terrae oculis lustraret, et tam longinqua spatia, quae multorum labore annorum vix confici potuissent, una visione percurreret? Ridiculum est vel hoc cogitare, quod Scriptura de visione corporali dixerit. De terra ista visibili: Oculi stultorum [0191B] in finibus terrae, nisi forte quis in his verbis hoc significare credat, quod stulti quique et carnalis vitae amatores, qui a terrena bona tota, mentis intentione semper ambiunt, pro eis adipiscendis ac quaerendis usque ad exteras nationes, et saepe usque ad ultimos fines terrarum discurrunt: et propterea illic oculos habere dicuntur, quod cogitatione ac desiderio semper illuc intendunt. Sapiens autem qui ad ea, quae sursum sunt mentem erexit et intentionem dirigit, ipse oculos in capite suo habeat, pro eo quod ad id quod summum omnium ac principale est adipiscendum intendat. Posset hoc, quantum ad veritatem interpretationis pertinet, satis convenienter induci; si Sapientia nos ad altiorem intelligentiam, et terram aliam, aliosque fines, et oculos alios [0191C] cogitandos non vocaret. Nam, si caput sapientis recte spiritualiter intelligitur, necesse est ut terram quoque et fines ejus propter oculos stultorum mystice et non corporaliter interpretemur. Sicut ergo hic mundus visibilis habet terram suam et coelum suum, sic homo habet terram suam, et coelum suum. Nam et ipse homo mundus est et minor mundus dictus est homo. Hujus terra est caro ejus, et coelum ejus anima ejus. Sed in hoc mundo majore intra coelum terra est, in mundo autem minore coelum intra terram. Et tamen mundi minoris coelum majus est, quam coelum mundi majoris. Terra vero ejus quid est ad terram illius? Quam parva est? et tamen coelum ejus in terra ejus. Quid est coelum in [0191D] terra? Anima in corpore. Anima coelum, corpus terra. Anima in corpore; coelum in terra. Et tamen semper coelum sursum, terra deorsum. Nam, sicut coelum hoc terra suo loco excelsius est, ita coelum illud terra sua natura sublimius. Propterea in mundo majore, quae in terra sunt, sub terra sunt; quae extra terram sunt, supra terram sunt. In mundo minore, quae intus sunt supra sunt, quae foris sunt subtus sunt. Quae sunt intus, et quae sunt foris? Invisibilia intus sunt, visibilia foris sunt. Ergo invisibilia supra sunt, visibilia subtus; et invisibilia supra coelum nostrum, invisibilia sub terra nostra. Omnia terrena sub terra nostra sunt, quia ad ejus servitutem facta sunt, et ad ejus obsequium ordinata. Ergo supra terram terra nostra. Et quid dicam? [0192A] Nonne et supra coelum est terra nostra? Nonne illuc portavit eam, et illic collocavit eam sumptam de nobis, qui eam sumpsit pro nobis? Ergo supra coelum est terra nostra. Facta erat primum per naturam supra terram terra nostra, postea ivit per culpam in terram, et sub terram, terra nostra; sed nunc per gratiam elevata est supra coelum terra nostra. Ergo terrena omnia sub terra nostra sunt. Et est tamen ipsa terra terrenis juncta et quadam amicitia copulata, sicut coelum coelestibus junctum est et foederatum, et terra usque ad terrena, et coelum usque ad coelestia. Ergo terrena fines sunt terrae, et coelestia fines coeli; quia terra usque ad terrena et non ultra, et coelum usque ad coelestia et non ultra. Terra per concupiscentiam tendit se usque ad terrena, et [0192B] coelum per sapientiam tendit se usque ad coelestia. *Caro* enim, ut ait Apostolus, *concupiscit adversus spiritum; et spiritus adversus carnem [n: (Galat. V)]*. Spiritus enim concupiscit sursum et caro concupiscit deorsum: et ideo in contrarium alteri utrumque se tendit. Et utrumque cum pervenerit quo tendit, ibi finem facit et non ultra se tendit. Ergo fines terrae terrena sunt, quo terra carnis per desiderium carnale tenditur. Et habet quidem terra nostra alium finem, judicii, sed desiderii alium finem non habet. Hucusque per desiderium tenditur, sed per judicium ultra ducitur. Per desiderium quidem concupiscentia tenditur ad terrena; sed per judicium post terrena in terram ducitur post terram ad gehennam. Per concupiscentiam ad voluptatem, post [0192C] voluptatem ad iniquitatem, post iniquitatem ad mortem, post mortem ad damnationem. *Unusquisque,* ait Scriptura, *tentatur a propria concupiscentia abstractus, et illectus. Concupiscentia enim, cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum autem, cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem [n: (Jac. I)]*. *Concepit dolorem, et peperit iniquitatem. Convertetur dolor in caput ejus, et in verticem ipsius iniquitas ejus descendet [n: (Psal. VII)]*.

Itaque carnalium voluptatum delectationes fines terrae sunt, et delectationes quidem carnis sequitur mors carnis. Mortem vero carnis sequitur ultio damnationis. Igitur fines terrae unum finem habent mortem quo excipiuntur, et consumuntur; mors [0192D] autem finem habet damnationem, quo excipitur et consummatur. Delectationes enim carnales morte consumuntur, ut amplius non sint; mors vero carnis damnatione consummatur, ut semper sit. Istos fines stulti considerare nolunt, qui oculos habent in finibus terrae. Tantummodo enim primos fines terrae intuentur circa terram, ubi terra ipsa finitur; non ultra alium finem, ubi isti fines finiuntur. Intendunt ad fines desiderii sui, non ad fines judicii sui. Ad delectationem carnis suae, et ad voluptatum suarum illecebras oculos aperiunt, et quid ultra postea futurum sit non attendunt. Ideo stulti sunt qui in media via finem faciunt, ubi non est finis: et non prospiciunt finem ubi est finis. *Cor stultorum ubi laetitia est et cor sapientium ubi tristitia (Eccle. [0193A] VII)* Et alia Scriptura dicit. *In omnibus operibus tuis omnis diebus vitae tuae, memorare novissima tua, et in aeternum non peccabis [n: (Eccli. VII)]*. Propterea stulti peccare non timent, quia ad solam respiciunt peccati delectationem, non autem respiciunt quae deinde sequitur, delectationis damnationem. Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae; oculi sapientis in capite ejus. Quod est caput sapientis? Quod cuique summum est, hoc caput est illi. Caput enim summum hominis est. Caput ergo sapientis, hoc est quod sapienti summum est. Quid autem sapienti summum est, nisi quod summum omnium est. Neque enim sapiens esset, qui pro summo haberet, quod summum non esset. Itaque summum omnium caput sapientis est: et fortasse ipsa sapientia, hoc caput est, quam [0193B] qui sapiens est, cunctis praeponit, quae concupiscendum aliquid habere videntur, et in ejus comparatione despicit universa. Et recte, quia Sapientia summum omnium est; caput sapientis ipsa est, quoniam et hoc ipsum quod sapiens est, ab ipsa Sapientia est, et quod esse cupit, sapiens totum in ipsa est. Quapropter caput sapientis non aliud rectius accipitur, quam ipsa Sapientia; quoniam ab ipsa est bonitatis origo, et in ipsa consistit omnis boni consummatio.

## HOMILIA XII. *In illud, secundum aliam translationem: Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae; ubi nostra habet: Stultus in tenebris ambulat, et in reliqua capitis secundi.* (cont.)

Itaque summum omnium caput sapientis est, et hoc caput non aliud quam ipsa Sapientia est; quoniam Sapientia summa omnium est. Summum ergo bonum caput est, et summum malum finis. Duo enim sunt summum bonum, et summum malum, [0193C] altrinsecus ex adverso constituta, et de medio universa bona, et mala ad istos duos fines recurrunt. Omne bonum ad summum bonum, et omne malum ad summum malum. Non enim est verum bonum, nisi conducat ad summum bonum, nec verum malum nisi recurrat ad summum malum. Ergo similiter omne malum ad summum malum, sicut omne bonum ad summum. Sed non similiter omne malum a summo malo, quemadmodum omne bonum a summo bono. *Omne* enim *datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est descendens a patre luminum [n: (Jac. I)]*. Et de malis quid? *Initia,* inquit, *dolorum sunt haec [n: (Matth. XXIV)]*. Ergo a summo bono omne bonum, et ad summum bonum omne bonum. Similiter [0193D] ad summum malum omne malum, sed non a summo malo omne malum. Ergo summum bonum omnium bonorum, et caput est, et finis. Summum omnium malorum caput non est, sed tantum finis. Igitur omne bonum praeter summum bonum, in tantum bonum est, quantum conducit ad summum bonum; et omne malum, praeter summum malum, in tantum malum est, quantum conducit ad summum malum. Multi enim fuerunt qui media ista bona habuerunt, et vera bona eis non fuerunt, quia per ea ad summum bonum non pervenerunt. Et multi fuerunt qui media mala gravia sustinuerunt, et mala eis non fuerunt, quia per ea ad summum malum non descenderunt. Illi itaque falsis bonis elati ad summum malum corruerunt; isti falsis [0194A] malis exercitati, et humiliati ad summum bonum profecerunt. Propterea sapiens usque ad caput suum oculos levat, et non sufficit ei aliquid, quod infra est, donec perveniat ad id quod summum est. Quidam enim oculos sursum habuerunt et usque ad caput oculos non erexerunt, sed in corpore medio remanserunt. Sed quid facerent membra sine capite? Nunquid vivere possent membra a capite praecisa? ita omne bonum, sine summo bono non est verum bonum. Vidistis hominem abstinentem ab his quae lege prohibentur, non homicidium facientem, non adulterantem, non rapientem, non falsum testimonium perhibentem, non concupiscentem rem proximi sui, et dixistis hominem bonum, bonae vitae, bonae conversationis, dignum laude, dignum retributione. [0194B] Et quam multi fecerunt haec, et Deo non placuerunt; quia propter Deum non fecerunt, quod fecerunt: et ideo nec bene fecerunt, quia propter summum bonum non fecerunt. Vidistis alium adhuc altius ascendentem et majora bona facientem, non solum a malo abstinentem, sed etiam in bono se exercentem, jejunantem, orantem, elemosynas multas tribuentem, compatientem miseris, subvenientem in angustia, et tribulatione constitutis, et praedicastis magnum et imitatione dignum, quasi Deo proximum et delectum. Et tamen multi omnia ista fecerunt, et nihil profecerunt; quoniam Deum in causa non posuerunt. Non habuerunt oculos in capite suo sicut sapiens, sed in tentationem suam deorsum curvantes, vel sibi, vel aliis placere cupientes [0194C] et de bono suo sine Deo gloriantes, bonum suum perdiderunt, et ad summum bonum non pervenerunt. Merito enim membra viva tenere non potuerunt, qui caput a corpore praeciderunt. Ideo oculi sapientis in capite ejus, ut ad summum bonum prius mentis intentione ac desiderio praecedat, postea studio et actione subsequatur, deinde retributione perveniat. Praecedat intentione, ut omne quod facit, pro illo adipiscendo faciat; subsequatur studio, ut in illo perseveret; perveniat retributione, ut illud in praemium accipiat. Tali modo igitur oculi sapientis sunt in capite ejus.

Propterea namque caput nostrum cum esset deorsum, nobiscum ne forte nostra quoque intentio deorsum [0194D] remaneret, ascendit sursum caput ad caput, ut nos traheret post se: et ecce sursum sunt non duo capita, sed unum caput. Caput enim deorsum fuit Christus homo in mundo, et caput sursum fuit Deus Pater in coelo. Vis scire quod Christus caput est? *Caput mulieris vir, caput viri Christus [n: (I Cor. XI)]*. Et caput omnis Ecclesiae Christus constitutus est a Deo. Et ipsa Ecclesia sponsa Christi, et corpus Christi, quid dicit de sponso suo Christo? et de capite suo Christo? Ipsa namque sponsa est, quae in canticorum dilectum suum commendans, post multa talia et alia multa, hoc in ejus laudem addit, dicens: *Caput ejus aurum optimum [n: (Cant. V)]*. Ergo caput est Christus, et caput habet Christus. Et quod est caput Christi? Audi Apostolum: Caput mulieris vir; caput [0195A] viri Christus: *Caput Christi Deus [n: (I Cor. XI)]*. Itaque caput Christi est Deus: et ipse Christus ascensurus in coelum dixit: *Ascendo ad Patrem meum, et Patrem vestrum: Deum meum et Deum vestrum [n: (Joan. XX)]*. Si ergo ad Deum ascendit, ad caput suum ascendit; quia caput Christi Deus. Et hoc caput est aurum illud optimum quod nulla rubigo consumit, nulla vetustas conficit; quia immortalis divinitas corruptionem non recipit. Ecce igitur caput nostrum sursum est Christus, et caput nostrum sursum est Deus, et unum caput nostrum Christus et Deus; quia et Christus Deus, et unus Deus Christus: et caput Christi Deus et unum caput Christus, et caput Christi Deus; sicut unum principium Christus, et caput Christi Deus: *Ego,* inquit, [0195B] *principium, qui et loquor vobis [n: (Joan. VIII)]*. Hoc enim principium ipsum est caput nostrum: ad quod sapiens oculos suos erexit, nunc ad illum intendendo per fidem, ut postmodum in illud oculos suos habere possit, illud contemplando per speciem. Ad hoc principium et ad caput istud, ut oculos levemus Scriptura nos admonet, dicens: *Si consurrexistis cum Christo, quae sursum sunt sapite, ubi Christus est in dextera Dei sedens; quae sursum sunt quaerite, non quae super terram. Mortui enim estis, et vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo [n: (Coloss. III)]*. Nam ubi mortui sumus, ibi sapere non debemus; sed ibi sapere debemus, ubi vitam habemus. Si mortui sumus super terram, quomodo sapimus super terram? Quis enim mortuus sentit? Ibi [0195C] itaque sentire debemus, ubi vitam habemus; ibi sapere, ubi vita nostra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo, ubi Christus est ad dexteram Dei sedens. Quid est sapere? amare ipsum, est sapere. Amor enim ipse sapor est, et dilectio ipsa sapientia est. Amare itaque quae sursum sunt, hoc est sapere ea, quae sursum sunt; quia ipsa dilectio illuc trahit, ubi est quod diligitur: et habet interim saporem suum quo reficitur, donec perveniatur ad id quod diligitur. Quia ergo quod per sapientiam diligitur, sursum est; idcirco sursum trahit ipsa Sapientia. Et quia quod per concupiscentiam diligitur, deorsum quoque trahat necesse est ipsa concupiscentia. Ab eo autem quo Sapientia sursum trahit, et concupiscentia deorsum, quasi divisio est tenebrarum a luce: et quae corda [0195D] deorsum descendunt a luce deficiunt; quae vero ascendunt in luce sunt. Qui enim ad vanitatem descendunt, a veritate deficiunt, et qui a veritate deficiunt, deficiunt a luce; quia veritas lux est. Et non deficit ipsa lux, sed ipsi a luce deficiunt, quando tenebrae fiunt; quia tenebrae non sunt lux, nec illuminantur a luce ut luceant. Tamen ipsa lux lucet etiam in tenebris, sed tenebrae eam non comprehendunt [n: (Joan. I)], ut eam in se suscipiant, et participes ejus fiant, quoniam tenebrae luci communicare non possunt. Istae ergo sunt tenebrae in quibus ambulant stulti: qui terrena sapiunt et non intelligentes honorem suum, *comparati sunt jumentis insipientibus et similes facti sunt illis [n: (Psal. XLVIII)]*. Nam [0196A] quia more jumentorum sola terrena appetunt, et coelestia nullo mentis affectu requirunt; ita tandem carnis delectatione caecantur, et voluptatum illecebris sopiuntur, ut nec cogitare valcant a quibus bonis ceciderint, neque ad quae mala sint perventuri prospicere. Quid igitur isti, nisi in tenebris ambulant, qui ita prava delectatione caecati sunt, ut nec vera bona possint cognoscere, nec vera mala praevidere? Quas tenebras intus patiuntur qui lucem praesentem non vident, et illud bonum non possunt agnoscere, cujus praesentiam nulla valent aversione declinare? Quare hoc? nisi quia stultitia excaecavit oculos eorum: quam in finibus terrae illos defixerunt, statuentes apud se oculos suos declinare in terram.

## HOMILIA XII. *In illud, secundum aliam translationem: Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae; ubi nostra habet: Stultus in tenebris ambulat, et in reliqua capitis secundi.* (cont.)

[0196B]Sed ne forte contrarium quis putet quod hic stultus in tenebris ambulare dicitur, et quod illic, ut commemoratum est, oculi stultorum in finibus terrae esse perhibentur. Videtur enim quasi utrumque affirmatum, quod videant et non videant, cum utrumque tamen verum simul esse possit, quod videant et non videant. Nam qui dixit: Stultus in tenebris ambulat, videtur omnino dixisse quod stultus non videat. Et rursum qui dixit: Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae, videtur dixisse, quod aliquid videant, vel ea quae sunt in finibus terrae. Quomodo ergo in tenebris ambulant, si vident? Quomodo autem non vident, si ea vident, quae sunt in finibus terrae? Sed sciendum est quod stulti non ideo in tenebris ambulare dicuntur, quod nihil videant: vident enim, [0196C] quae sunt in finibus terrae, sed quod sive in his quae vident, sive in his quae non vident, veritatem non videant. Visibilia enim tamen per intentionem et desiderium vident, et invisibilia non vident. Et in his quae vident, putant bonum esse, quod non est; et in his quae non vident, nesciunt, bonum esse, quod est. Itaque nusquam veritatem vident, et ideo in tenebris ambulant etiam in his, quae vident. Excaecavit enim corda eorum delectatio carnis et illececebra voluptatum, ut veritatem non videant. Quia mens falsa dulcedine inebriata dum hoc solum, quod in praesenti dulce et jucundum videtur, cogitat, nec reminisci potest quanta dulcedo sit eorum bonorum a quibus aversione sua corruit, nec providere quanta sit amaritudo malorum supervenientium, ad quam [0196D] semper praecipitationis suae ruina festinat. Et nota quomodo se consequitur sententia veritatis. Superius namque iste considerata vanitate rerum mundanarum, contemptis omnibus ad contemplandam sapientiam se transtulit, dicens: Transivi ad contemplandam sapientiam, erroresque et stultitiam. Deinde considerans quod vera sapientia hominis alia non est, quam vera bona quaerere, et amare quae sursum sunt, ubi rex noster est: qui nos idcirco praecessit, illuc ascendens, ut quo sequeremur ostenderet. Attendens quoque quam difficile mentem terrenis delectationibus assuetam ad desideria aeternorum erigere, adjunxit et ait: Quid est homo, ut sequi possit regem factorem suum? Vides tamen [0197A] quod corda, quae ad delectationes carnales se mergunt, a lumine veritatis tenebrescunt, quasi definitivam boni malique sententiam dedit, dicens: Vidi quod tantum praecederet sapientia stultitiam quantum differt lux a tenebris. Deinde studium utriusque commendans novissime adjunxit, et ait: Sapientis oculi in capite ejus stultus autem in tenebris ambulat. Quapropter ad summam recurrat sententia, et dicat: Difficile quidem est hominem mortalem ad contemplationem supernae sapientiae cor desideriis terrenis pressum erigere; sed tamen quia sapientia lux est, et omnes qui ab ejus contemplatione deficiunt, in tenebris sunt, necesse est, quantum possibilitas suppetit, etiam mortalem hominem quaerendae atque investigandae Sapientiae studium adhibere. [0197B] Haec est enim sapientia hominis in hac vita, Sapientiam quaerere et investigare. Nam invenire sapientiam et perfecte apprehendere verum, non huic vitae datum est, sed futurae repositum. Habet tamen ipsa inquisitio Sapientiae nunc lucem suam, qua discernit eos qui amant Sapientiam et quaerunt ab iis qui stultitiam amant, et ambulant in tenebris. Sed mens carnalis jucunditatem visibilis lucis amans, pro interna luce quaerenda labore vanum existimat; quia ejus claritatem post hanc lucem sublatam, in mentibus sanctis inexstinguibilem permanere aut dubitat aut prorsus ignorat. Nam quia pari sorte similique conditione sapientes patitur et stultos, ab hac luce visibili cernit post mortem carnis subtrahi: dubium ei fit etiam de luce [0197C] Sapientiae, an ipsa possit in mentibus sanctis post mortem carnis inextinguibilis conservari. Propterea licet studium ipsius Sapientiae bonum ac laudabile esse consideret, utrum tamen tanto labore comparandum sit, dubitat, cujus fructus an perpetuus esse possit, nondum adhuc ei ratio ulla indubitata manifestat. Hanc ergo fluctuationem humani cordis iste in semetipso, et per contemplationem veritatis videns, et per affectum communis infirmitatis sentiens, per sententiam quoque assumit, ostendens qualiter quaesitam visamque sapientiam, ipsa eum mortalis vitae consideratio a studio sapientiae revocabat, et quod idcirco alios in sapientia procedere vanum omnino existimaverit, quia in reddendo mortis debito, [0197D] parem caeteris se esse agnovit. Hoc est enim quod, post laudatam Sapientiam studiique ejus commendationem, subito nunc ad considerationem communis infirmitatis conversus infert, dicens:

*Didici, quod unus utriusque esset interitus.* Quia enim vidit utrumque, id est et sapientem et stultum uno mortis interitu ab hac vita subtrahi, etiam hoc dubitare coepit, utrum post hanc vitam diversa meritorum praemia secundum hanc ipsam diversam hujus vitae conversationem debeant inveniri. Et si hoc verum esse constat, quare una via ab hac vita exeunt, qui post hanc vitam ad unum praemium non pertingunt? Si vero quemadmodum unus cunctis transitus est, ita etiam universis fit una perventio: quare ante mortem dissimiliter laborando currerent, [0198A] qui simili morte exeuntes ad dissimile post mortem praemium, non pervenirent? Hoc est enim quod sequitur: *Et dixi in corde meo: Si unus, et stulti, et meus occasus erit, quid mihi prodest, quod majorem sapientiae dedi operam?* His enim, qui hanc vitam solam esse credunt, studium Sapientiae vanum omnino existimatur: propterea quod ejus labor praesentis vitae est, praemium autem et fructus laboris futurae. Idcirco quia laborem vident, cito ipsum laborem fastidiunt, et facile ad ea convertuntur, quae etsi sapientia nequaquam appetenda esse doceat, quia tamen eorum fructus praesens est, commodiora existimant. Sed quia Sapientia etiam in hac vita laborem suum omnino infructuosum esse non sinit, eosque qui se sectantur, magna intus consolatione [0198B] refovet, ac per illuminationem veritatis in hac mortalitatis miseria de aeternitatis praemio habere fiduciam suadet, iste statim postquam pro vitae carnalis defectu de fructu vitae perpetuae dubitare coeperat, pro eadem sua dubitatione ex intima se consideratione accusat, dicens:

*Locutusque cum mente mea, animadverti quod hoc quoque esset vanitas.* Et continuo causam adjungens quare supradictam dubitationem rem vanam esse testetur, et vanitatem ipsam cujus respectu veritatis ei in dubium venire potuisset infert, dicens:

*Non enim erit memoria sapientis similiter, ut stulti in perpetuum.* Sapientia enim, quae vitae praesenti mortalitatem non tollit futurae vitae tribuit [0198C] aeternitatem: et licet sapientis et stulti in exitu hujus vitae similis conditio sit, in futura tamen vita similis memoria non erit. Sicut enim hic eos dispar vivendi conversatio dividit, ita illic quoque cum in memoriam venerint ut ad judicium adducatur, dissimilis pro meritis suis retributio separabit. Neque enim futura tempora oblivione cuncta operient, sed venient in recordationem tempore suo cuncta quae facta sunt, ut in judicium advocetur omne opus, sive bonum sive malum sit. Propterea sapientis memoria non in perpetuum non erit similiter ut stulti, et futura tempora non operient cuncta oblivione, quia, cum tempus advenerit, et iste pro merito virtutis suae gloriam, et ille pro stultitiae suae excessu [0198D] poenam percipiet. Hoc est ergo pro quo vanum non est stultitiam devitare, et majorem sapientiae dare operam; quia, cum praemium retributionis percipitur, quantus sit justi laboris fructus manifestatur. Habet tamen justum quoddam taedium, haec ipsa nostrae mortalitatis consideratio; quia dignum est ut homo quod transitorium videt etiam prius quam finiatur despiciat? et pro eo adipiscendo, quod diu stare non potest, inani se labore non affligat. Propter hoc rursum de eadem pari mortalitatis conditione sententiam ingeminat, dicens:

*Moritur doctus similiter ut indoctus: et idcirco taeduit me vitae meae.* Merito siquidem talis vita in taedium venit, quae tota confusioni obnoxia, neque in bonis suis dum stare videtur, neque in malis suis [0199A] dum finitur, bonos a malis vel dignos ab indignis secernit. Bona siquidem ejus sine discretione ad indignos pariter ut ad dignos perveniunt, et mala illius bonos simul et malos parili sorte et eodem proventu affligunt. Unde, et bona quoque vitae hujus justis in despectum jure veniunt: quae et pro se laborantes variis doloribus affligunt, et saepe multo labore quaesita sine utilitate possidentium ad malos a bonis et a suis ad alienos transeunt. Quod iste considerans non solum, quae mala videntur hujus vita, sed ea quoque quae speciem boni praetendunt, re autem vera mala sunt, universa ad unam partem constituens, similique aestimatione adjudicans unam de cunctis sententiam dat, dicens:

*Videns mala esse universa sub sole, et cuncta vanitatem, [0199B] et afflictionem spiritus, rursus detestatus sum omnem industriam meam.* Et ne forte putares eum illam hic industriam detestari qua majorem sapientiae dedit operam, et non illam potius qua eorum occupatione, quae sub sole vana sunt, distendebatur: mox quam industriam detestandam existimet, exponit dicens: Et quae [qua] sub sole studiosissime laboravi. Subauditur detestatus sum. Continuoque causam quare et haec, et eorum pariter industriam detestetur, aperit, cum subjungit:

*Habiturus haeredem post me, quem ignoro, utrum sapiens an stultus futurus sit: et dominabitur in laboribus meis quibus desudavi, et sollicitus fui.* Et novissime de hoc commendans judicium suum infert.

[0199C] *Et est quidquam tam vanum?* Ac si diceret: Nihil ego tam vanum judico, quemadmodum cum alius avare congregans casso labore atteritur, alius et otiose, et luxuriose vivens in alienis laboribus dominatur. Multiplex enim vanitas est, ubi alius sine causa affligitur, alius illicite delectatur. Prima namque vanitas est non profutura appetere; secunda transeuntia congregare; tertia nostro labore parta aliis, et eis maxime quos quales futuri sint, nesciamus possidenda relinquere. Si enim vana essent haec omnia, etiam in nostros usus quaesita et retenta, quid erunt ad stultorum voluptatem transmissa? Unde ait:

*Cessavi, renuntiavitque cor meum ultra laborare sub sole.* Causam quoque quare a labore cessaverit [0199D] ingeminans subjungit, dicens:

## HOMILIA XII. *In illud, secundum aliam translationem: Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae; ubi nostra habet: Stultus in tenebris ambulat, et in reliqua capitis secundi.* (cont.)

*Nam cum alius laboret in sapientia, et doctrina, et sollicitudine, homini otioso quaesita dimittit.* Hoc ipsi contigit Salomoni, qui in sapientia, et doctrina, et sollicitudine laborans congregavit divitias, et opes cumulavit, et tandem omnia stulto haeredi possidenda reliquit. Reliquit enim stultitiam generis sui filium Roboam, qui in paternas opes succedens, omnia dissipavit, regnumque paternum, quod amplum satis et magnificum susceperat, minoratione sensus et cordis saturitate scissum turbatumque dereliquit. Sed et multi laborant sapientia, et doctrina, et sollicitudine cum magno labore, et studio secreta naturae, et arcana veritatis rimantes, et inventa memoriae [0200A] posteritatis ad commendanda studia sua verbo pariter, et scripto transmittentes, ac saepe otiosis quaesita relinquunt, quia nonnunquam subsequentium negligentia hoc paratum in usum assumere respuit quod priorum sagax diligentia non sine grandi labore, et cura acquisivit.

*Hoc ergo vanitas est, malum magnum.* Vanum est idcirco in cognitione veritatis laborare, ut in notitiam illorum veniamus, qui veritatem nec propter se suscipere volunt, neque in aliis sciunt approbare. Hujusmodi ergo laborem fructus non sequitur, quia nec sibi profutura congregat, nec quibus congregata derelinquit, aliqua virtutis aemulatione ad studium boni provocantur. Si enim quaerenti labor est, et accipienti utilitas non est, quid prodest labor talis? [0200B] Sed et malum magnum est, ut unde alius labore atteritur, alius otiose et illicite abutatur. Malum enim est magnum, quia et ille malo suo colligit et iste accipit in malum suum. Propterea vanitas est hoc et malum magnum.

*Quid enim prodest homini de universo labore suo, et afflictione spiritus, quo sub sole cruciatus est?* Si non ad aliud prodest, nihil prodest; imo vero si non ad aliud prodest, multum nocet, quia poenam magnam habet ejus inquisitio, sed fructum inventio non habet. Quae est enim poena nunquam esse sine poena?

*Cuncti dies ejus doloribus, et aerumnis pleni sunt: nec per noctem mente requiescit.* Multum miser est, qui nec illud tempus, quod naturaliter quieti datum [0200C] est, quietum habere potest. Per diem labore atteritur, per noctem cura et sollicitudine laboris cruciatur. Quem enim vigilantem distensio laboris et inquietudo exagitat; dormientem quoque animo per imagines, et phantasias insomniorum ingesta fatigat. Nullum ergo tempus intermittitur requiei, totum dolori et labori occupatur, et nihil utilitati ac saluti acquiritur.

*Et hoc nonne vanitas est?* Vere vanitas est, et magna vanitas prorsus. Sed quid tunc? Si hoc vanitas est, quid ergo faciendum est?

*Nonne melius est,* inquit, *comedere, et bibere, et ostendere animae suae bona de laboribus suis?* Si vani sunt labores qui utilitatem non conferunt laborantibus, [0200D] ergo melius est laborare et fructum capere laborum suorum. Ratio manifesta videtur, sed multa habet exceptionem. Multo enim melius si dictum fuisset, et ubique verum constaret. Si vani sunt labores ex quibus laborantibus fructus non provenit, ergo ejusmodi labores omnino postponendi sunt, et laborandum potius in iis ubi et certus et verus laborantibus fructus proveniat. Nunc autem hac ratione vanitas mutata est, non dimissa, et alia alii vanitas successit, non omnis vanitas discessit. Vena sollicitudo reprehenditur, ut male secura mens per torporem, et otium, et incontinentiam ad turpitudinem relaxetur. Si enim ille, qui supervacuo labore se distendit, vere reprehensibilis cernitur, cur propterea, qui ad voluptatem et incontinentiam se resolvit [0201A] placere putatur? Sed carnalis animus difficile medium veritatis invenit; et propterea nonnunquam unum vitium deserere sponte acquiescit, quoniam per id sibi viam ad aliud, quod magis placet aperiri cernit. Et tanto audacius se in contrarium tota intentione effundit, quanto magis certum habet aliud malum esse, quod deserit. Jam enim se in suo malo non solum nulla reprehensione dignum existimat, verum etiam laudabilem suspicatur et cum malum manifeste committat, non se malum facere videri vult, sed potius malum devitare. Non enim considerat vitium declinando in vitium se corruisse, et idcirco nequaquam id quod agit malum sinistre notandum putat; quia in eo quasi non tam facere quam declinare malum laborat. Unde, et hic quoque [0201B] cum vidisset eos, qui non profuturas sibi divitias cum labore et sollicitudine avare congregant, neque his quae possident utuntur, sed aliis post se possidenda et utenda relinquunt, miseros et reprehensione dignos, ut illorum devitet stultitiam, libere se in contrariam sententiam projicit, dicens: Nonne melius est comedere, et bibere, et ostendere animae suae bona de laboribus suis? Una omnium sententia est, qui proclives sunt in vitium. Semper adversa reprehendunt, ut sua commendent. Pereant avari, dicit vorax et prodigus, et devorat, et inebriatur, et distendit se ac replet usque ad suffocationem. Et proverbium illi est semper: Pereant avari. Et commendari se putat, quia talis non est, ne reprehensibiliter talis sit, qualis est. Imo etiam propterea talis [0201C] esse, qualis est, videri vult, ne forte talis sit quales esse alios accusat, qualis esse non vult, quasi vero medium aliquod non sit, ubi fieri utrumque possit; et ne talis sit, quales esse alios accusat, et tamen talis non sit, qualem impudenti gloriatione se esse exsultat. Melius est comedere, et bibere, et ostendere animae suae bona de laboribus suis. Quam pulchra verba manducare, et bibere! Quis est qui obhorreat cum audit manducare et bibere, aut contra modestiam sive pudicitiam hic aliquid dictum putet? Sed latet impudens turpitudo velo pudicitiae tecta. Dicat ergo manifeste: Melius est devorare, et inebriari, et concupiscentiae suae desideriis effreni libertate servire. Si enim sic dixisset, qualis esset sententia? Et quidem [0201D] omnino sic dixit; quia hoc significare voluit in eo quod dixit: Melius est manducare, et bibere, et ostendere animae suae bona de laboribus suis.

*Et hoc de manu Dei est.* Dicunt hoc homines, et est hominum genus, qui hoc dicere solent: Devoremus, et inebriemur, et benefaciamus nobis ex iis quae Deus dedit nobis, quia hoc de manu Dei est; quia, et haec ideo nobis data sunt, ut bene nobis faciamus. Quare enim haec omnia facta sunt, nisi in usus hominum, ut eis utantur homines, et bene sit ipsis in iis quae dedit Deus ipsis? Et haec dicendo excaecantur, et rapiuntur sine mensura, et pudicitia in voluptates suas, ut applaudant sibi, quoniam haec omnia Deus ad utendum fecit; sed nesciunt neque considerant, quod etsi Deus bona omnia ad usum [0202A] fecit, ad pravos tamen et inordinatos usus nihil fecit.

*Quis ita vorabit, et deliciis affluet ut ego?* Mala gloriatio ista. Et sunt tamen qui in ejusmodi gloriantur: et istos quoque sapientia praeterire non debuit in numero vanitatum. Tales in alio loco propheta increpat, dicens: *Vae qui potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam ebrietatem [n: (Isa. V)]*. Quis ita vorabit, et deliciis affluet ut ego? Qualis amator sapientiae? Quantum retrorsum conversus, imo quantum aversus et perversus ab illo, qui paulo ante lucem sapientiae vidit, eamque a stultitiae tenebris tam subtili consideratione divisit, dicens: Vidi quod tantum praecederet sapientia stultitiam, quantum differt lux a tenebris. Unde tam cito pessimatus [0202B] [pessundatus] est sensus iste putatis? An propter se non dixit, quod de se dixit, quod amator sapientiae fuit: et hoc non fuit quod dixit; sed quosdam tales significare voluit: propter quos hoc dixit, quod de se dixit? An, et hoc totum etiam ipse secundum aliquid vere fuit, et tamen amator sapientiae propter hoc esse non desiit; quia simul in uno homine, et sensus carnis secundum ingenitam corruptionem et peccatum, quod habitat in eo, suasit nequitiam et tamen spiritus secundum virtutis affectum, et judicium probitatis dilexit sapientiam? Videte tamen quid sit homo, sive in eo qui hoc dixit, et talis fuit, sive in iis propter quos dixit, quod de se dixit: quos tales esse significare voluit. Videte prorsus quid sit homo. Quis ita vorabit, et deliciis [0202C] affluet ut ego? *Quid gloriaris in malitia, qui potens es in iniquitate? [n: (Psal. LI.)]* Si nemo potest quod tu potes, magnum est si bonum potest. Si vero amplius in malo potes, quid gloriaris? Malum enim posse potestas non est, sed infirmitas. Quis ita vorabit, et deliciis affluet ut ego? Quis enim est, ait, qui contradicat, cum Deus hoc jubeat? Deus enim laetitiam creavit, et voluit ut qui ei placent in ipsa jucundentur.

## HOMILIA XII. *In illud, secundum aliam translationem: Oculi stultorum in finibus terrae; ubi nostra habet: Stultus in tenebris ambulat, et in reliqua capitis secundi.* (cont.)

*Peccatori autem dedit afflictionem, et curam surperfluam, ut laboret, ut distendatur, et congreget, et non possideat, sed tradat ei qui placet Deo.* Ergo bona bonis, et mala malis. Considerate quanta est perversitas ista. *Mentita est iniquitas sibi (Psal. [0202D] XXVI)*. Et de se mentita est iniquitas, et de Deo mentita est; et tamen nonnisi sibi mentita est. Dixit iniquitas: *Bona bonis, et mala malis [n: (Eccli. XXXIX)]*. Et ubi est: *Misericordia, et veritas obviaverunt sibi? [n: (Psal. LXXXIV.)]* Ubi est: *Universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas? [n: (Psal. CXVIII.)]* Ubi est: *Homines et jumenta salvabis, Domine: quemadmodum multiplicasti misericordiam tuam Deus? [n: (Psal. XXXV.)]* Ubi est denique, quod Veritas ipsa et misericordia dicit: *Estote misericordes, sicut et Pater vester misericors est: qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos? [n: (Matth. V.)]* Si bonis tantum bona data sunt, quid est quod dicit Scriptura de bonis: *Vasa figuli probat fornax, et homines justos caminus tribulationis? [n: (Eccli. XXVII.)]* [0203A] Et: *Omnes qui pie volunt vivere in Christo, necesse est ut persecutionem patiantur [n: (II Tim. III)]*. *Circumierunt in melotis, in pellibus caprinis, egentes, nudi, angustiati, afflicti, quibus dignus non erat mundus [n: (Hebr. XI)]*. *In fame et siti, in frigore et nuditate? [n: (II Cor. XI.)]* Itaque mentita est iniquitas de Deo, cum dixit: Quod bonis tantum bona, et malis tantum mala dat Deus. Nam et bonis bona dat, et malis mala dat; et bonis mala, et malis bona. Bonis enim et bona dat ut foveantur, et mala dat ut exerceantur; et malis mala dat ut castigentur, et bona dat ut provocentur. Itaque mentita est iniquitas de Deo, cum dixit: bona bonis et mala malis dat Deus. Verum autem dixisset, si de veris bonis et de veris malis dixisset, quod vera bona et vera mala non nisi bonis bona, et [0203B] malis mala. Propterea ergo de Deo mentita est iniquitas. Sed et de se quoque mentita est iniquitas. Quando mentita est iniquitas de se? Quando se bonitatem dixit, tunc de se mentita est iniquitas, quia iniquitas bonitas non est. Et ubi iniquitas bonitatem se dixit? Quando dixit: Quis ita vorabit, et deliciis affluet ut ego? Tunc bonitatem se dixit: hoc enim iniquitas dixit, quia dictum iniquitatis et impuritatis est hoc contra bonitatem et honestatem. Ergo iniquitas hoc dixit, et in hoc bonitatem se dixit: quia hoc bonitatis tantum esse dixit, quod se facturam dixit, quia se bonitatem esse praesumpsit. Dixit enim:

*Homini bono dedit Deus in conspectu suo sapientiam et scientiam, et laetitiam.* Primum dedit sapientiam, et scientiam ut intelligat et sciat quaerere laetitiam [0203C] in conspectu suo: quia eam fecit Deus ut exsultent in ea, qui placent ei. Quasi vero sapientia non sit et multo major sapientia, illam tristitiam quae secundum Deum est quaerere et amplecti, quam ineptam laetitiam, cum e contrario dicat Scriptura: *Cor stulterum ubi laetitia, et cor sapientium ubi tristitia est [n: (Eccle. VII)]*, Verum quidem hoc est, quod Deus laetitiam electis suis in conspectu suo praeparavit, et sapientiam et scientiam in corde eorum posuit, ut sciant et intelligant quaerere eam ubi ipsa est. Sed haec non est illa laetitia qua laetantur qui male faciunt: *qui exsultant in rebus pessimis [n: (Prov. II)]*. Non enim est in conspectu ejus illa laetitia, quia de iis qui eam amplectuntur dixit Scriptura: [0203D] *Pones eos deorsum, in reliquiis tuis praeparabis vultum eorum [n: (Psal. XX)]*. Ergo Deus homini bono laetitiam dedit, sed eam quae in conspectu suo est. De qua scriptum est: *Justi epulentur, et exsultent in conspectu Dei: delectentur in laetitia [n: (Psal. LXVII)]*. Et iterum: *Visita nos in salutari tuo, ad videndum in bonitate electorum tuorum: ad laetandum in laetitia gentis tuae, ut lauderis cum haereditate tua [n: (Psal. CV)]*. Et rursum dicit: *Adimplebis me laetitia cum vultu tuo: delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem [n: (Psal. XV)]*. Hanc ergo laetitiam dedit Deus homini bono in conspectu suo.

*Peccatori autem dedit afflictionem, et curam superfluam.* Non malitiam inferendo, sed ad malitiam descendendo in occupationem pessimam.

[0204A] *Ut addat et congreget, et tradat ei qui placuit Deo.* Ideo tamen, quia ille per avaritiam divitias congregavit, et iste in usum misericordiae acceptas dispersit. Alioquin nec qui congregavit jure reprehenditur, nec qui possidet commendatur. Nunc autem omnia perverse dicuntur, cum dicitur quod qui devorat et deliciis affluit bonus est, et illi dedit Deus sapientiam, et scientiam, et laetitiam in conspectu suo, cum supradictum sit stultos esse qui oculos habent in finibus terrae; respicientes ad delectationes terrenas, et voluptati carnis servientes. Itaque mentita est iniquitas, quae dixit voluptatem praemium esse justitiae, fructumque sapientiae in ipsa consistere, et corporales delicias existimavit felicitatis summum continere. Sed non diu in gloria falsum judicium [0204B] stare potest. Exit enim veritas, et prosternit mendacium. Ait quippe.

*Sed et hoc vanitas est, et cassa sollicitudo mentis.* Quid hoc? Non solum hoc ut peccator addat, et congreget, et non possideat, vanitas est, et cassa sollicitudo; sed hoc etiam vanitas, et cassa sollicitudo est, ut justus divitias peccatoris requirat, et concupiscat, aut, si acceperit, cor apponat. Totum ergo vanitas est, et cassa sollicitudo, quod nec utenti, nec quaerenti divitias, et voluptates, et gaudium, et laetitiam, quidquam sub sole permanere potest. Transeunt enim omnia et fluunt, et non subsistit quidquam sub sole, ut impleatur sententia: *Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas [n: (Eccle. I)]*. Completur etenim in eo quoque vanitas [0204C] quod, et ipsum cor hominis in eodem statu non permanet, sed semper a se alterum et sibi adversum atque extra se peregrinum, ab eo semper quod est elongat in id quod non est; et transit, et rapitur maxima vanitate, sive de vanis ad vera, sive de veris ad vana, ubique vanum et instabile, nunc summa appetens, nunc se in infima demergens. Illic approbans veritatem; hic anteponens vanitatem. Et videmus nunc fluctuationem istam maximam mentis humanae in uno homine universum genus hominum contemplantes, et mirabamur quomodo tam cito pessumdetur sensus mortalium, et post tam sublimem contemplationem veritatis, ire patiatur in aliena turpitudinis. Ex quo quidem non aliud datur intelligi, [0204D] nisi ut cognoscamus miserabilem vanitatem nostram et in eo quod ad alta pertingimus, et potiora probamus, consideremus qualis homo ex natura factus sit: in eo vero quod tam misera et abjecta appetimus, intelligamus qualis homo ex culpa sua sit effectus, ut vel in hoc veritatis participes esse incipiamus, quod nostram veraciter vanitatem agnoscimus.

## HOMILIA XIII. *Quomodo omnia tempus suum habeant.*

Multi sunt sermones hominis, quia cor hominis unum non est. Nisi enim prius mens a fonte veritatis introrsum se per multa desideria spargeret, nequaquam sermo foris per tam multas se assertiones derivaret. Nunc autem quia animus rector ab [0205A] amore virtutis per varia desideria in concupiscentiam vanitatis scinditur: idcirco in approbatione ejusdem vanitatis vario ei inconstantique judicio lingua foris per verbum famulatur. Propterea ergo Salomon de vanitate disputans, toties in sermone sententiam mutat, ut videlicet sensum in cogitatione per amorem vanitatis mutatum ostendat. Cor namque humanum quod in desiderio aeternitatis fixum non est, nunquam stabile esse valet; quoniam aestu desideriorum carnalium toties a sua stabilitate concutitur, quoties ab iis quibus per amorem inhaeserat, ad alia concupiscenda movetur. Quia enim in rerum transeuntium usu fructum aeternitatis exquirit, et in iis, quae solum ad temporis consolationem facta sunt, felicitatis gaudium [0205B] invenire se putat: ideo semper cum in rebus habitis, experientia docente, aut jucunditatem falsam aut veram miseriam invenerit, continuo ad alia se quasi potiora quibus, vel dolorem suum allevet, vel expleat jucunditatem, appetenda convertit. Hinc ergo semper futura appetit, praesentia fastidit: et fit miro quodam modo, ut qui semper in desiderio futurum fallitur, vix aliquando in experientia praesentium omnino decipiatur. Ipse enim sibi testis est homo; vera bona non esse haec ipsa quae diligit; quia dum semper animo futuris inhiat, et nunquam se in iis quibus fruitur vere felicem agnoscit: in hoc plane et ipse probat quod haec omnia licet possint a stultis, cum non habentur pro summa felicitate, appeti, nunquam tamen cum habentur, possunt [0205C] ad summam felicitatem possideri. Et tamen carnalis mens concupiscentiae suae tenebris caecata, plane videre non potest quod nec ipsa omnino ignorare potest, quod cum semper vanitatem videat in experientia praesentium, nunquam tamen se cohibet ab appetitu futurorum. Experta improbat, experienda laudat, et quo immoderatius in desiderio eorum quae nondum habet, per concupiscentiam effunditur, eo graviore in defectu eorum quae jam habet dolore vexatur. Hanc ergo fluctuationem mentis humanae hactenus nobis Ecclesiastes in semetipso expressit cum in rerum approbatione, vel pro fastidio praesentium, vel pro futurorum appetitu, mente mutata, toties judicium variavit. Putavit enim [0205D] in iis quae sub tempore volvuntur aliquid stabile invenire ubi animo requiesceret: et idcirco alia post alia quasi experiendo probans, et omnia experta improbans, agnovit tandem nihil esse in omnibus, quod fruentibus se, aut perpetuo consistere possit aut plenum jucunditatis fructum, dum praesens est, exhibere. Idcirco nunc arguens ignorantiam suam, pro eo quod in rebus mutabilibus permanentem credidit laetitiam possidere, ostendit, quod sicut omnia non solum prospera, sed adversa quoque suo tempore bene utenti bona sunt, ita iis qui perverso amore temporalia pro aeternis diligunt, et in eis felices se posse fieri sperant, nec ipsa prospera veram felicitatem conferre possunt. Male ergo fecit cum quaedam ex iis sibi quasi potiora prae omnibus [0206A] ad jucunditatem elegit; quia fortis animus, qui per temporalia ad aeternitatis statum festinat, non solum prospera hujus mundi interim ad consolationem expetit, sed adversa quoque cum tempus postulat, ad exercitationem virtutis suae libenter in usum assumit. Et ideo omnibus experimento probatis mutabilium tandem conditionem agnoscit, et quod nihil ex omnibus quae transeunt perpetuo stare possit, fatetur, dicens:

*[n: (ECCLE. V.)] Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo.* Quare ergo tu hujus mundi, vel mala metuas, vel bona concupiscas, cum transeant universa sub coelo? Cum potius hoc veritati concordet, ut in omnibus iis nec aliquid, sive in bono, sive in malo pro summo habeas; quia transeunt [0206B] omnia. Nec aliquid suo tempore abjiciendum existimes, quia juste ordinata sunt universa. Omnia enim tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo. Omnia tempus habent, ut nihil perpetuum semperque permanens inveniatur: sed omne quod est aut aliud subsequatur ut non ab initio veniat, aut praecurrat aliud ut usque ad finem se non extendat. Tempus etiam habent omnia certum et determinatum, quando incipiant et quando finiantur; sive etiam quandiu subsistant, et quando subsistant singula ut nihil praeter rationem sit; et prudens animus sic se, et temporibus, et temporalibus aptare studeat ut et in iis quae transeunt quasi permanentibus fiduciam suam non constituat, et in iis quae bene ordinata sunt contra dispositionem [0206C] Creatoris murmurare non praesumat. In omni autem eventu veris, et permanentibus bonis se conformans, ita rerum mutabilium varietatem despiciat, ut licet unaquaque re pro tempore utatur dum praesens est, nunquam tamen in ejus transitu animum a statu suo declinare permittat. Ille enim prudentissimus est, qui sic scit transeuntia in usum vertere, ut tamen non norit in eorum defectu mentem a sua stabilitate inclinare. Omnia enim suo tempore bene utenti bona sunt, et tamen universa quae mutabilitati subjacent, licet in miseria qualemcunque consolationem praebeant, facilitatem tamen conferre non possunt. Nihil ergo suo tempore abjiciendum, et nihil non suo tempore eligendum, sed sic animus [0206D] ad usum temporis praeparetur ut tamen ad mutabilitatem temporis non mutetur. Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo. Quare ergo eligatur ad omne tempus aliquid unum, cum omnia tempus habeant? Si enim unum aliquid ex omnibus omne tempus haberet, non omnia tempus haberent; quoniam ex duobus contrariis sibique repugnantibus si tempus esset, ut alterum semper esset, tempus esset ut alterum nunquam esset. Sicque hoc nullum tempus haberet, cum illud cum quo idem tempus habere non posset, omne tempus haberet. Nunc ergo, quia omnia tempus habent, nihil unum ex omnibus omne tempus habet; sed habet suum tempus unumquodque, quando ut sit bonum es et tempus quando bonum est, ut non sit. [0207A] Quando ergo tempus habet, bonum est ut sit, etiamsi bonum non est illud quod bonum est ut sit, et quando tempus non habet ut sit, bonum est ut non sit, etiamsi bonum est, quod bonum est ut non sit. Cognovit hoc Job, et suscepit bona laudans Deum in beneficiis suis, et putavit hostis, quod tempori subjaceret conscientia sancta. Tulit divitias et facultates; pignora interfecit; percussit carnem, opprobriis et injuriis lacessivit, ut frangeret adversis quem prosperis emollire non poterat. Ille autem sciens quod omnia tempus habent, sicut in bonis per continentiam semetipsum cohibuit, ita in malis quoque fortiter per patientiam adversa toleravit. Uxor autem ejus quia stulta fuit, et non intellexit quod omnia tempus habeant, putavit momentis [0207B] temporum examinanda praemia meritorum: et ideo percussum videns et derelictum credens, frustra Deum coluisse increpuit, et quasi pro benedictione sua flagella meruisset, irrisit, dicens: *Nunc benedic Deum, et morere [n: (Job II)]*. Cui ille respondit: *Quasi una de stultis mulieribus locuta es. Si bona suscipimus de manu Domini, mala quare non suscipiemus? [n: (Ibid.)]* Omnia enim tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo. Si tempus est ut prosperis foveatur infirmus, tempus est ut adversis quoque perfectus exerceatur; si tempus est ut bona bonis et mala malis propter veritatem, et tempus est ut mala bonis et bona malis propter probationem. Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo.

## HOMILIA XIII. *Quomodo omnia tempus suum habeant.* (cont.)

[0207C]Quid causaris sub tempore omnes de legibus temporum? Temporis est subjacere mutabilitati, et pati vicissitudinem. Nam si haec omnia in tempore non fiunt, quando fieri habent? Extra tempora enim aeternitas erit, et mutabilitas non erit: et non erit ibi tunc, omnia tempus habent; sed omne quod erit, sic erit, ut pro tempore aliud et aliud esse non possit, sed quod erit semper erit. Ergo quandiu vivis sub tempore, patere leges temporis. Patere volens, ne forte etsi nolueris, tamen patiaris. Patere leges temporis, ut transeas per tempus ad statum aeternitatis. Non enim potest in tempore aeternitatem invenire, quia post tempora tunc demum venit aeternitas: et illi post tempora aeternitatem inveniunt, qui in fluxu temporum alternantium mente [0207D] in desiderio aeternitatis defixi, immutabiles consistunt. Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo. Nam et ipsum coelum omnium temporum spatia metitur, et omnia quae sub coelo sunt tempore transeunt, et non transit ipsum coelum a quo est tempus. Quasi enim ex ipso coelo tempus est, et in ipso coelo tempus non est: et cum omnia quae sub coelo sunt tempus accipiant de coelo, in ipso tamen coelo aeternitas constat. Magnum spectaculum sapientiae visibilis imago est, ut ex visibilium contemplatione ad aemulationem invisibilium provocemur. Aspice coelum. Quasi moveri videtur, et mutari non videtur. Sed mutantur quae sub coelo sunt, et inde omnis motus origo est, ubi [0208A] mutabilitas nulla est. Ideo transeunt universa sub coelo, quia in coelo cuncta consistunt. Et ipsa quae transeunt esse suum metiuntur ex ipsis, quae subsistunt; quia non esset certa subsistentia transeuntium si subsistentium status non esset perpetuus. Illa enim, quae vere sunt, semper sunt; et semper sunt quod sunt; et sunt alia, quae vere non sunt, et ea quae vere sunt: quodammodo aemulantur, ut sint aliquid in eo quod sunt; et cum esse coeperint id quod sunt, transeunt in id quod non sunt; et non vere hoc sunt quod sunt, quia desinunt hoc esse, et jam non sunt, nec vere hoc sunt quod esse incipiunt, quia incipiunt tantum hoc esse, et nondum sunt. Ita sunt ista in vero esse errantia, et participare videntur in ipso transitu in quo currunt, esse [0208B] quod non capiunt nec comprehendunt, licet attingere videantur, ne omnino nihil sint. Apparent enim ibi, et cum quaeruntur non sunt, quia abierunt in nihilum unde venerant, et non erant ex eo ubi erant. Ipsum enim in quo erant solum vere erat; et totum quod erat ipsum erat, nec aliunde acceperat quod erat; et in ipso admissa sunt haec omnia, ut ex eo quod ipsum vere erat, essent, et haec aliquid. Quantum ergo participant verum esse, tantum sunt omnia haec quae non habent in seipsis verum esse: quibus hoc totum est esse, quod sunt ipsum quod habet verum esse. Et cum in se unum sit, in ipsis tamen pro capacitate participantium aliud videtur esse, cum sint ipsa alia in eo, quod non est aliud. Habet ergo singula secundum participationem ejus, [0208C] quod semper est, spatia subsistendi alia majora et alia minora; prout sunt in eo quod nec majus nec minus est, sed idem semper ipsum est. Ideo dividitur et mensuratur ex eo unicuique spatium suum et tempus suum alii breve, alii longum; et sunt dies et menses, et anni, et lustra, et saecula, et horae breves, et momenta, et instantia; et omnia haec tempus sunt in ipsis quae transeunt, et vere non sunt; et in ipso a quo sunt quod sunt, unum sunt et inveniuntur illic non tempus, sed aeternitas. Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo. Ex omnibus enim quae sub coelo sunt nihil aeternum est, sed omnia tempori subjacent et mutabilitati. Omnia enim initium aliquando habuerunt, aliquando habitura finem: et inter initium, [0208D] et finem spatium est ipsum temporis, quod tempus est illi quod principium habet et finem; et ipsum aeternitas illi; quod nec principium habet nec finem. Ipsum enim quod coepit, antequam inciperet, non fuit; et cum desiit esse, jam non fuit; et tunc illi nihil fuit, quia illud nihil fuit; et tamen fuit etiam tunc quod semper fuit; et idem ipsum postea fuit cum hoc fuit; et hoc quod coepit, in illo coepit; et quod fuit, in illo fuit, quandiu fuit; et cum fuit hoc, quod non semper fuit, fuit, et illud quod semper fuit, quia hoc in illo fuit; et quod isti tempus fuit, quia non semper fuit; fuit illi aeternitas, quia semper fuit. Ita ex aeternitate omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub [0209A] coelo. Tempus habent quando incipiant, et quando finiantur tempus habent. Spatia habent quandiu subsistere habent: hoc enim spatium mora est subsistendi inter principium et finem; et ipsa spatia multorum similia, multorum dissimilia sunt; omnia tamen aequo judicio compensata. Et cum mora fit iis, qui in laetitia et gaudio vivunt, et in bonis ducunt dies suos, felicitas magna videtur; et cum iis qui in aerumnis sunt et adversis fatigantur, spatia longa procurrunt, magna miseria et infelicitas magna existimatur, et nescit tamen homo sortem suam neque judicium Dei super se scrutari potest: nam et ipsa tempora longa finem habent: et cum finem acceperint, ipsa jam non sunt, quae bona videbantur; similiter, et quae mala putabantur, jam [0209B] non sunt. Et succedunt saepe bonis transeuntibus mala mansura, et malis transeuntibus post finem, bona quae non habent finem: et tunc bona praeterita prodesse nil possunt in multitudine malorum, et mala praeterita in abundantia bonorum nihil obesse feliciter consummatis.

Non ergo glorietur homo pro tempore suo, ante tempus, neque temporum adversis frangatur, qui in tribulatione est; quia transeunt omnia, donec veniat tempus, quando remetietur in aeternitate quidquid in temporum spatiis tractum est, sive majus, sive minus. Tunc longa spatia temporum non placebunt impiis transacta felicitate temporum; et permanentibus culpis quae per tempora contraxerunt, cum aeterna viderint supplicia pro temporalibus [0209C] commissis. Justis autem tunc tempora sua longa etiam modica videbuntur, cum merita temporalia viderint praemiis aeternis compensari. Ante hoc tempus quidquid in tempore agitur, occultum est, sive longum sive breve sit, ut homo Dei judicium scrutari non audeat, sed paratus sit ad omne tempus, sive bonum sive malum sit, ut per bona et mala probatus transeat ad bona glorificandus. Et si interim longa sint spatia temporis, non praesumat in bonis, non corruat in malis; quia spatiis suis transeunt universa sub coelo, ut transeunte tempore sub coelo succedat aeternitas quae est in coelo.

*Tempus nascendi, et tempus moriendi.* Nunc [0209D] exemplis succedentibus prosequitur quod generaliter praemiserat, dicens: Omnia tempus habent. Et enumerat hic et bona et mala: et post bona, mala, et item post mala, bona; nusquam sola mala, vel sola bona. hoc enim tempore vitae hujus, non est habere bona sine malis, nec mala sine bonis; quia mista sunt omnia, quandiu tempus est ut omnia habeant tempus.

## HOMILIA XIII. *Quomodo omnia tempus suum habeant.* (cont.)

*Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi; tempus plantandi et tempus evellendi; tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi; tempus destruendi et tempus aedificandi.* Primum bona et mala: tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi. Postea mala et bona: tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi. Non sola bona, nec sola mala; sed et bona et mala. Nec solum post [0210A] bona mala, sed etiam post mala bona: prius tamen post bona mala, et deinde post mala bona subsequuntur. Duae quippe vitae sunt: una secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum. Et scimus, testante Apostolo, quia *non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod* carnale est, prius est [n: (I Cor. XV)]. Ergo duae vitae sunt, prima carnalis, secunda spiritualis. Et habet utraque vita bona sua et mala sua; quia *universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas [n: (Psal. XXIV)]*; *quoniam ipse salvat homines, et jumenta [n: (Psal. XXXV)]*; *aperit manum suam, et implet omne animal benedictione [n: (Psal. CXLIV)]*. Proposuit enim omni homini et bona et mala. Bona quidem, quibus per misericordiam foveat; mala, quibus per justitiam culpas examinando addicat. Et habet omnis vita [0210B] bona sua et mala sua, ut omnia tempus habeant, et suis spatiis transeant universa sub coelo; utrumque datur, et utrumque proponitur; alterum ex justitia, alterum ex misericordia. Universae viae Domini misericordia, veritas. *Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi: justitia et pax osculatae sunt [n: (Psal. LXXXIV)]*. Si sola mala, non esset misericordia. Si sola bona, non esset justitia. Igitur et bona et mala proponit Deus, et potestatem electionis homini relinquit, utra prius accipiat. Nam utraque gustaro oportet, sed utra prius, in ipso est. Carnalis autem quasi ad haereditatem festinans, et declinans judicium, ut careat benedictione in novissimo; prius bona eligit, et dat illi Deus bona temporalia quae finem habeant ut illis succedant mala mansura sine [0210C] fine. Spiritualis vero prius probatur adversis ut ad prospera perducatur, et habeat ipse quoque mala sua et bona sua; sed mala in tempore, bona in aeternitate. Ita omnis vita alterna sorte ducitur in consummationem, altera de bonis ad mala, altera de malis ad bona. Et omnia tempus habent ut sint, et transeunt ut non sint, suis spatiis procurrentia ad finem, quandiu sint. Transeunt bona in malis, et mala in bonis; et dum transeunt aliquando moram faciunt, et habent spatia quaedam singula prout ordinantur, donec finem accipiant. Propterea enumerat quaedam alternantium in mundo, ut omnium mutabilium fluctuationem ostendat. Et primo ponit bona et mala, quasi vitae carnalis statum describens; [0210D] deinde mala et bona, spiritualis vitae exprimens conditionem. Post alternat, et mutat bona et mala; et mala et bona, ut alteram quamdam confusionem ostendat, quia nec malis usque in finem bona, nec bonis usque in finem mala. Sed et ante finem nunc bona et mala, nunc autem mala et bona subsequuntur. Omnis tamen variatio haec distributionis principium habet a bono in malum, cum dicitur: Tempus nascendi, et tempus moriendi; et finem a malo in bonum, cum dicitur tempus belli et tempus pacis. Quia prima vita primum bonum, et ultimum malum. Secunda vita primum malum, et ultimum bonum habet; in medio utriusque malis, et bonis incerta sorte fluctuantibus. In his autem omnibus quae enumerantur pro exemplo universorum [0211A] quaedam sunt sumpta de ipsa vita humana, quaedam de iis quae pertinent ad vitam humanam, ut totum mutabile ostendatur, quod hominis est, qui fortassis totus in corruptionem non iret, si vel in se vel in suis saltem aliquatenus stare potuisset. Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi, hoc est devita humana; tempus plantandi et tempus evelendi, quod plantatum est, hoc est de iis quae pertinent ad vitam humanam. Opus enim hominis simul cum homine interibit; quia sicut in homine quod nascitur, nascitur ut moriatur, ita quod plantatur ab homine, plantatur ut evellatur. Non enim in voluntate hominis tempus est omni rei sub coelo, sed in arbitrio Conditoris. Quoniam omni rei sub coelo tempus est cum vult Deus, etiam [0211B] si homo, cum tempus est, non vult quod vult Deus. Propterea, quae facit Deus, facit semper cum tempus est; quae vero facit homo, non semper cum tempus est facit, cum vel ignorantia, quod rectum est, nescit, vel voluntate prava appetit, quod est inordinatum. Ideo omnis rei tempus subest voluntati Creatoris, quando tempus est ut fiat, quod faciendum est in tempore, et omne quod fit in tempore; si ejus voluntati non concordat tempus erat cum fieret, sed non erat tempus cum fieri debuisset. Propterea sola opera hominum tempora sua non servant, etiam cum fiunt in tempore; quia in ea parte solus homo tempus statutum non sequitur, ubi arbitrii libertate abutens se sub Conditoris voluntate non moderatur.

[0211C]Aliud est ergo tempus quod unicuique rei per dispositionem Conditoris tribuitur; aliud quod praesumptione humana contra dispositionem Conditoris usurpatur. In illo tempore homo cum caeteris legem patitur; hic vero solus prae caeteris legem praevaricatur. Et idcirco illic recte cum eo agitur, etiam in eo quod ipse non vult; hic vero saepe contra rectum agit, non agendo nisi quod ipse vult. Tempus nascendi, et tempus moriendi. Nemo cum vult nascitur, etiam si quando vult aliquis moriatur. Et tamen multi cum moriuntur, voluntate non moriuntur, quando tempus est, et multi qui necessitate nascuntur, nascuntur quando tempus est. Etiam ii, qui ante tempus nascuntur, nascuntur quando tempus est; et [0211D] qui post tempus nascuntur, nascuntur quando tempus est: quia tempus nascendi confert necessitas, tempus moriendi aliquando eligit prava voluntas. Ideo nemo cum nascitur offendit in tempore; et multi offendunt in tempore cum moriuntur. Nam etsi natura aliquando praeterit, voluntas tamen non offendit, quia pro culpa patienti non ponitur quod non ipsius circa se voluntas, sed dispositio desuper justa moderatur. Tunc ergo tempus est omni rei quando justum est ut fiat quod faciendum est, quidquid illud fuerit. Vel a Deo sine homine, vel ab homine, cum Deo. Nam sine Deo ab homine ut aliquid fiat, ita tempus nullum est, sicut justum nihil fieri sine Deo ab homine potest. Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi. Tempus plantandi et tempus [0212A] evellendi. Possumus hic summam quamdam atque universalem mutabilitatis omnium comprehensionem attendere, ut sicut in principio de tota operis serie distinximus, ita hic quoque primo illam cui omnia subjecta sunt mutabilitatem exprimat, ac deinde eam in qua humanae actiones fluctuant, latius prosequendo immaniorem cunctis plusque metuendam ostendat. Nam prima ista quatuor quae posita sunt ad illam specialiter mutabilitatem, quae inest rebus omnibus ortum et occasum habentibus, spectare videntur, caetera omnia ad eam proprie quae in actionibus humanis versatur pertinere. Quod enim omnia orta occidunt, et aucta senescunt, propter ea quae vivunt et sentiunt dictum est: Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi; propter ea quae vivunt, et non [0212B] sentiunt; tempus plantandi, et tempus evellendi; vel pro iis quae naturalem habent ortum, primum tempus nascendi, et tempus moriendi posuit; ac deinde pro iis quae studio et industria ad vivificationem aptantur: tempus plantandi, et tempus evellendi subjunxit. Haec est ergo illa magna vanitas, vanitas vanitatum, cui parum est, ut mutabilia sint omnia, nisi adhuc in contraria rapiantur, dum transeunt universa. Quantum est enim elongare et peregrinari a proprio esse, et ire ac pergere in contrarium esse, ubi non possis omnino esse quod esse incipias, nisi id quod es prorsus esse desieris? Illic ergo durus transitus est, ubi nulla ratione subsistere potest quod sequitur, nisi prius id quod praecedit totum perimatur. Et quid putas cum de bonis ad [0212C] mala itur, cum bona in mala contraria commutantur, qualis est mutatio illa, maxime illic ubi recursus nullus est: neque reditus ullus sperari potest? Nam et mala aliquando in bona commutantur, et rursum bona in mala; et saepe fit hoc ut alternatim sibi succedant utraque. Nec grave omnino illud est, quod mutuo temperantur, ut nec magna sint mala, quibus bona succedunt, neque bona optima, quae malis subsequentibus terminantur et totum hoc sustineri potest, et comparationem habet quodcunque cum acciderit, ne nimium existimetur, unum est quod cum evenerit, quis poterit sustinere.

*Tempus tacendi et tempus loquendi. Tempus congregandi et tempus perdendi. Tempus lugendi et tempus [0212D] ridendi.* Omnia haec portabilia sunt: et cum evenerit homini unum aliquod horum, transit illud et venit aliud; et hoc quoque dum steterit tempore suo transit, et redit aliud quod transierat; et hoc usquequaque fit item et item quandiu vivitur; et nunquam permanet unum aliquid ut solum sit semper.

## HOMILIA XIII. *Quomodo omnia tempus suum habeant.* (cont.)

*Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi.* Haec horum similia non sunt, neque recursum habent cum semel evenerit. Una est enim mors et una nativitas: et sicut post unam nativitatem una mors, ita ante unam mortem non nisi una nativitas. Et nemo moritur qui prius natus non fuerit; nec cum semel mortuus fuerit, deinde nasci potest aliquis. Principium vitae nativitas est, mors finis et de nativitate ad mortem itur, sed post mortem ad nativitatem [0213A] reditus non patet. A nativitate enim incipit tempus hominis, et morte finitur. Et propterea ista dissimiliter omnibus tempus habent; aliud, ut in eo tempus primum sit, et ipsum amplius non sit; aliud, ut in eo tempus amplius non sit, et illud semper sit. Hoc ergo gravius cunctis est, quod ita tempus habet, ut ipsum sit sine tempore, quia post ejus tempus non erit tempus quo possit denuo reparari quod abstulit et consumpsit ejus tempus. Propterea melius videtur tempus nascendi quam tempus moriendi, quia in tempore nascendi vita datur, in tempore autem moriendi tollitur vita. Et tamen qui nascuntur moriuntur, et qui moriuntur nascuntur, quoniam qui ad mortem nascuntur ex eo mori incipiunt, ex quo sub mortalitatis defectu vivere incipiunt; [0213B] et qui ad vitam moriuntur, ex eo vivere veraciter incipiunt, ex quo post mortem jam mortales esse desierunt. Quocirca bona mors optanda magis est quam mala vita, quia bona morte ad bonam vitam pergitur, mala vita ad mortem malam pervenitur. Propterea omnia tempus habent, et nihil suo tempore abjiciendum: quoniam et tempus nascendi est, ut prima vita incipiat, quae per justitiam exercetur in tempore; et tempus moriendi, ut secunda vita succedat, quae praemio justitiae perfruitur in aeternitate. Postea adjungit quod sequitur:

*Tempus plantandi, et tempus evellendi quod plantatum est.* Hoc ergo secundum de opere est artificis, cum natura. Nam primum opus solius naturae erat, [0213C] et ipsum transitorium erat. Nunc autem opus artificis cum natura simul subjungitur; et ipsum quoque transitorium esse demonstratur, ut nihil maneat sub sole, laetitia quae de nativitate vel plantatione suboritur mortis et eradicationis memoria temperetur. Deinde sequuntur opera solius artificis sine opere naturae, et ipsa plurima enumerantur, et omnia transitoria esse demonstrantur, ut in gradibus suis vanitas excrescat; et tamen universa haec sicut mutabilitate vana sunt, ita tempore congrua fiunt, ut in his omnibus homo, et si statum aeternitatis tenere non potest, servare tamen studeat ordinem rationis.

*Tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi. Tempus destruendi et tempus aedificandi. Tempus flendi et tempus ridendi. Tempus lugendi et tempus saltandi.* [0213D]Et multa alia quae enumerantur, et alia multa quae enumerari non possunt. Et in his omnibus vita humana vicissitudinem patitur, et subjacet mutabilitati. Transeunt enim ista omnia super eam, et incurrunt vicissim alia post alia; et subsequuntur quae praecesserant, et rursum quae secuta fuerant, praecedunt; et sine intermissione hoc agitur in undis magnarum fluctuationum. Venit post fletum risus, et post risum succedit fletus; et cum dolori gaudium successerit, iterum gaudia in dolorem commutantur. Et omnia haec tempus habent, cum voluntas hominis se per justitiam pro tempore divinae voluntati, vel ad haec agenda sponte conformat, vel ad patienda supponit. Tempus enim habent omnia, quando ea homo vel agit secundum Deum, vel patitur pro Deo, quia secundum [0214A] Deum ambulantem omnia in tempore suo si prospera eveniant, fovent; si contingant adversa, exercent. Ideo omnia tempus habent quae homo juste facere potest vel juste pati. Quod autem sine injustitia fieri non potest, non habet tempus unquam ut fiat, quia ad malum faciendum homo nullum tempus accepit, cui propter hoc solum tempus suum datum est, ut vel corrigat mala quae fecit, vel bona suppleat quae nondum fecit. Propterea peccata tempus non habent; et omnia tempus habent, quia in tempore suo omnia bene fieri habent; et bona sunt cum bene fiunt omnia, et ex omnibus non sunt peccata, quae bene fieri habent, nec sunt bona peccata, tametsi bonum est ut sint ipsa peccata. Ideo tempus non habent peccata, et permittuntur in tempore [0214B] fieri peccata; et non juste fiunt quando fiunt, et juste fieri permittuntur quando fiunt; et cum facta fuerint, juste ordinantur; et fit tempus ut fieri permittantur, et non fit tempus ut fiant quia non bene fiunt, et bene permittuntur, ut juste ordinentur. Tempus plantandi, tempus lugendi, tempus saltandi, *tempus acquirendi.* Ubi est tempus luxuriandi et tempus inebriandi? Sed illa bene fieri possunt in tempore suo: ideo ipsa tempus habent. Ista tempus non habent, quia nunquam bene fieri habent. Sed forte contrarium videatur quod positum est tempus occidendi, tempus belli, tempus odii. Sed haec omnia bene fieri possunt; et ideo tempus habent, cum juste fieri habent. Nam est et gladius justitiae, [0214C] quo reges et principes criminosos puniunt pro zelo aequitatis, et interficiunt homines damnatos pro sceleribus suis, secundum praecepta legis divinae accepta potestate in hoc ipso Deo servientes. Et hi pro defensione patriae, et pace Ecclesiarum, bella gerunt, et expugnant inimicos pacis, ne opprimant innocentes. Est et odium sanctum quo crimina odiuntur, non homines; et ipsum aliquando pro terrore salubri severitatem districtam exterius corrigendis vitiis irrogat, et intus dulcedinem dilectionis, qua salutem hominum sitit, inviolatam conservat. Propterea tempus est odii, et tempus belli: et omnia tempus habent, quando juste fieri habent. Profiteri licet mihi quod et in principio: quod ad alta et sublimia ista sensu minor sim ut narrem quod oporteat, quia [0214D] quod non oportet et non convenit, hoc satis est declinasse si datur. Multa enim sunt in profundo sapientiae secreta abscondita, et non valet homo scrutari arcana ejus; et verba sapientiae ad sensum omnem excellentia spargunt de iis quae latent lumen aliquod, et ipsum modicum est ad totum. Propterea laborat homo cum videt illud, et existimat ingredi ut contempletur; et non valet nisi fuerit cum ipso sapientia, et ostendat illi intus secreta viarum suarum in parte qua gratiosus factus est ad eam. Et cum hauserit multum, hoc multum illi est, et exiguum est ipsum ad plenitudinem redundantem. Ideo multa diximus de fluctibus rerum et de agitatione contraria eorum quae sub coelo sunt; et parum est adhuc totum hoc ad totum; et erunt fortassis qui nos profusiores [0215A] existimaturi sunt in loquendo, quia non attendunt multitudinem dicendorum, et eorum quae dicta sunt profunditatem. Nos breviter hoc prolocuti sumus, ut novam iterum reportemus ad principium futurae narrationis dictionem, et animos habeamus alacriores.

## HOMILIA XIV. *Reliquorum quae tempus suum habent declaratio et dictorum repetitio.*

*Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo.* Quaesierat supra Ecclesiastes unum aliquid in mundo in quo animo requiescere potuisset; et non invenit illud inter omnia, sive quia imperfecta erant singula, sive quia transitoria erant universa. Propterea coepit fastidire, [0215B] et reprobare omnia; et tamen quaerere non desiit semper in his gaudium plenum et invenire non poterat. Tandem ergo aliquando mutabilium conditionem agnoscens, vidit se in utroque errasse, sive quod ea quae in genere suo bona erant, mala esse arguit, sive quod ea quae transitoria erant, perpetuo stare posse putavit. Nunc itaque corrigens semetipsum pro existimatione praeterita, profitetur omnia quae sub coelo sunt simul et tempore transeuntia et tempore suo bona. Quorum omnium mutabilitas et fluctuatio quanta sit, ut melius intelligi possit, universa haec non solum transire tempore, sed tempore quoque in contraria ire ostendit, dicens: Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo. Et [0215C] enumerat deinde universa in genere suo distinguens: *Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi.* Primum secundum principium et finem describit cursum rerum mutabilium, ut postea eorum quae in medio versantur, mutabilitatem et vicissitudinem diligentius prosequatur. Sane quatuor sunt opera, quibus omnia temporalia et omnia tempore transeuntia explicantur. Primum est opus Dei, secundum est opus naturae; tertium est opus artificis cum natura; quartum est opus solius artificis sine natura. Opus Dei est essentiam rerum de nihilo creare materiam rerum in formam disponere, motum autem rerum sub certo ordine temperare. Propterea tria haec ad opus Dei pertinent, [0215D] id est essentia rerum, forma et ordo. Haec autem tria, sicut postea auctor ipse attestatur de operibus Dei, stabilia sunt, nec temporis capiunt mutabilitatem, quia et rerum essentiae hoc quod sunt nunquam esse desinunt, et rerum formae secundum primam Conditoris sui institutionem suis generibus perpetuam identitatem custodiunt, et motus rerum primi ordinis legem nunquam transcendunt. Neque enim vel essentiae rerum nihil esse, vel formae rerum aliter esse, vel ordo rerum dispositioque ab initio, aliter se habere potuerunt; sed servant omnia primae legis normam et antiquae institutionis pactum, nunquam secus currentia adhuc cuncta custodiunt. Propterea ergo permaneant opera Dei, quia stabile est in rebus [0216A] omnibus quod Deus fecit, ut maneat semper. Opus itaque Dei est creare, formare, disponere universa. Opus naturae est semina rerum de occulto sinu per incrementum producere, eademque rursum marcescentia cum concidunt per defectum ad occultum sinum, unde prodierant revocare. Opus artificis cum natura est: ea quae oriuntur de terra, studio et industria adjuvare. Opus solius artificis est in subjecta rerum materia operari vel disjuncta componendo, vel conjuncta separando; ita ut nec creare cum Deo possit, ut sit quod non erat, nec cum natura fetibus rerum incrementum tribuere, ut majus sit quod minus crat

Tres itaque opifices sunt in hoc mundo, Deus, natura et artifex imitans naturam. Sed hi tres [0216B] valde dispari potentia id quod ad effectum producunt, efficiunt. Nam Deus in opere suo, nec naturae opera indiget, nec opificis imitantis naturam. Operatur enim Deus aliquando sine natura, aliquando in natura, aliquando supra naturam. Nam sine natura primum fecit ipsam naturam. Quando enim naturam fecit, cooperantem naturam non habuit. Non enim potuit quod nondum erat, semetipsum operari cum eo qui solus erat. Sic ergo primum naturam fecit sine natura, ut postea in natura, alia faceret cum natura, alia supra naturam. Cum natura quippe facit ea quae de natura secundum naturam producit; supra naturam facit, quando in natura, praeter naturae cursum solitum et posse primum, majori addita [0216C] potentia aliquid ad effectum producit. Quando ergo naturam operatur Deus, et quando supra naturam operatur natura, Deo non cooperatur; quia illic tantum natura accipit, quod non erat ut sit: hic vero accipit, quod non poterat ex eo, quod acceperat, ut possit. Ergo sine natura operari potest Deus; natura sine Deo non potest, quia quod natura facit, ex eo facit quod Deus facit, et cum eo quod Deus facit. Posse enim naturae primum Deus fecit; et ut ad effectum prodeat, rursum ipse facit cum ipsa natura quam facit. Omne ergo quod natura facit, Deus facit, sed non omne, quod Deus facit, natura etiam facit: qui sine natura naturam facit. Tertio loco sequuntur opera artificis [0216D] imitantis naturam, et ipse quidem aliquando cum Deo operatur sine natura, aliquando cum natura sine Deo, aliquando cum Deo simul et cum natura, aliquando sine Deo pariter et sine natura. Cum Deo operatur quando opera justitiae operatur; quia rectae voluntati, et secundum justitiam ordinatae Deus cooperatur. Sine Deo operatur, quando opera iniquitatis operatur; quoniam peccata a Deo non sunt, nec per ejus cooperationem fieri habet, quod fit contra ejus voluntatem. Cum natura operatur artifex, quando seminibus rerum ac fetibus propagandis, quibus natura incrementum subjicit, foris industriam et studium apponit. Sine natura operatur, quando praeterea, quae ad propagationem seminum spectant, et nascentium [0217A] atque eorum quae vegetationis sensusque vim habent, culturam in subjecta materia studium explicat, ut aliquid quodcunque ad effectum promoveat, in quo natura patitur tantum, non operatur, quia materiam operanti praebet, non effectum operandi exercet. Talia sunt omnia opera hominum, quae fiunt super terram, ex quibus multa mortalis vitae necessitas cogit, multa suadet cupiditas, multa vanitas operatur. Et in his omnibus, quia nihil stabile invenitur, et transeunt universa quae fiunt sub sole: quae vel natura producit, vel fingit artifex imitant naturam: cuncta subjicit vanitati sapientiae contemplator, sola opera Dei permanere probans; quoniam nec creata aliquando essentia consumitur, nec dispositionis [0217B] aut ordinis rerum ratio immutatur. Propterea ostendit primum naturae opera vanitati subjecta sive in iis quae natura sola operatur, quia orta occidunt, sive in iis quae cum natura artifex facit, quia aucta senescunt. Postea opera artificis imitantis naturam multa ac diversa enumerat: alia necessitatis, alia cupiditatis, alia vanitatis, et omnia vanitati subjicit quia mutabilitati obnoxia ostendit. Opus solius naturae narratur cum dicitur: Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi.

Deinde opus artificis cooperantis naturae subinfertur, cum dicitur: *Tempus plantandi et tempus evellendi.* Postremo opus hominis sine naturae opera adjungitur, cum subinfertur: *Tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi; tempus destruendi et [0217C] tempus aedificandi.* Et hoc deinde pluribus annumeratis multiplicius exponitur ut humani cordis vanitas quam multis implicata sit et late dispersa patenter demonstretur. Hoc enim ad rem maxime pertinuit ut vanitatem mentium humanarum, quae vitae mortalis incertum sequitur, quia illam arguendam suscepit et in narratione diligentius exponeret, et in comparatione anteferret. Ut caeterae omnes quasi ob hoc solum commemoratae videantur, ut illarum comparatione, haec quanta sit, agnoscatur. Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi. Tempus nascendi est, quando ducendus est homo in hanc vitam. Tempus moriendi est, quando ab hac vita est evocandus. Interim autem post [0217D] nativitatem ante mortem dum in hac vita mortali vivit, quae sustentamento indiget, et alimentis nutritur, ut subsistat. Tempus est plantandi et tempus evellendi, ut excolat homo terram de qua sumptus est, et seminet, et metat, et plantet, et carpat. Possunt autem et haec duo sequentia praecedentibus duobus per distinctionem conferri, hoc modo: Tempus nascendi et tempus plantandi; tempus moriendi et tempus evellendi. Nascente enim homine tempus est plantandi, ut fructibus terrenis alatur vita terrena. Moriente autem homine, tempus est evellendi; quia cum vita mortalis destruitur, etiam ea quae propter vitam mortalem condita fuerant, tolluntur. Quia autem infirmitati humanae post fructus terrae etiam carnis [0218A] usus conceditur: idcirco post tempus plantandi et tempus evellendi, congrue etiam tempus occidendi subinfertur. In quo esu, quia mensura necessaria est, ne hoc caro ad incitamentum vitiorum sumat, quod ad sustentamentum infirmitatis accepit: statim post tempus occidendi adjungit tempus sanandi ut videlicet ipsorum animalium vitam, quae pro nostra infirmitate sustentanda in tempore opportuno, id est cum necessitas exigit, occidenda accepimus caeteris temporibus diligenti cura nutrire ac conservare studeamus. Hoc enim quasi infirmantia sanare est in quibus sibi non sufficiunt subveniendo, deficientia reparare. Unde fortasse, congrue cum dixisset: Tempus occidendi, non addidit, tempus sanandi [0218B] quod occisum est. Sicut prius postquam dixerat tempus plantandi, statim adjunxit, *et tempus evellendi, quod plantatum est.* Quia scilicet plantata evelli possunt, sed occisa sanari non possunt. Sic fortasse si litterae sensum sequimur, nihil spirituali intelligentiae (quia postmodum vestiganda est) praejudicamus.

*Tempus destruendi, et tempus aedificandi.* Quando homo destruere debeat et quando aedificare, quispiam nequaquam quaerendum esse existimet; quoniam hic solum hoc demonstrari putet quod homo, si forte varia eventibus temporum subjicitur, ista dissimiliter etiam nolens patiatur. Nos autem ad faciliorem intelligentiam haec quae dicta [0218C] sunt applicantes, dicere possumus quod tempus occidendi sit, cum Deus peccata hominum punire volens, ad castigationem gladium interfectionis adducit; tempus vero sanandi, cum afflictos et tribulationum plagis saucios refovens, solita miseratione restituit. Et plane hoc magis veritati consonum esse videatur ut hic tempora rerum accipere debeamus, non quae humanae voluntati serviunt, sed quae divinae obtemperant dispositioni. Neque enim tempus est cujusque rei, cum homo vult, et Deus non vult. Quia et homo saepe vult cum tempus non est et cum vult Deus semper tempus est. Propterea omnia tempora ad divinam referuntur ordinationem: et dicitur tunc tempus esse omnis rei, cum a Deo juste disponitur, [0218D] sive ad castigationem et correptionem criminis, sive ad consolationem infirmitatis. Tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi. Tempus destruendi et tempus aedificandi.

*Tempus flendi et tempus ridendi. Tempus lugendi et tempus saltandi.* Prius ubique mala enumerantur, postea adduntur bona; quia prius pro nostris peccatis juste affligimur, postea Dei miseratione benigne refovemur. Et manifestum est, qualiter horum omnium quotidie vicissitudinem vita humana patitur quoties occulta dispensatione Deus nos vel flagellis erudit, vel donis consolatur. Deinde sequitur:

## HOMILIA XIV. *Reliquorum quae tempus suum habent declaratio et dictorum repetitio.* (cont.)

*Tempus spargendi lapides et tempus colligendi.* Quid autem secundum litteram hoc sibi velit, merito [0219A] quaeritur: cum tale aliquid ut inter humanas actiones tempus habere putetur, otiosum omnino atque incongruum videatur. Nisi forte ita intelligendum sit ut quia dicturus est in sequentibus: *Tempus belli et tempus pacis,* convenienter hic praemittat tempus spargendi lapides, et tempus colligendi, ut videlicet tempore belli instante colligantur lapides ad exstruendas munitiones et moenia murorum adversum obsidiones; tempore vero pacis, quia nulla pericula bellorum imminent, aggeres munitionum dispergantur, quatenus cunctis accessus sine contradictione patescant. Nec superfluum videri debet propterea quod supra dixerat: Tempus destruendi et tempus aedificandi quasi idem secundo repetitum sit; quia illud de aedificiis [0219B] domorum et habitaculis hominum convenientius dictum accipitur; hoc vero magis proprie ad munimenta murorum refertur. Potest tamen alius sensus fortassis magis idoneus sub his verbis intelligi. Nam quia supra praemiserat: Tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi, ne forte putaretur solos malos, et eos qui pro peccatis suis puniendi sunt ad interfectionem exponi: ostendit nunc justos etiam, aliquando Deo permittente, in exemplum malorum et castigationem cum impiis et peccatoribus et mortibus subdi, et exsiliis ac proscriptionibus dispergi, sicut per Petrum dicitur: *Tempus est, ut incipiat judicium a domo Dei [n: (I Petr. IV)]*. Quod autem lapidum nomine justi significentur, per Jeremiam manifeste ostenditur, [0219C] cum dicit: *Dispersi sunt lapides sanctuarii in capite omnium platearum [n: (Thren. IV)]*. Et Isaias rursum: *Ponam omnes muros tuos in lapides sculptos, omnes filios tuos doctos a Domino [n: (Isa. LIV)]*. Ergo tempus est spargendi lapides, ut justi in hac vita veram requiem non esse ex ipso sui dispersionis et concussionis labore intelligant. Et rursum tempus est lapides colligendi, ut post attritionem exsilii corporalis, ne deficiant animo iterum pace reddita temporali beneficio ad aeterna convalescant. Sic quod occultum est difficile in unam aliquam partem judicari potest: quoniam idcirco sermo divinus in quibusdam locis se a nobis dissimulat, ut se etiam illic ubi manifestus putabatur, scrutatione dignum [0219D] ostendat.

## HOMILIA XV. *De tempore et tempori subjectis per aliam interpretationem.*

Non nos igitur pigeat iterato parabolarum istarum duritiam attentare: donec forsitan usu sermonis attrito cortice verbi ejus interiora patescant. In temporibus enim sumus, et volvitur nobiscum sermo noster, donec stabiliamur in eo quod tempore non mutatur: hoc autem est, ut humanas maxime actiones contemplemur: quia in illis est, quod ingemiscimus, totum vanitatis.

*Tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi.* Quae fuerunt tempora occidendi, et tempora sanandi? Miserabile principium humanarum actionum, ab occisione et [0220A] interfectione. Sic incipere debuit opus vitae morti addictae, ut sententiam sequeretur auctoris: *Maledicta saeviens in necem suam.* Percurramus animo tempora praeterita, et videamus bella et interfectiones ab initio facta, usque adhuc, gentium et gentium, et innumerabilium populorum. Et sustinuit Deus humanum genus saevire in viscera sua: et in his omnibus operatus est judicia sua, furores hominum intorquens ad vindictam justitiae suae, ut alii juste paterentur, quod alii injuste voluerunt. Et surrexerunt alii et multi interficiebantur et damnabantur; et multi interficiebantur et salvabantur; et alii a morte interfectionis liberabantur, et ad damnationem servabantur, et alii liberabantur, ne damnarentur si interficerentur. In omnibus his justum judicium [0220B] complevit super eos: ut castigaret et parceret secundum moderamen aequitatis qua disponit universa Deus. Propterea tempus est occidendi et tempus sanandi: et alii faciunt quod voluit, alii patiuntur quod nolunt, et sedet desuper Arbiter justus, faciens quod vult, et disponens omnia ut timeatur. Tempus occidendi et tempus sanandi: *Tempus destruendi et tempus aedificandi.* Quanta a principio aedificaverunt amatores hujus saeculi, et nomen suum in terra sua vocaverunt, ut famam haberent apud posteros gloriosam. Laboraverunt enim labore gravi in operibus suis, ut starent post ipsos monumenta jactantiae illorum: et invaluerunt usque ad aliquid magna industriae suae signa posteris relinquentes; et apparent adhuc vestigia quaedam ruinarum in ipsis, praeteritorum [0220C] saeculorum: et miramur ipsos quos non videmus, quod talia potuerunt, et magis ingemiscimus super eos: quia cum essent ipsi homines ad aeternitatem conditi, vana dilexerunt: et evanuerunt, quia vani facti sunt in ipsis. Perierunt enim ipsi: et post ipsos opera eorum ceciderunt, et successerunt alii: et fecerunt ipsi quoque opera magna, et abierunt post haec in nihilum: et destructa sunt omnia, quae fecerant, pariter cum ipsis. Et iterum alii surrexerunt, et aedificaverunt, et non intellexerunt ubi esset prior generatio, et opera ejus: ut viderent vanitatem quae est sub sole. Et permisit eos Deus frustra laborare, ut aedificarent peritura: ut intelligat homo vanitatem suam, ut destruatur quod [0220D] aedificatum est, et iterum quod destructum est aedificetur: et non sit stabile opus hominis super terram. Ideo *omnia tempus habent:* ut erudiatur homo de vanitate sua, et de incerto vitae mortalis per quam ambulat.

*Tempus flendi et tempus ridendi: tempus lugendi et tempus saltandi.* Fletus et risus ad animum pertinent. Luctus vero, vel, ut magis proprie dicatur, planctus, et saltatio ad corpus. Fletu itaque et risu dolor et laetitia mentis exprimuntur: planctus autem et saltatio eadem ipsa significant, sed quando per corporis motum demonstrantur. Tempus flendi, et tempus ridendi: templus plangendi, et tempus saltandi. Habent omnia haec tempus suum in hominibus, dum currit vita ista mortalis: et permittit Deus varia sorte, et eventu dispari, [0221A] secundum altitudinem judiciorum suorum, et profundum consilii sui, quo disponit nos, ut haec currant et varientur super nos, prospera adversis alternando, et adversa prosperis commutans in tempore. Et veniunt tempora laeta, et rident homines, et saltant, et putant bene sibi esse: et obliviscuntur saepe Creatoris sui, et se morituros esse non animadvertunt. Sola enim praesentia respiciunt, et laetantur in eis quasi permansura sint semper; nec conditionem suam et vitae mortalis dubium attendunt, neque cogitant pericula superventura. Et ideo secure peccant, et effundunt se in voluptates noxias, et ambulant post desideria cordis sui in intuitu oculorum suorum, ut faciant quae non oportet, et multiplicent iram et indignationem. Et videt hoc Deus, et super seminat [0221B] dolores, et amaritudines lasciviis male dulcium voluptatum: et revocat ac cohibet effluentes ut non eant in omnem abalienationem. Tunc venit tempus flendi, et tempus plangendi: et dolent homines, et causantur saepe Deum quando bene cum eis agitur. Ipse autem dissimulat pravitatem illorum, et post tempus miscet iterum prospera adversis, ne deficiant: et rursum cum tempus est, adversa prosperis, ne praesumant: et hoc saepe agit nutriens et exercens, castigans et refovens hominem, ut discat esse timoratus: et sciat quoniam apud Dominum est potestas vitae, et mortis. Propterea est tempus flendi, et tempus ridendi: tempus plangendi, et tempus saltandi. Et succedit his tempus spargendi lapides, et tempus colligendi. Hoc tempus post illa enumeratum est, sed [0221C] ordinatum in illis: quia in tempore saepe simul sunt causae, quae unam temporis rationem conducunt. *Tempus spargendi lapides, et tempus colligendi.* Omnis mundus exsilium est iis quibus coelum patria esse debuisset: sed tamen animi mortalium usu coalescunt, et incipiunt homines diligere loca sua, et terras suas in quibus nati fuerant, vel nutriti; et succedit grandis oblivio aeternorum pro temporalium affectu: et nisi Deus tergeret istas passionum inolitas suavitates, non erat quo intraret ad nos desiderium ejus. Propterea dat judicia sua, et veniunt commotiones, et concussiones gentium, et transmigrationes populorum: et surgunt alii, ut rapiant non sua, et alii diripiuntur, et disperguntur, et iterum fortiores quibus posse datum est, et ipsi cum venerint, [0221D] ejiciunt eos, qui aliena violenter rapuerant, et possident non sua, et fluctuat mundus in semetipso: ut videat homo non esse hic stabilem mansionem, et assuescat paulatim abstrahere animum, et solvere a vinculis terrenarum delectationum. Propterea venit tempus spargendi lapides, ut non sit stabilis mansio super terram: et cogatur homo suspirare in exsilio suo ad patriam, ubi manent gaudia inconcussa, et pacis securitas nulla superveniente infestatione turbatur. Hoc ergo facit dispersio lapidum in tempore suo. Sed quia humana infirmitas corruit cito, et non potest diu in adversis salva consistere, venit post tempus dispersionis tempus collectionis: ut quiete temporis convalescat in hoc ipso admonita [0222A] sapere, et experiri quanta sint gaudia venturae quietis; ut ad illam festinet ubi timor dispersionis non est, neque exsilii aerumna metuitur, quibus aeternitas vitae in patria data est. Tempus spargendi lapides, et tempus colligendi. Deinde iterum aliud tempus sequitur post tempus istud: et nominantur alia quae et ipsa tempus habent saepe cum iis, quae dicta sunt temporibus, unum: saepe extra tempora ista tempore suo seorsum aliud.

*Tempus amplexandi, et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus.* Castis amplexibus tempus datum est, ut seminetur caro in propagationem, et humani generis seges, quae quotidie per totum mundum morte metitur, studio generationis reparetur. Pactum enim institutionis primae, qua ex carne caro sumenda erat [0222B] sine carnis contagio, post peccatum primae praevaricationis in carne peccati, per indulgentiam confirmatur, non solum pro explendo officio, sed etiam pro conferendo remedio: ne scilicet motus carnis immoderatius jam effervens turpius in omnem praevaricationem proflueret, si licite nusquam laxari potuisset. Praescribitur itaque meta usquequo se sine pudicitiae damno extendere possit carnis affectus: ut quod in matrimonii castimonia per concessionem agitur, etsi ad infirmitatem pertineat, ad turpitudinem tamen non imputetur. Sed ne rursum blandimenta voluptatis avertant animum in oblivionem Conditoris, salubri dispensatione aliquando homo et a concessis suspenditur: ne forte si his, quae in praesenti dulcia videntur, immoderatius inhiet, ad ea quae aeterna [0222C] sunt non festinet. Propterea datum est tempus amplexandi, et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus. Tempus enim amplexandi datum est, ut reparetur mortalitas et excipiatur mortalium infirmitas: tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus datum est, ut, dum caro a carnis delectatione subtrahitur, ad spiritualem animus delectationem nutriatur. Tempus amplexandi et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus. Quando enim colliguntur lapides, tempus est amplexandi; quando vero disperguntur, tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus: quoniam idcirco tempora augustiae data sunt, ut caro afflicta a suis se delectationibus temperet: ut post in tempore gaudii et consolationis se cum timore et reverentia ab excessu castiget. Sunt et amplexus charorum et contubernia [0222D] societatis amicae, in qua praeter carnis experientiam, convictus dulcis gratissimo foederatur consensu qui et ipsi solvuntur tempore suo, ne cor hominis in homine requiescat, donec veniat quod non solvitur pactum charitatis aeternae. Propter haec omnia tempus est amplexandi, et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus: ut in tempore non quaerat homo quod aeternum est, et qui hominis viventis societatem diligit, cogitet semper morituri separationem.

*Tempus acquirendi, et tempus perdendi.* Quae sunt bona quae primum acquiruntur, et postea perduntur? Perdita enim fuerant quaedam bona et acquisita sunt postea, ut deinceps perdi non possint. Et erant rursum alia bona non similia prioribus, [0223A] quae tamen bona visa sunt: et erat vere aliquid in eis ad bonum, sed non ut prima bona quae vera erant. Et ista bona non bona erant hominis ad verum bonum: et venit homo postquam vera amiserat, et acquisivit falsa bona, felicem se existimans in illis. Voluit enim consolari et habere in tempore quod aeternitas confert: et collegit peritura, quae tenere non posset; et concessit hoc Deus, ut boni distantiam agnosceret, et erudiretur vanitate sua, ad convertendum se in ea quae vera sunt. Propterea ergo dimisit Deus cor ejus, ut congreget ea quae stare non possunt et ea ipsa in tempore suo nunc tribuit acquirenda, nunc acquisita subtrahit: probans hominem in cunctis operibus suis, et ostendens vana omnia esse sub coelo. Propter hoc datur tempus [0223B] acquirendi; et tempus perdendi: ut dum adeptus fuerit homo quae concupierat, discat experiendo quod possint haec gaudia conferre iis qui magni aestimant peritura: cum vero habita perdit agnoscat quod omnia quae invito tolli poterant, fuerant etiam cum possidebantur extranea.

*Tempus custodiendi, et tempus abjiciendi.* Bona temporalia tempore suo custodienda sunt, quantum vitae temporalis necessitas postulat; sed quia in morte carnis omne quod ad vitae carnalis jucunditatem pertinet, necessitate amittitur, dignum est ut etiam ante mortem ab amore cordis voluntate abjiciatur.

## HOMILIA XV. *De tempore et tempori subjectis per aliam interpretationem.* (cont.)

*Tempus scindendi, et tempus consuendi.* Qui scindit, unita dividit: qui autem consuit, divisa et [0223C] separata conjungit. Omnia haec in vita hominum, quousque mutabilitati subjacet, sine cessatione agi iste prospexerat: in qua societas humanae conversationis, nunc quia utilitatis aliquid conferre videtur, appetenda est; nunc vero quia saepe eadem detrimentum adducit, fugienda. Habet ergo consutionem suam tempore suo consensus socialis; habet et scissionem suam in tempore suo zelus justae contradictionis; ut et bene volentibus et bona agentibus assensu et opere uniamur; ab his autem qui prava diligunt et iniqua operantur, animo pariter et operatione dividamur. Sed ne forte haec sententia eadem videatur cum illa qua supradictum est: tempus amplexandi et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus: quoniam in illa similiter de conjunctione et separatione [0223D] socialis dilectionis tractari asseruimus, possunt non inconvenienter quae illic dicta sunt tantum de amore ac dilectione significanda accipi: quae vero hic memorantur, ad quamcunque societatem sive pactionem quamlibet in qua idem consensus est et concordiae placitum, figurandam referri. Sic se similitudines rerum praestant ad sapientiam intelligendam: et utitur ipsa sapientia operibus suis ut se manifestet in nobis. Multa sunt quae in parabolis dicuntur et profunda scrutatione digna; sed non cuncta exire volunt, ut semper intus requirantur.

*Tempus tacendi, et tempus loquendi.* Prius tempus tacendi, postea tempus loquendi. Sapientia enim de [0224A] corde exit, nec aliunde lingua habet quod recte proferre possit, nisi prius verbum intelligentia formet. Propterea prius est tempus tacendi, post tempus loquendi: ut prius in silentio sagax cogitatio in se sapientiam colligat, quam lingua postmodum ad audientiam aliorum per verbum emittat. Propter hoc etiam tempus est tacendi et tempus loquendi, quoniam auditores verbi aliquando illud cum desiderio et amore suscipiunt, aliquando vero sine reverentia abjiciendo contemnunt. Quapropter tempus tacendi est, cum auditores admonitionis omnimodo impatientes aspicimus; tempus autem loquendi, cum eos verbum vel desiderare vel saltem sustinere velle videmus. Propter hoc quoque tempus tacendi est, quia in iis quae discutere non possumus, praesumere non [0224B] debemus. Et item tempus loquendi: quia alia quae possumus comprehendere, propter eruditionem proximorum necesse est non reticere. Unde non solum opera hominum, sed et verba fugientis vitae incertum sequuntur, ut totum vanitas occupet: et nihil stabile vel constans relinquatur: cum nec semper dicere possimus quae scimus, nec semper quae novimus, retinere: et nunc tacuisse noceat, quae dicenda fuerant: nunc vero dixisse culpa sit, quae fuerant reticenda. Item saepe non possumus, cum volumus: et sapere non volumus, cum possumus: saepius autem utrumque non debemus, cum facimus. In hoc magnum est incertum, et caligo ignorationis profundae: ut jactetur homo de tempore ad tempus, et non intelligat tempus suum in omni opere [0224C] suo.

*Tempus dilectionis, et tempus odii.* Multa sunt quae diliguntur in hoc mundo, et similiter odiuntur plurima. Et in omnibus, quae diliguntur, pauci veritatem diligunt: et in iis, quae odiuntur, pauci odiunt iniquitatem. Propter hoc diligunt homines, et putant saepe bene se diligere, et male diligunt: quia in iis, quae diligunt, veritatem non diligunt: nec ea diligunt, propter veritatem. Similiter odia exercent plurimi, et jactant zelum suum pro justitia et aequitate: et latet intus rixa in corde, et furor saevus odio se pascens iniquo. Et propterea non possunt discernere tempus suum primitus amor, et odium: quia non sequuntur judicium justitiae et veritatis, sed suo nutu feruntur in appetitus pravos, ut faciant quae volunt. [0224D] Diligunt, et odiunt, amant, et zelant, saepe, quae non debent, saepe quando non debent: et confusio fit magna amoris et odii, et dispergitur cor in universam vanitatem fugiens, quae recta sunt et quae prava sunt concupiscens. Propterea positum est homini tempus amoris et odii: ut intelligat et discernat quando ex iis, quae pro tempore bona et mala esse possunt, aliquid vel appetere debeat vel declinare. Nam extra tempora quaedam sunt quae tempore non mutantur, ut aliud esse possint: et sunt in his bona et mala. Et quae bona sunt, aeterna sunt, ut semper bona sint, et quae mala sunt, similiter aeterna sunt, ut semper sint mala. Non de illis tibi dicitur: Tempus dilectionis, et tempus odii. Nam illi aeterna dilectio est, et odium [0225A] aeternum: quoniam quae diligenda sunt, ibi semper diligenda sunt: et quae odienda sunt, semper sunt odienda. Interim autem nunc in tempore dum cuncta incerta sunt, ea quae transeuntibus nobis occurrunt, pro tempore se commutant, ut alteri in malum cedat quod alteri faustum exstiterat: et quod iste adversum doluit, ille sibi feliciter provenisse cognoscat. Propterea in iis omnibus, quae tempore transeunt, tempus est dilectionis et tempus odii: ut non firmet cor suum homo ad ea vel dilectione, vel odio: quae possunt et odio habita iterum juste diligi, et dilecta rursum juste odio haberi.

*Tempus belli, et tempus pacis.* Propter tempus occidendi, tempus belli ordinatur: propter tempus sanandi, [0225B] tempus pacis subsequitur. Et erat illud primum, hoc autem novissime commemoratum est: ut principium, et finis, cum mediis omnibus laboribus et periculis concludatur: ut vita hominis nunquam tuta sit, quae pertransit ut desinat. Exivit enim homo ut recederet, et non staret cum Deo: et fecit pactum dilectionis ad voluptatem hujus mundi, ut requiesceret in ea. Et noluit Deus foedus istud sustinere ut permaneret in abalienatione: et suscitavit contra eum quae perverse dilexerat, ut adversarentur, et affligerent illum: et factum est homini bellum cum omnibus quae in mundo sunt, ut dolorem et afflictionem inveniat in eis donec revertatur ad pacem cum Deo. Tunc ad pacem ejus se component omnia: ut subjecta sint humili quae fuerant adversa [0225C] elato. Primum enim cuncta pacata fuerant, sicut in novissimo pacabuntur universa: ut in medio quae transeant incerta sorte percurrant; donec veniant ut vel sub judicio cadenti in perpetuum adversa sint omnia, vel feliciter consummatio, subjecta sint universa. Ubi enim odium aeternum erit, illic erit et bellum perpetuum: et ubi erit aeterna dilectio, ibi pax sempiterna constabit. Neque ibi dicetur tempus pacis, et tempus belli, sicut non dicetur tempus dilectionis, et tempus odii: sed erit bellum, et pax: bellum sine fine, et sine fine pax. Non ergo existimet homo valde metuendum bellum, cui potest pax succedere: neque pacem illam veram, quam bellum subsequens potest perturbare: quia cuncta, quae transeunt, vana in hoc ipso reputanda sunt quod in [0225D] bono, similiter et in malo, semper permanere non possunt.

*Quid habet amplius homo de labore suo?* Ergo in incerto currit labor hominis: quia amplius habere non potest de labore suo, ne contentus sit homo iis quae labore suo constant: quia vana sunt omnia, et tempore transeunt, tempore finienda.

## HOMILIA XVI. *De spirituali intelligentia eorum quae de tempore dicta sunt.*

Sed jam tempus est ut post excursum temporum, secundum ea quae foris volvuntur in tempore, spiritualis etiam intelligentiae recordemur. Paulatim [0226A] namque promovet se sermo sapientiae ad spiritualia contingenda, ut exercitatum animum ad interiora subducat. Duas ergo vitas supra distinximus: unam secundum carnem, alteram secundum spiritum. Vita autem carnalis tempore prior est, eo quod omnis homo prius in carne nascitur quam in spiritu renascatur: et omnis qui vivit in carne, vel secundum carnem ambulat, et vitam spiritualem nondum attigit: vel secundum spiritum ambulat, et vitam carnalem abdicavit. Quapropter omnis spiritualis ex carnali spiritualis factus est: sed non omnis carnalis ex spirituali carnalis est effectus. Vita enim carnalis semper vel sola est, vel prima, ut illam omnis homo vel solam teneat, ut spiritualem vitam nunquam inchoet: vel prius habitam spiritualis vitae [0226B] studio subsequente commutet. Utraque haec vita sectatores suos habet: carnalis quidem eos qui vitae praesentis gaudia diligunt; spiritualis vero eos qui futurae vitae jucunditatem inquirunt. Quorum illi quidem blandimentis terrenarum delectationum carnem fovent, hi vero studio virtutum in spe ac desiderio futurorum spiritum exercent. Cum duobus istis populis mundus per temporum mutabilitatem ad finem decurrit, donec veniat ut statuto pacto justitiae amborum judicium fiat. Placuit enim Deo ut ostenderet divitias gloriae superventurae in vasa misericordiae, etiam vasa irae in sustentatione per temporalem misericordiam traducere: et ipsa similiter vasa misericordiae, ut justitia et veritas adimpleatur, nunc interim molestiis tentationum exercere: ut habeat [0226C] omnis vita et quod de misericordia gratuitum accipiat, ne bonitas relinquatur incognita; et quod de justitia districtum sentiat, ut veritas fiat manifesta. Propterea itaque proposuit Deus omni homini et bona et mala, ut utrumque demonstraret, misericordiam scilicet et veritatem: alterum, quo sine merito gratis beneficium tribuit; alterum, quo malo merito poenam dignam rependit. Propterea disposuit ut utrumque accipiat homo; et reliquit potestatem homini quid prius velit ut accipiat. Apposuit autem conditionem electionis in utroque, ne forte excusabilis sit concupiscentia prava: ut si homo bona temporalia in hac vita ad jucunditatem eligeret, aeterna adipisci non valeret; et si se hic flagello castigationis in judicio veritatis sponte supponeret, in [0226D] futura vita tormenta damnationis non sentiret. Reprobi autem qui vitam temporalem diligunt, et ejus jucunditatem vitae perpetuae gaudiis anteponunt, bona praesentia toto desiderio amplectuntur, atque in eis omnem felicitatem suam constituunt: electi vero temporales dolores patienter sustinent, ut ad ea, quae promissa sunt, gaudia aeternitatis possint pervenire: et in eorum respectu quidquid transitorium est, si amarum videtur, non metuunt; si dulce, non concupiscunt. Unde accidit ut carnalis vitae amatores prius habeant bona, deinde mala accipiant: spirituales vero prius adversis exerceantur, deinde ad bona pertingant. Illis prima bona, ultima mala: istis prima mala, ultima bona. Sed quia [0227A] rursum omnia, quae in tempore transeunt, confusa sunt et permista, ut ordinem non servent, sive de bono in malum, sive de malo in bonum, idcirco nunc interim inter principium et finem multiplex vicissitudo incurrit: ut scilicet nunc post bona mala, nunc post mala bona, et malis pariter et bonis incerta sorte contingant. Omnia ista dum de temporum volubilitate, et vicissitudine eorum, quae in tempore variantur, distinctionem quamdam proponeret Ecclesiastes, pro exemplo universorum diligenter expressit, ut et bonorum et malorum simul sortem provectumque in contraria currentem ostenderet. Cum enim dixisset omnia quae sub coelo sunt temporis rotatu variari et in contraria ferri, subjunxit exempla, et enumeravit multa de omnibus ut [0227B] omnium natura patesceret. Et in iis quae enumeravit, quaedam sunt in quibus commemorantur bona et mala - quaenam in quibus mala et bona, ut et carnalium et spiritualium pariter status et conditio agnoscatur. Septem enim sunt in quibus bona prius commemorantur, postea mala; et iterum septem in quibus mala prius dicuntur postea bona, ut universitas in utraque parte usque in finem decurrat. Septenario quippe tota haec vita praesens exprimitur: quae septem dierum curriculo provolvitur usque ad finem suum. Habent ergo mali septenarium suum, et boni similiter septenarium suum habent; quia tota haec vita malorum est de bono in malum, et tota bonorum de malo in bonum cuntium. Cujus [0227C] vitae principium malorum est in bono, et finis in malo; bonorum autem principium in malo, et finis in bono, mediis alternatim fluctuantibus. Media enim incerta sunt: et ob hoc etiam quod medium positum est, dubie est pronuntiatum, sive de bono in malum, sive de malo in bonum. Medium enim fuit tempus spargendi lapides et tempus colligendi: et ipsum ambiguam expositionem suscepit, sive de bello sive de pace significans, ut media incerta relinquantur. Si enim in hoc, quod prius dicitur, malum est, et quod postea bonum, jam octo erunt illa in quibus prius mala, postea bona nominantur: et sex in quibus prius bona postea mala commemorantur; quia bonorum vita recte ad numerum beatitudinis transit, malorum autem intentio simul, et vita temporalitatis laborem non excedit. Sic una est [0227D] veritas quocunque sententiam per interpretationem intorseris. Multa sunt alia quae forte convenienter in hac enumeratione vel distinctione dici potuissent. Sed nos fastidium quantum possibile est, evitantes, ad ea quae dicta sunt spiritualiter exponenda veniamus.

*Omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo.* Si in obedientia mandati perstitisset homo, non esset de numero illorum quae tempus habent sub coelo, et transeunt. Nam, si mente per iniquitatem non defluxisset, etiam corpore stabilis maneret per immortalitatem. Neque tunc sub coelo esset, ut cum iis volveretur, quae tempore transeunt; sed summo et vero bono inhaerens, non subderetur [0228A] momentis temporum, fixus per contemplationem in soliditate aeternorum. Ipsa enim aeternitas coelum erat, ubi mente fixus tempore mutari non potuit; quia supra tempora elevatus, subtus se labentia cuncta despexit. Postquam autem cor suum declinavit, ut illud per concupiscentiam rebus mutabilibus subjiceret, quasi de coelo lapsus coepit deorsum cum iis quibus inhaerebat defluere, et per volumina mutabilitatis suae ductus temporum momenta sentire. Hinc mens humana temporibus obnoxia facta est; ut in ea jam mala cum bonis vicem habent, quam sola prius bona sine vicissitudine quietam et inconcussam possidebant. Propterea omnia tempus habent, et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub coelo, ut ille quoque qui se per amorem mutabilibus [0228B] subdidit, lege aliorum suae mutabilitatis fluctibus agitatus, quietus stare non possit. Sic ergo tempora venerunt in cor humanum, quando multa desideria introicrunt in illud, et mutabilitas illic dominari coepit: et venerunt alia, et alia discesserunt; et facta est fluctuatio et inconstantia magna. Jam enim cum mundo visibili mundus invisibilis volvebatur, et coeperunt in eo temporum momenta discurrere, et esse anni, et menses, dies, et noctes, sementes et messes, pluviae et siccitates, fecunditates et sterilitates. Omnia enim ista in spiritualium natura adducta similitudine corruptibilium noxa peccati peraguntur, ut natura ad aeternitatem facta, ei quae temporaliter transit, prave associata similiter in alterationem deficiat. Surgunt quippe germina [0228C] virtutum ex radice prima, et pergunt ut crescant, et veniant in effectum consummationis. Et veniunt contra vitiorum ortus, et zizania superseminata; et extollunt se ut suffocent ea quae recta sunt, ne prosperentur; et fit magna exspectatio, et periculum grave spei admistum et timori. Nam pluviam gratiae, et stillicidia veritatis suae si effuderit Deus in animam sitientem, surgit messis virtutum proventu multiplici; et veniunt anni fecunditatis et tempora serena illucescunt nubilo ignorantiae depulso. Sin autem auferat beneficia sua iratus, et contineat benedictionem suam ut judicia sua exerceat, tunc tristia tempora succedunt, et marcent genimima bona in siccitate, et tribuli et spinae vitiorum multiplicantur ad laborem et dolorem homini [0228D] peccatori. Et in his omnibus tempora sua patitur anima peccatrix, coelum desuper, quod perdidit, aeternitate immobile prospectans, cum ipsa deorsum volvatur temporalis: et in ea pertranseant spatiis, et mensuris suis quae stare non possunt omnia. Et ideo omnia tempus habent, et spatiis suis transeunt universa sub coelo.

*Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi.* Haec est sors peccatorum in tempore, ut si forte in eis bona nascuntur aliqua, postea moriantur, et non perseverent in finem. Nascuntur enim etiam in malis aliquando bona aliqua, et incipiunt quasi oriri et germen facere; sed nata mox arescunt, quia non habent humorem. Ad tempus enim credunt, et in tempore [0229A] tentationis recedunt, ut tempus habeant et non perveniant ad aeternitatem. Tempus nascendi et tempus moriendi. Tempus nascendi in bono, pravis est, cum per subitum mentis fervorem recta aliqua incipiunt, sed sequitur eos continuo tempus moriendi; quia perseverantiam boni non habentes, eadem mentis levitate qua coeperant, tempore pressurae imminentis coepta bona derelinquunt.

*Tempus plantandi et tempus evellendi.* Plantantur in malis bona, cum per exhortationem vel admonitionem rectam aliquando bona suscipiunt; evelluntur autem postea, quando prava suggestione conquassati, bona coepta amittunt. Nascuntur itaque per propriam voluntatem, plantantur per alienam admonitionem; moriuntur autem, cum propria desideria [0229B] a bono tepescunt; evelluntur, cum alia supplantatione concidunt. Et in his omnibus habent mali tempora sua, in quibus justo judicio disponuntur, sive ad hoc sive ad illud: et ubique praeveniunt bona, et mala subsequuntur praevisis ad malum. Deinde sequitur vita bonorum in qua mala praecedunt ut bona subsequantur, et ipsa mala quae praecurrunt, in bonum cooperantur.

*Tempus occidendi, tempus sanandi.* Occiditur in electis primum vetus homo, et vita carnalis quae vivit secundum carnis affectum: deinde sanatur qui secundum spiritum est novus homo, ut vivat in Deum.

*Tempus destruendi et tempus aedificandi.* Omnis homo primum malam aedificationem facit, quando [0229C] operatur in carne, et malis mala apponit quotidie, ut surgat aedificatio prava: quae destruenda est, et subvertenda in iis qui salvi fiunt ut justitia aedificetur in eis.

*Tempus flendi et tempus ridendi.* Prius flere debet homo pro iis quae prava ipse commisit, ut deinde secure rideat in iis quae a Deo bona accepit. Nisi enim praecedens fletus in contritione conscientiam abluat, in vanum risus pro iis quae foris laeta sunt sine interna jucunditate exsultat.

## HOMILIA XVI. *De spirituali intelligentia eorum quae de tempore dicta sunt.* (cont.)

*Tempus lugendi sive plangendi et tempus saltandi.* Prius caro debet in poenitentia tormentis pro prava delectatione affici, postea in studio virtutum bonis operibus exerceri. Sic nimirum vita justorum doloribus eruditur, et poenis praeparatur ad gaudia ut [0229D] munda veniat ad fructum suum, et praecedunt semper mala ejus ut transeant, et bona differuntur in finem ut maneant sine fine. Et possumus in hac narratione ordinem quemdam correctionis et emendationis animae justificandae considerare. Primum enim omnium est ut in eo qui corrigitur voluntas prava interimatur, ac deinde bona, vel sanctur infirma, vel mortua vivificetur. Quod enim male vivit, bene occiditur; et quod male infirmum est, bene sanatur. Post mutatam voluntatem pravorum operum moles male aedificata destruitur, et bonorum operum studia longa negligentia dissipata reaedificantur. Deinde pro culpa praeterita fletus sequitur, qui cum lacrymarum fonte conscientiam mundaverit, [0230A] in risum tandem consolationis, et gaudium commutatur. Sequuntur etiam in poenitentia planctus, vel luctus, cum dolor mentis usque ad carnis afflictionem producitur, ut postea cum exsultatione animi caro etiam attrita sui consolatione laetificetur

*Tempus spargendi lapides et tempus colligendi.* Si per lapides fortia virtutum opera accipimus, quid aliud in dispersione lapidum nisi multiplicationem bonorum operum accipere debemus? Lapides enim spargere, est fortium exempla operum in multorum notitiam longe lateque offerre. Lapides vero colligere, est post studium laboris fructum operum bonorum percipere. Tempus itaque est spargendi lapides, et tempus iterum lapides colligendi; quia prius debet homo in studiis activae vitae bonis se [0230B] operibus exercere, ut possit postmodum fructum operis sui in gustu contemplationis percipere. De quo gustu quia fruentibus jucundissimus est et summa delectatione plenus, ut iis quae amari possunt universis praecellere videatur apte mox subditur:

*Tempus amplexandi.* Sunt enim amplexus quidam sapientiae et interni amoris delectabiles nexus: cum mens introrsum admissa apprehendit gaudium dilectionis suae, et quibusdam brachiis desideriorum suorum astringens illud, foedus facit, et poscit pactum perpetis mansionis. Sed quia mortalis vita ab interni luminis aspectu cito tenebrarum suarum caligine intercepta repellitur, et mutabilitate conditionis suae ab aeternae stabilitatis societate separatur, [0230C] apte subjungitur:

*Tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus.* Post tempus enim amplexandi, sequitur tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus; quia humana mens, licet aliquando per gratiam sublevata, ad tactum internae dulcedidinis admittatur: tamen cito infirmitatis suae pondere pressa, ad terrena rursum, et solita cogitanda relabitur. Haec sententia licet specialiter ad malos pertinere videatur, eo quod quasi prospera et bona principium ejus, finis vero adversa commemorat; hanc tamen distinctionem in praecedentibus sex quae exposuimus observasse sufficiat, ut caetera quae sequuntur ad generalem potius significationem applicemus. Aliud enim per dispositionem notatur, atque aliud per significationem exprimitur; quia dispositio [0230D] ordinis quasi distinctionem personarum innuit, significatio vero per sententiam rerum tantummodo veritatem ostendit. Ergo id quod pro malis tantum vel bonis ordine dicendi commutato narratur sine discretione in bonis pariter, et malis non inconvenienter accipitur, ut etiam nonnunquam hoc magis ad bonos secundum significationem pertineat, quod vitam reproborum, quantum ad ordinem pertinet narrationis, demonstrat. Possumus tamen et hoc ipsum de reprobis quibusque non inconvenienter dictum accipere: qui etsi aliquando ad amorem boni, secundum quemdam affectum, speciem virtutis habentem, quasi ad amplexum sapientiae approximare videntur, tamen quia mentem a desideriis [0231A] carnalibus et cupiditatibus terrenis non dividunt, cito ad solita relapsi, in eo ipso quod appropinquasse videbantur, longe fiunt. Sicut ergo electi ab amplexu summae veritatis ad tempus suspenduntur, ut ejus desiderio ex ipsa sui dilatione amplius inardescant, et tandem desideratam plenius capiant, ita reprobi quoque ad tempus secundum quemdam modum, ut videant quo confundantur, nec sit excusata malitia, sinuntur, ut ad eam cognitione aliqua contingendam accedant. Sed hoc interest, quod justi quique atque electi post degustatam interni boni dulcedinem ideo ad tempus repelluntur, ut amplius desiderio ardeant; reprobi vero post agnitam veritatem abjiciuntur, ut ex ipsa cognitione contra se suae damnationis testimonium sumant. Illi ergo admittuntur, [0231B] et repelluntur ut provocentur; isti admittuntur et abjiciuntur, ut confundantur. Sic philosophi gentilium in parte plurima admissi fuerunt; sed non de prope contingebant sapientiam, neque illam ad se attraxerunt ut perfruerentur suavitate illius. Viderunt enim, et cognoverunt, et diligere se putaverunt, sed erat peregrinus amor de longe, speciem commendans, sed non hauriens suavitatem illius. Procul quasi extentis brachiis, et manibus expansis, amplexum facere voluerunt; et non erat dilectus inter ubera ut fortiter astringeretur, et moram faceret, et permaneret; et ideo cito et velociter fugit ab eis, nec potuit charitate extranea retineri. Fugit igitur dilectus. Sed dilectus non fugit ut effugiat; sed abscondit se tantum, et celat in irritationem dilectionis, [0231C] ut quaeratur in desiderio, et non inveniatur, quoadusque ardentissime diligatur. Et saepe iterum revertitur quasi permansurus, et praestat se experiendum; et post modicum rursum elabitur, fructum reservans in posterum. Et in his omnibus tempus est amplexandi, et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus.

*Tempus acquirendi, et tempus perdendi.* Quando est tempus acquirendi, nisi quando tempus est amplexandi? Et rursum, tempus perdendi quando est, nisi quando tempus est longe fieri ab amplexibus? Quando enim dilectus praesens est, successus omnium virtutum multiplicatur, et repletur domus interior abundantia et ubertate. Tunc sterilia fructum [0231D] faciunt, et quae emarcuerant impinguantur fecunditate, et divitias suas anima ipsa miratur quas possidet. Flagrant affectus sancti, desideria casta, motus autem adversi sopiuntur; et quidquid repugnare consueverat, vel importunum obsistere, longe fit, ut pacata sint et quieta universa. Bene agendi facultas pro voto suppeditat, et divitis voluntatis copia usque ad operum sanctorum multiplicationem redundat. Hoc ergo tempus est acquirendi, quando merita sancta cumulantur, et bonorum operum merces multiplicatur in thesauris aeternarum divitiarum. Sed ne forte successus continuus aliquatenus cor humanum per elationem praecipitet, sequitur tempus perdendi, ut dum ab eo ad tempus salubri dispensatione successus virtutum tollitur, melius [0232A] per humilitatem in virtute solidetur. Sic itaque mens sancta intus in amplexu sapientiae requiescens, virtutum divitiis augetur; foris autem sparsa per occupationem stringitur egestate, et attenuatur inopia: quemadmodum e contrario carnales quique perituras opes laborando colligunt, et dum amplexibus voluptatum vacare coeperint, easdem mox otiose et luxuriose vivendo consumunt. Possumus et alio intellectu tempora acquirendi et tempora perdendi convenienter accipere. Duae quippe vitae sunt, activa, scilicet, et contemplativa: quarum una, id est activa, in studio bonorum operum laboriosa exercitatione meritorum sanctorum lucra colligit; altera vero, id est contemplativa, in cognitione veritatis peccata dilectione requiescit. Quas videlicet vitas recte per [0232B] duas Jacob uxores, Liam scilicet et Rachel, significatas accipimus: quarum una, id est Lia, lippis quidem oculis, sed fecunda exstitisse dicitur; altera vero, id est Rachel, oculis pulchris, at sterilis, fuisse perhibetur. Activa quippe vita in prole boni operis fecunda est, sed contemplativa in cognitione veritatis perspicua. Et quia in utraque vita vicissim sanctorum virtus exercetur, et alterna quodammodo mutatione convertitur, ut scilicet nunc ejus patientia probetur in labore operis, nunc vero ejus desiderium reficiatur in dulcedine contemplationis; recte nunc dicitur: Tempus acquirendi, et tempus perdendi. Tempus enim acquirendi est, cum devota mens in studio boni operis meritorum lucra multiplicat, et quasi deinde tempus perdendi sequitur, [0232C] cum pro amore quietis intimae libenter sustinet detrimenta operationis. Quasi enim voluntarie divitias postponit boni operis, ut possit vel cum modico quiescere in dulcedine contemplationis. Cui tamen ex hoc nihil meritorum suorum minuitur, quae ipso desiderio et amore summi boni amplius quam operis studio promeretur. Tempus acquirendi, et tempus perdendi. De perversis quibusque constans est: quod si quando aliquid boni recte agendo acquirunt, cito illud, quia in bono coepto perseverantiam non habent, amittunt. Quibus profecto tempus acquirendi prodesse nil potuit, quia illi tempus perdendi acquisita successit. Quos saepe in hoc ipso majus detrimentum sequitur, quia pro iis quae acquisierunt intumescunt, sed pro iis quae perdunt non humiliantur.

[0232D] *Tempus custodiendi et tempus abjiciendi.* Tempus est ut electos suos Deus, quia forsitan adversis frangi potuissent, a tentatione custodiat; et rursum tempus est abjiciendi, ut eos, cum molestiis exercendi sunt, velut iratus salubriter ad tempus ad tentationem exponat. Sed et malos Deus in hac vita saepe a molestiis ingruentibus tutos atque quietos custodit, ut eos postmodum in judicie tanto gravius abjiciat quanto patientius hic etiam, dum protegit adversarios, portat. Sed et homo ipse multa pro tempore custodire debet, quae postea in tempore suo abjiciat: quae et suo tempore custodita possint servanti ferre subsidium; et rursum, nisi tempore [0233A] suo abjiciantur, facere impedimentum. Terrena namque substantia recte pro tempore et ad carnis sustentationem custodienda est; et rursum tempore suo, si periculum animae in illa constare cognoscitur, sine dubitatione abjicienda. Multa quoque in spirituali disciplina et studio virtutum sunt, quae pro tempore nunc custodire, nunc vero abjicere oportet: ne si forte opus virtutis sine discretione agatur, idipsum ad culpam constet, quod pro merito reputari potuisset. Omnia enim tempore mutantur, et non est aliquid quod semper idipsum permaneat; et ideo qui vivit sub tempore debet causas et proventus rerum omnium temporibus compensare.

## HOMILIA XVI. *De spirituali intelligentia eorum quae de tempore dicta sunt.* (cont.)

*Tempus scindendi, et tempus consuendi.* Omnis qui in carne secundum carnem vivit, per carnis affectum [0233B] quasi unum est cum iis quae caro concupiscit. Necesse est ergo ut homo qui a carnalibus ad spiritualia convertitur, prius animo ab iis quibus per affectum inhaeserat avellatur. Tunc siquidem libere se spiritualibus per amorem conglutinat, cum de terrenis affectibus nihil superest quod ejus mentem in desideria aliena avertat. Itaque tempus est scindendi, ut prius homo mentem a desideriis terrenis avellat; postea tempus consuendi, ut animo per amorem spiritualem aeternis et permanentibus bonis adhaerere incipiat. Nec hoc praetereundum videtur quod ea quidem quae scinduntur, substantialiter unum sunt; ea vero quae consuuntur, essentialiter quidem diversa sunt, sed mediante vinculo fili quasi accidentaliter unum fiunt. Sic enim omnis [0233C] homo corruptibilibus et perituris unitur per naturam, sed efficitur particeps aeternorum per gratiam. Sic quippe consuuntur humana et divina in unum, ut quae duo fuerant per naturam, fiant unum per gratiam. Compunctio siquidem ipsa acus est, et dilectio filum; et facit viam acus, et perforat utrumque, ut filum utrumque contineat. Neque enim consutio aliter fieri potuisset, nisi utrumque foraretur et utrumque contineretur, quia discederet alterum ab altero, et facile se ab unitate divideret, si utrumque vinculum non contineret. Propter hoc utrumque perforat acus compunctionis, et filum dilectionis connectit utrumque, ut stent simul, et non discedant ab invicem. Humana quippe perforat [0233D] acus compunctionis, quando culpam persequitur; divina perforat, quando occulta aeternorum scrutatur. Sic enim gemina constat compunctio, et est irriguum superius, et irriguum inferius *(Josue, XV)*. Per irriguum superius perforantur divina, et per irriguum inferius perforantur humana. Per compunctionem quippe, quae de culpa surgit, transfigitur peccatrix conscientia; et per compunctionem, quae surgit de desiderio aeternorum, penetrantur occulta. Illa subtiliter conscientiam penetrat, ut pellat noxia; ista profunda consideratione invisibilia scrutatur, ut apprehendat amata. Sic utrumque perforatur, et utrumque transfigitur: alterum dolore, quo reatus eruitur, alterum desiderio, quo concupita requiruntur. Posthaec succedit filum amoris: [0234A] quo utrinque vinculum unitatis efficitur, ut ab invicem deinceps juncta non separentur. Utrinque enim amor surgit, et concurrit vinculum dilectionis in unum, quia mens humana respiciens videt illic quanta sibi commissa per misericordiam; divina vero considerans, contemplatur in eis, quanta sibi sint promissa ad gloriam. Et utrumque diligit, et fit nexus charitatis in ambobus, quia dulcis est misericordia ad gloriam, et gloria jucunda ad misericordiam. Et non potest dilectio horum separari, quia consutio facta est, et firma stant vincula charitatis aeternae. Tempus igitur scindendi tunc fuit, nunc autem tempus consuendi.

*Tempus tacendi, et tempus loquendi. Qui audit,* inquit Scriptura, *dicat: Veni [n: (Apoc. XXII)]*. Qui enim [0234B] prius aurem cordis per obedientiam ad verbum Dei aperit, ille postmodum recte ad loquendum proximo linguam resolvit. Nam qui prius per obedientiam in verbo aedificationis alteri tacere non didicit, noxae subjacere convincitur, si alios ipse docere praesumit. Igitur prius est tempus tacendi, ut discat homo quod doceat; et deinde tempus loquendi, ut qui veritatem jam cognovit, loqui eam in tempore suo non erubescat. Utrumque enim culpa est, et cum videlicet homo temere praesumit quod non debet, et cum per negligentiam torpet ab eo quod debet. Et ideo prius cavendum ne committamus illicita, postmodum studendum ne debita negligamus. Tempus tacendi, et tempus loquendi. Succedunt sibi tempora et venit tempus post tempora.

[0234C] *Tempus dilectionis, et tempus odii.* Si quis dixerit in tempore dilectionis tempus esse loquendi, et tempus tacendi in tempore esse odii, ut non detur sanctum canibus, neque margaritae projiciantur ante porcos [n: (Matth. VII)], sed ponat justus digitum super os suum, quando dies mali sunt, et obmutescat, cum consistit peccator adversus eum: nonne ideo justitia venit in terram, ut peccatores arguantur, et ut convertantur iniqui, ne pereant? Propterea ambigua sunt tempora, quoniam ipsorum est in incertum percurrere. Nihil tamen sine tempore est, sive dilectio sit, sive odium. Tempus enim habet dilectio, et tempus odium. Cui enim praecipitur ut proximum diligat sicut seipsum, eidem dicitur ut odiat semetipsum. [0234D] Unde constat quod qui Deum amat sicut se, cum in Deo diligit proximum: sic contra Deum nec diligere novit semetipsum. Tempus ergo est dilectionis, et tempus odii, ut qui pro Deo studemus inimicos diligere, cum causa Dei laeditur, non praesumamus etiam amicos amare. Est adhuc alia dilectio, et odium aliud: ut quisque carnem suam, et in iis diligat quae infirmitati sustentandae necessaria sunt, et oderit in iis quae desideria prava exposcunt. Tempus itaque dilectionis est, et tempus odii, quoniam oportet nos, quandiu sub hujus mortalitatis defectu vivimus, et contradictionem peccati in carne nostra portamus, magna adhibita discretione pensare, quando et fatiscentem naturam per compassionem fovere debeamus, ne concidat, et quando rursum [0235A] surgentem in carne motum vitiorum affligendo premere, ne convalescat. Scriptum quippe est: *Nemo carnem suam odio habuit [n: (Ephes. V)]*. Et rursum dicitur: *Carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis [n: (Rom. XIII)]*. Unde patenter ostenditur quod et diligenda caro est, quantum pertinet ad compassionem naturae: et rursum quantum ad castigationem culpae spectat, odienda. In quo quia magno discretionis moderamine opus est, tempus praescribitur dilectionis et odii, ut medio incedentes limite neque suffocemus naturam, dum culpam persequimur, neque culpam nutriamus, quando naturam fovemus. Sed quia hoc sine labore magno et lucta gravi fieri non potest, subjungitur: Tempus belli, et tempus pacis, ut simul agnoscat homo, et quod nemo sine pugna [0235B] ad victoriam pervenit, et quod qui legitime certat, post adeptam victoriam in pace requiescit. Idcirco enim post tempus belli tempus pacis ponitur, ut qui concertationis pondere frangi poterat, de pacis dono consoletur. Tempus belli, et tempus pacis. Tres sunt qui bellum suscitant contra nos: videlicet diabolus, et mundus, et caro nostra. Hos enim omnes hostes se habere Paulus cognovit, qui pugnam se contra omnes suscepisse asseruit. Pugnam enim contra daemones sibi pariter cum omnibus fidelibus jugem esse testabatur, cum diceret: *Non enim est nobis colluctatio contra carnem, et sanguinem: sed adversum potestates, et principatus; adversum rectores tenebrarum harum, contra spiritualia nequitiae in coelestibus [n: (Eph. VI)]*. Rursum adversus mundum, id [0235C] est homines perversos amatores mundi, pugnam sibi fuisse asseruit, qui se Ephesi contra bestias pugnasse narravit [n: (I Cor. XV)]. Item adversus carnem propriam pugnam sibi incessabilem esse testatur, dicens: *Sic pugno non quasi aerem verberans; sed castigo corpus meum, et in servitutem redigo: ne forte cum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar [n: (I Cor. IX)]*. Tres igitur sunt tyranni, qui contra nos exercitus suos producunt in praelium: et habent singuli acies suas instructas ad faciendum bellum animae. Diabolus siquidem adversus fidelem animam suggestionum agmina instruit: mundus prospera et adversa ad nos superandos producit: caro vero desideriorum carnalium turbas excitans, contra nos in praelium exsurgit. Sed contra hos [0235D] omnes oportet fidelem animam viriliter decertare, et ad debellandas adversae potestatis vires, virtutum jacula, Dei protectione munitam, exercere. Diabolum quippe vincimus, si cum perseverantia ejus suggestiones suscipere recusamus. Mundum vincimus, si et constanter prospera ejus despicimus, et patienter adversa toleramus. Carnem autem vincimus, si pravis ejus desideriis non consentimus. Sed hostes semel victi non statim cessant, ut pax continuo esse possit; sed tentant iterum, et iterum moliuntur, et conantur quomodo possunt: et saepe quasi audentes, cum sint timidi, ipsi cum terrore impetum faciunt, ut probent quid sit animi in nobis; saepe insidias struunt, et progrediuntur occulte ad explorandum, [0236A] et celant se, et volunt esse occulti, donec improvisi superveniant. Et in his omnibus pericula multa oriuntur, et circumspectio quotidiana, et timor undique: et fit bellum magnum, et diuturna concertatio, donec pars nostra convalescat omni modo, et desperantes prorsus cessent, et discedant a spe sua; ut aut deterreantur a nobis aut in nostram ditionem subjiciantur. Nam, et hoc sine dubitatione proveniet, si non defecerimus a spe nostra et patientia bona, ut tandem pax plena et integra restituatur post consummatum laborem concertationis. Tunc enim fugabitur a nobis diabolus divina virtute, ut non audeat praesumere adversum nos; sed territus fugiat, et abscedat in confusionem. Mundus quoque ipse, qui saevire in commotionibus suis [0236B] consueverat, pacabitur, et carnis desideria spiritu roborato sopientur. Tunc in tempore pacis nostrae recordabimur temporum antiquorum, quando bellum fuit, et non poenitebimus tunc: sed laetabimur, et exsultabimus pro diebus in quibus vidimus mala; et erit pax dulcis in gratulatione praeteritorum laborum. Propter hoc tempus belli est, et tempus pacis

*Quid habet amplius homo de labore suo?* Quid amplius habet quam bellum et pacem, dilectionem et odium, et universa alia, quae temporum proventus rota suae volubilitatis educit? Non ergo amplius habet de labore suo quam bellum et pacem: quoniam hoc labore suo non potest, ut habeat solam [0236C] pacem. Igitur nec labore suo pacem habet, sicut voluntate sua bellum non habet. Omnia enim nutum sequuntur dispositionis supernae: neque arbitrio humano temporum momenta subduntur, ut hoc, vel illud, eveniat; sed patitur legem homo in omnibus, sive volens ad meritum, sive nolens ad tormentum. Non igitur confidere debet homo in labore suo, neque in actis suis spem ponere, quasi possit ipse, vel quod desuper non ordinatum est efficere, vel quod dispositum est impedire. Nihil enim labor hominis universis adjicere potest, ut quid amplius sit: quia justa Artificis moderatio sic cuncta in aequitate disposuit, ut omne, quod sine ejus cooperatione nititur, universitatis ordinem deserens, ad non esse potius moveatur.

## HOMILIA XVII. *De animorum confusione ex temporum transitu.*

[0236D]

Modo de temporibus exivimus, sed utinam pervenissemus ad aeternitatem! Restant enim, adhuc multa, et plurima volvuntur circa nos: et iterant rursum tempora orbem suum usquequaque, ut non sit finis, donec omnia fuerint consummata. Sequitur quippe post mutabilitatem rerum gravis confusio animorum: quoniam pergunt corda super volumina, et transitus temporum, ut non stent in veritate, sed defluant cum eis quae vadunt ut transeant. Propterea cessat ab his omnibus quae foris nutant, et fluctuant quasi modica sint universa haec et non valde ad periculum operantia: et convertit se introrsum, et ingeminat illic querelam de vanitate [0237A] quae abscondita est: et illam gravi examinat conquestione super eam quae foris paret aliena. Non enim nocuisset mutabilitas rerum, si animorum mutabilitas non fuisset: quoniam idipsum bonum erat, ut transitoria pro tempore mutent speciem, sed non erat bonum ut judicia mentium humanarum deserant veritatem. Non itaque causamur quod tempora varia sunt, quoniam bonum est: sed causamur quod varia sunt humana judicia: quoniam hoc bonum non est. Neque enim veritas a se esse potest alia: quia, quod bonum est in veritate, malum non est: et quod in veritate bonum non est, malum est. Quare ergo judicatur quod hoc bonum est, et hoc malum est; et judicatur quod malum est hoc, et hoc bonum est: cum in veritate vel [0237B] bonum non est, si malum est, vel malum non est, si bonum est. Alter dicit, Bonum est, et alter dicit, Malum est: et qui dicit, Hoc bonum est, dicit Illud malum est: et qui dicit Malum hoc est, dicit Illud bonum est: et omnes male dicunt, quia totum bonum est. Hoc autem solum bonum non est, quod male dicunt de illo quod bonum est. Quapropter bona sunt omnia: et soli mali illi sunt, qui prae caeteris omnibus boni esse debuerunt. Caetera enim omnia sunt quod esse debuerunt, et ipsi soli non sunt quod esse debuerunt: quia veraces non sunt, et in veritate non sunt; et ideo bona sunt omnia in eo quod sunt, ipsi autem boni non sunt in eo quod sunt, quia non sunt quod esse debuerunt. Hoc itaque inter caeteras vanitates, et ipsum pro vanitate magna [0237C] numeratur, et cunctis solum vanitatibus comparatione praeponitur. Et dicit:

*Vidi afflictionem, quam dedit Deus filiis hominum, ut distendantur in ea.* Quae est enim illa afflictio?

## HOMILIA XVII. *De animorum confusione ex temporum transitu.* (cont.)

*Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo: et mundum tradidit disputationi eorum; ut non inveniat homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem.* Ergo mutabilitas rerum non affligit hominem, sed disputatio sua ipsa affligit eum. Et merito: quia disputatio inquietudinem semper significat et concertationem. Et ideo mutabilitas rerum, labor hominis non est; sed quod ipse inquietus factus est, hic est labor illius. Et ipsa inquietudo disputatio [0237D] magna est, quam habet homo in instabilitate sua, ut non sentiat idem: quoniam divisus est, et alius factus, ut non sit unus totus. Considerate nunc magnam disputationem quam exercet homo super terram. Multa enim est, et prolixa, et involuta nimis: ut non facile finem habere possit, donec homo ipse finem accipiat. Et nunc, ut credatis, videte quam multas ab initio curiosi sapientiae de operibus Dei sententias formaverunt: et nemo fuit usque adhuc qui negotio huic tam grandi finem imponere potuisset. Et litigant adhuc quotidie, et concertationibus pugnant disputantes: et dicit alius Hoc est, et alius dicit Non est, sed est aliud; et dicuntur multa, et confinguntur quasi fabrefacta mendacia opinionum de judicio rerum. Et plurimi asserunt [0238A] quod nihil est nisi ipsum quod videtur, et veniunt alii, et contestantur quod nihil vere est nisi ipsum quod non videtur. Et in his omnibus congerunt et multiplicant argumenta sua, et texunt rationes, et quasi rationes: et est cuique ratio existimatio sua. Proposuit enim Deus opus suum in oculis hominum, ut interroget corda ipsorum de eo: et ipse retrorsum absconditus latet, donec experiantur exercitationem nostram in illo. Et hauriunt sensu, et corde dijudicant, et proferunt plurima de thesauro judiciorum suorum, et de profunda abysso phantasiarum, et opinionum falsarum suarum et cogitationum inanium. Et dicunt alii quod natura sola est, et non est aliud; et Deus nihil est, sed timor vanus adinvenit omnia; et sic fuit semper [0238B] quod est ab initio, et ante initium sine initio. Et volvuntur saecula, et operatur seipsam natura, et renovat, et non potest aliud esse quam semper erat. Alii contra proclamant et litigant pro injuria creatoris, et defendere se putant quem impugnant ipsi mendaciis suis. Dicunt esse opificem, qui de coaeterna sibi materia universa finxerit, ut formam daret meliorem, et non cognoscunt isti creatoris potentiam, sed abnegant de nihilo factum aliquid: negantque horum, quae sunt quippiam in nihilum posse relabi: sed tantum in alterationibus rerum operam conditoris consistere. Post hos alii succedunt litigantes, et disputantes, et promittunt errorem tollere, et manifestare veritatem et ipsi de nihilo cuncta facta confitentur, et factum [0238C] non esse per quem facta sunt omnia; et fuisse aliquando quando creatum nihil fuit, et fuisse tunc ipsum qui semper fuit. Et habent isti in suis dogmatibus quasi principium bonum, sed succedit malus finis. Qui enim de rerum creatione quasi vera sentiunt, de subsistentia rerum plurima mentiuntur, et non est finis disputationum et adinventionum hominum. Fingunt essentias, et formas, et atomos, et ideas principalium constitutionum, et elementa plurima, et nascentias infinitas, et motus invisibiles et efficientias procreatrices. Et in iis omnibus multiplicantur simulacra rationum, et fiunt disputationes plurimae, et veritas non est in eis omnibus. Similiter enim qui dicit, falsum dicit, et qui contradicit, [0238D] falsum dicit, quia disputando et mentiendo omnes una vanitate a veritate elongaverunt. Neque enim invenire poterit homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Ex omnibus quae facta sunt ab initio et quae facienda sunt usque ad finem, non poterit homo invenire unum aliquid ut comprehendat illud, et sciat totum quod est ipsum. Nam et si quidam videantur invenisse plurima, proposita erant omnia, et quae occulta fuerunt nullatenus inveniri potuerunt. Tradidit enim Deus mundum disputationi eorum, *et proposuit eis opera sua, ut viderent ea et judicarent.* Et in iis manifestavit multa quae voluit agnosci, et quae abscondita esse voluit, non potuerunt inveniri. Propterea omnia quae cognita sunt in eis manifestavit Deus; et non invenit ea [0239A] homo sensu suo, donec revelarentur in eo quantum voluit Deus. Quaedam namque foris proposita fuerunt, et quaedam intus revelata sunt, et non invenit homo aliquid, ut sensu suo iret ad ea quae occulta fuerunt, donec manifestarentur in ipso. Et si contendere voluerit quod aliqua invenerit ipse, nunquid tamen omnia invenire potuit quae operatus est Deus ab initio usque in finem? Et in ipsis quae invenit, totumne invenire potuit quod fuit, et non reliquum permansit aliquid absconditum et occultum quo non admissus est sensus ejus, ut inveniret totum? Nam si totum invenisset homo, non esset disputatio ulla neque currerent opiniones in adversum de iis omnibus quae in mundo sunt. Omnes enim similiter mundum hunc videmus: et est positus ante oculos [0239B] nostros, ut traderetur disputationi nostrae; et videmus totum hoc ante nos, et nescimus unde huc advenerit. Latet enim qui fecit eum, et praetendit opus suum ante se, ut abscondatur, et manifestetur in eo. Factum quippe simulacrum humanam contemplationem e vicino excipiens, facit ut creatorem suum nec manifestum videre, nec ignorare similiter totum possit. Propterea intellectus hominis exercitatus rerum specie surgit, et ex eo quod se offert manifestationi secundum aemulationem veritatis ad interiora scrutanda conatur; et habet principium in operibus Dei primae contemplationis, sed non pervenit usque ad finem operum Dei, ut capiat totum quod absconditum est. Si enim ad finem pervenire potuisset, invenisset utique Deum, quoniam a quo [0239C] sunt, ibi finem habent omnia et consummationem. Non ergo pervenit ad finem, quoniam Deum invenire non potuit, donec ipse se manifestaret in nobis; et confusi sunt scrutantes scrutationes, quoniam defecerunt [n: (Psal. LXIII)], et non valuerunt, ut comprehenderent, et finem facerent disputationum suarum. Propterea *stultam fecit Deus sapientiam mundi [n: (I Cor. V)]*, quia posuit mundum in disputatione eorum, permanens ipse occultus donec deficerent disputantes et quaerentes inania. Et non inveniet homo omne opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Posthaec revelavit se Deus et exivit ut inveniretur, cum gloriari jam non possit homo, quasi ipse sensu suo et sapientia Deum cognoverit, qui in [0239D] opere Dei scrutando defecerat. Ad hoc ergo profuit quod mundus in tempore traditus est disputationi eorum, ut non invenirit homo omne opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Istae sunt disputationes hominum vana curiositate quaerentium abscondita operum Dei, quas multiplicant sibi fabricando de iis quae ignorant mendacia, et concortationibus muniunt errores suos. Et sunt adhuc aliae quaedam disputationes in desideriis hominum multiplices nimis et variae, et surgunt ex ipsis multarum studia vanitatum. Omnis enim homo praefert quod diligit ipse, et trahuntur corda omnium in infinitas scissiones, ut non consentiant in uno unquam. Alii lasciviam et luxuriam et voluptatem sequuntur: inebriari et ludere et ridere et saltare, et [0240A] existimant hanc esse felicitatem hominis et jucunditatem suavissimam. Alii honores ambiunt, et dignitates, et famam magnam in populis, et commendant studia sua, et disputant gravi concertatione, quoniam melior est portio ista in vita hominis. Alii pecunias cumulant et coacervant opes, et putant securitatem comparare, et fiduciam magnam contra ingruentem egestatem in tempore angustiae. Et laudant isti providentiam et sollicitudinem dicunt meliorem, cum velint tamen securi esse ipsi. Et sic quidem feruntur omnes in appetitus suos seorsum singuli contraria approbatione; et disputant rixando, et dissentiendo desideriis importunis. Et traditur mundus disputationi eorum, ut in ejus affluentia experiantur singuli voluptates suas et probent, et [0240B] videant, et consumant in argumenta alterutrum adversum de se copia, illius quisque quod ipse elegerit in approbatione desideriorum suorum. Et rapiunt pertinacia magna quisque quod sibi ipse elegerit; et laudant partem suam singuli, et fit disputatio magna et altercatio voluntatum in variis aestimationibus quas pariunt desideria multa. Et in iis omnibus non invenit homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Initium namque operum Dei est usus rerum temporalium; finis vero et consummatio, fructus aeternorum. Propterea qui in rebus mundi disputationem suam constituit, et approbationem desideriorum suorum exquirit: non potest invenire in operibus quae operatus est Deus quidquam ab initio usque ad finem; quoniam, [0240C] licet experiri sinatur quanta esse possit delectatio in bonis hujus saeculi, illam tamen ineffabilem jucunditatem quae consummatam felicitatem confert, non apprehendit in contemplatione Dei. Idcirco traditus est mundus amatoribus mundi, quibus datum non est ut ab initio usque ad finem invenire mereantur opera Dei; quia quibus aeternorum bonorum dulcedo tollitur, eis carnales datae sunt delectationes, et mundi gaudia exposita in desideriorum suorum malorum dissipationem. Invenimus et alias adhuc disputationes in judiciis hominum graves et multiplices, et rigas coacitantes horrendas, ita ut in blasphemiam etiam excrescant Creatoris, et dicant quae non oportet. Arripiunt enim homines vicem [0240D] Dei violenter, et judices saeculi se constituunt, et disputant de mundo et de operibus Dei, et providentia ejus, et judiciis quibus mundum universum disponit. Et dicunt alii hoc bene fecit Deus; et alii murmurant, et dicunt non bene factum est illud. Istae enim querelae sunt hominum, et praesumptiones quibus provocant iram Dei; quia subdi nolunt legibus ejus, sed disputant de operibus ipsius, et judicia ejus reprehendunt. Periit aliquis morte crudeli aut gravi damno, et casu miserabili attritus est; et venit inimicus ejus, et dicit: Bene fecit Deus; hominem impium et peccatorem secundum malitiam suam judicavit; et murmurat amicus ejus, et querelam movet adversus Deum, cur perire permiserit innocentem, et justum non custodierit. Et damnatur [0241A] ille pro malitia sua; et iste pro temeritate sua judicatur. Et tamen non cessant homines disputare de operibus Dei, et judicia illius pro sua existimatione pensare; et reprehenditur Deus a cogitationibus hominum malignorum. Dicunt enim homines quod non debuit Deus creasse noxia, nec quae infesta sunt et nocent posuisse in operibus suis; et maledicunt creaturas Dei bonas, et blasphemant Creatorem earum. Ranas, et muscas, et serpentes, et venenata omnia, et omnia adversa et pestilentiosa quare fecit Deus? Melius enim fecisset, si cuncta bona fecisset. Mala quippe plurima sunt, et mala omnia bona non sunt. Et fecit quidem cuncta bona ipse in tempore suo; sed solus homo malus, non intelligens bonitatem neque retinens judicium [0241B] veritatis, mala voluntate a bonitate discordat: et cum fit quod male ipse non vult, dicit male fieri; cum bene fiat, et ipse male velit. Idcirco malae voluntates et concupiscentiae nequam excaecant corda hominum, ut non intelligant quod rectum est, quia non amant nec volunt quod bonum est. Et reprehendunt Deum quod noxia fecit; et nemo tamen reprehendit cum laeditur inimicus suus, cum sint ipsi universi inimici Dei, et adversarii veritatis. Propter hoc non intelligit homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. *Carnalis* enim *homo non sapit ea quae Dei sunt [n: (I Cor. II)]*. Sequitur enim concupiscentiam suam, et laudat delectationem desideriorum suorum, et cum sibi datur quod diligit, putat secum bene agi. cum potius hoc fiat [0241C] in malum ejus, et cum obsistitur desideriis suis, murmurat et movet querelam; et causatur, quasi male actum si quod juste ordinatur; et non intelligit opera quae operatur Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Ex quo de terra educitur, donec in terram revocetur: opera quae operatus est Deus non intelligit ab initio usque ad finem. Multa enim operatur Deus circa hominem ab initio ejusque ad finem illius, et non invenit homo quo fine fiant omnia haec, donec ipse finem accipiat. Tunc autem intelliget, et tunc inveniet quae operatus est Deus in eo ab initio suo usque ad finem suum, vel in misericordia vel in judicio, ut eum ad talem finem perduceret, quem operibus suis ab initio usque ad finem probavit ut [0241D] veniret in consummationem. Interim autem donec finis adveniat ab initio usque ad finem latent omnia, ut non inveniat homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Propterea disputare potest de operibus Dei, quae operatur Deus ab initio usque ad finem; sed invenire non potest opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Si autem non potest homo invenire opus quod operatur Deus ab initio suo usque ad finem suum, ut vel hoc saltem intelligat quod ipse vidit, quomodo tunc inveniet opera quae operatus est Deus ab initio mundi, usque ad finem saeculi quae ipse videre non potuit? Cesset ergo homo disputare de judiciis Dei, quibus mundum universum gubernat et disponit ab initio usque ad finem; quia homo neque rector [0242A] neque judex mundi a Deo positus fuit, sed possessor; neque ut sua virtute aut potestate mundi elementa regeret aut proventus temporum arbitrio dispensaret, sed ut fructus mundi, et temporum vices secundum Creatoris dispensationem in usum alendae infirmitatis suae acciperet. Propterea adjunxit et ait:

## HOMILIA XVII. *De animorum confusione ex temporum transitu.* (cont.)

*Cognovi quod non esset melius, nisi laetari et facere bene in vita sua. Omnis enim homo qui comedit et bibit, et videt bonum de labore suo, hoc donum Dei est.* Nam omnis homo qui contendit, et disputat de operibus Dei, et causatur judicia Dei, et ejus dispositiones in mundo accusat; hoc donum Dei non est, neque ex Deo est illud, sed contra Deum, et melius facit qui licite in hoc mundo donis Dei justo labore [0242B] acquisitis utitur, quam qui adversus Deum pro iis quae in hoc mundo contra suam voluntatem vel existimationem eveniunt, rixatur. Neque enim potest homo rixando et murmurando contra Deum ejus dispositionem immutare: et ideo melius est ejus judicia cum timore suscipere, quam in ejus injuria pro nostra laesione murmurare. Nam et ideo Deus judicia sua abscondit a nobis, ut, dum ea nec nostro intellectu penetrare, nec pro nostro arbitrio immutare possumus, amplius timeamus. Idcirco prosequitur et dicit:

*Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverent in aeternum. Non possumus eis quidquam addere nec auferre quae fecit Deus, ut timeatur.* Non solum de operibus Dei quibus essentias rerum [0242C] creavit: creatisque per singula genera, et species rerum formam modumque imposuit, hoc verum est, quod opera Dei perseverent in aeternum: pro eo quod ejus dispositio in eis non mutatur, et servant singula, ut sint quod ea esse instituit: et si transeunt, non ex ipso hoc est, quod id quod sunt ex ipso sunt; quod autem esse desinunt, ex semetipsis habent: sicut et hoc quod antequam essent, nihil fuerunt, ex semetipsis habuerunt. Non solum itaque verum est hoc de operibus Dei quibus creaturam mundi disponit, quod sine immutatione et confusione ordinis maneant in aeternum; sed etiam de dispositione et praedestinatione judiciorum ejus quibus facta hominum examinat, hoc verum est, quod [0242D] maneant in aeternum, et legem providentiae suae, et statutum cogitationis ipse non mutat. Et sicut operibus ejus rerum generibus neque addere possumus creando, ut sit quod non erat, neque auferre perimendo, et destruendo, ut omnino nihil sit quod aliquid erat: sic neque judicia ejus immutare possumus, vel addendo ut fiat quod ipse non disposuit, vel auferendo ut non fiat quod ipse fieri ordinavit. Ut enim solus ipse timeatur, et ad eum omni tempore in misericordia respectus sit conscientiae humanae, idcirco soli sibi potestatem servavit operum, et judiciorum suorum, ut nemo immutare possit quod ipse legibus aeternis fixum constituit, ut adimpleret. Propter hoc non disputet homo in universis quae illi adveniunt, sed suscipiat judicia Dei cum [0243A] reverentia et timore: et cum quidem prospera tribuit Deus, et placita condonat, casta exsultatione laetetur in beneficiis ejus; cum vero adversa egrediuntur, et molesta occurrunt, mala sua merita confitens, justitiam illius commendet et veritatem. Quod si quando molestiis ingruentibus, patientiam suam labefactari conspexit, contra murmurationis et impatientiae vitium dona munificentiae Creatoris sui opponat: ut animus qui pondere tentationis premitur, ne aliquatenus in blasphemiam erumpat, recordatione beneficiorum Dei mitigetur. Tunc enim incipiet benefacere, et laetari in vita sua, et videre bona de labore suo: non solum quando bonis hujus mundi industria sua acquisitis cum gratiarum actione perfruitur; sed tunc etiam quando in adversis [0243B] constitutus, pro patientiae suae labore spe futurae consolationis laetatur. Comedet enim et laetabitur in donis Dei, quando in prosperis exsultabit de munere, et in adversis hilarescet de retributione. Sic se omni tempore componet ad pacem cum Deo, ut videat et intelligat quod cuncta bona facit in tempore suo, ut non juste accusetur ab homine in omnibus quae acciderint. Rata enim sunt judicia ejus: et de legibus illius, in aeternum stantibus, non potest immutari magnum vel parvum aliquid. Nam sicut in cunctis rerum generibus quae videntur imminui vel deperire, in iis quae transeunt, in supervenientibus et succedentibus restaurantur, ut dispositio universitatis ordinem suum ratum immobilemque conservet; et permaneat semper primae dispositionis statutum [0243C] inviolabile, ut neque ultra transgrediatur vel infra remaneat operum Dei certa moderatio: sic et judicia ejus secundum certam providentiam currunt, ut his neque addi neque minui aliquid possit. Et si quando ipse aliter facere videtur, et aliter judicare, dispensatio occulta est qua non mutatur consilium, sed opus variatur et judicium exercetur. Nam et hoc ipsum judicium est: quod judicium differtur aliquando ut tempore suo restauretur, ut non pereat aliquid ex omnibus quae facta sunt, ut maneant semper. Semper enim hoc est, ut culpa poenam habeat, et justitia praemium consequatur. Sed est poena occulta, et poena manifesta. Similiter praemium occultum est, et praemium manifestum. Et saepe Deus malos tolerat, et differt poenam illorum [0243D] manifestam: et habet tamen omnis malitia poenam occultam. Et judicat Deus, et videtur differre judicium vel facta hominum omnino non attendere ab iis qui non vident nisi ea quae foris sunt. Similiter aliquando probat Deus justos, adversitatibus et tribulationibus exercet, et videtur justitia non habere praemium apud ipsum: et tamen nunquam caret retributione sua occulta: et manifesta aliquando differtur, ut interrogarentur de perseverantia sua conscientiae hominum. Et quia ea quae in manifesto sunt dissimiliter currunt, fluctuant eorda hominum, et mirantur ubi sit judicium veritatis; cum in hoc mundo innocentia premitur, et malitia prosperatur; propter hoc subjunxit, et ait:

## HOMILIA XVIII. *De perversis hominum moribus: et quid ex eis censuerit Ecclesiastes.*

[0244A]

*Vidi sub sole in loco judicii impietatem, et in loco justitiae iniquitatem. Et dixi in corde meo: Justum et impium judicabit Dominus, et tempus omnis rei tunc erit.* Quia vero mentibus humanis de judiciis Dei et de rerum omnium proventu contrario gravis aborta est disputatio, et subjiciendae nunc sunt rationes, quare corda hominum adversus ipsum moveantur, et in murmurationem consurgant, breviter superiora repetemus ut eorum quae dicenda sunt, ex ipsis sententiam quasi a principio dicamus. Superius demonstraverat Ecclesiastes nihil in hoc mundo perpetuo in eodem posse consistere; sed temporum [0244B] vices contrariis euntibus sine cessatione raptari: quae videlicet rerum mutabilitas licet a Creatore rerum omnium recte ordinetur, tamen cor humanum per impatientiam in murmurationem et blasphemiam adversus ipsum concutitur. Et ideo subjunxit post enumerata rerum tempora, et ait: *Vidi afflictionem quam dedit Deus filiis hominum, ut distendantur in ea. Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum tradidit disputationi eorum.* Haec est ergo afflictio hominum, disputatio eorum adversus Deum; quia in eo quod judiciis Dei humiliter subdi nolunt, et ejus dispositionem, quae bona est in rebus omnibus, cum quid contra voluntatem eorum pravam agitur, contumaciter reprehendunt, non solum eos exterius poena adversitatis, et tribulationis molestia [0244C] atterit, sed multo magis intus furor, et impatientia murmurationis affligit. Quam afflictionem Deus illis dedisse dicitur, non mentem illorum pravitate corrumpendo, sed judicia sua juste, ut probentur ipsi, quod mali sunt, ab eorum cognitione subtrahendo; ut, cum videre non valent qua justitia fiat quod circa eos agitur, amplius per impatientiae suae vitium a cognitione veritatis excaecentur. Idcirco dedit illis afflictionem, quando disputationem dedit celando judicia sua, ut non inveniat homo omne opus, quod operatur Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Nam praecedunt aliquando quaedam causae manifestae in hoc mundo judicia Dei, cum Deus facta hominum in praesenti vita subsequente retributione vel bona remunerat, vel punit mala. Et in his tantum valent [0244D] aliquatenus discerni judicia Dei, ut aliquid judicium habeat homo occultae veritatis, quatenus illa etiam quae penetrare non potest, veneretur.

Cum vero causae praecedentes occultae sunt, vel quae subsequuntur latent, oriuntur disputationes plurimae et contradictiones, et affligunt se mentes hominum pravae rixando, et murmurando contra Deum, cum penetrare non possint judicia ipsius, neque invenire opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Non enim penetrare possunt in tanta caligine, quo fine fiat aliquid, etsi quaedam in principio causae exstare videntur, sed occulta sunt omnia propter finem. Idcirco non invenit homo omne opus Dei ab initio usque ad finem; quoniam [0245A] et si quaedam videre videtur non penetrat totum, et fit dubium totum, quia non manifestatur totum; propterea ne rixetur homo in dubiis contra Deum, et murmuret in adversis constitutus, dono Dei conceduntur prospera multa, et placita plurima, ut licite utatur homo bonis justo labore acquisitis, et gaudeat, et laetetur, et mitiget conscientiam suam adversus Deum. Et bene sentiat de illo, et non disputet neque contendat adversus illum, quasi adversetur Deus qui bona largitus est. Hoc enim sibi vult quod subjungitur, dicens: *Et cognovi, quod non esset melius nisi laetari, et facere bona in vita sua.* Qui enim sibi benefacit in vita sua de his quae dono Dei concessa sunt hominibus ad fruendum ut laetetur et gaudeat in Deo suo, melius facit quam qui [0245B] disputat et contendit adversus Deum. *Omnis enim homo qui comedit, et bibit, et videt bonum de labore suo, hoc donum Dei est.* Idcirco hoc quia donum Dei est, et licite concessum a Deo, melius est quam disputare, et contendere, et murmurare: quod donum Dei non est, nec concessum hominibus a Deo; quia malum est et afflictio magna. Multum quippe affligitur qui neque amare vel approhare potest, quod sustinet; nec quod odit, immutare. Idcirco multum affligitur qui disputat, et rixatur contra Deum, blasphemans judicia ejus et opera ejus detestans, cum ea quae operatur Deus homo mullatenus possit immutare.

Propterea quod sequitur et dicit: *Didici, quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus perseverarent in aeternum.* [0245C] Sicut enim opera conditionis in generibus suis ordinem divinae institutionis non transeunt, ita quoque opera judiciorum ejus, quibus facta hominum et totum mundum disponit, sententiam praedestinationis et providentiae ejus in aeternum fixam non confundunt. *Neque enim addere illis quidquam possumus,* ut amplius sit quam provisum est; *neque auferre,* ut sint minus quae facta sunt, ut timeatur Deus. Propter hoc namque dispositio rerum visibilium in cursu transeuntium rerum et succedentium vicissitudine ordinem non confundit, ut sciat homo et intelligat providentiam esse aeternam, quae ab initio rata constantique praecepti sui examinatione quemadmodum proventus suos temporibus suis [0245D] consequerentur, cuncta disposuit. Ut illam quoque in factis suis discat metuere, cujus omnipotentiam cernit in cunctis suis operibus, et judiciis constantiam atque immutabilem permanere. Rata quippe dispositio operis et certa moderatio, qua cuncta temporibus suis ad effectum producit Deus, manifeste demonstrat, quod sicut sua sapientia in discernendo non fallitur, ita quoque consilium suum in judicando non mutatur. *Quod factum est ipsum permanet.* Sicut in hoc toto rerum conditarum corpore quod factum est permanet, quia dispositionis ordo non confunditur, etiamsi natura mutabilis varietur, ita etiam in judiciis ejus quod factum est permanet, quia in eo etiam quod secundum ineffabilem dispensationem, variationem temporum dissimiliter [0246A] ordinat, providentiae suae sententiam non immutat. Idcirco quod factum est, permanet, et in rerum universitate, quantum pertinet ad ordinem dispositionis, et in judicii ejus exhibitione, quantum ad sententiam praedestinationis spectat. Quae futura sunt jam fuerunt. In utroque etenim quae futura sunt, jam fuerunt; quia et in generibus rerum omnium quod fuerunt ea quae jam non sunt, hoc idem secundum naturae similitudinem et identitatem procursus in genere suo singula futura sunt, quae nondum sunt. Et in judiciis divinis quam veritatem in praeteritis servatam audivimus, eamdem in supervenientibus exhibendam exspectamus. Instaurat enim Deus ubique quod abiit; quia sicut rerum transeuntium defectum per succedentium in suis generibus [0246B] multiplicationem reparat, ita quotidie facta hominum judicando, antiquam judiciorum suorum, quae ab initio exercuit veritatem, licet intermissa ad templum videretur, integram se tenuisse demonstrat. Semper enim apud ipsum malitia poenam habet, et praemium virtus. Sed quia poenarum quaedam occulta est, quaedam manifesta: dum impios et peccatores Deus per patientiam tolerat, et eis statim poenam manifestam non irrogat, humana stultitia eum aut nescire aut non curare facta hominum, sive etiam, quod pejus est, pravitatem malignantium approbare putat. Inde ergo cor hominis adversus Deum concutitur, unde Deus ab hominibus amplius diligendus et laudandus demonstratur. Conqueritur homo, quod malus homo a Deo toleratur, [0246C] cum manifestum sit quod nullus homo fuisset bonus, si nullus aliquando fuisset toleratus malus. Et tamen scandalizantur infirmantium corda, dum vident in hoc mundo impios prosperari et premi innocentes; quia ad sola ea quae foris sunt in manifesto respiciunt, et illa quae vel intrinsecus latent occulta, vel in futuro manifesta exhibenda servantur, non attendunt. Quorum querela ex qua causa surgat, aperitur cum subditur:

*Vidi sub sole in loco judicii impietatem et in loco justitiae iniquitatem.* Vidit quippe, quod in hoc mundo Deus impios judices esse permittit, et potestatem obtinere ut dominentur et opprimant innocentes, et facta hominum iniqua, quae justa esse debuerunt, [0246D] et in his omnibus confusionem magnam esse sub sole. Quia enim Deus potestatem in hoc mundo perversis tribuit, propterea impietas est in loco judicii, et in loco justitiae iniquitas: ut ibi sit impietas ubi esse deberet judicium, et ibi iniquitas ubi justitia. Nam, quia praelati sunt impii, idcirco sunt iniqui subjecti, quia nisi illi per impietatem innocentiam opprimerent, isti per iniquitatem justitiam non impugnarent. Propterea namque inferiores ad iniquitatem perpetrandam audaces sunt, quia superiores ad tutandam innocentiam pii non sunt; quia si illi injuriam patientibus judicium facerent, isti ad inferendam injuriam tam prompti non fuissent. Sed in hoc quoque sub sole impietas est in loco judicii, et in loco justitiae iniquitas: quod omnis [0247A] homo mala proximi sui sine misericordia persequitur, sua vero mala unusquisque contra justitiam etiam quantum potest, defensare conatur. In causa quippe proximi sui impius est omnis judex, et in sua causa adversus proximum iniquus, quia cum mala proximi judicanda sunt, misericordiae non meminit; cum vero acta sua adversus proximum examinanda sunt, justitiam non custodit. Et in hunc modum perversa sunt judicia omnia sub sole, et nutant mentes hominum, et mirantur ubi sit judicium Dei qui haec sustinet.

## HOMILIA XVIII. *De perversis hominum moribus: et quid ex eis censuerit Ecclesiastes.* (cont.)

Adhuc possumus, et alio intellectu fortassis commodiore sub sole in loco judicii impietatem, et in loco justitiae iniquitatem considerare. Est quippe sub sole in loco judicii impietas, et iniquitas in loco justitiae, [0247B] quando in hoc mundo, et justus sustinet poenam iniqui, et iniquus capit praemium justi. Boni namque in hac vita tantum judicantur, ut pro suis excessibus hic flagella Dei suscipiant, et ad futurum praemium transeant purgatiores. Mali vero, quia ad futurum servantur judicium, saepe in hoc mundo non solum nulla adversa sustinent, sed desideria quoque sua implere permittuntur, ut cuncta illis ad jucunditatem et felicitatem vitae praesentis pro voto succedant. Et videntur dissimiliter currere retributiones ut boni mala, et mali bona accipiant, et impium esse judicium justorum, ut opprimantur innocentes, et poenam sustineant iniquorum, et ut praemium justorum tollant iniqui: et confusa omnia, et permista, quia Deus non statim exercet judicium ut [0247C] innocentes eripiat, et justos de oppressione impiorum, et eos puniat qui operantur iniqua. Inde gravis concussio nascitur animorum, et succenduntur zelo pusillanimes qui non vident, nisi quae foris sunt solum, et putant quasi Deus humana non curet, et fortunae commiserit universa, et nihil judicio fiat. Et, quod crudelius est, saepe in tantam itur perversitatem ut blasphemetur Deus, et dicatur quasi approbet iniquitatem, et impietas apud ipsum sit, nec cognoscat judicium verum. Et hoc totum ex eo oritur, quod sub sole impietas est in loco judicii, et in loco justitiae iniquitas, et quasi in vanitate quae sub sole est, confusa sint omnia, et dissimiliter cuncta proveniant. Et tamen, cum considerat homo opera [0247D] Dei, et videt qualiter rata constantique moderatione universa disponit, intelligit quod omnium inspector est Deus et moderator: et quod cassari non possunt judicia ejus, et quod facta hominum quae in hac vita non judicat, in posterum examinanda conservat. Si enim, quemadmodum ex operum ejus dispositione probatum est, justus judex est Deus, superest ut quod in praesenti in factis hominum judicandis non agitur, in futuro perficiendum sine dubitatione credatur. Propterea, ut proponeret querelam infirmorum in eo quod Deus in hujus vitae volubilitate, et transitu omnia quasi indiscussa relinquit, et facta hominum dissimili meritis retributione disponit, dixit: Vidi sub sole impietatem in loco judicii et in loco justitiae iniquitatem. Statim [0248A] vero, considerans quod justa judicia Dei cassari omnino non possent, intellexit differri tantum judicium, non auferri, et ait:

*Dixi in corde meo: Justum et impium judicabit Dominus, et tempus omnis rei sub coelo tunc erit.*

Tunc quando justum et impium judicabit Dominus, tempus erit omnis ei rei sub coelo: quia omne quod in vita agitur, sive bonum sive malum sit, tunc ad judicium perducetur. Et nunc quidem in hac vita justum et impium judicat Dominus, sed occultae sunt retributiones istae, et quae manifestae erunt differuntur in futurum. Et idcirco parvicordes murmurant, et queruntur, et putant non esse judicium justum; quia retributiones non vident. Tamen, et nunc judicium justum agitur: et unusquisque [0248B] secundum merita sua judicatur. Sed hoc totum intus est, quo carnis oculus non attingit. Et quae manifesta sunt, differuntur donec judicium illorum adveniat; et tunc omnia occulta, et manifesta erunt manifestata, et judicabuntur omnia secundum judicium justum. Et tunc justum et impium judicabit Dominus; et tempus omnis rei sub coelo tunc erit. Interim autem obscura sunt omnia, et permista currunt ad finem suum. Et una sorte involvuntur justi cum impiis, donec pariter currunt in via, ut, cum simul exierint, discernantur et ordinentur dispariter. Usque illuc enim nulla discretio est in omnibus quae foris apparent sub sole. Sed sicut simul oriuntur omnia, sic vivunt simul, et simul pertranseunt universa. Et hoc totum fit, ut probentur [0248C] corda hominum: an vivat in eis aliquid de cognitione veritatis, et affectu boni quod absconditum est, si forte ex illo argumentum fidei sumere incipiant se esse amplius, quam id quod videtur solum. Nam extra nihil est unde hoc possit agnosci, et tolluntur foris argumenta omnia ut operari incipiat, quod intus est, et probetur quantum sit. Nam, si cognoverit se ex eo homo magnum est, et pro merito constat quod Deum requirit per fidem, quem non videt per speciem. Recessit enim primum, et avertit se quando praesentem contemplabatur: et erat reatus magnus et culpa gravis lucem praesentem odisse; et constitutum est homini ad remedium placationis, si requisierit absentem et absconditum desideraverit; [0248D] et sciat esse quod non videtur, ut manifestum fiat tempore suo. Ideo nunc subtrahuntur omnia, et absconduntur quae invisibilia sunt, et relinquitur homo foris solus cum alienis, ut nihil videat de suo, ut probetur si forte recordatio in illo superest aliqua ad convertendum ad requisitionem illius. Propterea nunc iste altius considerans profunditatem judiciorum Dei, videt non esse mirum, si in hujus vitae nubilo inter justum et impium non discernitur, cum tanta sit involuta caligine nostra mortalitas, ut in ea homo etiam bestiis similis videatur. Propterea infert, et dicit:

*Dixi in corde meo, de filiis hominum ut probaret eos Deus, et ostenderet similes esse bestiis. Idcirco unus est interitus hominis, et jumentorum, et aeque [0249A] utriusque conditio.* Idcirco enim mortalis factus est homo, et ideo moriuntur filii hominum similiter ut jumenta ut probentur, et ostendantur similes esse bestiis. Duo quippe in homine facta erant, unum ad similitudinem Dei, alterum ad similitudinem jumenti. Et illud quidem quod creatum est ad similitudinem Dei, natura factum est immortale, sicut immortalis fuit Deus, ad cujus similitudinem factum est. Illud vero, quod ad similitudinem jumenti factum fuerat, corruptibile erat natura, sicut illa ad quorum similitudinem factum erat. De terra enim utraque sumpta sunt, et erat terra utriusque materia; et ipsa terra natura erat corruptibilis, sicut illa, quae facta sunt de terra. Ita ergo duo in homine facta sunt, unum terrenum, alterum coeleste; unum natura [0249B] corruptibile, alterum immortale; unum similitudo jumenti, alterum Dei. Et erat quidem corpus terrenum natura corruptibile, factum ad similitudinem jumenti; anima vero coelestis erat, natura immortalis, condita ad imaginem Dei. Et conjuncta sunt in homine corpus et anima, duo in unum: et datum est corpori beneficium societatis, ut participaret de immortalitate animae ad incorruptionem: et hoc totum ad gloriam animae factum est, quia placita erat Deo in justitia et veritate consistens, ut non attereretur vestimentum ejus si perseveraret obedientia illius. Et coopertum est gloria incorruptionis, quod erat similitudo jumenti in homine ut quasi dissimularetur; nec videret illud in confusionem dilectionis, sed in toto conspiceret illius formam, quod amabat, [0249C] et non elongaret alicubi. Postea avertit se anima in abalienationem amoris, et oblita est quod melius erat suum, et intuita est foris pulchritudinem alienam. Et intendit in fucum pallii sui, ut se oblectaret ibi; et coepit fornicari ad illecebras corporales, et subtracta est ab oculis ejus dilectio spiritualis. Et iratus est Deus, et non placuit ipsi aversio ista, et voluit hominem revocare intus ad id quod verum erat, ut semper non haereret super imagines fucatas intuitus fallacis. Et abstraxit gloriam indumenti ejus ut iret in corruptionem, et jussit animam reverti ne vegetaret illud, et portaret ad aeternitatem; et concidit vestimentum ejus ut ostenderet homini quod non esset in eo gloria ejus ubi se bestiis similem esse videret. Et cecidit homo, et dilapsum est [0249D] quod erat terrenum corruptibile, et fluere coepit ut rediret unde venerat. Factumque est ut probaretur homo, an meminisset boni sui, et si nosset requirere illud dum cogitur speciem vanam relinquere, et exire ab eo qui perverse inhaeserat.

*Propterea ut probaret Deus filios hominum, et ostenderet eos similes esse bestiis. Idcirco unus est interitus hominis et jumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio; sicut moritur homo, sic et illa moriuntur.* In morte ergo una est hominis et jumenti conditio; quia sicut homo moritur, ita etiam et illa moriuntur. Sed tamen conditio mortalitatis homini ex judicio est, jumento ex natura. Et quod similiter habent ex simili causa non habent; quia homo ut moriatur ex [0250A] culpa habuit, jumentum vero ex natura ut moriatur, accepit. Tamen probatur homo, et ostenditur similis esse bestiis; quia unus est interitus hominis et jumentorum, et similis utriusque conditio: et sic homo moritur sicut illa moriuntur.

*Et similiter spirant omnia.* Id est, et ille, et ipse similem habent vitam, et spiraculum simile vivificationis. Et in his omnibus:

*Nihil habet homo jumento amplius.* Quia communis utriusque est, et ortus, quoniam pariter de terra facta sunt; et procursus, quia simul:

*Omnia vanitati, et mutabilitati subjecta sunt.* Et transeunt universa, et consummatio finis eadem moriuntur similis, et revertuntur ad terram de qua primum sumpta fuerunt. Sic, et prius homini cum [0250B] jumentis una origo erat in corpore, quod sumptum est de terra, et una vivendi conditio cum jumentis, ut similiter corpus terrenum aleretur de terra; sed unus finis cum jumentis homini non erat, quia factus erat homo ut non moreretur, neque in terram reverteretur de qua factus est. Ita tunc per incorruptionem corporis humilis origo tegebatur, et dissimulatum erat per immortalitatem ne veniret in exprobrationem quod homo similis esset bestiis; neque ostendere voluit homini Deus unde esset ignobilitas ejus, ut eum in ipsius conditione totum exponeret. Sed vestivit eum pulchritudine immortalitatis, et posuit seorsum extra genus suum in sortem alteram. Cum vero peccasset homo Deo, privavit eum gloria sua, et remisit ad originem suam, ut per id, quo ibat, [0250C] agnosceret unde venerat. Propterea unus est interitus hominis et jumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio; quia sicut homo moritur, sic et illa moriuntur: et similiter spirant omnia, et in his omnibus nihil habet homo jumento amplius, sed cuncta pariter subjacent vanitati.

*Et pergunt omnia ad unum locum.* Id est ad terram matrem suam, et originis principium, quia:

## HOMILIA XVIII. *De perversis hominum moribus: et quid ex eis censuerit Ecclesiastes.* (cont.)

*De terra facta sunt, et in terram pariter revertuntur.* Et si quis dicere voluerit: quod habet homo amplius jumento in eo, quod spiritus filiorum Adam vadit sursum, ut occidente in mortem corpore, superstes in vita remaneat: et spiritus jumentorum descendat deorsum, id est, pariter cum morte corporis [0250D] defluat in corruptionem: quis novit hoc? Non tamen quia verum non est, sed quia occultum est: ideo:

*Quis novit hoc?* Non enim dixit falsum est hoc, sed quis novit hoc? Nemo hoc novit. Non enim sciri potest hoc ab homine, et tamen credi potest. Et verum est, quia creditur: et quod creditur, verum est, et ipsa credulitas non dubia scientia firma est; et tamen nemo hominum hoc scit qualiter sciuntur ea quae videntur, et audiuntur, et tanguntur, et caeteris sensibus percipiuntur; et qualiter sciuntur ea, de quibus naturaliter dubitari non potest, et quae incredulis etiam dubitantibus, indubitabili ratione demonstrantur. Sola enim fide hoc percipitur, et ideo dubitatio magna est fidem non habentibus super [0251A] hoc, quia illud nesciunt, nec demonstrari eis potest ab iis qui fide hoc capiunt, quia ipsi fidem non capiunt. Propterea putant ipsi hominem nihil prorsus jumento habere amplius, quia nesciunt quod spiritus filiorum Adam vadit sursum, et spiritus jumentorum deorsum. Et cum dicitur eis: quod homo jumento amplius habet, quia spiritus hominis sursum vadit ad vitam, et spiritus jumentorum ad mortem deorsum, dicunt: Quis novit hoc? Non enim putant sciri aliquid posse, nisi oculo carnis videatur, et contingatur sensu, et ideo scientiam fidei non recipiunt, qua sola homo ad id revocatur in quo jumento habet amplius. Et quia videre non possunt illud, nec contingere in manifesto ut comprehendant quid hoc est, quod habet homo jumento amplius: [0251B] desperant omnino de vita perpetua, et increduli fiunt iis quae dicuntur, et se in delectationes vitae praesentis tota intentione projiciunt, quasi haec sit portio illorum sola, et nihil amplius sint accepturi postea. Nesciunt enim, quod ideo absconditum est, ut credatur quod habet homo jumento amplius, et probetur homo ipse ignorantia sua in fide a Deo. Si enim videretur non crederetur, sed sciretur; nec esset meritum, nec probaretur homo, nec convincerentur iniqui, nec boni exercerentur. Propterea absconditum est ut non videatur, quod habet homo jumento amplius, ut fides meritum habeat, et infidelitas locum. Et sunt multi infideles, et dicunt: Quis novit hoc? Et probant certa pro incertis non esse relinquenda; et incipiunt praesentia amplecti, [0251C] et ea quae videntur rapere, ut teneant quae certa sunt; et ludificantur in incerto quia transeunt, et elabuntur dum teneri putantur; et succedunt quae certa sunt, quae putabantur incerta. Haec omnia demonstrat iste, et format narrationem suam huc et illuc, ut sequatur mentes hominum, quoniam in hunc modum ipsae nutant, et fluctuant in incerto vitae caliginosae. Dixit enim dubitationem hominum de vita sua, quia ignorant an habeat homo jumento amplius, et non inveniunt quis noverit, si post mortem corporis spiritus hominis superstes in vita remaneat; nunc ipsorum vocem in approbationem praesentium delectationum pro hac ipsa sua dubitatione, ac desperatione vitae futurae assumit, dicens:

*Deprehendi: nihil esse melius quam laetari hominem [0251D] in opere suo: et hanc esse partem illius.* Qui enim futuram vitam esse non credunt, ii partem hominis hanc solam esse putant, ut laetetur in opere suo et in hac vita labore suo perfruatur; quoniam qui mercedem post opus consummatum subsecuturam non existimant, ii operis emolumentum non post opus, sed in opere capiendum arbitrantur, atque illum felicem solum esse qui sui laboris fructum in praesenti ad usum praeparat, non eum qui sui operis mercedem in posterum capiendam reservat.

*Quis enim cum adducet, ut post se futura cognoscat?* Ex quo ab hac vita semel egressus fuerit homo, non adducitur amplius, nec revocatur ultra in hanc vitam ut experiatur, et sentiat rursum quae [0252A] aguntur in hoc saeculo ut possit denuo delectationibus ejus perfrui, et percipere jucunditatem illius quae futura est post eum. Ideo quandiu vivit, capiat quantum potest, et utatur hoc mundo antequam abeat, et educatur ex illo; quia non revertetur amplius, nec reducetur ut post se futura cognoscat. Et fieri potest ut iis, quibus ipse uti noluit, alius post ipsum abutatur, et gaudeat, et exsultet in bonis ejus alienus, et non possint amplius ad usum ipsius reduci, cum semel ablatus fuerit. Propter hoc et hujuscemodi putant homines hanc esse partem suam, ut fruantur voluptate mundi dum vivunt; et ob hoc solum factos se existimant, nec futuros post haec aliquid, cum finem acceperit vita ista. Et multiplicant rationes, et argumenta, et quae sibi sunt rationes coacervant [0252B] alias post alias, ut seipsos decipiant et confirmentur corda eorum in malum, et credant quod falsum est. Et aedificant mendaciis murum inter se et veritatem, ut non videant eam; et proponunt cuncta, et exquirunt diligenter omnia, quibus possint verisimiliter demonstrare quod vita alia non est, et haec sola bona est: et propter hanc vitam tantum factus est homo, et alia post ipsam non erit. Et haec tota concussio de caligine judiciorum Dei consurgit; quia in dubio hominem posuit ut probaret eum, nec videret quod habet homo jumento amplius. Et tamen ipse errorem istum rursum aliis judiciis prosequitur, et ostendit bonam non esse vitam istam in qua mala plurima regnant; nec potest vera delectatio vel requies tranquilla inveniri. Et ideo superseminat [0252C] adversa, et convertitur retrorsum ad se, et elongat, ut oppressos non liberet, ut valde affligantur, et dolore, ac tristitia, mala dulcedo, et delectatio iniqua tergatur. Et idcirco qui volunt in vita ista jucundari, et pactum faciunt amoris cum saeculo, et inique proponunt non requirere veritatem, coguntur veris judiciis videre mala, quae sub sole sunt, ut non placeant sibi nimis in aversione sua. Propterea iste cum dixisset bonum esse hominis laetari in opere suo, et hanc esse partem illius, et definitionem dedisset ad requiescendum in istis, movetur alia consideratione, quod non, sic vita ista est, ut requies in ea esse possit. Propterea adjungit, et dicit:

[0252D] *Verti me ad alia [n: (Eccles. IV)]*. Ad alia quippe recte conversus dicitur, quia iis quae nunc visurus est, aliud ab eo quod prius existimaverat, credere admonetur. Haec enim omnia, quae videbuntur tunc, alibi doceat esse verum bonum hominis, quam in hac vita, quae tantis miseriis et doloribus subjecta est, in qua innocentia premitur, et dolor consolationem non meretur: hoc itaque aliud, et longe aliud ab eo, quod prius videbatur et putabatur, iste considerabat, et ait:

## HOMILIA XIX. *De innocentium oppressione, et derelictione: et vario ac stulto impiorum de hac vita judicio.*

*Verti me ad alia. et vidi calumnias (Eccles, IV)*, *quae sub sole geruntur, et lacrymas innocentium, et [0253A] consolatorem neminem; nec posse resistere illorum violentiae, cunctorum auxilio destitutos.* Ergo non putes hic patriam esse. Sed considera et agnosce te sub sole esse, ubi volvuntur omnia et confusa sunt universa, quoniam ideo hoc factum est ut agnoscas exsilium tuum, et patriam requiras aliam. Idcirco calumniae fiunt hic et oppressiones injustae, ut impetant alii alios sine causa et opprimant sine misericordia infirmos fortiores, et non fert consolationem hic innocentibus Deus, quia illis alibi reservat consolationes suas, et nunc interim cunctorum auxilio destitutos relinquit, ne in alieno auxilio consolentur, quod suum non habent, et minus gemant, et suspirent, et desiderent ejus consolationem, quam nondum habent. Sed perversorum animus in utraque [0253B] parte correctionis impatiens, nec prosperis excitatur, nec castigatur adversis. Cum enim dulcia vitae hujus respiciunt, haerent animo in illis, et dicunt: Satis est hoc, et non est aliud bonum hominis praeter istud futurum postea. Cum vero adversa attendunt, hebetantur, et corruunt animo, et corruunt diffidentia, et desperant semetipsos, quia spem aliam non habent. Et optant magis non esse, quam mala esse; quia malum est, quod sunt, et non noverunt bonum esse, quod optare possint, ut se transferant ad illud; quoniam in tempore voluptatis suae discere illud noluerunt, ut in tempore malo requiescerent in illo. Et ideo faciunt, quod solum noverunt: cum male sunt, nihil esse volunt, quia non noverunt viam aliam, qua effugiant malum esse, nisi transeant [0253C] ad non esse. Propterea visis malis, quae sub sole sunt, continuo voce illorum subinfertur cum dicitur.

*Et laudavi magis mortuos quam viventes; et feliciorem utroque judicavi, qui necdum natus est; nec vidit mala, quae sub sole fiunt.* Ista quippe vox illorum est, qui verum bonum non noverunt, nec aliud putant homini ad bonum vel ad malum esse, nisi quod praesens est totum. Idcirco in bonis supra modum exsultant, in malis desperant; et ubi spes illorum est, illic desperatio constat. Propter hoc visis malis mundi hujus dicunt, feliciores mortuos quam viventes, et utrisque necdum natos feliciores. Quia enim hoc solum existimant esse, quod videtur, [0253D] visa miseria, quae in illo est, jam in esse alio felicitatem non requirent, quia esse aliud praeter hoc, non noverunt; sed in solo non esse eam constituunt; quoniam in hoc toto quod solum esse putant infelicitatem invenerunt. Idcirco magis laudant eos qui fuerunt, et non sunt quam eos qui adhuc sunt, et utrisque beatiores praedicant illos qui necdum sunt. Si enim, ut videtur ipsis, malum est totum esse, bonum est non esse, et melius non fuisse. Nam si malum est malum esse, bonum est malum non esse, et melius non fuisse. Quod enim longius a malo est in bono, ipsum majus est bonum. Sicut quod longius a bono est in malo, ipsum majus est malum. Si ergo malum est esse, bonum utique et non esse, et multo melius utroque, nunquam fuisse. Ejusmodi itaque [0254A] perversitates pariunt de se mentes hominum sub sole, ut hoc etiam ad confusionem omnium accedat, quod homo ipse caligat ad vivendum se. Si enim videret homo quid homo sit et quare factus sit homo, recognosceret utique bonum suum, et jam non magis felices diceret, qui nihil sunt, quam eos qui sunt aliquid. Desiderio namque tanti boni astrictus animus, licet malis temporalibus afflictus vitam praesentem fastidiret, spe tamen consolationis venturae omnino esse magis quam non esse, diligeret. Sed nunc perversitas magna excrescit in mentibus hominum ignorantium bonum suum, et vanitas in consummatione, qua major esse non potest. Homo enim vanitate mutabilitatis suae a vera essentia defluens, sine cessatione omni tempore, id [0254B] quod est, esse desinit; et transit in id semper quod non est, et ita quodammodo assuefactus malo suo tandem ad hoc perversitatis semetipsum praecipitat, ut jam omnino nihil esse concupiscat. Sed hanc insaniam multi quasi in manifesto propositam, et quae abscondi non possit, evitare cupientes, convertuntur, ut esse suum custodiant, et adhibent sollicitudinem et industriam magnam laborum suorum, ut securam faciant vitam suam a malis, quae sunt sub sole; et congregans opes, et multiplicans divitias, et caetera omnia quae solatio vitae esse possint, multa providentia et sollicitudine exquirunt. Et faciunt multa, et operantur memoria digna plurima; et nonnunquam industria sua et labore [0254C] violentiam alienam effugiunt, sed invidiam alienam evadere non possunt. Quapropter de iis quoque post impatientiam desperantium sententiam subdit, dicens:

*Rursus contemplatus sum omnes labores hominum, et industrias animadverti patere invidiae proximi.* Cum enim labores hominum consideraret, vidit quod industriae bonorum, proximorum invidiae patuit; quoniam perversi quoque sicut per pigritiam ligantur, ut in semetipsis opera virtutum non exerceant, sic per invidiam stimulantur ut ea in proximis carpant

*Et in hoc ergo vanitas, et cura superflua est.* Vel hoc vanitas est, quod homo bonis operibus alterius invidendo curam animo suo, et angorem malitiae [0254D] inducit, cum invidendo non illi cui invidet noceat, sed sibi, vel etiam hoc vanitas est, quod homo pro his temporalibus bonis laborat nimis, et sollicitus est, et cura superflua se affligit cum eorum acquisitio citius proximum ad invidiam excitet, quam protrahat ad dilectionem. Cum enim bona sit industria qua homo exercetur, mala est cura superflua et sollicitudo qua affligitur. Simul, et fiducia vana, et spes, qua in multitudine divitiarum vera securitas exspectatur; cum earum acquisitio potius securitatem auferat, quando proximos, qui in paupertate forsitan amare nos potuissent, pro sua aemulatione ad invidendum nobis inflammat. Jure igitur industria approbatur, et sollicitudo vana arguitur. Sed venit rursus aliud genus hominum de [0255A] grege vanitatis quaerentium occasionem torpori suo. Et reprehendunt isti operantes, et quasi sollicitos arguere videntur, ut ipsi sint dissoluti. Sic enim vanitas currit, ut nunquam medium limitem virtutis inveniat.

*Et ideo stultus complicat manus suas, et comedit carnes suas, dicens: Melior est pugillus, cum requie, quam plena utraque manus cum labore, et afflictione animi.* Complicat stultus manus suas. Stultus enim est qui sibi nescit providere in posterum. Stultus est qui putat manus otio complicatas impleri divitiis. Complicat manus suas: alteram ad alteram plicat, ne extendantur ad operationem. Complicat manus suas, quasi pactum faciens cum otiositate. Et comedit carnes suas. Putat se corpori suo parcere, [0255B] quia illud laboribus non affligit, sed inde caro ejus egestate consumitur, unde otio nutritur. Comedit carnes suas. Pascit enim cum stultitia sua, et otiocitas sua impinguat eum. Sed tamen caro ejus quantum in utili vacatione pascitur, tantum subsequenti inedia maceratur. Ideo comedit carnes suas, dicens: Melior est pugillus cum requie, quam plena utraque manus cum labore, et afflictione animi. Verum est quod melior est pugillus si deficere nesciret, et cunctis benedictio viduae Sareptanae data esset [n: (III Reg. XVII)]. Sed non ad omnes Elias missus est. Quare ergo stulte dicis meliorem pugillum cum requie, quam plenam utramque manum cum labore? Forsitan consideras quando pugillum habes, et requiem habes; sed non attendis quando nec ipsum [0255C] pugillum habebis, quid tunc facturus sis, et quam requiem tunc sis habiturus. Ideo nunc comedis pugillum in requie et placet tibi otiositas tua; neque curas nunc interim alium pugillum quaerere cum labore, quem comedas, cum iste defecerit. Ideo comedis carnes tuas nunc, quia ipsae vapulabunt post otium hoc importunum, et sui maceratione post modum exsolvent, quod requies inconsulta expenderit. Et forte putes quod nunc omnia genera vanitatum [0256A] dicta sunt, et non est aliud genus vanitatis quod inveniat speculator sub sole. Ideo sequitur:

*Considerans reperi aliam vanitatem sub sole. Unus est, et secundum non habet, non filium, non fratrem, et tamen laborare non cessat; nec satiantur oculi ejus divitiis, nec recogitat, dicens: Cui laboro, et cur fraudo animam meam bonis?* Qui enim unus est, et solus alium successorem non habet, nec filium quem genuit, nec fratrem cum quo genitus est ipse: nam patris successor ipse est. Qui ergo secundum non habet, quem relinquat post se successorem in bonis suis: et tamen congregare non cessat, nec perfruitur iis quae possidet; sed servat avare quae cupide congregavit: quid hoc vanius esse potest? Qui enim laborat et fruitur labore suo, [0256B] aliquem fructum capit; et qui laborat, nec utitur iis quae labore suo acquirit, et tamen iis quos diligit possidenda ea relinquit, aliquod emolumentum capit laboris sui, desiderium et votum dilectionis suae. Qui vero laborat, et, nec sibi, nec alii, quem diligit, laborat: quare laborat, nisi soli vitio suo cui servit? hic enim soli vitio servit, et non est alius affectus, qui excuset sollicitudinem vanam, cui ignosci possit, nisi solus ille quem vitium genuit. Multi sunt labores hominum, qui alienis relinquuntur, et non capiunt fructum ex eis, qui faciunt illos. Et multi quoque in sapientia laborant, et dant operam, et student multa scire, et dicere plurima, et scripto sensa sua commendant, ut ad posteros transmittantur; nec capiunt fructum ex [0256C] his omnibus, ut melius sit ipsis, sed inanes remanent a veritate et a dulcedine sapientiae vacui. Et vanitas est omnis labor eorum, etiamsi veritati approximare videatur. Nesciunt enim homines hujusmodi, cui laborent, et fraudent animam suam bonis; quia, cum ad solam operis magnitudinem intendant, fructum ex eo non capientes, et sibi ex illo nullam utilitatem provenire conspiciunt, et utrum haec ipsa aliis post se profutura sint, ignorant.

english:
## OF WHICH THESE ARE THE ARGUMENTS:

- *In hom. XIX on Ecclesiastes, on the varied exposition of Holy Scripture, and on Solomon's intention. Preface.*
- *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this book, on the explanation of the vanities. Homily I.*
- *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, and through the forgetting of those things which have been. Hom. II.*
- *How Ecclesiastes proves by his own works that all the works of men are vain, with an epilogue upon the foregoing. Hom. III.*
- *On the threefold vanity of things, and on the worst occupation of men. Hom. IV.*
- *On the letter of the words of Ecclesiastes, by the literal and the moral exposition. Homil. V.*
- *What it is to be distended in the worst occupation. Hom. VI.*
- *That the perverse are corrected with difficulty,* etc. *Hom. VII.*
- *That man flees away from the truth: as Adam fled in paradise, and hid himself. Hom. VIII.*
- *On the various vain endeavors of Ecclesiastes. Hom. IX.*
- *On the remaining matters as far as that place: « The fool walketh in darkness. » Hom. X.*
- *How wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily,* etc. *Hom. XI.*
- *On that passage according to another translation, « The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth, » where our copy has: « The fool walketh in darkness, » and on the rest of the second chapter. Hom. XII.*
- *How all things have their own time. Hom. XIII.*
- *A setting forth of the remaining things which have their own time, and a repetition of the things said. Hom. XIV.*
- *On time and on the things subject to time, according to another interpretation. Hom. XV.*
- *On the spiritual understanding of those things which have been said concerning time. Hom. XVI.*
- *On the confusion of minds arising from the passage of the times. Hom. XVII.*
- *On the perverse manners of men, and what Ecclesiastes judged from them. Hom. XVIII.*
- *On the oppression and abandonment of the innocent, and on the vain and foolish judgment of the impious concerning this life. Hom. XIX.*

## PREFACE. *On the varied exposition of Holy Scripture, and on Solomon's intention.*

[0113C]

What I lately discoursed before you concerning the book of Solomon which is called Ecclesiastes, [0114C] I have now marked down with the pen, briefly running over it (because certain things there seemed worthy of remembrance). All Scripture expounded according to its own proper interpretation both shines out more clearly, [0115A] and opens to its readers an easier approach to the understanding of itself. Many, not understanding the power of the Scriptures, becloud their comeliness and beauty with foreign expositions; and when they ought to have unlocked hidden things, they darken even the manifest ones. But to me they seem to lie under a like fault, both those who obstinately deny that the mystical understanding and the profundity of the allegories is to be sought in Holy Scripture where it is, and those who superstitiously contend that it is to be applied where it is not. Wherefore in this work I judge that I must not labor much over tropologies, or over mystical senses of allegories to be searched out through the whole sequence of his narrative at least: especially since the author himself here aims not so much at movements to be instructed, or at mysteries to be recounted, as at stirring the human heart [0115B] to contempt of worldly things by the manifest truth of his reasonings and by evident exhortation. Nor yet do I deny this, that many uncertain mystical things belong to this narrative, which require their own proper explanation . especially in what follows, since always, in the advance of the narrative, he touches more and more upon spiritual things according to the increase of contemplation, and is lifted up from things visible. But it is one thing to attend to that by which the whole intention of the writer and the whole sequence of the narrative is led; and another to hold that certain things said mystically by accident, and to be understood spiritually, are not to be passed over negligently. Now therefore we undertake to explain the surface of the narrative, which is strong with so great a loveliness of speech and of sentiments, so that the things which you now read written (this poor little lucubration, whatever it be, [0115C] affording a way to the understanding) you may henceforth rejoice not only to have written for you, but understood by you.

## HOMILY THE FIRST. *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this work, on the explanation of the vanities.*

*[n: (ECCLE. I.)] The words of Ecclesiastes, the son of David, king of Jerusalem.* This is the title of the book: in which both the quality of the work that follows is briefly expressed, and equally the person of the author is commended. For in that it is said, *words*, a manifold disputation is signified, and one drawn out into diverse sentiments. For because in this book the manners, the pursuits, and the works of many are described, [0115D] therefore it is necessary that the speaker take up the voices of many, and express in his own discourse the opinions of many, so that he may be able to present in his own person the persons of many (though he himself who speaks be but one). For near the end of the book he testifies that he has spoken to many, and that many were in himself, saying: Let us all alike hear the end of speaking. *Fear God, and keep his commandments: this is every man.* This also is why he willed to be named Ecclesiastes in this work; because, namely, his discourse here is directed not to some one man in particular, but to the whole Church, that is, to the assembly, or the multitude of the people, and his oration in this book serves at once for the expressing and the forming of the manners of many. By three [0116A] words indeed we read that Solomon was called: Idida, which is interpreted *beloved*; and Coeleth, which in Greek is called *Ecclesiastes*, in Latin *concionator*, an assembly-speaker; and Solomon, which sounds *peaceable*. Further, he may be called Ecclesiastes, or assembly-speaker, who instructs the Church or the assembly, that is, the multitude of the people, as he himself is plainly shown to have done in this book. And that Solomon was beloved by the Lord, and enjoyed great peace in his kingdom until the last times of his life, when he transgressed the covenant and the law of the Lord, the history plainly discloses the kingdom. And so, according to the three names, he composed three volumes. The first, whose title is Parables, or the Proverbs of Solomon. The second, which we now have in hand, which is called Ecclesiastes. The third, which is called [0116B] the Song of songs. In the first, as out of a father's affection, he addresses his beloved son, and by frequent admonition exhorts him to turn aside from vices and to pursue the virtues. In the second, he admonishes a man grown and of ripe age not to think anything among the things of the world to be perpetual. But at the last, when he is now perfected and, having trodden the world underfoot, is unencumbered, in the Song of songs he joins him to the embraces of the Bridegroom. Not far indeed from this kind of treatment even the philosophers of the Gentiles were accustomed to form their hearers, setting before those to be instructed first ethics, then physics, and last of all theology.

These things having been set down first for the opening up of the understanding of what is to be said, let us now come to the very sequence of the book. Solomon's matter in this work is all things subject [0116C] to vanity, that is, things falling and transitory. His intention is to persuade contempt of the world. His manner of treatment is such. He shows, according to a threefold vanity, that all things are subject to vanity, that is, are falling and transitory — namely both the things which were made for the sake of men, and the things which were made by men, and the things which were made in men. In those things which were made for the sake of men, the vanity is of mutability. In those which were made by men, the vanity is of curiosity. In those which were made in men, the vanity is of mortality, and all is vanity. And of these indeed we shall discourse more amply hereafter, if we first treat of the things that must be said concerning the very kind of contemplation. In which the mind of the beholder, lifted up, was able either to see or to recount such new and such wondrous things concerning [0116D] the condition of man's estate. For let us see what he says:

*Vanity of vanities, said Ecclesiastes,* etc. But where do you suppose the mind of this man was when he said these things? He was a man, but he was above man. For unless he had gone beyond man, he would not have seen that every man is a liar. Therefore concerning the consideration of this man a consideration must first be had by us, and the kinds of spiritual beholding must be distinguished. There are three visions of the rational soul: cogitation, meditation, contemplation. Cogitation is when the mind is touched in passing by the notion of things, when the thing itself is suddenly presented to the soul by its own image, either entering through sense or rising up from memory. Meditation is the assiduous and shrewd turning over of cogitation, striving either to unfold [0117A] something involved, or, searching, to penetrate something hidden. Contemplation is the clear-sighted and free gaze of the soul, poured out on every side upon the things to be beheld. Between meditation and contemplation this difference appears to lie. That meditation is always about things hidden from our understanding. But contemplation is about things manifest, either according to their own nature or according to our capacity. And that meditation is always occupied about the probing of some one thing; contemplation is poured out to the grasping of many things, or even of all. Meditation therefore is a certain curious force of the mind, and a shrewd one, striving to investigate obscure things and to unravel perplexed ones. Contemplation is that liveliness of understanding which, having all things in the open, grasps them by a manifest vision. And thus [0117B] in a certain manner what meditation seeks, contemplation possesses. But of contemplation there are two kinds: one which is both prior and belongs to beginners, in the consideration of creatures; the other which is later, and belongs to the perfect, in the contemplation of the Creator. In the Proverbs, Solomon went forward as though by meditating. In Ecclesiastes he ascended to the first step of contemplation. In the Song of songs he carried himself over to the highest. In meditation there is as it were a certain wrestling of ignorance with knowledge, and the light of truth in a certain manner flashes out in the midst of the darkness of error, just as fire in green wood at first indeed takes hold with difficulty; but when it has been roused by a more vehement blast, and has begun to blaze more sharply into the material set under it, then we see certain great globes of smoky gloom [0117C] rise up, and wrap round that flame, still of a slight sparkling, shining through but rarely, until at length, the burning gradually increasing, when all the vapor is drawn off and the gloom scattered, a serene splendor appears. Then the victorious flame, running through the whole heap of the crackling pyre, freely lords it, and flying about the material set under it, and grazing it with a soft touch, by licking burns it up and penetrates it; nor does it rest before, by penetrating, it has stolen into the inmost parts and drawn wholly into itself, in a certain manner, whatever it found outside itself. But after that which is to be burned up has, by the burning, been consumed and has passed over wholly, as it were out of its own nature, into the likeness and the property of fire, then all the crash falls away, and the noise [0117D] is lulled, and those darts of flame are lifted and taken out of the midst, and that savage and devouring fire, all things being subjected to it and incorporated with it by a certain friendly likeness, composes itself in deep peace and silence; because now it finds nothing either diverse beside itself, or adverse against itself. First therefore fire was seen with flame and smoke, then fire with flame or smoke, last of all pure fire without flame and smoke. Just so, without doubt, the carnal heart, like green wood not yet dried out from the moisture of carnal concupiscence, if at any time it has conceived some spark of divine fear or love, first indeed, while depraved desires struggle against it, a smoke of passions and disturbances arises; then, when the mind has been strengthened, and it has begun with the flame of love to burn more strongly and to shine more brightly, [0118A] presently all the gloom of the disturbances vanishes: and now with a pure mind the soul pours itself out to the contemplation of truth. But last of all, after the heart has been penetrated by assiduous contemplation of the truth, and has entered to the very fountain of the highest truth, to the marrow, with the whole affection of the soul, then, being as it were wholly set on fire into that very sweetness and turned into the fire of love, it rests most at peace from all noise and disturbance. First therefore, because among the perils of temptations counsel is sought, it is as though in meditation there were smoke with flame. Secondly, because with a pure mind the heart is poured out to the contemplation of truth, it is as though at the beginning of contemplation there were flame without smoke. Thirdly, because now, truth having been found and charity perfected, nothing further is sought beyond that [0118B] which alone is; in the fire of love alone, in the highest tranquillity and felicity, he is sweetly beaten back. Then, when the whole heart is turned into the fire of love, God is truly felt to be all in all, since he is received with so inward a love that, besides him, nothing even of itself is left to the heart. That we may therefore distinguish these three by their proper words: the first is meditation; the second, speculation; the third, contemplation. In meditation, the disturbance of carnal passions, rising up importunately, beclouds the mind kindled with pious devotion. In speculation, the newness of an unwonted vision lifts it up into wonder. In contemplation, the taste of a wondrous sweetness changes the whole into joy and delight. Therefore in meditation there is solicitude; in speculation, wonder; in contemplation, sweetness. [0118C] Yet even spiritual speculation itself is wont to refresh the soul with great delight, when after the wrestling of temptations and the gloom of error it suddenly settles it in unhoped-for peace, and floods it with an unwonted brightness. Into this, therefore, this man, caught up in mind above all things falling and transitory, saw that there is nothing of all things that abides, and, terrified as it were by the stupor of this new and unwonted vision, cried out: Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. For he was gazing upon the whole universe, and upon it wholly subject to vanity, and called its vanity the vanity of all vanities, that is, the vanity containing in itself every vanity, as it were the genus of all genera (in that it contains in itself all the genera of things). For all is vanity, and out of all things [0118D] is the universe, and the universe is vanity. But now, since we have already said, as much as seemed fitting for the present, concerning that very kind of contemplation by which this human mind was able to look through into these things concerning man, or concerning human affairs, we shall return to our proposed subject, and shall next distinguish the kinds of all the vanities which, illumined by that same contemplation, he detected to be present in things that fall; because in that we strive first to explain lucidly the very matter of the whole work, we also open its text more manifestly to those who read it. For his whole narrative is woven out of the vanity of temporal things.

## HOMILY THE FIRST. *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this work, on the explanation of the vanities.* (cont.)

There are therefore three kinds of vanities, which this book especially pursues, in which it embraces every vanity: and it testifies that all things which are done under the sun [0119A] lie subject to these. The first is the vanity of mutability, which is present in all falling things by their condition. The second is the vanity of curiosity, or of cupidity, which is present in the minds of men through the disordered love of passing and vain things. The third is the vanity of mortality, which is present in human bodies through penalty. The first vanity therefore is natural, and fit or congruous. The second vanity is culpable, because it is perverse. The third vanity is penal and wretched. And we call the natural vanity, that is, mutability, fit for this reason: because out of the ordered alternation of passing things the greater beauty of the universe stands firm, and its instability is dispensed to the greater advantage; because in it both weariness is taken away from human minds by the variety of things, and the comeliness [0119B] of the universe, as has been said, is increased. For corporeal nature, whose beauty is perfected according to diverse species and forms, is adorned with an ampler comeliness out of its very mutability, while through the intervals of times, and the alteration of things passing away in time and things succeeding in time, it takes what it could not take all at once; because its species come on by succession, which could not be present in it all together. Further, that vanity which rules over depraved minds stands forth so much the more deformed than the rest, inasmuch as mutability was alien to spiritual substance not only through grace but even through nature. Therefore this alone is reproved among all the rest, and before all the rest this alone is shown to be iniquitous and perverse. But the penal vanity, which is in human bodies through mortality, is for this reason [0119C] called wretched, because man now has it from the penalty of sin, that he lies subject to the condition of things temporally passing away — he who before, in his own creation, had received to stand above the condition of all visible things. For the condition of passing things is that all things which have risen should set, and things increased should grow old. But the nature of man, taken indeed out of corruptible matter, yet through grace raised above corruption and confirmed against corruption, had received this as a gift: that it should indeed have a rising with the rest, but should not have a setting; and that among things to be born, but not to die, it should receive increase by the growths of age, and should not suffer defect. This dignity man lost through the sin of transgression, when, stripped of the robe of immortality, and fallen back to the condition of his own origin, [0119D] he heard from the sentence of the Creator: *Earth thou art, and unto earth thou shalt go [n: (Gen. III)]*. To this vanity therefore (which was born to lie subject to the rest) to man alone is it reckoned for a penalty; because man alone had received to stand above it through grace. Since therefore we have distinguished three vanities: the first indeed, that is, the vanity of mutability, is the cause of sin; the second, that is, the vanity of cupidity, is sin; but the third, that is, the vanity of mortality, is the penalty of sin. Therefore the vanity of cupidity is reproved in the vanity of mutability. In the vanity of mortality it is punished. For as the Psalmist says: *Man when he was in honour did not understand; but was compared to senseless beasts, and was made like unto them [n: (Psal. XLVIII)]*. For unless he had first, through disordered [0120A] concupiscence of the flesh, inclined himself to the things that belong to beasts, he would in no wise have been made like to beasts through the mortality of the flesh. But now, because through the desire of his mind he began to lean upon mutable things, he too could not be stable in that which he had been. We can still distinguish these vanities by another division, so that the same thing, the more manifoldly it is set forth, may so much the more evidently be known. One vanity is in created things. Another in human works, another in bodies, another in minds. The first is of mutability; the second of curiosity; the third of mortality; the fourth of iniquity. The vanity of mutability is considered in things in two ways: either because they are empty, or because they are transitory. In the one they are vain, because they show what they do not have; in the other they are vain, because they do not remain [0120B] in what they have. There they are vain, because they have form alone, and do not have essence. Here they are vain, because although they have some essence, yet they have no substance. There they are vain, because without truth they set an appearance before us. Here they are vain, because they hold out a standing and pass away. So are all things falling and transitory, false and deceiving: they who love vain things, and trust in vanity, and for that reason are made not only vain, but vanity itself out of vanity, fail away.

The vanity of cupidity consists in three things: namely in the concupiscence of the eyes, in the concupiscence of the flesh, and in the pride of life. For in all these there is vanity. For all things which pertain to the flesh, whether they seem good or evil, are neither true evils nor true goods; nor can they always be, whether they be good or evil, [0120C] that which they are. Therefore it is as vain to place hope in those things which seem good as to dread those which are thought evil. For what does the concupiscence of the eyes do? See what it does, and you will find how great a vanity lies hidden, cloaked under this veil. It catches at the deceitful paints of things and at slippery sights. Forgetful of itself, it is poured out abroad, and giving itself wholly to curiosity it goes round all things, ranges over the universe, in case anything new, anything unwonted, anything wondrous should occur — what this or that may mean, what appearance each single thing may have, or what signification they hold out. To all the motions of things it is always changeable, always headlong, rash, forward, unstable, wanton, impatient and slippery; often exulting in vain hope, often trembling with empty fear, having no [0120D] root within, but always suspicious, hanging upon the outward motions of things. Before peril it wavers, before danger it trembles; everything which can befall on either side, whether good or evil, fearing and desiring both, it turns aside from vainly, by suspicion alone. It burns after the manner of one impatient, awaiting to see what is to come; at things present it is dissolved, at things that stand firm it is dulled, and at every vicissitude of things, whether they be sad or glad, it is varied by an inconstant fluctuation of the mind. But consider how vain this is. Assuredly every creature is such to a man as he himself is to it, so that by those things which are without, neither can a good mind be harmed, nor an evil one helped. Therefore all these things can be neither for evil to a good man, nor for good to an evil one, [0121A] except so far as the soul itself either profits by spurning them, or fails by loving them perversely, or by fearing them vainly. How great a vanity then it is, to look upon these things with so great solicitude and curiosity, as though they were of some moment either to give or to take away salvation, and either not to attend to, or to dissemble, those inward goods in which true salvation consists? What shall I say of the concupiscence of the flesh? How vain it is, since the delight of the flesh itself, however great it be, can neither help when past, nor remain when present? What does it profit to defend with so great effort against corruption a flesh that is to die, by the excess of delights and the affluence of pleasures, when there is no one who can guard it from corruption? For as to the pride of life, whether it will glory in riches or in dignities, what can be vainer? [0121B] For who would not vainly glory that he is more heavily laden than the rest? This indeed is all that riches, all that dignities confer upon their possessors: that whereas they seem to receive in them more than others, they are thereby found more heavily laden than others; whom certainly, for the acquiring or the keeping of those same things, they always either wear down with labor or afflict with care. But in all these things there is great vanity, and superfluous care. The vanity of mortality, which consists in two things: namely in the penalty which wears down, and in the penalty which dissolves. The penalty which wears down first makes us grow old through the failing of life. The penalty which dissolves afterwards compels us to go into rottenness, and to return, through the corruption of the flesh, into the dust from which we were taken according to the flesh. Hence therefore let man weigh in what vanity every man lives, who unwilling [0121C] suffers the corruption of the flesh, because willing he works the corruption of the mind. Wholly then is he subject to vanity who both flows away in flesh through mortality, and in mind through iniquity. But the one of these is his own from himself, the other his own against himself, and the whole is in himself. These three kinds of vanities the author distinguishes at once in the beginning of his book, which afterwards, pursuing them one by one through the whole sequence of his work, he extends by copious [sic: *disputat one*], everywhere reproving in the three that fourth kind of vanity which we said is present in depraved minds, and showing this alone to be liable to fault and owing a penalty. The vanity which is present in created things through mutability he sets forth first. Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. Then in the second place [0121D] he adds the vanity which is in human works. What hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? In the third place he subjoins that vanity which is present in human bodies through mortality, saying: *One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh.* And according to these three distinctions he also divides the whole sequence of the following work into three parts, assigning to each its own portion. In the first part, whose beginning is: *The sun riseth, and goeth down,* he disputes concerning the vanity of mutability. In the second part, which begins thus: *I Ecclesiastes was king of Israel in Jerusalem.* He pursues most widely the vanity of human cupidity. In the third part (which is placed as it were for a close in the last position in the disputation, whose beginning is: *Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth* ) he calls to mind the vanity [0122A] of mortality, so that the human soul may as it were hear at the end that which it is the more needful to perceive with intent consideration, and to recall to memory the more often. These things we have prepared, according to the grasp of our understanding, for the opening of Ecclesiastes, which is the second of Solomon's books, for those entering upon the reading of it. But we confess that to explain worthily its whole breadth is above our powers: in matters of this kind, covered over with deep profundity, seeking rather to hear a teacher than to snatch a teacher's place. For it is better, as Plato says, modestly to learn what is another's than shamelessly to thrust forward one's own. But if we have been able to say anything fitting upon this, let it be beyond hope and expectation. If anything usefully, not beyond our intention. First, as it were [0122B] a certain proem, he sets before his book: in which he distinguishes that threefold matter of the following work which we have called to mind, concerning which he afterwards enters more amply into disputation. The proem therefore is: *Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity,* as far as: *The sun riseth, and goeth down.* From there the first part of the book is begun, and the rest as we have said. Now let us consider the very words of the letter, whether we may be able to grasp in them anything of the things which have been said above.

## HOMILY THE FIRST. *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this work, on the explanation of the vanities.* (cont.)

*Vanity of vanities (said Ecclesiastes), vanity of vanities, and all is vanity.* With weight is that to be pronounced which he speaks of himself as though of another: said Ecclesiastes. For because for authority's sake he set down his own person, he fittingly spoke of himself not as of himself, but as of another, so that, since he had to speak of himself as some great one, as the matter [0122C] demanded, he might more becomingly and more maturely say this of himself in another than in himself. So Balaam, speaking of himself, says: *He hath said, the hearer of the words of God, who hath beheld the visions of the Almighty, who falleth and hath his eyes opened [n: (Num. XXIV)]*. And John in his Gospel. He speaks of himself as though of another, saying: *This is that disciple whom Jesus loved, who giveth testimony of these things, and we know that his testimony is true [n: (Joan. XXI)]*. And Paul speaks of himself as though of another to the Corinthians, saying: *I know a man in Christ, whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth, such a one caught up even to the third heaven, and such a one caught up into paradise, and that he heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter [n: (II Cor. XII)]*. But this kind [0122D] of speech, as often as it is taken up in Scripture, is done either for the sake of humility, or of admiration — namely, that when we would say great things, we should rather ascribe them as it were to others, lest it seem either proud or excessive, if we should attribute them to ourselves. For we ought both to remove great things from ourselves for humility's sake, and to show wondrous things as it were from afar, for admiration's sake. For those things are less wondrous which come nearer to knowledge. Therefore, that the minds of all may be raised up to the utterance that is to come, and may awake as at some miracle of newness, it is rightly said: Said Ecclesiastes. As if it were said: What so great and such a one has said could not be vain, even though he said it concerning vanity. The common teacher and the instructor of all, Ecclesiastes himself, has said it. What did he say? Hear what he said, and attend. For they are no small things [0123A] that are said: Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. If all is vanity, then he also is vanity who said this. And how will it stand firm that what vanity said concerning vanity is not vain? But if it is true that what he said is vain, it is not to be heard, but spat out. What then shall we say? Either not all is vanity, as he said, and he said what is false; or all is vanity, as he said, and he himself is vanity, and said a vain thing. But assuredly, as he himself said: All is vanity, and he himself, who said it, is vanity; and not only vanity, but even universal vanity: and yet what he said is not vanity, but truth; because in that which he said he himself was not vanity, since he said against vanity what he said concerning vanity; and it is agreed that he could not be contrary to vanity in that in which he was vanity [0123B]. Something therefore was in him which was not vanity, and that could speak not vainly against vanity. But what was this, or where was it? Assuredly, if we shall say that this body was it, or something in the body, which spoke without vanity concerning vanity: then could the body, which is corrupted, subject to vanity and born for vanity, at some time be without vanity — a body which wholly lives in vanity? We remember the saying of the Psalmist: *Universal vanity, every man living [n: (Psal. XXXVIII)]*. For that which dies is the very thing which lives: which is born that it may live, and lives that it may die. But what is it that dies, save that which is deprived of life? That therefore dies in man which is extinguished from life. And what is this, save the body and the bodily sense? For it is not itself after the living creature, [0123C] from which it is a living creature, and when it ceases to be capable of sensation, the sense ceases to be. Therefore that which dies in man is the very thing which lives in man; which is for that reason subject to vanity, because it is liable to mortality. Therefore the bodily sense could not reprove vanity, in which nothing can be found free and pure from vanity. What then must be said this was? Was it perhaps the soul? Have we not shown above that it too is subject to vanity? For in it we placed the vanity of iniquity: which stands forth so much the more deformed than all other things, in that from it alone the others have either that they are harmful, or that they are at all. For without this vanity, neither would there be the vanity of mortality, nor would the vanity of mutability be harmful [0123D]. How then can the soul, which is subject to so great a vanity, truly reprove vanity? Or is something surviving found in it free from vanity, and was it said without cause: Universal vanity, every man living? For man is universal vanity, because in body and in mind he is subject to vanity. What man? *Every man living.* Not every man life, but every man living. For man is both life and man is living. Where the life, and where the living. Life in that which quickens; living in that which is quickened. And the flesh lives from the soul, and the soul from the flesh: and both live, but the flesh has wholly from the soul that it lives? the soul has not wholly in the flesh that it lives. For it lives also in God, and would that it did live? What lives in the flesh is vain. What lives in God [0124A] is not vain, but is true, because it is from truth. In that part therefore in which it lives from truth, it truly reproves vanity, and it is found how vanity reproves vanity, not through vanity but through truth. Rightly therefore Ecclesiastes, who in mind was lifted above all vanity and had come through to truth itself, saw sublimely in that same truth what he truly said concerning the reproving of vanity: Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. The driving home of the words with the affection of the speaker signifies both the greatness of the matter and the newness of the wonder. And it is a sentiment uttered with heightening. For there are certain degrees, and as it were certain progressions, for one going both to the better and to the worse. For thus is it said the Song of songs, and the age of ages [0124B], just as here it is now said: Vanity of vanities — so that by a certain like distance and a similar difference the Song of songs may be understood to excel above the song only so far as a song excels a word, and next a word silence. And an age of ages to excel an age only so far as an age alone excels a moment, or again a moment nothing. And with a like progression made here by the contrary: that vanity of vanities is worse than simple vanity by so much as simple vanity is worse than a solid and abiding essence. Thus by driving home the sentiment may be read: Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity — so that in all things vanity of every kind may be expressed, and out of all things a certain sum may be understood to be made up, which contains every vanity, so that as it were each single [0124C] thing is by itself vanity, and the universe gathered out of them all is vanity of vanities. So in the creation of things, when God was completing his works, each single work is by itself called *good [n: (Gen. I)]*, and last of all, all things being perfected, the universe is named *very good*. For if that which in part is good is found better in the whole, that also which in part is evil must needs be worse in the whole. Therefore vanity is of vanities, and the vanity of all vanities is universal vanity, and the universality of vanity is all vanity. Or else that vanity of human minds is here reproved by comparison with the other vanities: which, as risen out of the other vanities, and having surpassed all vanities by comparison of vanity, is deservedly called vanity [0124D] of vanities. It can also not incongruously be that this threefold repetition of vanity is referred to the three kinds of vanities recalled above, so that as it were one of the vanities is the work of man, another mortal nature, the third this whole world with its universe of mutable things. For this man considered the works of mortals, and saw of each single one that with labor and grief they come to their effect. When made they subsist for a brief time; but passing away they leave no fruit behind them. He saw with how great affliction and misery human life is worn down daily without ceasing, even in those things which it works for its own consolation, and how it almost always suffers more loss in seeking a remedy than it receives of consolation in obtaining a solace. And in all these things, at how vainly every man living is troubled, wondering and amazed [0125A] he says: Vanity of vanities. Then, attending to the very condition of mortals, and finding in it a greater and more miserable vanity, he saw that if it is reckoned a great vanity when that which man makes passes away, then that vanity is altogether to be grieved over and pitied when that which man is cannot stand. Upon this therefore, redoubling again, he cried out and said: Vanity of vanities. Last of all, beholding the [sic: *inconstantinam*] and the fluctuation of all mutable things hastening to their setting, concluding as it were in a sum he added and said: All is vanity.

## HOMILY THE FIRST. *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this work, on the explanation of the vanities.* (cont.)

*What hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun?* What hath he more — it is understood — than that which has been said of all things: Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity? As [0125B] if he were saying: If all things are subject to vanity, how can the works of men be alien from vanity? If according to something that is vain which God created, how is that not much more vain which man makes? If that is temporal which the Eternal made, what is that which the temporal makes? Therefore what hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? He laboureth under the sun, namely either as acting or as suffering. Distinguish these two: he who acts and he who suffers labors under the sun; each labors, both he who acts labors, and he who suffers labors. But this is the difference, that the one labors as though unwilling, the other willingly. For he who acts labors, and himself makes that from which he labors. But he who suffers labors, and does not himself make, but sustains, that from which he labors. These two kinds of men live in this world, namely those who labor [0125C] and act, and those who labor and suffer. Who are they that labor and act? Hear the Psalmist: *Nevertheless universal vanity, every man living. Nevertheless man passeth as an image; yea and he is disquieted in vain. He storeth up, and knoweth not for whom he shall gather these things [n: (Psal. XXXVIII)]*. Who are they that labor and suffer? Hear Paul the apostle: *The creature,* he says, *was made subject to vanity, not willingly; but by reason of him that made it subject, in hope [n: (Rom. VIII)]*. Therefore both labor: both those, namely, to whom this life is sweet, and those to whom this life is bitter. Those labor to enjoy its delights; these labor to be freed from its misery. Those labor in fear lest they go hence quickly; these labor in dread lest they remain here long. The labor of the former is reproved for vain solicitude. The labor [0125D] of the latter is crowned for patience. To the former it is said: *Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof [n: (Matth. VI)]*. And that: *Be not solicitous, saying: What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed? [n: (Ibid.)]* To the latter it is said: *Be you also patient, strengthen your hearts [n: (Jac. V)]*. And that: *If we suffer with him, we shall also reign with him. If we die with him, we believe that we shall live also together with him [n: (II Tim. II)]*. To the former it is said: *Ye sons of men, how long will ye be dull of heart, why do ye love vanity, and seek after lying? [n: (Psal. IV.)]* To the latter it is said: *Blessed are all they that fear the Lord, that walk in his ways. For thou shalt eat the labours of thy hands, blessed art thou, and it shall be well with thee [n: (Psal. CXXVII)]*. Therefore the labor of the former has a penalty in the work, and a penalty in the recompense. [0126A] But the labor of the latter has indeed a penalty in the work, but a reward in the recompense. In the labor of the former there is true misery. In the fruit of their labor, a false and vain consolation. In the labor of the latter, a temporal and transitory affliction. In the fruit of their labor, eternal blessedness. Therefore the labor of the former is empty in its fruit, true in its misery. The labor of the latter is transitory in its penalty, eternal in its fruit. But there, for the evil man, what of good seems to be present is vain; the evil of these men which appears is as it were vain, because it is transitory; but the good which does not appear is perpetual. Let it not therefore seem wondrous that we call the evil in this life laboring and acting, but the good only laboring and suffering, since if we look more closely upon the truth, we shall find the evil always laboring by acting, and the good always by suffering. [0126B] For as incontinence harasses the evil even then when they seem to be at rest, so patience keeps the good tranquil even when they are set in labors. Wherefore in a certain wondrous manner all the good and the just, when for God's sake they waste themselves with voluntary affliction, then also labor by suffering; because, setting themselves against themselves, what outwardly they inflict by raging in strictness, inwardly, remaining quiet and without disturbance, they bear in patience. But all the perverse and lovers of the carnal life, even then when they sustain evils brought upon them from without by another's violence, because inwardly they disturb themselves with the goads of fury and of impatience, they rather themselves make that from which they labor. Therefore the good labor in this life, but the evil labor even for the sake of this life; because the temporal labors to which all the depraved [0126C] and perverse subject themselves for the obtaining of temporal sweetness, the good bear patiently for the sake of eternal consolation. But because this mortal life, in which and for which men labor, tends daily through the spaces of living to the end of life, rightly is all the labor of man reckoned in the number of the vanities, when it is said: What hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? [nt: It is understood: apart from vanity.]

## HOMILY THE FIRST. *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this work, on the explanation of the vanities.* (cont.)

It is to be noted, however, that he does not say: What more is the labor of man? But: What hath a man more, he says, of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? Whence it stands firm that here the matter treated is not so much the labor of man as the fruit and profit of human labor; [0126D] because it is not asked what or of what sort the labor of man is, but what fruit man obtains of all his labor by which he labors under the sun. And all this fruit is declared to be nothing other than vanity, when it is said: What hath he more? As if it were said: Man hath nothing more than vanity of his labor. Therefore vanity is the whole fruit of man's labor, and every man labors in vain, being about to receive nothing but vanity of all his labor. Was the labor then of the saints also vain, who faithfully served God, and for love of him suffered so many torments and kinds of tortures? Who would presume to say this? For how was the labor of those men vain who, vexed indeed for a little while, came through transitory griefs to abiding joys, and through a temporal death obtained everlasting life? [0127A] Or is that labor to be called vain for this reason, because what they suffered has passed away: and yet according to something not vain, because what they received abides? For that even the labor of the just is vain — so far, that is, as regards the transitory penalty and this as it were imaginary appearance of misery — the Psalmist seems to hint, when he says: *Thou who framest labour in commandment [n: (Psal. XCIII)]*. For God as it were frames labor for his elect, when outwardly, as though angry, he inflicts upon them by judgment a temporal penalty, for whom inwardly, by the providence of his mercy, he keeps the rewards of eternal blessedness. Since therefore the Psalmist names the labor of the just, and this imaginary grief, because it has the appearance of misery but does not have true misery, a *framed* thing, he assuredly shows [0127B] that this same labor can also, according to something, be not unfittingly called vain. Behold therefore the labor of the work passes away. What was vain passes away; what was transitory has passed away: the labor has passed away, the grief has passed away. Has the fruit of the work passed away, or the wage of the labor? Therefore it is permitted: behold, according to a certain manner of speaking, the labor itself and the temporal grief is not unfittingly called vain. Yet will the wage of that same labor ever rightly be called vanity? God forbid! How then shall that stand which was said: What hath a man more of all his labour? For it was said of the reward of labor and not of the labor itself, of the profit, not of the work: What hath a man more of all his labour? Behold, man hath more, and much more hath he, [0127C] and thou sayest: What more hath he? Therefore he added and said: That he laboureth under the sun. Behold, we have the difficulty of this question resolved. For here he openly shows what labors he reproves of vanity. Those which are done, he says, under the sun. What is it, to be done under the sun? Perhaps what he says, under the sun, is to be taken simply; because men, dwelling in this lower part of the world, receive from above the light of the sun, and are lighted so that they may see for the doing of the works necessary to human uses. For on this account the times of human life have been so distributed by divine providence in alternating turns, that the very vicissitude of the alternating times might repair sick bodies wearied by too great a stretching out of their actions. Therefore night and day unceasingly succeed one another [0127D] with mutual evenness, so that by day the sun, passing over from its rising to its setting in its course above, may pour out its light on every side upon the things beneath it, and, illuminating human eyes by its presence, may rouse both those eyes and those of the other living things of the earth to the exercise of acting, and at the same time afford the means of working. But by night, withdrawing itself from human sight, and, as with certain swaddling-bands of infancy, spreading over them the veil of darkness and covering the eyes of mortals, it may foster their weary limbs to rest and slumber, that it may restore them again, repaired and more eager, to labor and to the day's exercise. This wondrous order of the divine dispensation the Psalmist beheld, when, commending God's works, he calls this to mind among the rest as something excellent and worthy of no small praise, saying: *He hath made [0128A] the moon for seasons; the sun knoweth his going down. Thou hast appointed darkness, and it is night: in it shall all the beasts of the woods go about. The young lions roaring after their prey, and seeking their meat from God. The sun ariseth, and they are gathered together, and they shall lie down in their dens. Man shall go forth to [sic: od] his work, and to his labour until the evening [n: (Psal. CIII)]*. Hence also is that which God promises to Noah as he goes out of the ark after the flood, as for some great sign of his loving-kindness and gift of his bounty, saying: *All the days of seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day shall not cease [n: (Gen. VIII)]*. Beautifully therefore he said that men, distended down below in this ark of the world through the various runnings-about of the occupations of mortal life, labor under the sun, so that this too belongs to the vanity [0128B] of human work: that a light passing over from above, and to be ended in darkness, gives light to man for his working. For he considered how abject and wretched is the condition of mortals, who upon the surface of the earth, like certain worms creeping in vain curiosity, are roused by a light suddenly poured in from above, as though to be mocked, to snatch at what they vainly desire, and, the same being withdrawn after a little, are wrapped about again in a sudden blindness, and can in no wise go forward further into effect. Therefore the very light by which they are lighted is shown to them from afar and at a distance from above, and unapproachable to man, so that it may be proved to stand in no way in man's power; so far that man receives from it only so much as the graces of God, who bestows and orders all things, shall have permitted, not so much as [0128C] man's perverse will, serving cupidity, desires. A great vanity therefore it is to labor under the sun, and small confidence to labor under the sun: whose light, however pleasant to look upon and delightful to the sight it be, yet cannot always be present to human eyes nor profit them. But if it please us to push our consideration yet higher and to look into the matter more subtly, we can take time to be signified by the name of the sun, so that what he said, under the sun, may be the same as if he had said, under time. For because chiefly by the sun both the course of the times is distinguished and the nature of temporal things is varied, time itself is fittingly expressed by the sun, when it is said under the sun it is the same as if he had said, under time. But has he perhaps in this too willed to intimate [sic: *in nuere*] something to us, in that he did not say in time or with time, [0128D] but under time: and must a discernment be had by us, that we may understand that some things are those which were as it were made with time; but others those which were either made in time, or are done under time? Let us discern therefore, if we can, whether perchance we may be able to find the reason why he said rather that the works of men are vain as made under time than either with time or in time. All things which were made were either made with time, or in time. For those things were made with time whose rising time did not precede: such as the angelic nature, and that formless matter of visible things, which in the beginning God created. Those things were made in time whose rising time preceded, such as those works of the six days in which God perfected and completed [0129A] the fabric of this sensible world; but those things also which afterwards were made formally, or essentially, were all made in time. Again, of those things which are done in time, some are done in time and under time, others are done in time only, not under time. Those are done in time and not under time which indeed begin in time, but are not ended in time. Those are done in time and under time which both begin in time and are ended in time. Likewise, of those things which are done under time, some are done for the sake of time, others are done for the sake of eternity. Those therefore which are done for the sake of time are vain both in act and in fruit. But those which are done for the sake of eternity are indeed vain in act; but in fruit they are not vain, because, even if they pass away in the work, yet they abide in the recompense. For a good work [0129B] is not this alone which appears outwardly transitory; because it consists both of a visible action and of an invisible devotion. For, as man consists of a living thing and of life, and the living thing indeed dies, but the life does not die; so without doubt the good has both a visible action in itself, and an invisible devotion. The visible action is as it were the body; the inward devotion is as it were the spirit. The action lives through devotion, as the body through the soul. But devotion quickens the action, as the soul the body. For every action which is without devotion is dead. Therefore the visible action itself as it were lives, and the invisible devotion itself is life. But that which lives, this dies; but that which is life, this does not die. Because a transitory action, just as it has its beginning from time, so indeed it is ended in time. That therefore which dies, [0129C] which is ended, which passes away, which is given over to mutability, is itself liable to vanity. But that which is life, which abides, which does not admit of an end or of corruption, does not itself admit vanity. Let it be said therefore: What hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? [nt: it is understood: apart from vanity.] Nothing more, because all things which are done under the sun are vain. And what would he have of vain things but vanity? What then? Will good works which are done under the sun be able to confer nothing more upon those who work them than vanity? And how did we say above that this question was resolved by that which he says, under the sun? Behold, the same question rises up for us again, no less difficult than the one above, because we cannot deny that good works too are done under the sun, that is, under time, according to what [0129D] has been expounded above; and yet we do not dare to say that nothing but vanity follows from them. And behold, the book plainly says: What hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? But if we are willing to consider the very words more diligently, it is plainly shown what those works are which are reproved as vain. For he did not say: What hath a man more of all his labour which is done, or which was done, under the sun? But rather he says, which man himself laboureth under the sun. He does not therefore reprove the labor so much as the laborer as being under the sun. So that because man himself, set under the sun, labors, therefore what he labors at is vain. But who is he who labors under the sun? He who, pressed down by love of temporal and transitory [0130A] things, labors for the obtaining of the same, if he does not have them, or for the keeping of them, if he has them. This man, set under the sun, labors, and this man labors in vain. But he who exercises good works for the hope and desire of eternal things, this man does not labor under the sun, even though the labor in which he labors is under the sun; because, although the work which he carries through is temporal, yet he himself transcends all temporal and falling things in mind and in devotion. This man therefore does not labor in vain, even though that in which he labors is vain; because that for which he labors is not vain. And when that which is vain, in which he labors, has passed away, he has ready that which is not vanity, for which he labors. Such a man therefore does not belong to that sentiment in which it was said: What hath a man more of all his labour that he laboureth under the sun? Because he does not [0130B] labor under the sun, but above the sun, who does not set the wage of his labor in things rolling and passing away with time.

## HOMILY THE FIRST. *On the title of the work, on Solomon's names, and books, and on the beginnings of this work, on the explanation of the vanities.* (cont.)

*One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh.* Behold vanity. One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh. This human nature conceived, corrupted in the first root of its stock, and, sown together with this same corruption, it sprouted out into the whole offspring of posterity. For the first parent of the human race, as soon as he heard: Earth thou art and unto earth thou shalt go, from that time made mortal, because he fell from the state of incorruption, began as it were to pass over from life to death through mortality. This way therefore all men after him pass through, who descend from him by the birth of the flesh. This is that vanity of which the Psalmist spoke, saying: *Nevertheless [0130C] universal vanity, every man living. Nevertheless man passeth as an image [n: (Psal. XXXVIII)]*. This vanity therefore, as greater than the rest and more horrible to human minds because of the dread necessity of death, he added in the last place, so that man might hear this at the end, in which he may more evidently recognize the misery of his own condition. For the first vanity is not even in the name; nor is it referred to man. The second vanity is indeed not in man; but yet it is referred to man. The third vanity both is in man, and is referred to man. Accordingly, as though advancing by certain steps always to higher things, he set first that vanity which is neither the penalty of man nor his fault. Then he added that vanity which is not the penalty of man, but the fault. Last of all, that which is not the fault, but the penalty: [0130D] although yet neither can such a fault ever be without penalty, nor is such a penalty — at least in those to whom the sacrament of salvation does not come to aid — altogether free from fault. But I have called that the fault of man, not the penalty, and this the penalty, not the fault; because in the one man's desert is discerned, and in the other judgment is found. This penalty therefore, as heavier and more monstrous than the rest, he set last: which, though it be not more wicked than the fault, is yet more grievous to the flesh, and more effectual for the rousing of carnal minds. Let him say therefore: One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh. As if he were saying: If you think it is to be neglected that everything you do is vain, is even this to be neglected, that you yourselves are vanity? One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh. If the dying [0131A] depart and those who are to die follow after, what joy is there? The grief of the living seems indeed to receive consolation in those who are born; but from that whence it is thought to be ended so that it should not be, from thence it receives that it should always be. For that the dying depart is grief. What consolation follows in that those who are to die come on? A consolation which is bounded by mourning. And what can be vainer in either? One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh. If some lamentable chance were to involve only a few, or at least not all, it would seem tolerable; but as it is, a savage plague drags all with it to destruction. One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh. If it passeth away, whither does it go? If it cometh, whence does it come? Alas, dread lot! How canst thou be secure, O man, wrapped in such great darkness? Behold, thou knowest that by living thou tendest to death. But canst thou know [0131B] of what sort, or where, thou art to be after death? Consider therefore in how great a vanity thou livest, thou who daily seest that which thou art pass away; nor yet canst thou by any reasoning know of what sort is that which thou art to be. One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh.

*But the earth standeth for ever.* Hearken, O man, and blush. The earth standeth for ever. Why does the earth stand, and thou canst not stand, for whose sake the earth was made? Perhaps thou wilt say, because it stands for thy consolation. It stands that it may send forth those who come, bear those who pass over, and receive those who depart. For those who are born come from the earth by the origin of the flesh, and the living pass over upon the earth by the mutability of the flesh, and the dying return into the earth by the corruption of the flesh. Therefore it stands for thy consolation; nay rather it stands for thy confusion [0131C]. How? See of what sort it stands, of what sort it bears, and whom it bears, and out of what sort it bears. Of what sort therefore does it bear? Hear of what sort: *Cursed is the earth in thy work; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee [n: (Gen. III)]*. And whom does it bear? Hear again: *Cursed art thou upon the earth [n: (Gen. IV)]*. And out of what sort does it bear: *In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread; and thou shalt eat the herbs of the earth? [n: (Gen. III.)]* Therefore the cursed bears the cursed. And yet it bears them. But from that whence it bears, it has something for thy consolation and something for thy penalty. What is for thy consolation is with thy labor; what is for thy penalty is through thy labor. It has bread, and it has thorns also. Bread with thy labor, for thy consolation; thorns through thy labor, for thy penalty. In the sweat of thy face [0131D] shalt thou eat thy bread: this is for thy consolation, with thy labor. When thou hast worked, the earth will not give thee its fruit, but thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. This is for thy penalty, through thy labor. Therefore it stands not only for thy consolation, but much more it stands for thy confusion. It stands not only for the easing of thy misery, but it stands for the testimony and the penalty of thy fault. The earth standeth, and thou standest upon the earth. Stable is she who bears, and thou fallest in ruin who art borne. Why is this? Art thou too not earth? What then was said to thee: Earth thou art, and unto earth thou shalt go? Therefore thou art earth, and thou art upon the earth, and thou art of earth. Why then dost thou not stand for ever? Hast thou been made weaker than that earth from which thou wast taken? What then did the hand of the craftsman work, if it did not advance [0132A] its work to something better? Was there then no knowledge with him, or was he found weak, so that in his hands that good matter should be made worse? God forbid! Nay rather, he made thee much better than that had been out of which he made thee; because he had made the earth stable, but thee he made out of earth immortal. Therefore he made thee better than that had been out of which he made thee. Not therefore from the craftsman did thy corruption proceed, who made thee with so great power and with such goodness that nothing could be less than perfect, nothing would he have worse than the best. And so the best craftsman made a good thing formed, whose eternal incorruption and immortal goodness neither begets a fault nor receives a fault.

But perhaps the matter is to be blamed, which was such that nothing else could be made of it. For the matter was earth, and there came forth an earthen vessel. What? This is a wonder. [0132B] Thou therefore, in saying this, oughtest to have looked to this: that, if thou art an earthen vessel, then thou wast hardened out of soft mud into a potsherd, and thy clod, if it had not the nature of firmness, yet had the nature of confirmation. If it had not that this should be by nature, yet it had by nature that this could be by grace. Therefore thy matter did thee no harm, which both keeps whole what nature conferred, and does not itself diminish what grace gave. For the earth standeth for ever. What is *standeth*? It perseveres in that which it was made; it keeps its own nature; it does not desert its own condition; what it received, this it retains uncorrupted. Earth it was made, and earth it remains; never is it other than what it is. And when it is other, it is other not by the failing of corruption, but by the advance of exaltation. Just as in thee [0132C] it has been made other, and is to be other, than it was born; but by exaltation, not by corruption. And when in certain earthly things it seems to carry itself over from one thing into another, yet it is never other than it is; because it is earth, and always it is earth, and that which passes over is earth and that into which it passes over is earth; and when this passes over into that, or into that other, yet that which is earth does not pass over, which in this and in that is the same. Therefore the earth has to be moved within the bosom of its own nature, and has to work out of that which it is, that which it is: it has not to pass over beyond the bounds of its own nature out of that which it is into that which it is not: and for that reason, the earth standeth for ever in that which it is not. Why therefore hast not thou too stood in that in which thou wast made upon the earth, just as [0132D] the earth stands in that in which it was made? Why hast thou degenerated, so as not even to imitate thy matter, which so far keeps what it is, that even when thou hast been made together with the earth, thou canst not be other than the earth is? As far as that thou flowest away by thy own fault; beyond it thou art not permitted to go forward by its nature. Behold how much it guards what it is, so that even when it has received thee, flowing and unstable, it does not suffer thee to pass over further into another thing which itself is not. Whence then is it for thee to flow away? Search diligently, and think. Neither thy craftsman nor thy matter did this for thee; because she, both by standing for ever, keeps in thee also what she herself is, and he, by making thee for eternity, gave also more than she is. Whence therefore is this for thee, save from thy own fault, out of which it is now a penalty for thee that thou returnest into her, to whom this had been given of grace, that thou shouldest stand always [0133A] above her? Therefore thou passest away, and the earth standeth in testimony against thee, so that, reproving thee as mortal and receiving thee as dying, it may convict thee before it punishes thee. Therefore the earth standeth for ever. One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh; but the earth standeth for ever.

These things we have said, according to the littleness or the scantiness of our understanding, upon the opening of the book of Solomon which is called Ecclesiastes, in no way presuming that we have said what most of all had to be said, since it is so great a thing for us only not to have said what had not to be said. But for the rest it must be known that this book requires a certain new kind of exposition; because, since it wholly aims at moving the affections of the human heart, one must more often form one's discourse in it as though by conversing than by expounding. Whence [0133B] it is needful in these matters sometimes even to dwell longer upon words in those things which seem plain and open, so that the very driving home of the utterance may touch more strongly and penetrate more effectually the heart of the hearer. He who shall wish to handle this Scripture otherwise, even if he serves conveniently the understanding of his hearers, yet, not retaining its force and property, profits perhaps less unto edification.

## HOMILY II. *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, the succession, and the forgetting of those things which have been.*

The words of Ecclesiastes, which testify that all things under the sun are vain, have — I know not by what compact — just now, when they were read, been made sweet in our ears. And behold, we have begun willingly to hear our own evils, and what we do not love [0133C] we nevertheless love to hear. For we do not love our own evils, and we love to hear our own evils; because by hearing the evils which we do not love, we remember the goods which we do love. And this very remembrance of goods (even amid evils) is sweet to the soul, and assuredly so much the sweeter the more bitter are those evils themselves, which, whether by hearing or by feeling, we recognize to be far from those goods for which, at least by remembrance, we sigh. This was the whole reason why we wonder that this recital alone has just now been savory to us, in which the hardship of our exile is described to us, and it is declared of what sort and how great our misery and calamity is. For our mind, in the hearing of its own evils, as though awaking out of a certain sleep of former time, suddenly [0133D] recognized where it was, and, amazed and wondering at so great an abyss of ruin, began at the same time also to consider from how great a height it had fallen into this very depth of misery, and, because it could not yet do so in effect, it sighed after that height with a certain wondrous desire of inward ardor. This therefore was what in those words which recited our misery drew our affection. This made it that it should ever be pleasing to us thus to hear our own evils, and that whatever that be which is perceived along with that which is so sweet cannot be bitter. This daily makes their very laments sweet to the wretched, and amid sighs and groans feeds the afflicted delightfully with tears; because the remembrance of the things that are loved is sweeter amid adversities, and the soul itself burns the more with desire of things absent, is touched the more sweetly by the memory of things past, [0134A] is the more strongly inflamed by the deferring of things to come. This our Ecclesiastes knew excellently well, who in his whole narrative so diligently pursues the vanity of passing things, that out of the consideration of it he may admonish the human heart to meditate upon heavenly things and to awake in desire of things eternal. For he knew that the more evidently the vanity of those things which pass away in time is recognized, the more sublimely within is the eye of the mind opened to the state of eternity. Beginning therefore, in this first part of his work, he shows that all things are vain which are under the sun, that is, that whatsoever things are visible are subject to corruption, or liable to mutability. For he shows that neither in heaven, nor under heaven, nor upon the earth, nor in the earth is there anything perpetual which does not suffer vicissitude nor [0134B] pass over into alteration. And therefore that nothing truly is out of all those things which are always without ceasing drawn into that which they are not, and cannot keep stable or uncorrupted what they are.

*The sun riseth, and goeth down, and returneth to his place: and there rising again, he goeth about by the south, and turneth again to the north.* This is to be distinguished by itself. Then follows:

*Surveying all things round about, the spirit goeth forward, and returneth in his circuits.* And this is to be set down by itself. Afterwards follows:

*All the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea doth not overflow: unto the place from whence the rivers come, they return, to flow again.* And this is to be joined together.

Three things therefore he seems to set forth as an argument [0134C] for the mutability of all things: the sun, the spirit, the rivers, that is, fire, air, moisture — so that by the sun fire, by the spirit air, by the rivers moisture may be understood to be signified, as the whole from a part. For above he set the earth as it were an immovable foundation in the middle place. Now he disposes the other three elements, that is, fire, air, water, fluctuating about it with unstable motion, so that in the procreating of mutable things he may show that to these three elements the motion of acting and, in a certain manner, the office of the craftsman has been assigned. But that the earth lies subject, immovable, as a certain matter of all things to be procreated; powerless indeed to act, but only fit that out of it, while the rest work, there may be formed those things which are to be created [0134D]. Through these three elements therefore nature exercises its power in that fourth, which elements, running about that fourth and in it by a wondrous law, and tempering one another, bring forth out of it so many innumerable forms and species of things as are shown by the yearly, the monthly, the daily vicissitudes of the seasons, alternating continually without ceasing in their approach and their withdrawal. Since therefore all things being born which rise out of the earth and receive from the earth their substance and nourishment obtain the nature of vital motion from these three elements, rightly did he place in them both the origin of mutability, and did he express the nature and property of all mutable things, so that in these we may equally see both whence it is that whatever rises under time cannot stand, and by what way that which is not comes forth to be present, or that which [0135A] is returns to not being. The sun riseth, and goeth down, and returneth to his place, and there rising again he goeth about by the south, and turneth again to the north. In few words he has embraced a great matter: concerning which we must say some things according to the time, yet not detain the hearer's mind longer upon such matters, lest we seem, against our own purpose, to be rolled away from the sacred exposition into describing the courses of the stars. All these things indeed have been said for this alone, that the human mind may be the more conveniently roused by the recital of those things which it knows, and that through these it may awake to think upon those things which it does not know: and therefore it ought not to be a weariness to us, nor seem unworthy, to attend diligently to those things which the divine discourse has taken care to recount diligently to us. He shows therefore by what way [0135B] this great luminary, which illuminates all things by its presence, is carried round in this globe of the sensible world with unceasing agitation, and by its approach and withdrawal works the various changes of things. The sun riseth, and goeth down, and returneth to his place. First he shows that it has a circular motion, and always returns to that from which it goes forward, so that, because in a circle no end can be found, its course may be shown to be perpetual. The sun riseth, and goeth down, and returneth to his place. Then he describes the windings of its progression, saying: He goeth about by the south, and turneth again to the north — so that this very thing may belong to the great changing of things, that it does not always in the same manner nor in a straight line direct its course as it goes. The sun riseth, and goeth down. It riseth daily, when emerging [0135C] it is presented to human sight. It goeth down, when descending to the lower parts according to the convexity of its [sic: *circum actionis*] it withdraws itself from our eyes. It returneth to his place; because, its rolling driving it on, it is called back beneath again to its rising. But after its rising, tending to its setting, it is first turned toward the south, because by an oblique course, especially when it tarries in the summer signs, it climbs from the rising to the meridian line. But then, descending to the setting, it is bent again by an oblique progression toward the north. Still another exposition, fitting enough, can be applied to these words: namely, that we take all these things to be said not of the long-continued but of the yearly course of the sun. For the sun riseth to us when, [0135D] entering through the vernal equinox, it rises toward our pole. But it goeth down, when going out through the autumnal equinox it descends to the lower parts. It goeth about by the south, when it tarries in the winter signs. It turneth again to the north, when it is carried round in the summer signs, which are nearer to the northern pole. The sun riseth therefore, and at its rising all things equally rise which revive from its heat. It goeth down, and at once, the vital fire being withdrawn, all things fall which flourished from its presence. It goeth about by the south, that the winter's cold may temper the summer's burnings. It turneth again to the north, that those things which the winter's frost and icy torpor had bound fast may, warmed again by the summer's heats, be quickened. Thou seest therefore how great changes of things one body draws along with it.

## HOMILY II. *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, the succession, and the forgetting of those things which have been.* (cont.)

[0136A]Surveying all things round about, the spirit goeth forward, and returneth in his circuits. If by the spirit we have taken the air, then in fitting order, after he had described the instability of the heavenly element, he shows that the lower things also suffer the same law, saying: Surveying all things round about, the spirit goeth forward. As if he were saying: If the force of nature does not suffer those things which are in heaven to stand, it is necessary that the same condition of mutability govern those things also which are under heaven. Indeed, just as to the sun? so also to the air he attributes an orbicular motion, so that its agitation may be shown to be perpetual. But that he subjoins in the plural: He returneth in his circuits — this can signify that the motion of the air is not always and everywhere the same, but that, since in one place it is stirred more vehemently, in another more moderately, its very fluctuation, [0136B] poured back into itself by a reversed turn, is moved unequally; and does not uniformly come to rest, so that we may not be forced to extend a motion once begun as far as the uttermost, but that the several motions and impulses, made as it were upon themselves; and gradually, the motion languishing over the space, come to rest. But that also which he says, Surveying, is aptly attributed to this element, in that by its mobility it cleanses and scatters all the filth sprinkled or gathered anywhere. Or because, penetrating all things by its subtlety, it pours itself out everywhere. Or else this word is coupled to the preceding sentiment thus: The sun riseth, and goeth down, and returneth to his place; and there rising again he goeth about by the south, and turneth again to the north, surveying all things round about. And here, a distinction being made, then the following sentiment is brought in thus: [0136C] The spirit goeth forward, etc. For the sun by its course surveys all things round about; because it touches all the parts of the world, rising or setting through the diverse signs. For in Cancer, rising and setting, it touches the north. In Capricorn, the south. In Libra and in Aries, it passes through the middle by the rising and the setting. There follows: The spirit goeth forward, and returneth in his circuits. According to the preceding exposition, we can now not incongruously [sic: *incovenienter*] take the spirit to be that fiery power which, proceeding from the sun itself, pours itself out through all things, and, invisibly penetrating the universe, quickens and moves it. Whence the ancients also said that nature is. A craftsman fire, going forward into sensible things to be procreated. For of vital motion, and of sensible quickening, in all things that are born [0136D] the fiery power is the origin: which supplies increase to all things, and, feeding and cherishing them with an invisible nourishment, brings them at length to an invisible substance. And this hidden power of nature, moving and feeding all things, the poet also named a spirit: and his words are well known: *First, the heaven and the lands, and the liquid plains,*
*And the shining globe of the moon, and the Titanian stars,*
*A spirit within doth nourish: and, poured through the limbs,*
*Mind stirs the whole mass, and mingles itself with the great body.*
[n: (Aeneid. VI, 688.)] Although in these words he seems rather to approve that error which asserts that this sensible world is as it were a soul consisting of soul and body, and that its very soul is the spirit moving all things. But [0137A] in whatever way the opinion of those who err be expounded, we with a sound understanding can take the spirit going forward into all things, and returning in his circuits, to be the hidden power of nature, which invisibly nourishes and quickens the universe, and leads each single thing to a certain end and lawful term. This spirit therefore, that is, the hidden power of nature, surveys all things; because, pouring itself out invisibly through all the parts of things, it distributes to each its proper quality according to the capacity of its nature. It goeth forward, and returneth, because it first advances by increase all things which rise in time, and then leads them back, as they grow old, to their origin. For it goeth forward, because it goes out in things being born, and in things growing it proceeds as far as a certain measure. It returneth, because in things growing old, and slipping backward through the failing [0137B] of their nature, it is called back as far as the beginning of its own origin. Thus therefore we rightly take the courses and progressions of individual things to be as it were certain circles and orbs running back into themselves; because all things that have risen in time return at length by their setting thither whence they went out by the beginning of their birth. And each single thing indeed is proved to have, according to its own measure and the time in which it subsists, a course differing from another, that is, greater or less. But all things are known to have, as one origin, so also one end; because all things return by their setting to the earth, which at the beginning of their rising went out of the earth. Just as therefore the sun riseth and goeth down, and returneth to his place, so the spirit goeth forward, and returneth in his circuits. Because [0137C] just as in the body of the sun the fire, going forward locally, is led back to the beginning of its rising, so also naturally in all things that are born, the motion which it raised up through the increase of things, it leads back to its own origin through their failing and setting.

There follows a third clause in which is treated the element of water, which in the order of things is placed third after fire, in procreation is associated as second. For as much as pertains to the disposition and the order of things, fire possesses the first and highest place; air the second, next to fire. Afterwards water claims the third place; in the last and lowest place the earth settles. Among these four, fire and water, by nature indeed most opposed, yet friendly by an even confederation [0137D], are the origin of all things that are born. And therefore if we attend to place or to nature, we discern these two to be separated from one another. If we look to their effect, we find them both nearest to one another and friendly. Therefore concerning the element of water, which affords to things being born the other vital fostering along with fire, as though third after fire and air, or second along with fire, silence was not to be kept among the natures of mutable things. And for that reason he describes this element's circuit also, and its running out into the procreating of sensible things, saying: All the rivers run into the sea, and the sea doth not overflow. And at once he adds the reason why the sea does not overflow when all the rivers have been received into it: namely, because again they return to the place from whence the rivers come, to flow again. For the channels of the waters, through the whole [0138A] body of the earth, draw moisture inwardly and from without after the manner of veins, so that the watering may be evenly poured out into every part. But that this infusion may be able to be continual and perpetual, therefore the course of the waters has been disposed in an orb, and in that perennial circling, so that what is poured in from above may never fail; as much as flows downward in the one part, so much in the other part is called back to its rising through hidden passages. So also the food of the body is carried by a certain circuit, and first descending from the palate into the belly, and then passing over into the privy, and in that very passage of it, as by a certain instilling of nature, nourishment is supplied to what is failing; and when this has been evaporated and emptied out, it is necessary again that recourse be had to the help of eating for the repairing of the weakening limbs. As it were therefore a circle [0138B] of ever-renewed need, running back into its own origin, is drawn; because, while without ceasing what has been taken passes away, it is always necessary that it be taken again, so that it may be able to furnish substance for the supplying of the defect. Such nourishment therefore as the substance of food supplies by assiduous repetition to the body it feeds, altogether such nourishment does the reflowing of the elements pour into the body of the earth for the procreating of its offspring and the quickening of its seeds. This fire, this water, this air cease not to do by continual approach and withdrawal without intermission, so that they may always replenish the things that befall and empty out the things that recede, so that, because the vigor of the past infusion cannot subsist, of necessity the watering for the repairing of fullness may be repeated anew. What confidence, therefore, of perpetual subsistence will the nourishments of things be able to afford, [0138C] when in all things thus always without ceasing both the things that repair pass away, and the things repaired fail? For although a repeated infusion seems to afford some sort of consolation to this defect, yet it is a great misery always to receive for need, and never to be able to lack the need of receiving. Whence it is manifest that all transitory and falling things are vain, which continually grow empty of the solidity of their own state, either by passing away or by failing. A great spectacle therefore has here been prepared for holy minds, which know how to draw from visible things the knowledge of invisible ones. Which know how to say to their Creator: *Thou hast made all things in wisdom, O Lord [n: (Psal. CIII)]*. *Thou hast delighted me, O Lord, in thy making, and in the works of thy hands [0138D] I shall rejoice. How magnified are thy works, O Lord, exceeding deep are thy thoughts become [n: (Psal. XCI)]*.

## HOMILY II. *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, the succession, and the forgetting of those things which have been.* (cont.)

For behold how all things transitory and subject to vanity are borne about in a circuit. And we know that a circle has no end. The things therefore which run in a circuit do indeed run, but they never arrive at an end. What rest, then, can be hoped for, where there can be no standing still? For where there is perpetual running, there is no standing. But where the way is a circuit, there is no place where the course could surely have an end. The things therefore which run in a circuit always run and never come to a standing. They always pass away, and never subsist. They are always being ended, and cannot find an end. When they have gone by, they are yet to come; when they have come upon us, [0139A] they do not subsist. This is the way of all mutable things, and the way of all who love mutable things and who follow mutable things. For of the wicked also it is said: *The wicked walk in a circuit [n: (Psal. XI)]*. And again: *The head of their circuit [n: (Psal. CXXXIX)]*, *and make them as a wheel, O Lord [n: (Psal. LXXXII)]*. The head too of all the wicked bears witness of himself, saying: *I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it [n: (Job I)]*. And of him the Apostle says: *He goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour [n: (I Petr. V)]*. You see therefore how the perverse always love the circuit, and do not withdraw from the circuit. Therefore the things which are perversely loved by the perverse, these themselves also all run in a circuit, for a testimony to them that they too follow a circuit. On the contrary the lover of eternal things says: *My foot hath stood in the straight way* [0139B] [n: (Psal. XXVII)]. And again: *Direct me in the path of thy commandments, for the same have I desired [n: (Psal. CXVIII)]*. And again: *The path of the just is straight [n: (Isai. XXVI)]*. And elsewhere once more: *They shall go,* he says, *straight, the things sent forth; and the Lord our God shall lead them to a sure place [n: (Sap. V)]*. O straight way, O circuit, whither dost thou lead. And thou, whither dost thou lead? Thou leadest, and leadest through. But thou leadest, and leadest astray; for those whom thou leadest, thou destroyest, thou dost not lead through. O circuit, how dost thou enwrap, how dost thou embrace thy followers? To those who run through thee thou grantest neither a going out from thee, nor an arrival within thee. Therefore all things transitory and falling are rolled through circuits while they pass away, so that we may not seek in them the good of eternity — things which we always behold both so to arrive that they pass away, and so to pass away that they do not subsist. Let us see [0139C] therefore yet further these circuits of vanity. For the wisdom of God, as has already been said, has wonderfully provided this: that the motion of all things should be driven round in a circle, so that bodily nature — which by flowing away might at some time have felt failure — always by running back into its own origin, while without interruption it receives what it has poured out, might pour out without failure what it receives, and that there might be a failing without failure; nor might that ever be wanting which is able to fail, so that it may always be failing. Whence in one and the same thing, both that which it is, is wretched, and that which has been made is wonderful, because in the same work both the matter is found frail, and the craftsman's design is to be admired. And corruptible nature indeed persuades to contempt of the world, but the mind sinks down in wonder at the contemplation of the design. [0139D] To the beholding therefore of this design, after the course of mutable things has been unfolded, our Ecclesiastes turns himself, that in it he may exercise the mind's gaze through contemplation; because knowledge is not able sufficiently to comprehend it, he is eager to venerate it with worthy wonder. For, since he has unfolded the mutability of all things in three kinds of things — fire, air and water — according to the motion that moves, he shows thereafter how inexplicable that same mutability is according to the motion which is moved, through each several thing that rises and sets in the universe.

*All things are hard: man cannot explain them by speech: the eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing.* When any thing whatever is discerned on its surface, not yet is either its hidden cause or [0140A] its nature penetrated. For that which is, is seen; but of what sort that is which is seen, or what quality it keeps in the hidden place (whither bodily sense cannot come); why also it is so as it is seen, or whence it is so, or to what end it is — what man (I will not say in all things, but not even in any one thing whatever) is able to comprehend to the full? In how great darkness therefore is man enwrapped; by how great a blindness of ignorance is he hemmed in, whose sense can scarcely reach even so much as the surface of a few things? And even if he should discern all things that are according to their outward appearance, he would still not penetrate the hidden power of things and their invisible nature. Therefore the totality of things is in both ways incomprehensible to man: namely, both according to outward appearance, and according to inward [0140B] quality. But some individual things come outwardly in part by their appearance to the sense, others are hidden altogether — either because they are remote in place, or because, though present in place, they exceed by their own subtlety the slowness of human sense. Scarcely therefore does human sense suffice to attain some few things among things; but of the whole it comprehends nothing perfectly as it is. Therefore all things are hard: hard according to the totality, namely, in that they cannot be attained, and hard according to each several thing, because they can be fully comprehended by no sense nor understanding. And if they cannot be perfectly searched out by reason, much less can they be explained by speech. For this very thing is more unspeakable than all things in things: that in so great a confusion of mutability nowhere is an evident and manifest [0140C] design lacking to one who considers well; that even that which in things is not good is so well disposed, that in a certain manner the corruption of individual things is the beauty of the whole. Therefore human sense, sinking down in the consideration of these things, is sweetly refreshed out of its own failure; because in that which displeases according to corruption, in the most ordered beauty of the whole, even corruption itself is beautiful and pleases. Thus in a wondrous and unspeakable manner the Founder, in his creature, both punishes malice through the corruption of things and at once delights nature through beauty, so that man may recognize in his punishment what he has deserved through fault, and in his delight what he has lost. For how great an affluence of sweetness do we believe to be in the Creator of things, if [0140D] we find so wondrous a pleasantness in the beauty of creatures? Therefore, when he had spoken of the failure of human understanding in so manifold and perplexed and various a depth of things, he at once adds the delightfulness of nature in the beauty of those same things.

The eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. Since all the bodily senses find in created things their own delights, and each of them as it were certain proper dainties prepared for it — sight, namely, appearance; hearing, the sweetness of melody; smell, odor; taste, savor; and touch, smoothness. All the rest indeed serve bodily necessity, or even pleasure. But these two senses, that is sight and hearing, draw their nourishment rather toward spiritual delightfulness. Whence their refreshment also has no draining off of dregs, [0141A] because together with the perceiving of sweetness they draw no mass of corruption. For which reason their refreshment does not arrive at a satiety of sweetness; because no difficulty running through delays their appetite from perceiving sweetness, nor does any ensuing trouble restrain it. This nourishment therefore, pure and unmixed, without all bodily bulk, passes wholly into the refreshment of the soul; because although it flows forth from bodily appearance and passes through the sense of the body, it cannot nevertheless be retained by the body, since it has nothing bodily, nor does it bring in anything corpulent. For this reason therefore sight and hearing, as being more excellent than the rest and having nothing of depressing weight, have obtained a loftier seat in the body, so that they may freely and without obstacle flow out to their delights, or [0141B] admit into themselves without difficulty those things that flow in. There are, to be sure, two things which enter to the mind from the appearance of things through sight. And two likewise which enter in through hearing from the perceiving of voices. For through sight there comes from things to the mind's knowledge substance and form. From voices through hearing, signification and melody. And substance from things works the same in the mind through sight as signification from voices does through hearing. And likewise form from things does the same in the mind through sight as melody from voices does through hearing. For there are two things by which the whole nature of the rational soul is ordered, namely knowledge and affection, that is, wisdom and love. And if the soul perfectly obtains these two and lawfully orders them, it is blessed. But if either it falls short in obtaining them so far as nature requires, [0141C] or perverts them, once obtained, against nature, then in that part, without doubt, in which it suffers either the failure or the confusion of them, it must needs be made wretched. The whole substance therefore of the rational soul is governed by these two, that is by knowledge and affection, so that through wisdom it may find truth, and through love may embrace virtue. Therefore, that outward things also might serve the rational soul for the sake of blessedness, these two instruments of the senses were placed in the human body, so that through them the notions of visible things might enter in to the soul, and might produce in it wisdom or virtue, if it were not there at all, or increase it, if it were there in less measure. Therefore the essence of things entering in to the soul through sight, and the signification of voices through hearing, beget knowledge. But the form of things entering in through sight, [0141D] and the melody of voices through hearing, kindle the mind to delightfulness. For as often as outwardly either sight is affected by the appearance of things, or hearing is soothed by the sweetness of voices, the mind awakes within with wondrous affections, answering to that by which it feels itself touched outwardly. And it comes to pass sometimes that, through the sweetness which it draws by bodily sense, it returns to the remembrance of invisible goods and, admonished in a certain manner from the likeness, begins to long with unspeakable desire for that whose shadow and image, as it were, it feels itself to have perceived in bodily affection.

## HOMILY II. *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, the succession, and the forgetting of those things which have been.* (cont.)

Let Ecclesiastes therefore say: The eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. Because through these senses the beauty of visible things, while it affects the mind with delight in [0142A] the contemplation of itself, kindles in it an unspeakable longing for invisible goods. Which longing, namely, thirsting after an ineffable sweetness, can rather be provoked than filled out by the bodily sight or hearing by which it is aroused, however great a delightfulness they may bring; and by human speech, however profuse or eloquent it may have been — though it is scarcely told even thinly — it is never perfectly explained. For from the appearance of visible things the rational mind conceives only, as it were, certain seeds of joys; but as desire soon grows out into immensity, it travails and does not contain itself in so great a delight. Let no one therefore think the sight of visible things harmful to chaste minds; because, if to see the works of God were altogether harmful, the use of seeing would by no means [0142B] have been created by him. For the work of God is as it were his word, through which he speaks to us, and the eyes themselves are as it were instruments by which the words of God are perceived through contemplation. Just as therefore the ear is an instrument for perceiving the word of man, [d: so the eye is an instrument for perceiving the word of man,] so the eye is an instrument for perceiving the word of the Creator. Therefore fittingly in the human body both the eyes are set in front and the ears placed at the side, as though by this it were signified to us that our intention ought to be directed secondarily to our neighbor, principally to God. Rightly therefore, that it might be shown how from the consideration of visible things the desire of eternal things is born in the mind, the eyes and ears alone are mentioned. Because by these alone, well nigh, does the way of wisdom [0142C] and of virtue lie open to the mind, since, while beyond the other senses they perceive the beauty of visible things unmixed, they alone more purely kindle within the love of invisible goods. All things are hard: man cannot explain them by speech.

The eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. It is a marvel. The human heart does not suffice for the whole world, and the whole world does not suffice for the human heart. Why does the human heart not suffice for the whole world? Because all things are hard, and man cannot explain them by speech. Why does the whole world not suffice for the human heart? Because the eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. Therefore knowledge sinks down, affection transcends. Knowledge stretches itself as far as it can, and cannot take in the whole; but love drinks up the whole, [0142D] and still cannot be satisfied. Why is this? Because charity rises high above knowledge, nor does the human heart say: It is enough — until it has come to him, and has found him by whom it was made that it might be, and for whom it was made that in him it might be blessed. Every delightfulness, every pleasantness, every beauty of created things can affect the human heart; satisfy it they cannot, save that sweetness alone for which it was made. For the appearances of visible things are only, as it were, certain veins through which the invisible beauty, manifesting itself, flows out even to us. And therefore, when these naturally provoke our sense and affection toward themselves, they do not indeed fill up desire, but goad it to seek out the appearance of the Founder and to long for his beauty. [0143A] Therefore all these things which are seen outwardly were made for provoking human affection, not for satisfying it, so that, aroused by them, it may rise up and, increased, may transcend them. Wherefore the eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. For that which we behold made beautiful does indeed delight, but it does not suffice, unless we find him who made it.

Or what he says can be understood thus: The eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. For because he had set down before that all things are hard, and that man cannot explain them by speech — lest perhaps it should be thought that they could be comprehended even by knowledge, he added: The eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. As if he were to say: It is no marvel if man cannot explain by speech the difficulty [0143B] [sic: *cultatem*] of things, who cannot even by sense take in or search out their depth. For whether he seek through himself the things to be found, or hear from another the things already found, everything that he can take in is beneath the satiety of fullness. For if he begins to contemplate through himself, the eye is not sated with seeing. If he seeks to be taught by another, the ear is not filled with hearing. For the narrownesses of the bodily instruments, if they pour themselves outward, do not suffice for the depth or the immensity of things to be unfolded. But if they pour themselves inward, they cannot fill the capacity of the human heart. For because the heart of man, blinded by the darkness of sin, has not an eye within by which it may fully see the light of truth, nor an ear by which it may perceive the word of God sounding inwardly, it is compelled to open bodily eyes and ears for the watering of the dryness [0143C] of its ignorance, that outwardly it may draw at least some drop of truth in the appearance of things, whereby its thirst, though it cannot be altogether quenched, may at least a little be tempered. For this is what the Lord reproaches to his people through the prophet, saying: *My people have done two sins. They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have digged for themselves cisterns broken apart, that cannot hold waters [n: (Jer. II)]*. For we know that a cistern is dug for this reason, that water gathered from without may flow down into it, and be drawn from it again to pass over into the uses of men. But because this has no living vein, however great it may seem and overflowing with a gathering of waters, it can at some time be drained out [0143D] and dried up; because, when that which is poured in from elsewhere has been taken away and consumed, nothing of its own is left over to it whence it might be repaired. But the fountain which has a living vein, even if it is small, yet cannot altogether fail, nor does it ever feel a failure of its own outpouring, since to it an increase from its own comes always without failure. The bodily eyes and ears therefore, although they are the chief instruments by which the way is opened for the disciplines to the mind, yet, because the notions of visible things do not come from within from the fountain of truth, they lead them down to the heart of man through the narrow conduits of their own capacity and as it were like waters gathered here and there into a cistern. And because in the very things which they perceive they are able neither to comprehend the totality nor to penetrate the innermost parts, rightly is it now said: The eye is not satisfied [0144A] with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. Because the human mind, whether by living or by hearing, even if it perceives something, however little, of the truth, is nevertheless driven far from the fullness thereof by the condition of its own infirmity. It is no marvel therefore if the dryness of human speech does not suffice to explain the difficulty of things, since human sense also sinks down in the consideration of it. And therefore all things are hard, and man cannot explain them by speech: the eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing.

*What is it that hath been? The very thing that is to be. What is it that hath been done? The very thing that is to be done. Nothing new under the sun; nor is any man able to say: Behold, this is new. For it hath already gone before in the ages which were before us.* Perhaps someone may reckon that that error is [0144B] here confirmed by which the philosophers of the Gentiles, concerning the revolution of the ages and the return of all things into the selfsame, attempted with marvelous madness to establish the eternity of times. For they said that the series of mutable things had run from eternity in the same order in which it is now beheld, and would run without end, by the same law, the world in its totality having neither beginning nor end, through certain ages succeeding one another. And that the great age consists of fifteen thousand years (which they call the year); and that when it is completed, all the heavenly bodies being called back to their own place whence each several one had gone forth from the beginning of the age, and again beginning their motion into the opening of another age by a like plan and manner, and likewise moving the nature subject to them by a like plan — that again absolutely the same [0144C] things all rise up anew, in the order in which they had gone before in the preceding ages, in the same order nonetheless, with the same essence, the same form, in altogether the same places and times, and accomplish their own course and a fate like to the former and the very same; that they suffer also the same law and undergo the same fortune, so that it befalls that the same men are born, that the same men likewise beget the same sons, live by the same fortune, die by the same lot: the same outcome of things, absolutely the same quality, and the same state and course of all things which the past times of the earlier age had held. And that such a revolution and repetition of all things into the selfsame always has been and always shall be without end, so that, just as by [0144D] the return of one star through each several year all these things are then renewed to their former state, so by the return of all the stars and of the whole of nature to their rising, through each several age and the great years, all things are restored to their first condition. But how great this error is, manifest reason will easily prove. For that times cannot be eternal is most evidently proved by this: that all time had a beginning; and it stands without contradiction that everything which had a beginning at some time was not. Further, all past time was at some time present. But all time which was at some time present, before it was present, was not yet. Otherwise, if it was always present, it was no longer time, but eternity. If therefore all past time at some time was [0145A] not, there was [a time] when there was no time. And so times could not be eternal; but before times there was an eternity without time, which times neither increased when they began, nor will they consume when they shall be ended. It is clear therefore that the assertion of those is false who have proclaimed the eternity of the ages, and have testified that the beginning of mutability was without beginning. But lest perhaps in this place an error of this kind should seem to be confirmed, when it is said: Nothing new under the sun; nor is any man able to say: Behold, this is new. For it hath already gone before in the ages which were before us — in what understanding this is to be taken he shows at once in the words that follow, saying:

## HOMILY II. *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, the succession, and the forgetting of those things which have been.* (cont.)

*There is no remembrance of former things; nor indeed shall there be any recollection of those which are to be hereafter, with them that [0145B] shall be in the last time.* For if the former things and the last were absolutely the same as the present, he would by no means call men now present other than the former and other than those to come in the last time; nor would he say, with them that are to be after us in the last time, but he would say, with us who are to be in the last time. Unless perhaps someone should say that the first and the last are to be referred to the beginning and the end of the same age; otherwise those are neither first nor last who have been without beginning and are to be without end. But that the first and the last should be referred to the beginning and the end of the same age is forbidden by what he says: It hath already gone before in the ages which were before us. Because, while he speaks of some ages of those going before and others of those coming after, he shows that he has by no means meant the first and the last of the same age. [0145C] Therefore, since that sentiment shrinks back not only from Catholic truth but from reason as well, let us refer this saying to the likeness of things, which have been so established in their kinds from the beginning that each several one extends its offspring according to the likeness and the first form of its own origin, and there is nothing which exceeds the limit of the first disposition in its own kind. Thus in the very elements of the world, thus in those things which have been or are procreated out of them, nature keeps in all things the first disposition, so that nothing can be found under the sun other than the first, that is, diverse or unlike. As, for example, from the beginning heaven above, and earth below. From the beginning the lights in heaven — sun, moon and stars; birds in the air, fishes in the water, beasts on the earth. From the beginning flight for birds, swimming [0145D] for fishes, walking for men, and for certain beasts crawling, and dragging for serpents. And all these things, as they were, so they are, so they remain. And if at any time perchance, by some miracle happening beside the accustomed course of nature, they become other than they always are, yet they do not become so in the whole, nor do they always become so, so that that first establishment, although it may sometimes seem to be interrupted, may never nevertheless seem to be dissolved. Therefore the wisdom of God rules this confusion also. And what is confused to us is not so to him. And therefore nothing is new under the sun; because that which passes away in time has been ordained from eternity by him who is above the sun. And therefore each several thing, because they cannot stand in themselves by immutability, yet keep their standing in their own kind [0146A] through likeness, so that although individual things cannot always be what they are, yet the whole are never found to be other than the individuals. Therefore nothing new under the sun. How much more above the sun? For therefore also nothing is new under the sun, because that which is above the sun is eternal. Under the sun and moon there is nothing new; nor yet is there anything eternal. For nothing under the sun is eternal, because everything that is under the sun passes away in itself; yet it is not new, because it subsists in the likeness of its own kind. Therefore under the sun nothing is new, and nothing eternal. For because it hath gone before in the ages which were before us, therefore it is not new; and because there is no remembrance of things past, therefore it is not eternal. And therefore, because everything that comes passes away and does not subsist, nor does anything remain [0146B] under the sun, the eye is not sated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing; because, while it enters it slips away, and everything flees while it is thought to be held; and the sentiment is fulfilled: Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. What then, since under the sun the eye is not sated with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing? Let it go above the sun, where not only is there nothing new, but nothing transitory either; where there is both the remembrance of former things and the presence of things to come — nay rather, where all things past and to come are present; because nothing there is either past or future, where everything that is, is present, and everything that is, is there. There therefore both the eye can be sated with seeing and the ear filled with hearing: where a consummate and full perfection is perceived, and, the fullness having been perceived, eternity is not emptied out. So therefore this whole sentiment, by which it is said that under the sun there is neither anything new [0146C] nor anything eternal, seems to look to this: that man may recognize what he ought either to flee or to follow. For in this, that nothing under the sun is new, the eternal disposition is shown. But in this, that nothing under the sun can be abiding, it is demonstrated that in those things which are under the sun eternity is indeed signified, yet is not. In those very things therefore which are under the sun we recognize at once both: in that nothing is eternal, that what they are must be fled; and in that nothing is new, that what they are not must be followed. Wherefore let him run back to the highest sentiment, that, because in those things which are under the sun the eyes cannot be sated nor the ears filled by knowledge — since they do not comprehend the whole that is — nor can they be by desire, because, even if they should comprehend, the whole that is does not suffice, [0146D] nor does that which is present remain as long as they are able. They know that everything which is under the sun is vanity, and that man can have nothing more out of all his labor wherewith he labors under the sun.

Let him say then: All things are hard, so as to be comprehended by human sense — things which can neither be numbered in their multitude, nor comprehended in their quantity, nor searched out in their depth. And therefore it is no marvel if speech fails where understanding sinks down; and on this account man cannot explain them by speech, so as to render an account of each several thing, because he does not know all things: For the eye is not sated with seeing, when it considers by itself; nor is the ear filled with hearing, when it is taught by another — so that either the intention going out to the search of things might comprehend the whole, as much as is without, [0147A] or knowledge entering in might fill up the whole, as much as is within. Therefore the eye and the ear suffice neither for the whole world, so as to take in the whole, nor for the whole mind, so as to fill the whole. And yet through those things which are without they are admonished to go forward thither where life is, where they may find the whole and take in the whole, because all things *in him were life, and the life was the light of men [n: (Joan. I)]*. Thither therefore let them go forward, where at once they may find the whole and take in the whole and possess the whole, where in the eternal disposition those things have already been made which are to be in time. For what is it that hath been? For the very same, and not another, is to be in time than that which was before times, in the eternal disposition of God. Nor is any other mutable thing unfolded thereafter in the order of things than that which was ever fixed and abiding [0147B] in that ratified and unvarying divine disposition. And that it may manifestly appear that the subsequent effect of things accords with providence, therefore also in the very series of things the future does not disaccord with the past. For what is it that hath been done? The very thing that is to be done. Therefore what has always been in providence is at some time to be in fact; and what has already been done in fact is still to be done through likeness. But it seems to me that this ought not to be passed over, that he does not say. What is it that is to be, that he might then subjoin. The very thing that hath been — since past things are more certain than things to come, and because, even if they are not, yet they were at some time and were seen. But things to come never were.

And therefore that which is less certain would seem [0147C] rather to be put in the question; but in the answer, that which is agreed to be more known. But it is to be noted that the effect of things, according to cause, is later than providence; in our knowledge, earlier. Because until we behold a thing in its own act, we are utterly ignorant of what has been disposed concerning it in the eternal providence. And therefore rightly, when he asked, saying: What is it that hath been? (because providence in itself is hidden) he at once sends his hearers to the act of things for the understanding of it, saying: The very thing that is to be; because we cannot know what goes before in foreknowledge, until we have seen what follows after in the effect of things. But in the things themselves also we shall gather the quality of past things which we have not seen from the comparison of things to come [0147D] when they shall have come upon us. Let him say then: What is it that hath been? The very thing that is to be. Because, as has been said, that which goes before in providence — this same and not another follows after in the effect of things. And thereafter: What is it that hath been done? The very thing that is to be done. Because the same nature of things in each several kind has exhibited in act, in things past, the same likeness which it will bring forth they shall have come upon in things to come. And therefore there is nothing new in the kinds of things under the sun whose likeness has not gone before. Nor is any man able to say: This is new — as far as concerns the likeness of its own kind. For it hath already gone before in the ages which were before us, in its own kind, of which it is. And yet all things flow, nor does anything remain under the sun. And the things which are fixed in the disposition of him who orders [0148A] them, passing away in themselves, withdraw at once both from our presence and from our memory. For first they are withdrawn from our presence, so that they do not subsist by appearance; then they are also blotted out from memory by forgetfulness, so that they do not subsist even by recollection. And lest perchance the passing of things past should not suffice to draw the hard hearts of men to contempt of visible things, if, when those had been taken away, they who are present could have had confidence about their own standing. Therefore, after he said in recalling their passing: There is no remembrance of former things, he at once demonstrates the destruction of these also, saying: But neither of those who are to be after us. For if they are to be after us, they are surely others: it is plain that we who now subsist, when those shall have come who are to be after us, and we too taken away by the same [0148B] lot, shall then by no means come even into the recollection of the living. What then does it profit us that we have succeeded into this life those who were taken away by death, since we too, going down when our own time shall have come, shall leave other successors behind us. If therefore we wish to know of what sort we shall be with those who are to be after us, let us consider of what sort they now are with us who, long since taken away from this life, have gone before us. And that every hope of present things may be taken away from wicked minds, those also who are to be after us are said not to be about to remain, nor to be about to come into recollection with their own posterity — lest even this should come as a consolation to depraved minds, if he who cannot stand in himself might at least subsist in his heir or successor. Therefore [0148C] he shows one and the same destruction of all things past, present, and to come. There is no remembrance of former things; nor shall there be any recollection of those who are to be after us, with them that shall be in the last time — that he may subject all things to vanity, and turn the human mind from the love of those things which are seen under the sun to the desire of eternal things.

## HOMILY II. *On the proof of the vanity of all things under heaven: through the corruption of the elements, through the generation of things, the succession, and the forgetting of those things which have been.* (cont.)

But if anyone should not be willing to be content with the simple exposition, he has something else which he may understand in these words that have been expounded above, fittingly enough and perhaps more manifestly. For because he had said that neither is the eye sated with seeing nor the ear filled with hearing, he immediately adds the cause why neither can sight fill the eye nor hearing the ear: namely, because [0148D] the appearances of transitory things, coming indeed through the sense, arouse longing, but, swiftly fleeing away, cheat desire by their passing. For concerning this passing he subjoins the sentiment, saying: What is it that hath been? It already is not: for it has passed away, and now is not. The very same shall that also be which is to be: for it too, when it shall have come, will pass through, and when it shall have passed through, it will be no more. What is it that hath been done? That too has already passed through, and is not itself. Therefore the same shall that also be which is to be done; because it too, when it shall have been done, will pass through, and will be no more. But it can be asked why he mentioned past things only and things to come, when he rather intends to persuade to contempt of present things? But this very thing pertains to a great contempt of those things which [0149A] are seen: that he willed to mention in their number only those things which alone the sense of the flesh comprehends as present, as though he saw that those things alone are not, which alone seem to be — so that he cannot even say what it is that is. That which is, while it is, is well nigh nothing: for the moments of present things flee away with so hasty a course and so swift a slipping by that they cannot even wait for the words of those who speak about them. For even if it can sometimes be rightly said by the questioner, according to something, "it is," yet it is always more truly said by the answerer, "it was, and is not." Thus the question itself seeks an answer which as yet is not. But the answer, when it comes, does not find the question, which now is not. In a true consideration therefore he saw that this alone, as it were, is not, which alone seems to be. For since it at once both [0149B] begins to be out of that which is not yet, and ceases to be into that which now is not, that which is, is well nigh nothing. And therefore by no means ask: what is it that is? Because that very thing of the questioner, to the answerer however near at hand, has already been, and is not. Rightly therefore is it said: What is it that hath been? The very thing that is to be. What is it that hath been done? The very thing that is to be done. As if he were to say: From the consideration of things past weigh what you ought to expect concerning the things that come after; for both are the same. Both that which hath been, and that which is to be. That which hath been done, and that which is to be done. It is the same, not by essence, but by a like nature. For that which hath been (as far as concerns things) and that which hath been done (as far as concerns actions), both have passed through. And there is not now even that which hath been [0149C] done. Likewise that which is to be among things, and that which is to be done among actions, the whole will pass through, and there will be nothing perpetual under the sun. Whence is this? Because the condition of things past, and of those which are to be, is the same, and the nature alike. For nothing is new under the sun, nor is any man able to say: Behold, this is new. For it hath already gone before in the ages which were before us. And because the condition is alike, therefore as things past, so also things to come. And of what sort, thinkest thou, are those things past themselves? Hear of what sort: There is, he says, no remembrance of former things. Therefore not only has their presence been taken away by destruction, but their memory too has been blotted out by forgetfulness. A great ruin. Of such sort are also those things which are to be. For neither of those who are to be [0149D] after us shall there be any recollection with them that shall be in the last time. And the sentiment is true: Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity.

## HOMILY III. *How Ecclesiastes proves through his own works that all the works of men are vain, with an epilogue of the things aforesaid.*

*I Ecclesiastes was king of Israel in Jerusalem: and I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things that are done under the sun.* To search out the words of the wise and their riddles, and to draw forth to the taste that sweetness of wisdom which is hidden within, and to bring its beauty forth into the light — who is able? A scribe learned in the kingdom of heaven, *who bringeth forth out of his treasure new things and old [n: (Matth. XIII)]*, if he should come to us — behold, he who God gave wisdom [0150A] and understanding to lay it open and to make it manifest, that men may know that in it is life. But what are we? Darkness before light, that we should think to comprehend what God has hidden from the eyes of men, to reveal the secret of his wisdom to his friends. What do we do? Therefore we shall not meditate on his commandments, nor shall we search out her paths, and our heart will be able to rest until it find her. Only let us pursue her with these very words; and if perhaps the finding be deferred, let the search for her meanwhile feed us above all things; if we cannot [teach] her as found, yet let us teach her as sought. Behold, our Ecclesiastes, disputing thus far concerning the vanity of mutable things, has embraced in a brief discourse so many things that in those words of his this appears wonderful to us: in what manner [0150B] the whole, and the whole concerning the whole, has been so said that for brevity indeed nothing less, but for evidence nothing more, seems needful to be said. But wisdom did this, which is whole in the whole and whole in each several thing. Nor is she, whole in individual things, contracted; nor is she, whole in the whole, expanded; but she is as great in individual things as in the whole, and in the whole such as she is whole in individual things, because neither can unity be less than itself, nor immensity greater. That same wisdom therefore has expressed in this brief body of discourse the whole image of the universe, that we, being small, may see the great in the small, since in itself we cannot [see] the whole. And we have seen there the whole world, and have recognized that truly there is nothing of all things that abides, but that all things which are under the sun flow and pass through, and that the sentiment stands true, that all is vanity. Now therefore, [0150C] after he has demonstrated to us of what sort those things are which were made along with us, he passes on to teach us what we ought to think or to expect concerning those things which are done by us. Because if that also which God made is subject to vanity, it cannot be doubted that what man, who is vanity, makes is altogether vain, and much more vain. This is what he now enters upon to demonstrate: namely, that all the works of men which are done under the sun are vain, and that man has nothing more out of all his labor wherewith he labors under the sun. But that he may win credence for his assertion, he sets himself forth as an example of all the things he is about to say, asserting that he has learned by trial all that he speaks and has proved it true. And therefore he sets forth his own person as of such a kind [0150D] that it may not seem incredible that he could have had trial of all these things. Therefore he demonstrates his power and dignity: king of Israel in Jerusalem. He shows his wisdom also: And I went before in wisdom all who were before me in Jerusalem. He enumerates his riches: houses, vineyards, gardens, orchards, fishponds, menservants, maidservants, herds, flocks, gold, silver. Lastly, lest anything should be thought to have been lacking, he adds luxury also and pleasure: singing men, singing women, and the delights of the sons of men; and all things, he says, which my eyes desired I denied them not, nor did I keep back my heart from enjoying every pleasure of its own in those things which I had prepared. And he testifies that in all these he ran through every trial of things, and found nothing beyond vanity and [0151A] affliction of spirit and superfluous care in all things that are done under the sun. But what those things are which are done under the sun has already been said above. But that the discourse may pass over more suitably to those things which are to be said, we shall now briefly and summarily repeat what has been said.

For we have shown that by the sun time is signified, for this reason: because chiefly by the sun is all the mutability and vicissitude of times distinguished, so that the same is understood by that which is said, under the sun, as if it had been said, under time. Again, that it might appear more evidently what those things were which, done under time, the author reproves of vanity, we distinguished that some things were made with time, others made in time. Likewise of those which were made in time, [0151B] some were made in time, not under time; others in time and under time. And those indeed which were made under time are more subject to time and liable to mutability, because they began in time and will likewise be ended in time; and therefore, lest they should extend themselves in any degree to eternity, they are in a certain manner shut in by time, since their time both went before their beginning and follows after their end. Yet, lest vanity should altogether rule in these, and truth should not find under the sun where to lay its head [n: (Matth. VIII)], we have excepted certain of those things which are done under time; and if we do not altogether take vanity away from them, yet we forbid them to serve vanity. For of those things which are done under time, some are done for time, others are done for eternity. And those which are done under time for time [0151C] are vain in act and in fruit. But those which are done under time for eternity are in a certain manner vain in act, but in fruit are not; because, even if they pass away in the work, yet they remain in the recompense. Wherefore such things, even if they have not fully escaped vanity, yet serve not vanity but truth; nor is that which they are altogether vain in them, because that for which they are is not vanity. But those which are done under time and for time are altogether subject to vanity; because both that which is in them is vain, and that which is from them is likewise vanity. And these are the things of which we treat at present. In which, under the sun, nothing beyond vanity and affliction of spirit — either when they are being done, or when they have been done — is found by those who love transitory things.

## HOMILY IV. *On the vanity of things, and the worst occupation of men.*

[0151D]

And yet in these things vanity itself rises up to increase as though by certain steps, and corruption, growing out as it were from a little thing, increased by degrees, always proceeds to the worse. For in them is found the first origin of vanity, curiosity; then cupidity; lastly pleasure. Among which the first indeed pertains to the concupiscence of the eyes, the second to the ambition of the world, the third to the concupiscence of the flesh. Through which vanities, namely, the human mind, flowing down from the highest truth, is cast headlong so far that, pressed at last by carnal desires and wholly bound fast [0152A] by the enticements of pleasures, it not only cannot of itself remember its own origin, but cannot even when admonished will either that what evilly is should not be, or that what evilly is not should be. For what is, is evilly; and what ought to be, evilly is not. And that it wills either that what is should not be, or that what is not should be: this is worse than both. This therefore our Ecclesiastes here begins to demonstrate by the example of himself: namely, in what manner the human mind falls down through these steps of errors from the highest truth into vanity, and, its own vice driving it on, always goes to the worse. For to cleave to truth, and to love truth itself for its own sake, ought to have been its true good. When therefore it forsakes truth and turns away from her the mind's attention, then first, repulsed from her, it suffers the punishment of its own error: that [0152B] the very truth which it would not love in itself and for its own sake it now begins to seek for the sake of vanity; and because it has ceased to contemplate that one thing in which it might see all things, now, aiming not so much at truth as at novelty, it longs to know many things. For because it has lost that inward contemplation in which is the true refreshment of the mind, it seeks hungrily, as it were the food of understanding, in the knowledge of those things which are without. But because in all those things which appear outwardly a perfect knowledge of the truth can by no means be found, the wretch, languishing in the misery of his own failing, begins, as with a certain loathing, to run about always from some things to the desiring of others; and, casting away the former as empty and barren, he hopes that he can obtain the effect of his desire in those that remain — so foolish and blind that, though [0152C] he sees himself always frustrated in them, and never reaching the end of his desire, yet these things by no means ever cease to be courted as vain and unfruitful. But a just punishment nevertheless follows upon this so shameless desire and foolish curiosity, by which it stretches itself out superfluously in the knowledge of visible things, and either neglects the knowledge of its Creator — in which alone true blessedness consists — when it is had, or dissembles to seek it when it is not had; since in the very place where it perversely seeks delight, it finds nothing beyond grief and affliction of spirit. For in so great an occupation, finding a difficulty greater than its strength, it is oppressed as by a certain weight of its own anxiety; because, while desire drives it to seek wisdom in things of this kind, where it cannot be found, it is at once distracted by their multitude [0152D] and beaten back by their depth. This then is the labor and affliction of spirit by which the foolish and shameless mind is deservedly worn away for its own rashness, while, not only forgetting its Creator but also neglecting itself, it is occupied in searching out the lowest things, which do not pertain to salvation. And yet sometimes knowledge, sought with such vanity and found with so great labor in however small a part, puffs up the mind through pride, and casts it headlong from curiosity to elation, as from vanity to vanity. Which elation, namely, bringing in the ambition of the world, while it makes the mind greedy of praise, kindles it to the love of pomp and the glory of riches, so that, while it slips down from the glory of the inward good to the appetite of the outward, it is always [0153A] cast headlong into a worse vanity. But neither can corruption, once begun, stand still here. For as the goods of the flesh, while they are not yet had, flatter the greedy man by their appearance, so that they must needs be sought, so afterward, while they are possessed, they entice to pleasure one nervelessly broken and softened by use. And so the wretched mind, after the love of vain praise, after the ardor of a more vain cupidity, is lastly inflamed to the appetite of pleasure, so that now it begins even to sow vanity in the flesh, that afterward, made flesh out of flesh, it may reap the fruit of vanity in corruption. For this is the fruit of vanity: that the wretched mind, overwhelmed at last by carnal desires and lulled asleep by the pleasure of carnal desires, sleeps so deep that now it seeks wisdom not only not in truth, but not even in appearance. [0153B] And it pours itself out wholly to the trying of the evilly sweet pleasure of the flesh the more greedily, by how much the more, wearied within and repulsed from the intention of its own search, it despairs of finding the truth. And because, stretching above itself through search, it considers that it has sunk down under labor and excessive difficulty, it lets itself loose with all greediness to another consolation, and one that can be had without labor; but there too, finding vanity, it is not suffered to rest, because in the pleasure of the flesh it can neither keep hold of the fleeing delight when it is present, nor call it back when it has passed away. And thus, wearied and scattered on every side, it is shaken by the storm of its own vanity, so that through that very thing wherein it went away evilly delighted, it may at last, wholesomely afflicted, be compelled to return. And often there is a certain grievous struggle in the mind, so that, while [0153C] it considers itself at once delighted and afflicted in the lowest things, with great desire, for love of liberty, it longs to forsake even the things it has loved, if it could be done. This struggle therefore and tumult of the human mind through the various pursuits of mortal life Ecclesiastes will express in the words that follow, taking upon himself in a sentiment the case of all; and he will show in what manner it falls down from the vanity of curiosity to the vanity of pomp and of ambition, and thereafter to the vanity of pleasure, as is demonstrated in the sequence and order of the book. But since we have completed those things which were to be said in the preface, let us now return to expounding the words of his narrative.

## HOMILY V. *On the literal and moral exposition of the words of Ecclesiastes already spoken.*

[0153D]

*I Ecclesiastes was king of Israel in Jerusalem.* First this seems to me by no means to be passed over: that some judge that Solomon wrote this book in penitence, and that he therefore so studiously reproves in it the vanity of worldly things, and most of all of carnal pleasure, because he himself had learned all things by experience, corrupted by the luxury of delights and seduced by the blandishments of women. And that therefore he was unwilling to say: I am king of Israel in Jerusalem; because, the purple of the kingdom laid aside, he had already come down from his throne, and, despising the power which he had ill held, he was bewailing his guilt in the habit of penitence — and therefore he says: he was king in Jerusalem. And would that it stood established that this is true, and that we had as certain a testimony concerning [0154A] his penitence as we have an undoubted one concerning his fault! But now, since we cannot affirm doubtful things for certain, let us pursue those which are not doubtful. I Ecclesiastes. He sets himself forth, as we have said, as an example of all the things he is about to say, so that hearers may the sooner give credence to his words, in that they understand that he learned what he taught not by hearing only, but by experiencing. As if he were to say. I who teach you have made trial of all the things I say. For who could better know what vanity there is in the summit of earthly power? For I was king of Israel in Jerusalem. A loftiness great enough: to reign over so great a people and in so noble and famous a city, and to see oneself upon the throne of the kingdom, lord over all in power and set above all in honor. And to what end these things? [0154B] I was, he says. As though he should say: Now I am not; because even if I am, I now recognize that that very thing which I am is nothing. And how he came to this, that he should recognize himself to be nothing, he then pursues, saying:

*I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out prudently concerning all things which are done under the sun.* As though he should say: I, outwardly swollen with power and inwardly puffed up with knowledge, attempted to seek things higher than myself. But where by vainly presuming I swelled above myself, there by failing I truly recognized the direction of myself. I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. A great purpose, if it could have come to effect; but how should the human mind suffice for so great things? Great pride therefore it is that mortal man should presume concerning so many things, and [0154C] again great curiosity to desire so many. I proposed, he says. See how all things sound of elation. He does not say, I thought; but, I proposed — whereas the temptation would at least have been venial and human if a swollen thought had touched the soul suddenly and in passing, as it is sometimes wont to do, and yet had not been received or approved by consent. But now the mind, not only lifted up but also blind, fell down into so great a depth of error that it not only thought to do that which was disordered, but even presumed that it could fulfil that which had been impossible. I proposed in my mind. A huge attempt. And what things? To seek, and to search out. To seek things unknown, and to search out things deep. How? Wisely. O foolish heart! [0154D] Therefore thou dost not seek wisdom, but professest only to seek by wisdom: for this thou hast said: I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. If therefore thou seekest wisely, thou wilt seek by wisdom. And thou sayest: Just so; I will seek by wisdom. For I should seek ill, if I did not seek by wisdom. For if I should seek without wisdom, even if I sought wisdom, I should seek foolishly. But to seek wisdom foolishly — that very thing would now be not to be wise, but to be without sense. Wherefore I will seek wisely, and I will seek by wisdom, and I will seek wisdom. Tell me then the wisdom by which thou wilt seek: where wilt thou seek? and by what wisdom wilt thou seek wisdom. By which dost thou seek? Already, he says, I have the wisdom [0155A] by which I may seek; and therefore by the wisdom which I have I will seek; and the wisdom by which I may seek, I will not seek. What wilt thou seek? Concerning all things which are done under the sun. What is "concerning all things"? Why didst thou not say, all things which are done under the sun? Because, he says, I proposed something greater, and much greater. For the things which are done under the sun are all visible, and therefore, though it be a great thing, yet it is not the highest, to seek and to search out those things which can be comprehended by the eye. Therefore I will not seek those things, but I will seek concerning those things. To seek and to search out concerning all things which are done under the sun. Not those things which are seen, but, concerning those which are seen, those things which are not seen. Not those things which are done under the sun, which are seen; but, concerning those which are done under the sun, the reasons and causes of those things which are not seen. These things therefore I proposed: [0155B] to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. Surely thou hast great wisdom. Who gave thee so great wisdom? Art thou a man, and wilt thou seek wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun? Whence hast thou such wisdom: God, thou sayest, gave it. Let us now see. For thou shalt not pass by unexamined. For we wish first to know whether thou canst render an account of thyself, thou who hast come with so great a purpose that thou thinkest to search out the reason of all the things which are done under the sun. Say then: in that wisdom by which thou proposest to search out the reason of all things, hast thou been able as yet to recognize at least thine own possibility: I, he says, unless I had hoped that I could bring the thing itself to effect — what I should believe altogether impossible, even if I thought to do it, yet I should by no means [0155C] propose that I would do it. O foolish heart! This is what I said: because thou hast not known thyself, therefore thou hast presumed to desire what was above thee — in the one blind, in the other swollen, in both foolish. Thou therefore wilt search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. Search now, bestir thyself, give effort. Seek, and thou shalt find. What wilt thou find? Thou wilt find wisdom. What wisdom? That thou mayest know thine own folly. For thou shalt seek and shalt not find what thou seekest; thou shalt labor and shalt not profit, and vexation alone shall give understanding to the hearing.

## HOMILY V. *On the literal and moral exposition of the words of Ecclesiastes already spoken.* (cont.)

*For God hath given this worst occupation to the sons of men, that [they may be distended] they might be occupied therein.* Rightly and justly: that because they would not stand in truth, [0155D] they should, divided through multiplicity, be distended and occupied in vanity. Therefore, he says, I saw all things which are done under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and affliction of spirit. Thanks be to God. Now for the first time thou hast begun to be wise. Now I see that thou hast the wisdom by which thou canst seek and search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. For wisely hast thou found, and wisely hast thou understood, that all is vanity and affliction of spirit. Yet I should like to know whence comes to thee this so sudden repentance. We expected something great, and that grand purpose had already made all men not attentive and expectant. For who would think that anything scanty could come forth out of so great a promise? To seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. And how afterward: God hath given this worst occupation [0156A] to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein. What occupation dost thou mean? This, thou sayest: that they propose in their mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. Why then dost thou call this the worst occupation: To seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun? Take away, he says, "wisely." For it would not be the worst occupation, wisely to seek and to search out concerning all things which are done under the sun. But who can do this? It is above the sense of man to search out the causes of all things and to comprehend the reason of all that is done under the sun. Therefore it can be proposed, but it cannot be done, to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. For many things lie hid, and very many are hidden away, and all are reserved for hereafter; nor ought that to be searched out [0156B] which is not lawful to be done. Therefore what cannot wisely be done cannot wisely be proposed, even if it is proposed to be done wisely. I therefore foolishly proposed what I could not wisely do: to seek and to search out concerning all things which are done under the sun. Foolish on both sides — both when I proposed what I could not, and when I did what I ought not — with a third folly added: that I knew neither of the two. Yet I sought and searched out what I proposed to seek and to search out; I sought, and I did not find what I sought. Yet I found something: namely, that I could not do what I had believed; and there I recognized that God hath given this worst occupation to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein. Therefore it profited to have been foolish; but yet folly was not wisdom. Yet folly was given, that it might train [0156C] the sons of men unto wisdom. They have been left to themselves, that they may know themselves, and knowing may condemn and flee what they have become of themselves. This worst occupation therefore God hath given to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein. For because the mind of man would not stand in that one good in which it could happily rest, and without distraction or occupation possess the fullness of the highest truth, it is cast forth outside itself and scattered into the multiplicity of visible things; and the truth which, blinded within, it cannot draw from the fountain, it attempts at least to flee, with parched inward parts, as it were through certain rivulets of visible things. But the more it pours itself outward by intention toward visible things, so much the more does it grow dark within from the knowledge of invisible things; [0156D] because, while it is scattered more widely through outward things, it is the more blinded, being turned away from inward things. Whence fittingly Cain, when he beheld his own crime uncovered, and, reprobate by a greater crime, despaired of pardon for his crime, is read to have said to the Lord. *Behold, thou dost cast me out this day from the face of the earth! and from thy face I shall be hid: and I shall be a vagabond and a fugitive upon the earth [n: (Gen. IV)]*. For the reprobate mind, cast out from the face of the Lord, is hidden, while, scattering itself through outward things, it is so much the more covered from the sight of the inward light, by how much the more it is held always occupied in thinking upon those things which are without. Whence fittingly it is there said, a vagabond and a fugitive. A vagabond, namely, through disordered concupiscence, and a fugitive through a sinful conscience: while he divides himself in concupiscence through thought, and in conscience through despair [0157A] turns himself away, the sinner himself hides from himself the light of truth, that he may not be able to return. Therefore God hath given this worst occupation to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein. Why did he give it, that they may be distended therein? That they may stretch and distend themselves, may labor and fail, and may return, and he may heal them. For if they were not distended in their occupation, nor labored, that occupation itself would become exceedingly sweet, and they would not be willing to forsake it, nor would they long any more to return where truth is. Therefore God gave them the worst occupation, that they may be distended therein. Let us give thanks to his mercy, because he has made us labor in our evil, in our turning away; because he has hedged our way with thorns, that we may return and be converted to him, the husband and spouse and friend of our soul, because it was well with us then [0157B] more than now. But this we did not understand, and we thought it was well with us when it was ill. And therefore he himself sprinkled bitterness and wormwood, and gave gall into the cup, upon our evilly sweet turning-away, which flatters unto death, and upon the worst occupation. And he gave this worst occupation to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein. For occupation is the distraction and the binding of minds, which turns aside and scatters and ensnares souls, that they may not be strong enough to think upon those things which are of salvation — and therefore, occupation. Why the worst? Because there is another evil occupation also, but not the worst; and it is that which is busied about the necessities of mortal life, and is anxious about very many things; and that occupation is evil; and, to say something further, it is malice itself, so that of it that word is rightly understood: *Sufficient for the day is its own malice. [0157C] [n: (Matth. VI)]*. This occupation therefore is necessary to the misery of mortal life, to be swallowed up afterward by the glory of immortal life; and therefore it is evil unto misery, but not evil unto fault; since, if they have a punishment alien from blessedness, it has not a fault contrary to justice and truth. But the occupation of curiosity, by which the mind stretches itself out to unlawful things, and presses on to search and to investigate what it either does not befit it to know, or is harmful to it — that is the worst occupation; because, while it spreads itself beyond measure, either it takes hold of what it has set its affection upon, and puffs up the mind through empty knowledge, or, if it is not able to lay hold of it, it wearies the mind through delay and despair.

## HOMILY VI. *What it is to be distended in the worst occupation.*

[0157D] *This worst occupation therefore God hath given to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein.* What is, that they may be distended? That outwardly they swell, inwardly they become empty. For what is distended appears indeed greater without; but whence it is seen to have taken increase from without, thence it is truly proved to have lost solidity within. For while it strives to reach beyond itself into that which is not, it begins to fail in itself and to grow empty of that which is. So indeed the human mind, while through curiosity it is stretched toward searching out those things which are outside itself, is hindered by the very occupation of its own searching, so that it cannot consider itself. This worst occupation therefore God hath given to the sons of men, that they may be distended therein. O worst [0158A] occupation! O ruinous distension! whither dost thou drag the mind? How much dost thou promise, and how much dost thou take away? Thou promisest to man the whole of what he himself is not, and thou takest away the whole of what he himself is. What if thou didst give the whole that thou promisest, and take away the whole that thou takest away? *For what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world, but suffer the loss of his own soul? [n: (Matth. VI.)]* How much more now, since falsely thou promisest the whole, and truly thou takest away the whole? Thou art worst, distending and scattering, afflicting and torturing minds; suggesting to those whom thou rulest that those things are always to be desired whose searching out is either harmful or vain, and whose finding is much more either useless or ruinous. If therefore thou wert sweet, and couldst possess minds without labor, who would ever detect thy malice? But now [0158B] the very labor and affliction which thou bringest upon minds make thee hateful, and what thou promisest is the more easily recognized to be vain, while what thou bringest in is felt to be hard. Thus thou trainest many unto wisdom, who then at last fully detect how great a vanity follows after thee, when they have begun to feel by experience how great a difficulty lies hid in thee for those who labor. Therefore he added and said: *I saw all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit [n: (Eccle. I)]*. I saw, he says, where, didst thou see? Who taught thee? By doing, he says, I saw; by experiencing I came to know. What didst thou do? *I set before,* he says, *in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun [n: (Ibid.)]*. And behold, I had begun to seek and to search out, and I thought that in so laborious a study I should find some issue. I stretched out [0158C] therefore my mind as far as I could; I poured out my thought upon surveying all things. I took sleep away from my eyes, nor did I give rest to my heart night and day, until I might find what my soul was seeking, that I might find the reason concerning all things which are done under the sun. But what end could there have been in such attempts? I did and I failed, I strove and I was driven back, until my soul wasted away and my senses were darkened; since, in so great a multitude of things and in the depth of hidden truth, while the understanding began both to be scattered and to be beaten back, I was no longer able to bear the weight of labor and the straitness of an inextricable struggle. Then, returned into myself and as it were driven back from that dense and impassable pathlessness of hidden nature against which I was striving to press, I began to think that it is foolish [0158D] and vain that mortal man should seek with so obstinate a zeal the knowledge of those things which not only were made outside his nature, but also can neither add anything to his salvation if they be known, nor take anything away if they be not known. There therefore I saw that God hath given this worst occupation to the sons of men; that they may be distended therein, because all things which are done under the sun are all vanity and affliction of spirit. For because they have no fruit, they are vain; and because they afflict, they are harmful. For they do not help those who possess them, and they afflict those who seek them. For they cannot be sought without labor, but they can be possessed without profit. For the mind, as soon as it has been occupied with the care and desire of seeking and of finding them, and has poured itself out into them through the zeal of curiosity [0159A] and the solicitude of cupidity — to be afflicted with a punishment worthy of its own rashness — is both scattered by their multiplicity and beaten back by their difficulty. I saw therefore all things which are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit. I saw that this very thing also had been vain, that I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. I saw that it is vain that the sons of men are occupied with the worst occupation, that they may be distended therein; and all this I saw when I had made trial of it, and I saw how great labor and affliction of spirit there was in this, that I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun. And I saw that all is vanity and affliction of spirit in all things which are done under the sun. These things therefore I saw. But why do not all the sons of men likewise [0159B] see the worst occupation which God hath given them, that they may be distended therein, so as to understand and see the vanity and affliction of spirit in all things which are done under the sun [sic: *sole*]? Why do they labor and not feel it; are afflicted and scattered; and are distended in the worst occupation, and do not understand their own vanity and the affliction of spirit in all things which are done under the sun? Because, he says, the perverse are corrected with difficulty. Of which let us speak more at large.

## HOMILY VII. *That the perverse are corrected with difficulty,* etc.

*The perverse are corrected with difficulty.* Therefore they cannot understand, because they are perverse; and therefore they labor and do not feel it, and they take delight in their own affliction *(Job [0159C] XXX)*, and think it is well with them while it is ill. For they are perverse to such a degree that the judgment of truth is not in them, thinking *good* to be what is *evil*, and what is *good* to be *evil, putting darkness light, and light darkness;* and esteeming *bitter sweet, and sweet bitter [n: (Isa. V)]*. For they reckon that there are delights beneath the senses; and therefore they love their own griefs, and thrust themselves willingly upon the worst occupation, and are distended therein; because, while with blinded mind they desire what falsely seems to delight, they do not attend to what truly tortures and afflicts. Therefore then they do not see their own vanity and the affliction of spirit in all things which are done under the sun, because they are perverse and are corrected with difficulty. And *the number of fools is infinite.* For they are not only turned away, but also [0159D] perverse. Turned away from God; in themselves perverse. And being turned away they are not easily converted, because being perverse they are corrected with difficulty. For if they were corrected in themselves, they would be converted through themselves. Because if they first received the judgment of truth in themselves, they would afterward see by their own judgment that vanity must be fled and truth followed. But now, being turned away, they do not see the light of truth; nor, being perverse, do they see by the light of truth; and therefore they are corrected with difficulty, because they know neither how to seek rightness and truth when absent, nor how to approve them when present. Therefore the perverse are corrected with difficulty, and the number of fools is infinite. For they would not be so many if they could easily be corrected. And in this it is manifestly shown how difficult the correction of the perverse is, that the multitude of fools [0160A] is infinite Now therefore the perverse and [sic: *stultitam*] are as hard to correction by their perversity as they are bold against truth by their multitude; and therefore the perverse are corrected with difficulty, and the number of fools is infinite. Wilt thou know, he says, how hard it is for the perverse to be corrected? Take me. I will this day become for thee an example of all. For I too was once perverse, and I myself did not understand my own perversity; but I thought myself to be upright, and to be acting rightly, when *I proposed in my mind to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun;* nor was there then any consideration of truth in me which might correct and restrain me, lest I should attempt to exceed my own measure, nor presume to desire those things which have not been given to men to know and to search out. I went down therefore into [0160B] the *worst occupation* which *God hath given to the sons of men, that* they may be distended *therein,* and I scattered my mind upon all things, and began to run through all things with thought, that I might seek and search out concerning all things which are done under the sun: but I was not able. And I began to labor and to be vehemently afflicted with weariness; and I saw that my mind, whithersoever it turned itself, was filled with grief and bitterness and anxiety, and the labor of seeking was immense, and the fruit of finding scanty. It came to pass therefore that at length the punishment itself and the great affliction made me prudent. *And I saw all things which are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit.* I knew therefore the truth, and I rejected vanity, because I felt the affliction. And I seemed already wholly corrected of my perversity; but there was still another entanglement; [0160C] and I did not know that the perverse are corrected with difficulty. I was then already corrected, so that I might know truth out of vanity, and I was not yet corrected so that I should not be proud of the knowledge of truth. One chaff of error had already been shaken off, and there still remained another, more tenacious and clinging, the chaff of elation. For the perverse are corrected with such difficulty that they either do not admit correction and purgation at all, or do not receive it to perfection. Therefore I had already begun to be corrected, but I was not yet perfectly corrected; and therefore I knew the labor of my presumption, but I did not know the use of my finding. I knew that it is a vain affliction to seek things not profitable to salvation; but I did not yet know that it is a vain elation [0160D] to be proud of things found.

Therefore *I spoke in my heart, saying: Behold, I am become great.* For I knew not that I had swollen with puffing up, and therefore I seemed great to myself, and I said in my heart: Behold, I am become great. In my heart I said: for out of the heart I swelled, and therefore in the heart I said it; because in the heart I saw whence I swelled, so that the elation might be there where the cause of the elation was. I spoke in my heart: Behold, I am become great. How great!

*I went before,* he says, *in wisdom all who were before me in Jerusalem.* Little by little one proceeds into corruption, and the depraved mind, as the swelling grows, is always cast headlong into the worse. First it thought of itself more than it ought; then it came even to the contempt of others. [0161A] I went before in wisdom all who had been before me in Jerusalem. Therefore then thou didst swell and wast puffed up, because thou didst go before in wisdom all who were before thee in Jerusalem. And how great a thing was this, that thou shouldst therefore lift up thy neck, because thou didst go before in wisdom all who were before thee in Jerusalem? Do not wonder, he says. Often pride rejoices more in singularity than in comparison. For elation does not always care to attend to what sort those are whom it goes before in the comparison; because sometimes this alone abounds for its exaltation, that among all who were before it in Jerusalem it recognizes none equal to itself. For this reason therefore I too, seeing that I went before in wisdom all who were before me in Jerusalem — even if I discerned that there had been few wise men before me in Jerusalem, [0161B] yet I gloried vehemently, considering myself superior to them in wisdom; since, although those before me, in comparison with whom I was made pre-eminent, were neither very many nor great, yet I saw that many wise men could come after me in Jerusalem, to whom I should become the first by the example of wisdom. That therefore I preferred myself in wisdom in comparison with those who went before looked also to this, that I gloried that I was established by a pre-eminent example into an authority for those to come, so that to those who went before I might be found the highest, but to those who came after the first author of wisdom. And therefore I spoke in my heart, saying: Behold, I am become great, and I went before in wisdom all who were before me in Jerusalem.

*And my mind hath contemplated many things wisely, and [0161C] I have learned.* Therefore thou wast already somewhat corrected, because thou didst not say, my mind hath contemplated all things wisely, as thou hadst above proposed *to seek and to search out wisely concerning all things which are done under the sun;* but thou didst bring in something more moderate, saying: My mind hath contemplated many things wisely — that thou mightest show thyself taught by the worst occupation, and to have seen the vanity and affliction of spirit, so as not to presume any further concerning all things; but yet not fully corrected, so as not to be proud concerning very many. By seeking all things therefore thou didst find very many, not all; and by failing toward all thou didst understand that man ought not to presume concerning all things; but by finding very many thou didst not consider that man ought not to be proud even concerning very many. Therefore in some respect thou wast corrected, and [0161D] in some respect uncorrected, when thou didst say: My mind hath contemplated many things wisely and I have learned; because, although they were many in comparison with few, yet those very things were few in comparison with all. But this looked rather to humility: that thou, who hadst already made trial of thine own failing with regard to all things, shouldst call the very many things thou hadst found not many in comparison with the few of others, but rather few in comparison with those things, all of them, which thou couldst not attain. But because the rashness of curiosity had already been repressed through its own failure and affliction in the searching out of all things, but the swelling of elation had grown in the contemplation of very many things, therefore thou didst still swell and say: Behold, I am become great, and I went before in wisdom all who were before me in Jerusalem, and my mind hath contemplated many things wisely [0162A] and I have learned. But, I ask thee, if thou didst go before in wisdom all who were before thee in Jerusalem, from whom didst thou learn, that thou shouldst say: My mind hath contemplated many things wisely and I have learned? If thou wast wiser than all, from whom couldst thou learn what thou thyself didst not know? Or wast thou therefore also wiser than all, because thou didst learn from all, and the wisdom of all was gathered in thee alone, so that thence thou mightest go before in wisdom, out of all men, each one severally — in saying which thou hadst all men as teachers, from each severally? Or perhaps thou didst not learn from men, but the trials of things taught thee what thy mind contemplated wisely, so that thence the contemplation of wisdom might become more certain to reason, in that the very outcome of things manifestly proved it to one making trial? For it does not seem to accord with thy character that thou shouldst learn from men, [0162B] thou who hadst been raised in esteem so far above men that thou didst think to seek and to search out not only many things wisely, but even all things which are done under the sun: therefore thou didst contemplate and learn, because thou didst think and prove, so that thou mightest demonstrate the force and power of thy understanding to be so much the greater, the more evidently thou didst bring forth all the arguments of thy reason to the visible trials of things. And perhaps this man willingly became a fool in his own wisdom, that he might teach fools wisdom. For he would not so diligently set forth to us the ways of his own error, unless in that same error of his he were thinking of our instruction. Therefore he still redoubles and commends that evil diligence of his, and subjoins how he obtained that wisdom of which he swelled, [0162C] saying:

*And I gave my heart that I might know prudence and doctrine, and errors and folly.* Which words can be joined to those above in two ways under the same sense; for, being about first to show this elation, he had thus begun. I spoke in my heart; and then he subjoins what he spoke. Behold, I am become great, and I went before in wisdom all who were before me in Jerusalem; and my mind hath contemplated many things wisely and I have learned; and afterward he brought in that which we have just now set forth. And I gave my heart that I might know prudence and doctrine, errors and folly. This whole series can be comprehended under one continuation, so that he is understood to have said all this in his heart: namely, that he was made great; and that [0162D] he went before in wisdom all who were before him in Jerusalem; and that his mind contemplated many things wisely and learned many things; and that he gave his heart that he might know prudence and doctrine, and errors and folly; and that after all these things, when he had thus spoken in his heart and had exalted himself concerning the searching out and the consideration of so great things, at last, coming to his senses, he recognized that this glorying also was vain, and on this account subjoins:

## HOMILY VII. *That the perverse are corrected with difficulty,* etc. (cont.)

*And I knew that in these also there was vanity and affliction of spirit: in that in much wisdom there is much indignation; and he who adds knowledge, adds also labor.* But if anyone wishes to distinguish the sentiment, and to divide off what we have brought forward last from the things said above, [0163A] he can draw it from what precedes in this way: that all the things which have been said above he spoke, as it were, in his heart — namely, that he was made great, that he surpassed in wisdom all who were before him in Jerusalem, that his mind contemplated many things wisely and learned them; and when he had said all these things in his heart, he then testifies that things higher still are to be investigated. As if he were saying: All these things which have been said above I spoke in my heart, and when I had spoken all these things together in my heart, then at last, taking confidence from the preceding contemplation, I gave my heart, that I might seek things higher still and investigate things deeper; namely, that I might know prudence and doctrine, and errors and folly. But that he says he gave his heart is to be understood thus: that he made it free [0163B] and unencumbered, so that it should not be divided among this thing or that, but should stretch itself wholly toward the consideration set before it. In this word he also expresses the type of pride and the swelling of elation: that he says he gave his heart to the contemplation of wisdom, as though the possibility of finding the truth lay ready at hand for him, if only the will to seek were not lacking. But to what end he gave his heart he sets forth, saying: That I might know prudence and doctrine, and errors and folly. Above he testified that he had contemplated and learned many things wisely; but now, after all these things, he disposes himself to investigate, that he may know prudence and doctrine, and errors and folly. Whence it is plain that the things above are to be referred to the nature of things, but these which he subjoins to the morals of men — using indeed a preposterous order, [0163C] since first his own life ought to have been corrected by circumspection of morals, and then study applied to the other things which lay outside his own nature, so that first the inner eyes of the heart might be cleansed from vices, and afterward opened in the contemplation of truth. But elation, which wished to appear great without, sought first the outward things, so that first, through outward knowledge, it might open a way for boasting, and then, by searching its own inward things as well, might cast them forth without for display. Whence rightly, when he had said that he had sought prudence, he added doctrine equally; because a mind greedy of glory and display wished by no means to have the prudence of circumspection for living well, but for teaching; and therefore it reckoned that the knowledge of prudence, without the knowledge of doctrine, would be useless to it and unfruitful. [0163D] But as for his confessing that he wished to know errors and folly also: by no means did he wish to know evils for this, that once known he might avoid them; but that he might both exalt himself over the knowledge of evils, and condemn others for their work. Now error is when evil is committed through ignorance, but folly is when evil that is known is not avoided. Therefore he wished to know both goods and evils alike, and along with the knowledge of both he coveted doctrine at the same time, so that all that the mind might comprehend through knowledge, it might be able to manifest for display through doctrine. But the perverse soul, finding everywhere the punishment of its own wickedness, fled back, on account of the labor and affliction of spirit, from all that it had inordinately desired for the sake of elation. [0164A] For because curiosity was driving him to inquiry and pride to display alike, it was fitting that labor should press him as swollen, and that occupation should scatter him as curious, so that at least in punishment he might recognize his own vice, and that, if not the love of virtue, then the pain of affliction might hold him within measure. Therefore above, being curious, he found occupation; but here, being elated, labor and affliction; since, while he seeks to know evils and goods not for edification but for elation, that very knowledge becomes for him a witness of his own depravity, so that the knowledge which in his elation he was seeking for display reproves the wicked man through his conscience. For he is compelled to despise himself from the very thing by which he strives to become great in the eyes of others; because while he seeks to know more of the truth that he may insinuate it to others, [0164B] he sees the more in himself, of his depravity, what he must condemn. Hence, therefore, the soul is indignant with its very self, and takes up a certain quarrel and wrestling against itself, because the foulness of the vices which pride despises, depravity defends. In this conflict of such a kind, therefore, great labor and indignation of pride is born; because, while it disdains to lie subject to the vices and strives to drive them from itself, it is overcome by its own depraved desires, so that it may not be able to accomplish what it wills. Thence, therefore, it now begins to abominate even the very knowledge of truth, so that, since on account of its infirmity it cannot take away what it hates in itself, it may at least be able, through ignorance, not to see it. Therefore, when he had said that he had found labor and affliction in his knowledge, and had set forth whence that same affliction and labor came, saying: In that [0164C] in much wisdom there is much indignation, and he who adds knowledge, adds also labor — he at once subjoins how, worn down and seized with accidie by that same affliction of spirit and labor and indignation, he overcame knowledge itself, and turned his soul away from the inquiry of wisdom, where he was afflicted, to delights and pleasure, saying:

## HOMILY VIII. *That man flees away from the truth: as Adam in paradise fled, and hid himself.*

*[n: (ECCLES. II.)] I said in my heart: I will go and abound in delights and enjoy good things.* Behold how the despairing mind casts itself wholly into pleasure, and now calls the blandishments of the flesh alone good things, because in them it finds no labor and affliction, reckoning as evil, as it were, [0164D] the inquiry into truth, in which it had earlier labored, distending itself through curiosity more than was right. But this estimation, in its turn, because it displays manifest folly, is the more quickly caught out; because the pleasure of the flesh, which seemed sweet to one desiring it, is at once rejected by one who has tried it. Whence he immediately adds, saying:

*And I saw that this also was vanity. Laughter I counted an error, and to joy I said: Why art thou deceived in vain?* But how great a vanity there is in the delights of the flesh, I remember that I said above. Whence the remaining things which follow are to be considered by us, because these too, although they seem plain in themselves, yet have perhaps something which diligent investigation may add. He says, therefore: Laughter I counted an error, and to joy I said: In vain art thou deceived? [0165A] It is clear to all that through laughter the gladness conceived within is in a certain fashion drawn outward, and that what lay hidden within of joy is published abroad — the bars of modesty being, as it were, broken — by a certain levity and incontinence of a slippery mind. And therefore laughter is rightly called an error; because when the mind pours its joy outward through unfitting gladness, going as it were to the left, it forsakes the straight way by which it ought to have gone, rejoicing, into God. But it is to be known that spiritual joy by no means dissolves the soul into laughter; but only that gladness which is conceived from the blandishment of the flesh is easily opened out also through a motion of the flesh. For because inordinate joy, in first entering the soul, broke the bars of continence, afterward, when it has begun to grow within, it easily bursts out without [0165B] modesty by the same way by which it slipped in. For a slippery mind pours out the perverse seed which it first conceives without modesty, bringing it to birth afterward, as it were, without chastity; nor can it hold itself back from casting out the gladness growing within, the bars of whose integrity were broken when it was conceiving it. First, therefore, it is deceived, when it takes in the allurements of the flattering world to its joy within; afterward it errs, when it pours out the joy conceived within, through laughter, into the wantonness of the world. It is to be noted that joy is only reproved, but laughter is altogether rejected; because laughter is in every way evil, while joy is not always evil, save when it is of evil; and therefore he rejects the one and chastises the other, so that both what is utterly evil may be guarded against, and what can be good may be corrected. [0165C] Therefore, he says: Laughter I counted an error, and to joy I said: Why art thou deceived in vain? It is deceived, therefore, when it takes delight in harmful things, and thinks it is well with it when it is ill. It is deceived also when it is wrapped up in the occupation of present delights, and is hindered, so that it may not be able to consider the evils to come.

But why in vain? It is deceived in vain, because the delights of the world can indeed themselves turn the heart away from the consideration of evils to come; but they cannot free it from the pressure of those that come upon it. It is deceived in vain also, because the joys of a deceptive good, in which it exults, are mingled with such great bitternesses that they ought rightly to displease, even if they were bound to remain. In vain, therefore, is it deceived on both sides; namely, both when it does not see the evil which it suffers, and when it does not foresee the evil [0165D] which it shall suffer; since both the reason is manifest which can judge the one for him who considers it well, and the experience is present which shows the other to him who suffers it. Therefore he adds and says:

## HOMILY VIII. *That man flees away from the truth: as Adam in paradise fled, and hid himself.* (cont.)

*I thought* therefore *in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might carry over my mind to wisdom, and might shun folly, until I should see what was useful for the sons of men: with what deed there is need under the sun, in the number of the days of his life.* O human heart, where art thou? How hast thou come hither, that thou knowest not this — what is useful for the sons of men, with what deed there is need under the sun, in the number of the days of his life? Where art thou, that thou art ignorant of this? *Where art thou, Adam, where art thou? I heard,* he says, *thy voice, and I hid myself [n: (Gen. III)]*. O thou hidden one, from whom hast thou hidden thyself? O [0166A] hidden one, where art thou? How far off art thou, and how near art thou? How far art thou from him, and how near art thou to him? Therefore, where art thou? Behold, thy God seeks thee and cries: Where art thou? Thou turnest thyself away that thou mayest lie hid, and closest thine eyes that thou mayest not see. But he, seeing one who does not see — and therefore does not see, because he desires not to be seen — cries and says, on account of thy affection and not on account of any defect of his own: Adam, where art thou? He seeks thee, therefore, that thou mayest find him; and he seeks thee that thou too mayest seek him and say: Lord, where art thou? But thou, what dost thou do? For he, if he has lost, yet seeks; if he has lost, he has not lost the whole, because he sees what he has lost; and therefore he seeks what he has lost, because he sees what he has lost. For he would not seek unless he saw. But thou, what? Adam, where art thou? Thou hast lost, and the whole; thou hast lost, because thou hast both lost, [0166B] that thou mightest not have, and hast ceased to see, that thou mightest not seek. For if thou seest what thou hast not, thou understandest what thou art to seek. But now thou art far off and art exiled from the truth, so that thou canst not see whence thou hast come and whither thou must return. Therefore thou seekest what thou oughtest to seek; because thou knowest not what thou hast lost. Thou seekest what is useful for the sons of men: with what deed there is need under the sun, in the number of the days of his life! Oh! how thou oughtest to have known this! But now thou art hidden from the truth, lying hid under the shadow of thine own ignorance; because thou hast withdrawn far off and hast been unwilling to be with her, without whom thou canst not be. For because thou canst not be without her, therefore thou seekest; and because thou art turned away and hidden, therefore thou knowest not what thou oughtest to seek — though yet in this thou hast by no means been able to be hidden from her, so as not to understand that thou must seek, [0166C] since thou seest that this too is lacking to thee which thou art seeking. Understand, therefore, that at least in this thou art utterly not hidden; because she follows him who flees, and presses herself upon him who is turned away, and teaches that she must be sought by him to whom she does not offer herself to be seen. Although this very thing too, outside the truth, thou dost not see — that thou seest it must be sought by thee, that thou seest it is lacking, granted that what it is thou dost not see. Therefore in the truth thou seest that thou must seek what thou dost not see to be the truth. Why is this? Because thou art hidden. For if thou wert not hidden, thou wouldest see that nothing besides the truth must be sought; and the truth itself thou wouldest not seek, but wouldest have. Now thou art hidden, and thou dost not see; and yet thou art not forsaken, because thou art admonished to seek what thou dost not see. Therefore it is said to thee: Adam, where art thou? — that thou mayest return to the truth and find the truth. [0166D] Thou wert unwilling to stand in the truth; now return to the truth, because thou canst not stand outside the truth. A wanderer and a fugitive and unstable shalt thou be all the days in which thou art not with her and in her; nor shall thy heart find where it may rest, if it be unwilling to stand in her; because neither will it stand outside her so as to seek, nor will it find, besides her, anything in which to rest. Upward, downward, far off and near, wherever it may go, it will not find rest until it finds her. Why art thou in tumult, unhappy one? Thou laughest, thou weepest, thou art cherished, thou art afflicted: what is that to wisdom? For because in wantonness and pleasure thou hast been foolish, in affliction thou shalt be wretched. What more will they be able to confer upon thee? *Vanity of vanities: vanity of vanities, and all things vanity [n: (Eccle. I)]*. [0167A] But thou hadst not yet come to know these things. Therefore, by thine own sense and thine own wisdom — which in her sight is folly — puffed up rather than solid, thou wert trying to struggle on, and didst suppose that thou wouldest do something when thou wert nothing. Thou hast tried all things, and everywhere thou hast failed. Soft things and hard, smooth and rough, prosperous and adverse: outside the truth they can corrupt, they cannot amend. Therefore thou wavest and art tossed; thou fallest and art thrown down and art driven on; thou desirest and dost not obtain. Groping and not seeing, thou goest forward in vain against what is opposite, seeking the truth where it is not. And thou, where art thou? She is within, and thou art without; and therefore she cries to thee and says: Adam, where art thou? Thou seekest, that she may reprove thy ignorance; she walks, that she may show thy instability. When the Lord was walking about *in paradise at the hour after midday, he called and said: Adam, [0167B] where art thou? [n: (Gen. III.)]* He did not walk, but walked about. What is "he walked about"? Hither and thither, as if wandering and roving, not going straight forward, but proceeding wherever — this is to have walked about. And why did he wish to walk about thus? That he might show himself outwardly such as he (had begun to be) within. For already the truth had been moved, and was wavering, so as to withdraw from the heart of the sinner. Nay rather, the truth stood and the sinful conscience wavered; and therefore the truth walked about without, because within the sinner wavered away from the truth. Yet it walked about and did not depart, nor did it go off straight on, drawing far away as though irrevocable and never to return again; but circling near and walking about close by, it went away and did not go away, now going and now returning, and surging with a certain great uncertainty, as though unwilling to desert its own seat and yet not [0167C] able to endure a polluted dwelling. What doest thou, Adam? Why art thou silent? Call her as she departs, follow her as she flees; since she is still near and waits to see whether perchance she be called back, and therefore she makes delay and gently threatens her departure, grieving that she has been injured and violently cast out; and she signifies that she wishes to return, if by chance she be invited to come. Therefore she signifies that she has not gone quickly away, but is waiting still: that she will go, nevertheless; and now, because there is no one to call her back, that she will go; and behold, that she walks in order to depart — since there is no one mindful of love, who remembers charity, who has at heart the affection of fellowship. O unhappy Adam, where is thy remembrance? Where hast thou fixed thy soul, that thou endurest these things? O hard one, hardened and obdurate, could not so great kindness, so great a flame, so vast an ardor of love soften thee, that thou shouldest melt and run [0167D] after her? But thou, what doest thou? *I heard,* he says, *thy voice, and I hid myself.* Why? *Because I was naked [n: (ibid.)]*. Therefore thou fleest the truth, because thou lovest depravity. But she, what does she do? She follows him who flees, she who forsook him as he departed. She who was turned away from him who did wicked things calls back him who persists in iniquity. Adam, where art thou? I, he says, know where thou art; thou knowest not. Therefore, where art thou? Attend to where thou art, that thou mayest correct what thou hast been made, and return to him by whom thou wert made. Adam, where art thou? I heard, Lord, thy voice, and I hid myself. O hidden and not hidden, not seeing and yet seen, from whom hast thou hidden thyself? I heard the voice, and the face thou didst not see. Why? Because hidden. For this thou hast gained by hiding thyself, that thou shouldest not see him by whom thou wast seen. Whom indeed [0168A] thou wast able to flee, but wast not able to escape; because not even hidden didst thou lie concealed from him. Therefore, being sought, thou wast found, because lying hid thou wast not hidden. But thou, by thy malice, fleest again, and again fleest, and art found and fleest; and always thou fleest, and dost not escape. Held, thou fleest; sought, thou fleest; searched out, thou deniest. Therefore, being sought, thou art found; having denied, thou art convicted; convicted, thou art condemned. Let us see, therefore, now, lest perchance we have made so great a digression without cause. Let us see our Adam — that ancient one, and new still by a repeated malice. Let us see him renewing still his old pursuits, and, a deserter from the truth, seeking the shade and the hiding-places and the coverings of leaves; convicted on every side, never willing to be reproved. Not able to lie hid, and always fleeing. Let us see, therefore, what he does. [0168B] For what does he do? *He saw* the food and gazed upon it, since it is delightful to the sight and sweet *to eat [n: (ibid.)]*; and he opened his jaws and said: I will go, and I will abound in delights, and I will enjoy good things. And behold, behind his back wisdom and truth cried out and said: Adam, where art thou? But he, hearing her voice and convicted by the truth crying within, could not deny the truth, and said: I heard, Lord, thy voice; and I saw truly that this was vanity, and therefore laughter I counted an error, and to joy I said: Why art thou deceived in vain? Behold a man hearing the truth and confessing the truth. Who, think you, is this man? He seems altogether great, and drawing near to the truth, who thus professes the truth. Truly great, if he were not hidden. For he hears, and does not see the truth; because he himself is without through concupiscence, [0168C] but the truth is within through wisdom. And the truth wishes to win him, and calls him back to herself, and again and so again cries from within and says: Adam, where art thou? But he, feeling himself betrayed and convicted, when one approach is blocked up, seeks other hiding-places for flight; and, held in check from pleasure, pours himself out toward avarice For indeed he first sought after the fruit for eating; now he seeks the leaves for shade, and hides himself from the light of the truth the more deeply, the more wickedly he covers the vice of ambition under the pursuit of thrift. Therefore he adds and says: I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine. Why? That I might, he says, carry over my mind to wisdom, and might shun folly. Well hast thou done this. *For no man can serve two masters [n: (Matth. VI)]*. Therefore thou hast done well, in cutting away [0168D] from thee the cloudy and darkening conscience, the delight of the flesh, so that thou mightest be able to find the luminous delight of truth, having nothing of impurity. Well hast thou done in this, that thou didst propose to withdraw thy flesh from wine, that thou mightest the better make thy soul drunk with wisdom, and gather it inward to its very self: where wisdom shines, where truth is known and prudence is found. For this very thing too was to shun folly: not to pour oneself out after empty and vain things to be desired, but to conform to the truth the whole intention of the mind and all the endeavors of the heart, restraining them under the governance of reason. This, therefore, thou hast done well. But how long? Until, he says, I should see what was useful for the sons of men: with what deed there is need [0169A] under the sun, in the number of the days of his life. See therefore that thou persevere, that thou seek in the truth, and that thou seek perseveringly; because the truth is not found save by those who seek her in the truth. Who are they who seek her in the truth? Those who approach her with the whole heart. Those who do not come half and withdraw half, but come whole and come wholly: these seek the truth in the truth. But those who gather their heart in one place and scatter it in another — these do not approach whole, nor do they approach wholly, and therefore they do not find the truth; because what they seemed to have gained of the truth in one place, they lose in another. Who gather wages and put *them into a bag with holes [n: (Agg. I)]*. If thrift gathers and avarice scatters, what does it profit? What does it confer if, binding the gullet, thou hast gathered through continence of pleasure, [0169B] and, opening the eyes, hast scattered through ambition? Thou markest that thou hast entered; but that thou hast gone out, thou markest not. If thou enterest and goest out, thou art without; just as, if thou goest out and enterest, thou art within. But if thou art without, wherever thou art thou art not with the truth; because the truth is within. And what does it matter where thou art, if thou art not there where the truth is? From wherever thou comest and by whatever way thou enterest, if thou art within, thou art well; because thou art with the truth. And wherever thou goest, by whatever way thou goest out, if thou art without, thou art ill; because thou art not with the truth. If, therefore, thou seekest in the truth, seek whole, approach whole, enter whole; because the truth is within. Why dost thou seek so long, and dost not find what thou seekest? Because thou seekest ill, because thou seekest there where what thou seekest is not. For thou seekest without, and what thou seekest is within. Therefore thou seekest ill, and [0169C] therefore thou canst not find what thou seekest, and for that reason thou wilt not be able to find rest there, where art thou? because the truth is not there where thou art. Where art thou? Under the shade, under the leaves; because thou hast lost the fruit, and therefore appearance deceives thee and the truth is not in thee. Wherever he shall have gone, thou wilt be defrauded: shadow is the whole of what thou seest, and the truth lies hidden. What is the shadow? The appearance of visible things is the shadow, and thou hast poured out thy soul into them, and hast hidden thyself under the leaves that thou mightest lie hid. And how dost thou seek the light while entering the darkness: in the fruit thou hast beheld vanity, and in the leaves dost thou think the truth to be? If all earthly things are vain for enjoying: how are they not much more vain for the seeing? For if they do not confer the true good on those who enjoy them, what can they confer on those who possess [0169D] and do not enjoy? Why then, after the good purpose of continence and the zeal for seeking wisdom, art thou so quickly turned again to vain occupation? Why? Save because thy mind has been cast forth without, and made a wanderer and a fugitive upon the earth. And therefore it cannot stand, because it is not fixed in the truth. Therefore, thou sayest, *I made my works great,* etc.

## HOMILY IX. *On the various vain endeavors of Ecclesiastes.*

*I made my works great. What works? I built myself houses, I planted vineyards, I made gardens and orchards, and I planted them with trees of every kind, and I built myself pools of water, that I might water the wood of sprouting trees.* This is what I said. Thou seekest without [0170A] what thou hast lost within. Thou makest thy works great, because in thine own self thou hast been made less. Thou buildest houses, because thou hast been cast forth from the dwelling of thine own conscience. Thou plantest vineyards and makest gardens, because the shoots of wisdom in thy heart have withered. Thou buildest pools, thou who hast not the fountain of life leaping up within. Thou waterest the wood of sprouting trees, because thou seekest shade, the light of truth being lost. What hast thou to do with these delights, unhappy one, forgetful of thine own goods? Where is now what a little before thou didst propose — to withdraw thy flesh from wine — thou who now makest thy soul drunk with every wantonness and vanity? Is wisdom sought thus? Thou didst seem to have gone out thither; how hast thou returned so quickly? How? Save because thou hast walked in a circuit, and thy path was tangled, and thrift led thee back [0170B] where gluttony had laid thee low. Behold, again thou hast fallen into pleasure, and hast been made the captive of vanity. How hast thou come hither, save because thou didst hear his voice and didst hide thyself? For this is the shadow of vanity under which thou liest hid, that thou mayest not see the truth. How, therefore, hast thou come hither? Oughtest thou not to have sought wisdom? But thy mind, exiled far from the truth and ignorant of the way of truth — from the very point at which it restrained itself from the one vice of pleasure by continence of the gullet, from that same point it poured itself out the more licentiously into every wantonness and superstition through the concupiscence of the eyes; and it is now the more wickedly corrupted in the whole, the more it seemed corrected in some part, however small. For before, thou wast corrupted and wast humbled, since thou didst see and understand what thou wast suffering; now, under the appearance of virtues, thou hast been made [0170C] the prey of vices. Within, avarice under the cover of thrift; and while it persuades the mind not to desert temperance in the things it possesses, it makes it keep things that will bring no profit. Thence, riches being multiplied, pride follows, while what has been sought through ambition is possessed for elation. Thence all these portents of vanity have arisen: that the foolish mind reckons the true good is to be found outside, in the trials of things — not as though the true good were to be sought within by means of the things which are without, but as though it consisted in them. Therefore without modesty it boldly diffuses itself through all things; and that mind which had found affliction in the abstinence of the flesh, another approach having been found through the concupiscence of the eyes, feeds carnal affection the more manifoldly. For it does not suffice the wanton man [0170D] to take delight in the things which were made for human service and for enjoyment, unless also, by a pride transgressing the equality of condition, he lord it over men. For this is what he adds after the rest and among the rest of his superstitions, saying.

*I possessed menservants and maidservants, and had a great household.* He was made lord of men, who was the servant of vices. How much better would a Lord be for thee, and here a companion? For there, to be lord would be the uprightness of one who reigns. But here, to be lord is not the uprightness of one who resists, but the iniquity of one who oppresses and the profit of one who endures. But the creature of glory attends to the appearance outwardly; the disease within it does not attend to. It thinks that what is puffed up is great, and therefore rejoices to be seen great outwardly. [0171A] But it does not fear to be empty and void within. I possessed, he says, menservants and maidservants, and had a great household. What could a great household have done without great possession, and much money, and an abundance of means? Therefore he added and said:

*Herds also, and great flocks of sheep, beyond all who were before me in Jerusalem.* Behold abundance. Where is glory? *I heaped up for myself silver and gold, and the substance of kings and of provinces.* How great the glory. And what follows, save that a mind forward to boasting quickly grows soft through wantonness and is unnerved, and says:

*I made myself singers, men and women, and the delights of the sons of men, cups and small pitchers [urceos] for the service [0171B] of pouring wines: and I surpassed in riches all who were before me in Jerusalem. Wisdom also persevered with me.* Great confidence. Therefore thou hast sinned securely. Therefore thou hast confidently poured out thy heart into the delights of pleasure, and upon the allurements of the beauties and enjoyments of vanity. Why? Because wisdom had persevered with thee. For why shouldest thou seek her, set within, if she herself did not leave thee wandering without? Yet what is this wisdom which so loves runnings-about and disdains the secret place? See lest perchance the likeness deceive thee, and what seems to be wisdom be not wisdom. Beware lest thou be deceived in the shadow of the sons, where thy father lay hid, who could not see the truth. For a shadow makes darkness; and if it seems to have rest, it has not light. Beware therefore lest thou too, while [0171C] under the shadow, thou seekest the rest of leaves, begin to suffer gloom. Nor canst thou, set in the shadow, discern clearly; because the image which appears is shadow alone, not truth. Hold this shadow of leaves, therefore, in suspicion, lest thou be deceived. What are the leaves? The appearances of visible things are the leaves, which now indeed appear beautiful and green, but will fall suddenly when the whirlwind has gone forth. What are the leaves? Houses, vineyards, gardens, pools, the wood of sprouting trees, households, possessions, gold, silver, the substance of kings and of provinces; lyres, citharas, pipes, organs, cups and pitchers, and precious vessels riches and pomps, and glory: all these are leaves. Why leaves? Because vain, because fleeting, because transitory: therefore leaves. They are green indeed [0171D] for a little time, but quickly wither and fall. But yet, while they stand, they make shade and have their own refreshment; but it is a dark shadow, and hostile to light. To the flesh indeed it seems to afford refreshment for a time, but it makes the eyes grow dim. Therefore we ought to hold the shadow in suspicion, and not easily to believe the things which are seen in the shadow. For images deceive the eyes, because the shadow itself too is an image, not truth. Therefore I said that thou shouldest hold the shadow in suspicion, thou who confessest thyself set under the leaves. Under the leaves thou art, in the shadow thou art, and thou seest wisdom beside thee. See diligently lest perchance it be not wisdom, but something else lying hid under her appearance. For what wisdom is there in the shadow of leaves? For the shadow of the leaves is delight, and enjoyment in the appearance and beauty of transitory things. And [0172A] this has its own wisdom. For thus men call wisdom that by which this rest, and this tranquility of the flesh, is cunningly and craftily sought and prudently preserved. And this is the wisdom by which *the children of this world* and the children of darkness *are more prudent than the children of light in their generation [n: (Luc. XVI)]* — which perseveres with those who lie in the shadow of the leaves; and they cannot see the light of true wisdom, in whose sight this wisdom is folly. For because they look to the advantages of the flesh alone, they do not attend to the losses of the soul; and because they wish to be cautious where there is nothing to be feared, they become foolish and imprudent to thee, where the danger is grave and the loss intolerable. For what wisdom is it to cherish the flesh and to neglect the soul? What wisdom is it to flee with the whole intention that which is troublesome [0172B] to the flesh for a little time, and not to guard against that which is agreed to be always deadly to the soul? This is the wisdom in which this man glories, lying under the shadow of the leaves. O leaves, and shadow, of what sort is your fruit? See, Adam, of what sort are thy leaves, and of what sort is thy fruit? Thou hast hidden thyself, and thy leaves afforded a covert, that, covered, thou mightest not see the truth. Thou hast eaten, and thy fruit furnished food, that, corrupted by the eating, thou mightest lose immortality. Recognize, wretched one; recognize thy evil; recognize thy misery; recognize where thou art and what thou hast been made. Turn thyself from the shadow to the brightness of light, that thou mayest not only hear the words but also see the face of the truth.

## HOMILY X. *On the remaining vanities, as far as that place: « The fool walketh in darkness. »*

[0172C]

*And when I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made, and to the labors in which I had sweated in vain, I saw in all things vanity and affliction of mind, and that nothing remains under the sun.* We have heard above with how great zeal this man toiled at gathering riches and increasing his goods; and then, on his own testimony, we have learned how he poured out his soul upon wantonness and upon the trying of pleasure, in those affluences of things which he had prepared; but now let us hear what he subjoins after all these things. When, he says, I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made, and to the labors in which I had sweated in vain, I saw in [0172D] all things vanity, and affliction of mind, and that nothing remains under the sun. And so at the outset this presses a question upon us: how does this man now for the first time say that he has turned himself to seeing his own works, when hitherto he seems to have done nothing else than to have applied his intention and his zeal to these things? When he made his works great, built houses, planted vineyards, and made gardens and orchards, and built pools, had menservants and maidservants, herds and flocks, silver and gold, the substance of kings and of provinces, and the delights of the sons of men. When, in short, not only in deed but also in mind he had so plunged himself into the love of his own things and into pleasure that he reckoned this his own portion, and in a manner believed himself to have been made for nothing else than that [0173A] he might delight himself in all these things which he had prepared: did he not see what he was doing? But he saw the appearance; he did not foresee the corruption. He saw what those things seemed to be which stood, but he did not attend to what those had become which had perished. For the love of present things, while it turned the whole intention of the mind upon itself, and, having entered through the gaze of the flesh into the deceptive appearance of the things that were seen, occupied the eyes of the heart as well, at one and the same time both took away the memory of things past and hid the foresight of things to come. Whence it came about that, while he looked to those things alone which were seen, he could not recognize the truth in them either; and at the same time, in his own works, being turned toward them, he saw the appearance which was coveted, and being turned away, he did not recognize the vanity which was to be guarded against. But it sometimes happens that [0173B] temporal goods are the more quickly detected to be vain when they have begun to abound the more — goods which often, when they are not had, are reckoned to have been able to profit, had they been at hand. But when, once had, they cannot, even in their own affluence, drive out the poverty of the mind, then for the first time they make manifest to him who tries them how scant a fruit they confer for those who labor. Whence fittingly this man, after so great an affluence of all things and the use of pleasures, says that he turned himself, that he might understand his own vanity. Because when he began to learn by experience that the things he possessed could not make him happy, then he recognized that the things sought with empty labor had made him far more wretched. When, he says, I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made — namely, looking back to what sort of fruit could have followed such great labors — then, he says, I found [0173C] that the fruit of my labors was not repaid me in an equal balance, and therefore I judged that I had labored in vain, looking back on the labors in which I had sweated in vain. For in all things there is vanity and affliction of mind. First affliction, afterward vanity; but also after vanity, affliction; and before vanity, affliction; and in vanity, affliction; and the whole is vanity, and the whole is affliction. For all things are vain which, even while they are, do not show forth to their lovers what they promise; and when they are thought to be held fast, they pass away. But it could perhaps have seemed tolerable, if there were vanity alone and there were not affliction. But as it is, there is both affliction before vanity, and affliction in vanity, and affliction after vanity, since the things that were possessed with love can neither be acquired without labor, nor kept without anxiety, [0173D] nor lost without grief. And therefore both the whole is vanity and the whole is affliction, because both in affliction there is vanity and in vanity affliction. And on this account, being turned, he rightly says: I saw in all things vanity and affliction of mind: and that nothing remains under the sun. For, instructed in his own affairs, he began to judge the affairs of others also; and what he had come to know in part, he truly pronounced of the whole, saying: Nothing remains under the sun. And from this it can be gathered how much, in other matters, whether toward good or toward evil, it avails a man to know what sort of man he himself has been to himself. For in some measure all things begin to be to you that which you yourself have been to yourself. If you do not see yourself, you see nothing well. If you are not deceived in the judgment of yourself, you are easily directed in the judgment of another. As here too, [0174A] being turned and directed, when he had subjoined concerning his own works: He saw in all things vanity and affliction of mind — at once, as one instructed in his own affairs, he begins to judge the affairs of others, and from the judgment of his own works he forms a sentiment about all things, saying: And that nothing remains under the sun. But because for perfection it does not suffice to reprove evils unless a man know also how to choose goods, he subjoined and said:

## HOMILY X. *On the remaining vanities, as far as that place: « The fool walketh in darkness. »* (cont.)

*I passed over to contemplate wisdom.* "Hebrew" is interpreted *one passing over*. This man, therefore, was made a Hebrew in order to contemplate wisdom. And indeed he himself was a Hebrew before too according to the flesh, but he was not a Hebrew according to the truth, until he began to pass over to contemplate wisdom. Just as one is called a Jew according to the flesh, and a Jew [0174B] according to the truth, so one is a Hebrew according to the flesh and another a Hebrew according to the truth. But he who is openly a Jew according to the flesh, and he who is openly a Hebrew according to the flesh, is not truly a Jew, and is not a true Hebrew. But he who in secret is a Jew according to the spirit, and according to the spirit is a Hebrew, is truly a Jew and truly a Hebrew. For many pass over according to the flesh and do not pass over according to the truth, because they do not pass over in order to arrive at the truth. They would more easily cross the seas and traverse far-off regions than reach the truth — and she is near. *Near is,* says Scripture, *the word in thy mouth [n: (Rom. X)]*; and the truth of the word is in the heart, and the word itself is truth, because the truth is the word. [0174C] And though the truth herself is so near, yet nothing is farther from those who love folly. But what is more foolish than always to look upon the lowest things, and to have countenances bent down to the earth? For this was given to the beasts, to whom it is granted to desire nothing beyond. But wisdom dwells in the things above; and to her they are unwilling to be lifted up, who are compared to the beasts and gaze upon the earth. This is that very folly out of which this man passed over to contemplate wisdom, when he despised the false goods which he had loved on earth, and lifted himself up to contemplate and to love the true goods which are above; because in all these things which are below under the sun he beheld vanity. Therefore, when he had seen in all things vanity and affliction of mind, and that nothing remains under [0174D] the sun, he passed over to contemplate wisdom above the sun. O how difficult a passage, and a way of how many days, for those who have weak steps! And I know not whether the whole life of a man can suffice to accomplish this journey. For who, living in this mortal life, will be able to lay hold of wisdom fully? For wisdom is drawn from hidden things and is found in hidden things; and wisdom always loves the secret place, nor does she offer herself to be contemplated save to those who enter in to her. But this is very grievous to weak souls: that they should leave what they have loved and forsake what is beloved, and pass over to the desiring of things which they do not know unless they be instructed by their own griefs, and that things which before were sweet should begin to be bitter; and thus in a certain manner many are drawn back, and are compelled to enter and to pass over to contemplate [0175A] wisdom. For when they have begun to taste and to understand the sweetness and pleasantness of wisdom, then they have no more need to be compelled, but follow willingly; and they gladly despise all things and leave all things, that they may pass over to contemplate wisdom; and then they arrive quickly, because they run swiftly and seek ardently, and wisdom begins to be near to them, because they themselves draw near to her and do not go far off from her into alien desires. So when Moses was in the desert a shepherd of animals, and had an Ethiopian woman for a wife, he did not yet know any fire but a consuming one; therefore he wondered that the bush was burning and was not burned up [n: (Exod. III)]. For as long as the soul feeds its own desires upon the lowest pleasures, and, bound by carnal concupiscence, has not yet come to the embraces [0175B] of wisdom, it is in a fire consuming and devouring, even to perdition. For the flame of lust and the love of the flesh consume those whom they kindle. But the love of wisdom has light, and has no consuming; and if it kindles the cold, yet it does not burn up those who are burning. Therefore Moses wondered how the bush was burning and was not burned up. For he too was burning, because he had an Ethiopian wife; nor was this a miracle to him, but to burn and not be burned up: what he had not experienced, this was a miracle to him. And the miracle itself drew him and urged him to pass over and see the greatest vision — how the bush was burning and was not burned up; and he began to run into a sweeter desire, and to forget the old longings where he was burning and was burned up, [0175C] and to loathe the love of his Ethiopian wife, because she was black and was not beautiful, nor like that Shunamite woman who warms old men and does not burn the young. For that fire, by which the bush was burning and was not burned up, did not signify the love of this Shunamite, that is, of wisdom; and therefore Moses, after he had passed over to see the vision, and had begun to feel how sweetly her flame burned, could no longer be held by the love of his Ethiopian wife, but, his heart kindled with a better fire, came even to converse with the Most High, and was sent for the salvation of the people. For in fire God spoke to him, and out of the fire he was heard, and through fire he was understood. And there was within a flame which had set his heart alight, by which, like the bush, he was burning and was not burned up. The mind itself had conceived God in fire, [0175D] and through fire it knew God. For unless it had burned, it would not have seen nor known; because fire itself is love, and love itself is knowledge. He knew, therefore, and loved; he saw and burned; he tasted and loved; and fire conquered fire, love overcame delight. The Ethiopian woman was despised, deformed and black, whom her own flame had darkened, and her very love made her not lovable. She was despised in comparison with the fairer one; nor did he wish to serve any longer for her, who recognized that with her he would always be a slave. For the carnal life and the concupiscence of the flesh is not from God the Father, but from the devil the father; and it consigns its own lovers to the servitude of its father and subjects them to his domination. And Moses serves and feeds [0176A] the cattle, and buys the love of a foul wife with base attendance; nor can he be free until God comes in fire and appears in love. For then he easily despises what he had loved wickedly, when he has begun to taste what he may desire more sweetly. And now Moses does not deign to serve for the Ethiopian woman; and although he does not cast her off afterward when she follows, yet he does not receive her into love. For, made a lover of wisdom, he ought so to have admitted the care of the flesh as not to subject himself by affection to it when it wantoned shamelessly, but yet to condescend by compassion to it when it was weak and compliant. For it is one thing to love for joy, another to endure for use. It is one thing to receive into the fellowship of love, and another to endure in the part of compassion. The life of the flesh is to be borne in necessity; wisdom [0176B] is to be joined to us in love. That one is to be sought after for her own sake; this one is to be fled for its own sake to be endured for our sake. Therefore Moses after the vision does not serve in Midian the father of the Ethiopian woman, nor does she any more bear sons, as one driven back from the bed, where the place of love and of affection is; and another fairer and more lovable having been received, from whose fellowship the face of Moses would be made not dark but luminous, whose love was shown in that fire, when the bush was burning and was not burned up. But Moses ran that he might pass over and contemplate the vision, because he had not yet conceived the fire of wisdom nor felt its sweetness. Therefore he wondered, and by that very wonder was drawn, so that drawing near he might grow warm and burn. And the fire itself, which enlightened him while absent, kindled him as he drew near. Therefore, drawing near, [0176C] he loosed his shoe, gladly renouncing now the carnal desires, the sweetness of that love having been tasted and its pleasantness recognized. For what could the concupiscence of the flesh have availed, compared with the love of wisdom? Therefore Moses hastened to run and to see the vision, and to pass over to contemplate wisdom. And it has been made manifest how he passed over, and how he arrived at contemplating wisdom. How much he saw in her, and how much he came to know of him, and how he was made a friend of wisdom, penetrating even into her depths and privy to her secrets. And how many are there from the beginning who wished thus to pass over to contemplate wisdom? First Abraham, that great father, went out from the fire of the Chaldeans, and passed over to contemplate [0176D] wisdom, and came into the land of vision which God showed him, and saw the brightness of wisdom and rejoiced. And Isaac had gone out to meditate, and passed over to contemplate wisdom; and God spoke with him. Jacob too, going on to contemplate wisdom, passed over as he came from Mesopotamia, and saw the Lord face to face, and his soul was made safe [n: (Gen. XXXII)]. After these, all the patriarchs and all the prophets passed over, and all wished to contemplate wisdom. And last of all wisdom herself came, and passed over, and her friends contemplated her; since she had come for this, that she might be seen, lest she should be sought in vain if she were never seen; and she said to those who had passed over, that they might contemplate [0177A] her. *Blessed are the eyes that see what you see. Many kings and many prophets have wished to see what you see, and have not seen; and to hear what you hear, and have not heard [n: (Matth. XIII)]*. This she said, and passed over, that after her those might pass over who desired to contemplate her, lest perchance she should now not be sought, if she were always seen. And many others followed after her, and very many passed through, and wisdom was made manifold. And many wished to pass over and could not arrive, because they did not hold the way. Others passed over and arrived. Others wished to pass over and could not pass through, because they thought to go by themselves. For the philosophers of the nations also, they too wished to pass over to contemplate wisdom, but they went astray and became vain, because they thought to lead [0177B] themselves. And yet they had begun to pass over, and had arrived as far as something, and came up to the way; but they did not enter the way, because they did not believe in Christ. Do you wish to know how far they had come? They were on earth in body, and they ascended in mind and passed over all earthly things, searching out the heavenly. Even to the moon and even to the sun, even to the stars of heaven, finally even to heaven itself and even to the firmament itself they ascended by their own wit, and arrived by their understanding. And what was there beyond, whither they could have gone? But wisdom is above all things, nor can she be found within all things, she through whom all things were made. He is none of these things, from whom is everything that is. But where could they have found that? It was not seen, and yet it was sought; nor could it lie hid so as not to speak, [0177C] nor be searched out so as to be found. Wisdom was within, and they were without; and they entered in mind after her, that they might pass over to contemplate wisdom. And they investigated and searched through wisely, and comprehended the secrets of nature, and found many hidden things; and none of these was wisdom, because all this was made through wisdom. Above all things, whither they ascended; within all things, whither they entered; and there was nothing beyond where they could have sought wisdom. And they fell and failed, searching out searchings; and it seemed to them that there was something divine above all things, and yet they did not know it nor understand it; but seeing, they grew the more dim, because with weak eyes they struck against a splendid light. And they began to reckon many false things concerning the true, and to liken God [0177D] by their own perverse heart, not to what he was, but to what seemed to them, who could not see what he was. But they reckoned that they saw well, and became vain in their own thoughts; and they were the worse blinded, and were found to wander the more deeply the more subtly they searched. But others thought that wisdom was to be sought more subtly by morals; and very many became despisers of their own goods, but not correctors of their own vices. And these too arrived as far as something, because they had the appearance of truth, but did not hold the truth. They cast away money, but retained malice. What was without they cleansed, and what was within they kept polluted. But this was not wisdom, because it was not truth, [0178A] but a false image alone. But they thought that they were walking along the road of the virtues; yet whither they were tending they did not know, because they did not know their own direction and end. And there were yet others who had certain virtues and were borne into them by a natural leading; and they passed over and arrived as far as something; and from a certain part of nature, by which she did not lie wholly subject to corruption, they saw the good and desired it. And it was given them to be capable of much in the pursuit of the virtues, and with an upright disposition inclined to goodness. Who does not know this — how many men of virtues they too had, and how great things, wonderful and worthy of imitation, they did: pursuing justice, cultivating piety, keeping chastity, confirmed in patience, steadfast in fidelity, circumspect in prudence — and what shall we say? Were not all these things [0178B] good? They were indeed, but of nature, not of grace; of creation, not of restoration: goods which nature had kept, lest she should be wholly corrupted; not goods which grace had given, that nature might be freed from corruption. Goods which grace had indeed given to nature when she was first created, and afterward had left to her when she was corrupted; but had not added over and above to her when she was to be purged from corruption. Goods by which the beauty of a nature well created might be proved; not by which the loftiness of a nature to be glorified might be acquired. All these, therefore, were goods for their own part, but they were not true goods, because they did not direct the mind by intention to the highest good. And by all these wisdom was not found, because she was not sought in truth; and she drew near neither to those, that she might enlighten their eyes to the truth, nor [0178C] to these, that she might direct their steps to virtue. And therefore neither could the blind find her, nor the lame arrive at her. But let this our Hebrew say what he has done, and how much he has profited by his passing over; since he too testifies that he passes over with the rest to contemplate wisdom, saying: I passed over to contemplate wisdom. This, therefore, is what you ought to consider. For he who passes over to wisdom leaves folly behind. And what is it that follows?

## HOMILY X. *On the remaining vanities, as far as that place: « The fool walketh in darkness. »* (cont.)

*Errors also, and folly.* If he passes over to wisdom who passes over to contemplate wisdom, how does he withdraw from folly, or leave error behind, who passes over to contemplate errors and folly? But wisdom is light; error, however, and folly are darkness. And he who is in darkness sees neither the darkness [0178D] nor the light. But he who is in the light sees both the darkness and the light, because all things that are reproved are reproved by the light. Since therefore he cannot see his own darkness, because he himself is still in darkness, but comes from the darkness to the light, that he may see through the light both the darkness and the light — not the darkness through darkness and the light through light, but darkness and light through the light alone. No one goes to darkness that he may see darkness, but comes to the light that he may see through the light not only light, but both darkness and light. He, therefore, who wishes to see his own darkness withdraws from it, lest he himself be in darkness and see nothing; and he passes over to the light, that through the light he may see darkness and light alike. Rightly therefore Ecclesiastes, when he passes [0179A] over to contemplate wisdom, comes to her — about to contemplate errors and folly also — as to a light, that in her he may see both the darkness and the light. That is, that in her he may see also that she is wisdom; and that through her he may see errors and folly, which is not wisdom. For he who sees wisdom sees that she is wisdom; and he who sees errors and folly sees that this is not wisdom; and yet he can see wisdom, and can see errors and folly, only through her — and she is wisdom. He, therefore, who passes over to contemplate errors and to contemplate folly passes over to wisdom, just as he who passes over to contemplate wisdom passes over to wisdom. Yet the one — that is, errors and folly — he contemplates in order to flee it; but to the other, that [0179B] is, to wisdom, he draws near in order to contemplate her; because neither of the two is wisdom, but to contemplate both is wisdom; and he who passes over to contemplate both passes over to nothing other than wisdom, nor does he leave behind anything other than errors and folly. Let him say, therefore: He passed over to contemplate wisdom, and errors and folly. What is error: not to know what is right. What is folly? To know and not to follow. What is wisdom? To know [sic: *cognocere*] and to love the good. But to know evil and to hate it — this too is wisdom, and the first wisdom; because to have hated evil is to have loved the good, and to have known evil is to have understood the right. Wherefore to know and to love the good is wisdom, and this same is to hate and to have known evil. And all this is known in wisdom, [0179C] when wisdom is seen, and what she is, that it may be loved; and what she is not, but is made manifest through her, that it may be hated. O how good this passing over is, and how happily he removes who removes to contemplate wisdom! What wonder is it if the God of the Hebrews is the Lord God, who makes such passers-over, and makes them pass over to such things? *Pass over to me,* says Wisdom, *all you who desire me, and be filled with my generations. For my spirit is sweet above honey, and my inheritance above honey and the honeycomb. They that eat me shall yet hunger, and they that drink me shall yet thirst; they that make me clear shall have eternal life [n: (Eccli. XXIV)]*. Since I give light of doctrine to all as it were before the dawn; and I will enlighten all [0179D] who hope in the Lord. For do you wish to know how wisdom enlightens those who have passed over to contemplate her? Question this very man, who passed over to contemplate wisdom; and consider how he has been enlightened from the time that he began to see her. For how blind he was before he had passed over to contemplate her, you have heard sufficiently above, when he thought to go where there was no way for man: to seek out and to investigate all things that were under the sun; and believed it to be something great to investigate the nature of those things which stand outside the nature of man — things which, even if they be known, so far as lies in them, cannot confer salvation, nor, if they be unknown, take it away. There, therefore, he was blind, in not seeing nor knowing in himself what he could, nor desiring for himself what he ought. But [0180A] now, enlightened by wisdom, attend to what he says.

*What is man, I say? What is he, I say?* I do not ask what he is as though admiring his dignity, but as knowing his infirmity. What is man? Man is nothing. Man is not anything such that he may be found sufficient for this. For what?

*That he may be able to follow the king, his maker.* For if he cannot attain the thing made, much more can he not follow the maker. If he cannot investigate what has been made, how can he comprehend him who made it? What is man, that he may be able to follow the king, his maker? His king and his maker. The very same who is king is maker. He is maker because he created; king, because he governs in that which he created, and directs it [0180B] to that for which he created it. For he created in a great good, and directs to the highest good. Who is he that follows his maker? He who lives as he was made. Who walks according to that for which he was instituted? He who keeps the good which he received when created, and guards unpolluted what nature conferred. This man follows his maker. And who is he that follows his king also? He who tends toward that to which he is directed; who hastens to arrive whither he is invited; who obeys the laws of one who presides well; who at the command of him who orders bends himself to all things with a spontaneous will. This man follows his king. But who is the man who can answer God? Who will be found sufficient to render a return to God? If he himself goes before, and so that you may follow: then one thing is his, another yours. Nay, if he himself begins the good and you complete it, what is less [0180C] is his, and what is greater is yours. If God goes before by beginning the good, and you follow after by perfecting it, you are now found not only equal to God, but greater. But perhaps he goes before by showing, so that you may follow by imitating. And where then is what is said: *His mercy shall go before me and shall follow after? [n: (Psal. LVIII.)]* Where is: *Of him, and through him, and in him are all things? [n: (Rom. XI.)]* Where is: *What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? [n: (II Cor. IV.)]* For if to show is his and to follow is yours, then you have something which you have not received; nor are all things of him and through him and in him, but certain things are man's which are not of him, if a man can of himself do some things which are not [0180D] through him. But wisdom does not enlighten for this, that a man should think thus; or that he should say that a man can have anything as it were from himself, who could not have even this from himself, that he is a man. What, then, does he say? What is man, that he may be able to follow the king, his maker? For how far do you think man is from God, that he should reach where he is? For what is it to reach where he is, unless it be to be what he is? And what is God? Or what is man? See how far apart they are. God is just and blessed; man unjust and wretched. See how greatly the just and the unjust, the wretched and the blessed, stand apart. But misery cannot be together with blessedness, nor can injustice arrive at blessedness. Justice is the way, blessedness the fatherland. But the servant of sin cannot be just, unless he has been freed from sin. See [0181A] therefore that man cannot follow the king, his maker, unless he be first visited by the king, his maker. Man cannot go to him; but he can, if he will, come to man. Therefore the king and maker of man came to man. He came to that which man was, and he himself was made what he was not. He was made man for man, taking on our misery, retaining his own justice. And there appeared between God and men, as the mediator of God and men, the man God: as God drawing near to men through misery, and as man not withdrawing from God through justice. Thus God descended to one, and man ascended to one; and in the one, two were found, the one from what is ours, the other from what is his: for there were, as it were, three things. God was just and blessed, and man was wretched and unjust; and because these could not come together, [0181B] the man God set himself in the midst, joining the wretched and the just, that through justice he might conquer misery, and might restore justice to blessedness. Therefore, when Emmanuel was with us through the justice which he had brought to us, and through the misery which he had taken up from us, he began to return whence he had come. That in man he might conquer misery through justice, and might call man back, with justice, through misery to blessedness. He held justice, therefore, and endured misery, until he should conquer misery and crown justice. And he ran, and went before us. *Suffering for us, and leaving us an example, that we may follow his steps [n: (I Petr. II)]*. Freeing us from the servitude of sin, that we too may have justice in misery, [0181C] and through misery, with justice, may pass over to blessedness. Promising us what he received, if we suffer what he endured; that we may reign with him, if we suffer for him. Thus, therefore, the incarnate Word, our maker and king, because we could not follow him in his own majesty, went before us in our humility, and out of what is ours established a way, that we might come to what is his. But not even so could man follow him, unless he were helped by him; because not even a just man would run through death to life, unless he who gave justice to the sinner should also give constancy to him who suffers. Rightly therefore he who had contemplated wisdom, and had recognized how utterly nothing man is by himself, said: What is man, that he should follow the king, his maker? For truly this man had passed over to contemplate wisdom, and [0181D] truly had been enlightened by wisdom: much more now, in being wise, truly recognizing the infirmity of man, than before, vainly stretching himself beyond the possibility of man. For there he was lifted up so as to fail; here he was humbled so as to advance. There he swelled outside himself through elation, so as to be emptied within himself; here through humility he gathered himself to himself, that he might be given to the One alone. And wisdom did all this after he had contemplated her, showing him in her own light first his darkness, and afterward her own light also — and the whole in her light and through her light. And the darkness was not light, nor was there darkness in the light; but through the light the darkness was seen, and was divided from the light. And he says:

*And I saw that wisdom excelled folly as much as light differs from darkness.* How was this seen? [0182A] Because wisdom enlightens, folly blinds. And whence can this be proved, that wisdom enlightens and folly blinds? Attend:

## HOMILY X. *On the remaining vanities, as far as that place: « The fool walketh in darkness. »* (cont.)

*The eyes of a wise man are in his head; the fool walketh in darkness.* Just now it has been proved that wisdom enlightens, folly blinds. In what has it been proved? Because the wise man has enlightened eyes, the fool sees nothing. For if the wise man has enlightened eyes, then wisdom enlightens. And if [sic: *sit*] the fool sees nothing, then folly blinds. For wisdom is light, and enlightens. If you have eyes where she reaches; but if you have eyes where the light is not, you have eyes, but see nothing. And what does this profit? Let your eyes therefore be where the light is, lest you be made as one not having eyes, if you have not the light. But where is the light? Above is [0182B] the light, where wisdom is. For wisdom is above, and light is above, and all light comes from above. And as below there is darkness without light, so above there is light without darkness. But in the middle, after light there is darkness, and after darkness light. Therefore there are days of heaven which darkness does not divide, nor does obscurity break in upon them. And there are days of earth upon which darkness follows. Because where wisdom always is, there is always light; and where wisdom is not always, there is as much light as there is wisdom. And where wisdom never is, there is never light. Therefore there is light where wisdom reaches, and where wisdom does not reach, there is no light. And where does wisdom not reach, if she reaches from end to end — what is left outside, where she cannot [0182C] reach, she who penetrates the whole and embraces the whole? *I alone have compassed the circuit of heaven, and have penetrated the depth of the abyss, and have walked in the waves of the sea [n: (Eccli. XXIV)]*: *reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly [n: (Sap. VIII)]*. It is a great question, therefore, what that may be where wisdom does not reach. Where the eyes of fools are, who walk in darkness and do not see. Let us therefore question another Scripture, where the eyes of fools are, who walk in darkness and do not see. For it says: The eyes of a wise man are in his head; but the eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth. Therefore in the ends of the earth there is darkness, and for that reason the fools who walk in darkness do not see, because they have their eyes in the ends of the earth. For if the light is there where he has his eyes, fools do not walk in darkness, but [0182D] have enlightened eyes and see. But if the fool walketh in darkness, and the eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth, then beyond doubt there is darkness there, where the eyes cannot see. And where is this? In the ends of the earth. Therefore the darkness is far off, and the light is near. Why then do we find darkness more easily than light? Perhaps because we are not far from the ends of the earth, and dwell beside the people of darkness, nor have we yet gone from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon [n: (III Reg. X)], where the light is: therefore we strike against the darkness and are dimmed away from the light. Yet the light itself is near and presses itself upon us; but bleary eyes love the dark, and have turned themselves into darkness. Therefore the light is near, but we are far off; and the darkness is far off, and we draw near to it.

## HOMILY XI. *What the ends of the earth are in which the eyes of fools are: and how wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily,* etc.

[0183A]

Yet where is the darkness, and where is the light? And which is the end? And the end where wisdom reaches. And which are the ends of the earth, where the eyes of fools are, who walk in darkness and do not see. And what is the head of the wise man, where his eyes are, who does not walk in darkness like the fool, but has enlightened eyes? Lest, therefore, we too perchance remain in darkness, let us seek out the light of wisdom, that we may understand where wisdom herself abides, and the division of light and darkness. Where light and darkness are bounded, and the limit of each. How far wisdom herself reaches, and what she is, and what is [0183B] outside her, and what is without her. First, because we have heard of two ends — the one from which and the other to which Wisdom extends herself, *reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly [n: (Sap. VIII)]*. And we have not yet come to know which these two ends are, and where they are, and whether these ends have an end, and whether beyond them there is anything else where wisdom does not reach. And if there is, how are they ends which do not arrive at an end? But if there is not, how are the ends of the earth, where the darkness is, contained within these ends, and how can there be darkness in the light, since Wisdom reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly. First, therefore, there are two ends of all things. The one is an end above which is nothing, and the other one below which is nothing. The end above which is nothing is the highest [0183C] of all. The end below which is nothing, the lowest. And so there are two ends of all things, the highest and the lowest. And whatever is in the universe besides the highest and the lowest is a middle between the highest and the lowest. And each single thing, the more it departs from the one, so much the more does it approach the other, whether from the highest to the lowest or from the lowest to the highest. Do you wish to know whether Scripture perchance somewhere mentions these ends more manifestly? *If I shall ascend,* says the Psalmist, *into heaven, thou art there; if I shall descend into hell, thou art present [n: (Psal. CXXXVIII)]*. Therefore he has established heaven and hell as the two ends of his own course. But nothing is higher than heaven, and nothing deeper than hell. And so heaven is the highest of all, hell the lowest — above [0183D] which is nothing and below which is nothing — and Wisdom reaches from end to end, and fills the whole and penetrates it. If I ascend into heaven, he says, thou art there; if I shall descend into hell, thou art present. He did not say, In heaven thou art present. Nor, In hell thou art there. But, if I shall ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I shall descend into hell, thou art present. Therefore in heaven he is, in hell he is present; abiding in heaven, coming into hell; in heaven he awaits those who come, in hell he follows those who flee. Those who ascend into heaven find him there; those who descend into hell do not escape him there. If I shall ascend into heaven, he says, thou art there; if I shall descend into hell, thou art present. And yet in both places thou art — both where thou art and where thou art present — reaching from end to end. From the end where thou art, to the end where thou art present, mightily, and ordering all things sweetly. Behold, [0184A] we have now distinguished the two ends to which wisdom reaches, the highest and the lowest, of which the one is as it were the place of wisdom where she abides, but the other is like a certain running-out and, so to speak, the goal of the stretching by which she extends herself. That end from which wisdom goes forth is the head, before which is nothing. But the end into which she runs out is the end beyond which is nothing. That end is both head and end. This end is not head, but only end. That end is head, because from it, and not above it; it is end, because up to it, and not beyond. But the other end is not head, because from it is nothing; yet it is an end, because whatever there is, is up to it, not beyond it. That end, therefore, which is above, is as it were a beginning and origin, above which is nothing. But the end which is below is as it were a goal and limit beyond which is nothing. For the origin and beginning [0184B] of all things is from the highest; but the limit and end is in the lowest. Wherefore the end below is an end, and only an end. But the end above is not only an end, but both head and end. If, therefore, heaven is above and hell below, and nothing higher than heaven and nothing deeper than hell can be found: heaven is the beginning, and hell the end. O how good a beginning, and how evil an end.

Therefore perhaps the eyes of the wise man are in his head, because, set in the middle, he looks back to his own beginning, that he may make his end there where he received his origin. For it is not good to be ended in the other end, where the end is one of consuming, not of consummation. Therefore man, who was created for eternity, alone among all animals has an upright countenance, that he may contemplate heaven [0184C] and may tend toward the end of consummation; and that he may reckon that not only is this visible heaven to be looked up to with bodily eyes, but that also with the mind and with the vision of the heart, lifting the inner eyes with a clearer and more piercing gaze above heaven even to the invisible things of heaven and the spiritual things of the virtues, he may climb up by contemplation, in the light of eternity, even to the end which has no end. That is the true heaven above every heaven, which is not only the heaven of heaven, but the heaven of heavens. Not second to the first, but third to the first and to the second. On this account Paul glories that he was caught up even to the third heaven [n: (II Cor. XII)], who had come in mind to the highest of all; and he had passed over not only the visible heaven, which human thought too can surpass, [0184D] but, having passed over also all those invisible things which were created above all this visible whole, he had been lifted up to behold the first beginning and the head of eternity. This is the third heaven. For the first heaven is the visible heaven. The second heaven is the invisible heaven of the visible heaven. The third heaven is the invisible heaven of the visible heaven and of the invisible heaven. The first heaven is only heaven, and the heaven of the earth. The second heaven, the heaven of heaven. The third heaven, the heaven of heavens. And this heaven has no heaven above itself. The first heaven is the supreme state of creation. The second heaven is the advancement of virtue above creation. The third heaven is the sublimity of contemplation. The first hell is the lowest state of creation. The second hell is [0185A] the failing of iniquity below creation. The third hell is the depth of damnation. The first heaven and the first hell, end and end. The second heaven and the second hell, end and end. The third heaven and the third hell, end and end. And everywhere Wisdom: She reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly. From the first heaven to the first hell is the first course of wisdom. For beginning from the highest downward, and descending from the topmost even to the bottom of things, she accompanies and cherishes all things which she has wrought, so that the things which have been made and created by her may not subsist without her. But from the topmost even to the lowest, among all the things that subsist, each single thing, the more it degenerates from the perfect beauty and consummate comeliness of the highest things, [0185B] so much the more, as if fleeing, does it in a certain manner go far off from wisdom. But Wisdom herself follows the flight of things from end to end; because, deserting nothing wholly among all the things which she made, and tempering each single thing from the highest to the lowest with a comeliness proper and fitting to its own kind, she testifies that she is present to these also. For she herself, the very same who disposed the most excellent of creatures in a highest and supereminent beauty, fitting the lower things also in due sequence and following them up with her disposition, leaves nothing disordered even to the bottom of things. And so Wisdom reaches to the end, even to those things which in all things are lowest; because in these too something of her is found, which through the infirmity of their creation and the defect of their nature have withdrawn far from the highest. But yet [0185C] Wisdom herself abides in the highest things as it were by remaining, but reaches the lowest as it were by running out; because those things, subsisting unchangeably in their own perfect comeliness, nowhere flow away from her likeness. But these, fleeing through defect, yet by that very thing which they retain of beauty in their own kind, show that wisdom is present to them also. Wisdom therefore reaches everywhere, because in everything that is there is something beautiful, and everything that is beautiful is the work of wisdom. But what, in that which is, is not beautiful, is not the work of Wisdom; because what is beautiful in everything that is, she herself made; but what is not beautiful, she did not make, but permitted in that which she made beautiful. Why then did she not make the whole beautiful in that which she made; and why did she not bring it about that what is not beautiful [0185D] should nowhere be in that which she made? Perhaps she had been wearied in making those former things, in which she had wrought a certain highest and perfect beauty. And therefore she pursued the rest afterward as she could, bringing it about indeed that the whole should be beautiful which she made in them, but not bringing it about that what is not beautiful should not be in them — which she did not make, but permitted; because she could not bring it about that it should not be at all. And so thereafter, descending to one thing after another and making one thing after another, she conferred always so much the less of beauty and comeliness upon the later of her works, as she the more, in making the former, consumed the strength of her might, by which she could do more, and the force and ingenuity of her prudence, by which she might know more. Therefore the order [0186A] of things degenerated downward, descending to the lowest. And unless wisdom had looked out for herself, so as at last to set in these an end of making, there was perhaps nothing further of beauty which she could have conferred on the things to be made.

## HOMILY XI. *What the ends of the earth are in which the eyes of fools are: and how wisdom reaches from end to end mightily,* etc. (cont.)

What do we say? Was the wisdom of God, then, diminished in the making? and did it pursue its work feebly to the end? And where is that which reaches from end to end mightily? If Wisdom mightily reaches from end to end, then the difference of beauty in the creation is not from a failing in the maker. Why then are not all things equally beautiful, unless it be that all things together may be more beautiful? For if individual things were not beautiful in differing degrees, all things together would not be incomparably beautiful; because the highest beauty would be in individual things — whatever one there were would be surpassing that one, and more eminent than all the rest — [0186B] not every beauty would be in all things together. Therefore Wisdom mightily reaches from end to end; because she so pursues her works down to the very bottom of things that she even orders the defect of lower things toward the beauty of the whole, so that the universe is the more beautiful for this, that in the universe certain things suffer defect by comparison with others and in respect of them. For this very thing, which in certain of her beautiful works seems not beautiful, is nevertheless not ugly where it is; but it has less of beauty in the part, because in the whole it is beautiful for that to which it is ordered. Therefore in no part is there ugliness, but nevertheless in certain parts there is greater and in certain parts lesser beauty; because the beauty in the whole of the parts is greatest [0186C] for this reason, that in the parts it is differing, and manifoldly varied and distinguished in every way. Then follows, and he says: Ordering all things sweetly. For she orders all things sweetly, because in kinds of things so many and so diverse, advancing each single one [sic: *promonens*] to its own term, she permits nothing to disturb the concord and peace of the universe; but she so assigns to each what is its own that she leads things running unlike to one end, and so that the working of one does not hinder the force and effect of another. O Wisdom, how widely thou art poured out, and yet thou art not scattered! How far into the distance thou stretchest thyself, and sufferest no failing! How great is thy course, from the highest even to the lowest! By as much as heaven is distant from earth, and hell [0186D] beneath the earth where the end of the earth is, and beyond there is no earth; by as much as the highest is distant from the lowest, so much does Wisdom penetrate through. And yet this way of Wisdom is short, and her stretching-forth is compendious, and she counts all that is a small thing for her to pass over and to lay hold of and to penetrate; nor is anything far off that is stretched out in space, if it be near in goodness. But iniquity is far more distant from justice, and farther than the two, heaven from earth, and hell beneath the earth. For justice is higher than heaven, and not only than heaven, but even than those who are in heaven. The angels are in heaven, and from the beginning they are in heaven; and from thence they ascended, through justice, above that which they had been made. And justice is higher than heaven, iniquity deeper than hell. For it is deeper than everything that is lowest in creation, because that which has fallen through iniquity [0187A] is beneath every creature; nor can anything be deeper than that than which nothing is worse. By as much, therefore, as he ascends who ascends into heaven, by so much does he ascend who advances toward justice. And by as much as he descends who descends to hell, by so much does he descend who falls to iniquity. And by as much as he ascends who ascends from hell to heaven, by so much does he ascend who returns from iniquity to justice. But by as much as he descends who descends from heaven to hell, by so much does he descend who rushes down from justice to iniquity.

And in all these things *they ascend even to the heavens, and they descend even to the depths, and their soul amid evils* wastes away [n: (Psal. CVI)]. Therefore heaven belongs to justice, and hell to iniquity; and the motions of souls are snatched along [0187B] by an alternating surge without ceasing, as though driven by contrary blasts, ascending and descending; and there come to be liftings up, and pressings down, and great commotions in that invisible sea of billowing desires. The good spirit comes, and drives upward. The evil spirit comes, and drives downward: and they ascend even to the heavens, and they descend even from the depths, their soul wasting away in the uncertainty of its own evils. And what does he say? If I shall ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I shall descend to hell, thou art at hand. For if you ascend into the heaven of justice, you have there with you wisdom holding you fast lest you fall; but if you descend to the hell of guilt, wisdom is there laying hold of you lest you escape. Above she has her right hand, and below [0187C] her left, reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly. Above she is strong, below she is strong, everywhere unconquerable. Above she is strong, so as to keep from evil those who trust in her, and to cast headlong into evil, by forsaking them, those who presume upon themselves. Below she is strong, so as to condemn for evil those who despise, and to justify from evil those who repent. Behold how many she has kept safe at the summit, how many she has cast down from the summit, how many she has raised from the depth, how many she has forsaken in the depth. Manifest are her judgments: and he who knows himself knows how Wisdom works all these things daily in the secret of the human heart, always presiding at judgment: and by hidden requital and invisible dispensation, weighing merits, now she takes up through grace, now she forsakes through justice, now through gentleness [0187D] she spares, now through severity she punishes. And when she has forsaken she takes up again, and when she has taken up she again abandons, that a man may not know his own end, and may walk anxiously all the time of his life, so that those who lie prostrate may not despair, and those who stand may not presume. If they are in the heaven of justice, let them fear a fall. If in the hell of guilt, let them seek mercy. Therefore justice herself first descended to hell; afterward she ascended to heaven, that in descending she might give hope to those to be set free, and in ascending might show the way to those to be glorified. Wisdom, then, reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly. For she comprehends the end of both — of the good, namely, which is in her; and equally of the evil, which is not in her. But in that which is from her it flows away from her, yet not altogether without [0188A] her, because what nature does not beget out of her own, she restrains by power within her own. For evil has no proper seat of its own, but by nature a stranger to what is its own, it lodges in what belongs to another, so that it is plain that it is not in its own; because if there were not good things in which evils were, evils would not be at all. For since evil is nothing other than the corruption of a good, and everything that is corrupted is good, that from which it falls away is one thing, that in which it subsists another. And that in which it subsists is good; but that which falls away, from which it falls away from the good, is evil: a falling-away from good can be nowhere else at all except in that which subsists in some good. Therefore if there were no good, there would be no evil at all; because there would be nowhere that malice could be, if Wisdom, which did not make it, did not suffer it within her own. For Wisdom did not make [0188B] malice; but in that which she made she permitted malice to be, so that Wisdom, set against malice, might conquer, and being compared might appear the more beautiful. For Wisdom sets herself against malice and measures herself with it in her works, and conquers it on both sides, so that she may reach from end to end; because malice, running toward defect, does not escape Wisdom, but Wisdom, rising toward advancement, transcends malice. For malice running toward defect does not escape Wisdom for this reason, that malice cannot find what it may corrupt except in those things which Wisdom created. But Wisdom, rising toward advancement, transcends malice for this reason: that malice cannot corrupt the whole of what Wisdom was able to create. So that malice may be compared, then, nothing can be brought through malice [0188C] to non-being which has not received being from Wisdom; but that malice may be overcome, malice does not corrupt the whole of what has been made by wisdom.

## HOMILY XI. *What the ends of the earth are in which the eyes of fools are: and how wisdom reaches from end to end mightily,* etc. (cont.)

Wisdom runs, therefore, that she may reach from end to end, transcending malice in the incorrupt goods, whither malice does not come; and following after malice in those things which have been corrupted, whither malice does not go before her. For malice cannot go before Wisdom, so as to be found either prior, before her rising, or posterior, after her failing; because that also is found prior to corruption which at some time admitted corruption, and posterior to corruption that which could not be wholly corrupted, and above corruption that to which corruption did not come. And for this reason Wisdom conquers malice, and goes before folly; because she reaches from end even to [0188D] end, that is, from the rising of every good, that she may transcend malice, beyond the failing of a certain good, that she may shut malice in. For in that in which every good at some time stood without corruption, Wisdom is acknowledged as prior. But in that good also which is corrupted, in which after the corruption something of good remains over which cannot be corrupted at all, Wisdom is found posterior. Wisdom therefore conquers malice; because she reaches from the end in which every good received its beginning, even to the end in which even a corrupted good, after the failing of the good, subsists in some good. And she reaches from end to end mightily, so as to hold malice itself within measure by her power, and to restrain it to order by her reason, lest either corruption, destroying the whole, stretch itself unto the end, or confusion, deforming the whole, [0189A] pour itself out to the uttermost parts. For this reason, therefore, she reaches mightily everywhere, subjecting malice to her dominion: and whatever of corruption malice brings in toward confusion, this Wisdom, by a wondrous law and a secret disposition, turns to the beauty of her own works, bringing it about out of what is not beautiful, that what is beautiful becomes most beautiful, and that what stands as good in itself rises up, out of that which is not good, into the consummation of goodness. She reaches, then, from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly. Nothing is excepted from her sweetness. She orders all things sweetly. What things all? Crooked and straight, good and evil, the subject and the adverse — she orders all things sweetly: not only good things, but evil ones too; not only straight things, but crooked ones too; not only subject things, but adverse ones too. She orders all things [0189B] sweetly. How sweetly? Do you wish to know how sweetly she orders all things? Without violence she subjects adverse things; without tumult she sets crooked things straight, and in her most peaceable kingdom, which justice holds within, she makes even evils and the motions of the vices that oppose her to serve, without compulsion, by a secret order and a most wise disposition. For she orders all things, even things not sweet, so sweetly that all the things which raise themselves against her will she neither powerfully extinguishes, so that they are nothing, nor violently compels, so that they can do nothing; but, allowing them to be and granting them to be able, she manifestly permits things running against her will, and secretly leads them to the fulfilling of her will. And when the wicked will those things against her, they will them without her; but when they can do what they will, they can do it from her. And when they do [0189C] what they can, they think indeed and wish to do what she does not will; and yet they do not do otherwise, nor are they able to do otherwise, than what she wills. For they are manifestly permitted and secretly led, that they may be sweetly ordered; and Wisdom reaches even to them mightily, so as to restrain them to her own disposition; and she orders sweetly, so as not to compel them against their own will. But even if at times she outwardly applies violence to crooked wills to be applied to, or to be chastised; nevertheless she never forsakes the sweetness of her disposition; because, remaining tranquil in herself, from that very source whence she disturbs the ill-quiet peace of those who oppose her, she thence composes the kingdom of her justice the more solidly unto peace. For this reason, therefore, she reaches from end even to [0189D] end mightily, and orders all things sweetly.

There remains now that greatest and highest course of Wisdom, from end to end: which ends have no end. Above, the sublimity of contemplation, and below, the depth of damnation. For these ends have no other ends beyond them by which they themselves might be bounded; but all things reach as far as these, which were made for these, and beyond them nothing. To these two ends wisdom, beginning from the middle, ordering on this side and on that, whether by advancing [sic: *promovende*] or by forsaking, leads the course of all things; strewing justice as a way for those ascending above; leaving iniquity as a way for those descending below, so that through justice one may go to blessedness [sic: *ab beatitudinem*], but through iniquity and injustice one may come to damnation. And when it has come thither, she will set all things in their own ends; [0190A] and the ends themselves will never have an end. And then too Wisdom herself will reach from end to end mightily, so that never more will she either fail in the requital of the just, or desist from the punishment of the iniquitous: ordering all things sweetly, on this side to joy, on that to eternal torment. But, I ask, what sweetness will there be in the regions below? what sweetness will there be able to be in eternal torments, that it should be said, ordering all things sweetly? Is it sweetly for this reason, that she who orders remains sweet herself, although those whom she orders are not sweet, nor is that sweet in which she orders? Yet how does she order sweetly? Is it sweetly for this reason that she orders, because the ordering itself is sweet, even if those things are not sweet which she orders: and, just as she orders evils not evilly but well, so she orders unsweet and bitter things sweetly? [0190B] For therefore evils exist, and good things have been permitted by the Omnipotent to be evils, not that evils may become gifts; but that out of evils good may come to be, and that the good things themselves may shine out more beautifully by comparison with evils; not that good things may be increased by evils joined to them, but that they may be commended by things compared with them. But who is wise, that he may understand these things — what evils do in the kingdom of the good: and yet, if they did nothing in the kingdom of wisdom, they would not be evils at all? Therefore some do evils on account of which they have been permitted to be: and both they themselves and evils do good, and evils themselves do not make good, but he makes good out of the evils themselves: he who knows how to use both good things and evil for good. And this is Wisdom, which reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly.

## HOMILY XII. *On that passage, according to another translation: The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth; where our copy has: The fool walketh in darkness, and on the remainder of the second chapter.*

[0190C]

We have perhaps lingered longer over the discussion of these matters than the brevity of a treatise would require; but not fully so long as the difficulty of the subject would demand. Now therefore, since we have found an end, and an end, concerning which Scripture spoke when it said that Wisdom reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly; and since it was our purpose to seek these ends on account of the ends of the earth, where the eyes of fools are, who walk in darkness, lest perchance Wisdom, who reaches from end to end, should reach to the ends [0190D] of the earth, and the light shine in the darkness in the ends of the earth, if Wisdom reaches to the ends of the earth, she who reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly. Since therefore we have found these ends. If nevertheless the things we have said about these ends are able worthily to fit their own truth to the interpretation of Scripture, and there be no other more excellent interpretation to which this one should by right give place, it now remains to inquire what these ends of the earth are that have been mentioned, and where they are; and also what that earth itself is, and where it is, in whose ends are the eyes of fools, who do not look back to their own head that they may see, and not walk in darkness. First, then, let us ask what this earth is, and where this earth is. Now we know that in this world there is earth and there is heaven, [0191A] and between earth and heaven is whatever is in this world. For in the body of this world heaven is highest and earth lowest; and just as above heaven there is nothing of this kind which is not in heaven itself, so beneath the earth there is nothing, save perhaps what is in the earth. And if we say of this earth that the eyes of fools are in its ends, how this will not be able to stand. For we proclaim eyes keen-sighted rather than blind, which we assert are stretched out by their own vision even to the ends of the earth. Which of the just men has been able to do this, to survey the compass of the earth with his eyes, and to run through in a single seeing such far-off spaces as could scarcely be traversed by the labor of many years? It is ridiculous even to think this, that Scripture said it of bodily vision. Of this visible earth: The eyes of fools [0191B] are in the ends of the earth, unless perhaps someone believe that in these words this is signified: that all fools and lovers of the carnal life, who with the whole intention of the mind always go about after earthly goods [sic: *a terrena bona*], run about in pursuit and search of them even to foreign nations, and often even to the uttermost bounds of the lands: and that they are therefore said to have their eyes there, because by thought and desire they always strain thither. But the wise man, who has raised his mind to the things that are above and directs his intention thither, he himself may have his eyes in his own head, in that he strains toward the attaining of that which is highest of all and chief. This could, so far as pertains to the truth of the interpretation, be brought in suitably enough, if Wisdom did not call us to a higher understanding, and to another earth, and to other ends, and to other eyes [0191C] to be thought of. For if the head of the wise man is rightly understood spiritually, it is necessary that we interpret the earth also and its ends mystically and not bodily, on account of the eyes of fools. As, therefore, this visible world has its own earth and its own heaven, so man has his own earth and his own heaven. For man himself also is a world, and man has been called the lesser world. His earth is his flesh, and his heaven is his soul. But in this greater world the earth is within the heaven; in the lesser world, however, the heaven is within the earth. And yet the heaven of the lesser world is greater than the heaven of the greater world. But what is its earth compared to the earth of that other? How small it is? and yet its heaven is within its earth. What is heaven within [0191D] earth? The soul within the body. The soul is heaven, the body is earth. The soul within the body; heaven within earth. And yet heaven is always above, earth below. For as this heaven is loftier than earth by its place, so that heaven is more sublime than its earth by its nature. Therefore in the greater world, the things that are in the earth are beneath the earth; the things that are outside the earth are above the earth. In the lesser world, the things that are within are above, the things that are without are beneath. What are the things within, and what the things without? Invisible things are within, visible things are without. Therefore invisible things are above, visible things beneath; and invisible things are above our heaven, invisible things beneath our earth. All earthly things are beneath our earth, because they were made for its service and ordained for its obedience. Therefore our earth is above the earth. And what shall I say? [0192A] Is not our earth also above heaven? Did he not carry it thither, and place it there, taken from us, he who took it for us? Therefore our earth is above heaven. Our earth had first been made by nature above the earth; afterward our earth went, through guilt, into the earth, and beneath the earth; but now, through grace, our earth has been raised above heaven. Therefore all earthly things are beneath our earth. And yet this same earth is joined to earthly things and coupled to them by a kind of friendship, as heaven is joined and allied to heavenly things; and earth reaches as far as earthly things, and heaven as far as heavenly things. Therefore earthly things are the ends of the earth, and heavenly things the ends of heaven; because earth reaches as far as earthly things and no farther, and heaven as far as heavenly things and no farther. Earth stretches itself through concupiscence as far as earthly things, and [0192B] heaven stretches itself through wisdom as far as heavenly things. For *the flesh,* as the Apostle says, *lusteth against the spirit; and the spirit against the flesh [n: (Galat. V)]*. For the spirit lusts upward and the flesh lusts downward: and therefore each of the two stretches itself in a direction contrary to the other. And when each has come whither it stretches, there it makes an end and stretches itself no farther. Therefore the ends of the earth are earthly things, whither the earth of the flesh is stretched by carnal desire. And our earth has indeed another end, that of judgment, but of desire it has no other end. Thus far it is stretched by desire, but by judgment it is led farther. Through desire, indeed, concupiscence is stretched toward earthly things; but through judgment, after earthly things it is led into the earth, after the earth to gehenna. Through concupiscence to pleasure, after [0192C] pleasure to iniquity, after iniquity to death, after death to damnation. *Every man,* says Scripture, *is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. For concupiscence, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin; but sin, when it hath been completed, begetteth death [n: (Jac. I)]*. *He hath conceived sorrow, and brought forth iniquity. His sorrow shall be turned upon his own head, and his iniquity shall come down upon his crown [n: (Psal. VII)]*.

And so the delights of carnal pleasures are the ends of the earth, and the death of the flesh follows upon the delights of the flesh. But the vengeance of damnation follows upon the death of the flesh. Therefore the ends of the earth have one end, death, by which they are received and consumed; but death [0192D] has damnation for its end, by which it is received and consummated. For carnal delights are consumed by death, so that they are no more; but the death of the flesh is consummated by damnation, so that it may be for ever. These ends fools are unwilling to consider, who have their eyes in the ends of the earth. For they gaze only at the first ends of the earth, round about the earth, where the earth itself is ended; not beyond, at the other end, where these ends are ended. They strain toward the ends of their own desire, not toward the ends of their own judgment. To the delight of their flesh, and to the enticements of their pleasures, they open their eyes, and they do not attend to what is to be thereafter beyond. Therefore they are fools who make an end in the middle of the way, where there is no end: and they do not look forward to the end where the end is. *The heart of fools is where mirth is, and the heart of the wise where sadness is (Eccle. [0193A] VII)* And another Scripture says: *In all thy works all the days [sic: omnis diebus] of thy life, remember thy last end, and for ever thou shalt not sin [n: (Eccli. VII)]*. For this reason fools do not fear to sin, because they look to the delight of sin alone, but do not look to what follows thereafter, the damnation of the delight. The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth; the eyes of the wise man are in his head. What is the head of the wise man? Whatever is highest for anyone, this is his head. For the head is the highest part of a man. The head of the wise man, then, is that which is highest for the wise man. And what is highest for the wise man, save that which is highest of all. For he would not be wise who held for highest what was not the highest. And so that which is highest of all is the head of the wise man: and perhaps Wisdom herself is this head, whom [0193B] he who is wise sets before all things that seem to have anything to be desired, and in comparison with her he despises all things whatsoever. And rightly, because Wisdom is the highest of all; she herself is the head of the wise man, since this very thing, that he is wise, is from Wisdom herself, and what the wise man desires to be is wholly in her. Wherefore the head of the wise man is understood as nothing else more rightly than Wisdom herself; since from her is the origin of goodness, and in her consists the consummation of every good.

## HOMILY XII. *On that passage, according to another translation: The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth; where our copy has: The fool walketh in darkness, and on the remainder of the second chapter.* (cont.)

And so that which is highest of all is the head of the wise man, and this head is nothing other than Wisdom herself; since Wisdom is the highest of all. The highest good, then, is the head, and the highest evil the end. For there are two, the highest good and the highest evil, [0193C] set on either side over against each other, and from the middle all goods and evils run back to these two ends. Every good to the highest good, and every evil to the highest evil. For there is no true good unless it leads to the highest good, nor a true evil unless it runs back to the highest evil. Therefore in like manner every evil is toward the highest evil, just as every good is toward the highest. But not in like manner is every evil from the highest evil, as every good is from the highest good. For *every* *best giving, and every perfect gift, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights [n: (Jac. I)]*. And what of evils? *The beginnings,* he says, *of sorrows are these [n: (Matth. XXIV)]*. Therefore every good is from the highest good, and every good is toward the highest good. In like manner [0193D] every evil is toward the highest evil, but not every evil from the highest evil. Therefore the highest good is both the head and the end of all goods. The highest of all evils is not a head, but only an end. Therefore every good, apart from the highest good, is good just so far as it leads to the highest good; and every evil, apart from the highest evil, is evil just so far as it leads to the highest evil. For there have been many who had these middle goods, and they were not true goods to them, because through them they did not come to the highest good. And there have been many who bore grievous middle evils, and they were not evils to them, because through them they did not descend to the highest evil. And so the former, lifted up by false goods, fell headlong to the highest evil; the latter, exercised and humbled by false [0194A] evils, advanced to the highest good. For this reason the wise man lifts his eyes as far as his own head, and nothing that is below suffices him, until he comes to that which is highest. For certain men have had their eyes upward and yet have not raised their eyes as far as the head, but have remained in the middle of the body. But what would the members do without the head? Could the members live, cut off from the head? So every good, without the highest good, is not a true good. You have seen a man abstaining from those things which are forbidden by the law, not committing murder, not committing adultery, not plundering, not bearing false witness, not coveting the goods of his neighbor, and you have called him a good man, of good life, of good conversation, worthy of praise, worthy of reward. [0194B] And how many have done these things and have not pleased God; because they did not do for God's sake what they did: and therefore they did not even do well, because they did not do it for the sake of the highest good. You have seen another climbing yet higher and doing greater goods, not only abstaining from evil, but even exercising himself in good, fasting, praying, bestowing many alms, showing compassion to the wretched, coming to the aid of those set in straits and tribulation, and you have proclaimed him great and worthy of imitation, as one near to God and chosen. And yet many have done all these things and have profited nothing; since they did not set God in the case. They did not have their eyes in their own head like the wise man, but bending downward into their own temptation, desiring to please either themselves or others, [0194C] and glorying in their own good without God, they lost their own good, and did not come to the highest good. For deservedly could they not keep the members alive, who cut off the head from the body. Therefore the eyes of the wise man are in his head, that he may first go forward to the highest good by intention and desire of the mind, afterward follow after it by zeal and action, and then come to it by reward. Let him go forward by intention, so that all he does he may do for the attaining of it; let him follow after by zeal, so that he may persevere in it; let him come to it by reward, so that he may receive it as his prize. In this manner, therefore, the eyes of the wise man are in his head.

For this reason, indeed, when our head was below with us, lest perchance our intention also should remain below, [0194D] the head ascended above to the head, that it might draw us after it: and behold, above there are not two heads, but one head. For the head below was Christ the man in the world, and the head above was God the Father in heaven. Do you wish to know that Christ is the head? *The head of the woman is the man, the head of the man is Christ [n: (I Cor. XI)]*. And Christ has been appointed by God head of the whole Church. And the Church herself, the bride of Christ and the body of Christ, what does she say of her bridegroom Christ? and of her head Christ? For she it is, the bride, who in Canticles, commending her beloved, after many such things and many others, adds this to his praise, saying: *His head is the finest gold [n: (Cant. V)]*. Therefore Christ is the head, and Christ has a head. And what is the head of Christ? Hear the Apostle: The head of the woman is the man; the head [0195A] of the man is Christ: *The head of Christ is God [n: (I Cor. XI)]*. And so the head of Christ is God: and Christ himself, about to ascend into heaven, said: *I ascend to my Father and your Father: my God and your God [n: (Joan. XX)]*. If therefore he ascends to God, he ascends to his own head; because the head of Christ is God. And this head is that finest gold which no rust consumes, no age wears away; because immortal divinity does not admit corruption. Behold, therefore, our head above is Christ, and our head above is God, and our one head is Christ and God; because Christ also is God, and the one God is Christ: and the head of Christ is God, and the one head is Christ, and the head of Christ is God; as Christ is the one beginning, and the head of Christ is God: *I,* he says, [0195B] *am the beginning, who also speak to you [n: (Joan. VIII)]*. For this beginning is itself our head: to which the wise man has raised his eyes, now straining toward him through faith, that afterward he may be able to have his eyes upon him, beholding him through sight. That we may lift our eyes to this beginning and to this head, Scripture admonishes us, saying: *If you have risen again with Christ, savor the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God; seek the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth. For you are dead, and your life is hidden with Christ in God [n: (Coloss. III)]*. For where we are dead, there we ought not to savor; but there we ought to savor, where we have life. If we are dead upon the earth, how do we savor upon the earth? For what dead man perceives? There, [0195C] therefore, we ought to perceive, where we have life; there to savor, where our life is hidden with Christ in God, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. What is it to savor? To love him, that is to savor. For love itself is savor, and love itself is wisdom. And so to love the things that are above, this is to savor the things that are above; because love itself draws thither where that is which is loved: and meanwhile it has its own savor by which it is refreshed, until one comes to that which is loved. Since, therefore, what is loved through wisdom is above, for that reason Wisdom herself draws upward. And because what is loved through concupiscence, it is necessary that concupiscence itself also draw downward. But from that whereby Wisdom draws upward, and concupiscence downward, there is as it were a division of darkness from light: and the hearts which [0195D] descend downward fall away from the light; but those which ascend are in the light. For they who descend to vanity fall away from truth, and they who fall away from truth fall away from the light; because truth is light. And the light itself does not fail, but they themselves fall away from the light, when they become darkness; because darkness is not light, nor is it illumined by the light so as to shine. Nevertheless the light itself shines even in darkness, but the darkness does not comprehend it [n: (Joan. I)], so as to receive it into itself and become partakers of it, since darkness cannot have communion with light. These, then, are the darkness in which fools walk: they who savor earthly things and, not understanding their own honor, *are compared to senseless beasts, and are become like to them [n: (Psal. XLVIII)]*. For [0196A] because after the manner of beasts they seek only earthly things, and seek after heavenly things with no affection of the mind, at length they are so blinded by the delight of the flesh, and so lulled asleep by the enticements of pleasures, that they are neither able [sic: *valcant*] to think from what goods they have fallen, nor to look forward to what evils they are to come. What, then, do these do but walk in darkness, who are so blinded by a crooked delight that they can neither know true goods nor foresee true evils? What darkness do they suffer within, who do not see the light that is present, and cannot recognize that good whose presence they are able by no turning away to avoid? Why is this? unless because folly has blinded their eyes: which they have fixed in the ends of the earth, determining with themselves to turn their eyes down into the earth.

## HOMILY XII. *On that passage, according to another translation: The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth; where our copy has: The fool walketh in darkness, and on the remainder of the second chapter.* (cont.)

[0196B]But lest perchance anyone think it contrary, that here the fool is said to walk in darkness, and that there, as has been recalled, the eyes of fools are declared to be in the ends of the earth. For both seem to be affirmed, that they see and that they do not see, although both may nevertheless be true at once, that they see and that they do not see. For he who said: The fool walketh in darkness, seems to have said outright that the fool does not see. And again he who said: The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth, seems to have said that they see something, namely those things which are in the ends of the earth. How then do they walk in darkness, if they see? And how do they not see, if they see those things which are in the ends of the earth? But it must be known that fools are said to walk in darkness not because they see nothing: for they see [0196C] the things which are in the ends of the earth, but because, whether in the things they see or in the things they do not see, they do not see the truth. For they do see visible things by intention and desire, and they do not see invisible things. And in the things they see, they think that to be good which is not; and in the things they do not see, they do not know that to be good which is. And so nowhere do they see the truth, and therefore they walk in darkness even in the things which they see. For the delight of the flesh and the [sic: *illececebra*] of pleasures has blinded their hearts, so that they do not see the truth. Because the mind, made drunk with a false sweetness, while it thinks of this alone which seems sweet and pleasant in the present, can neither remember how great is the sweetness of those goods from which it fell by its own turning away, nor foresee how great is the bitterness of the evils that are coming upon it, toward which [0196D] the ruin of its own headlong fall always hastens. And note how the sentiment of truth follows upon itself. For above, this man, having considered the vanity of worldly things, despising all, betook himself to the contemplation of wisdom, saying: I passed over to the contemplation of wisdom, and errors and folly. Then considering that the true wisdom of man is nothing other than to seek true goods, and to love the things that are above, where our King is: who therefore went before us, ascending thither, that he might show whither we should follow. Noting also how difficult it is to raise up a mind accustomed to earthly delights toward the desires of eternal things, he added and said: What is man, that he can follow the King his maker? Yet you see [0197A] that hearts which plunge themselves into carnal delights grow dark away from the light of truth — he gave, as it were, a definitive sentiment concerning good and evil, saying: I saw that wisdom went before folly as much as light differs from darkness. Then, commending the pursuit of both, he added at the last and said: The eyes of a wise man are in his head, but the fool walketh in darkness. Wherefore let the sentiment run back to its sum, and say: It is indeed difficult for mortal man to raise up to the contemplation of the wisdom above a heart pressed down with earthly desires; but nevertheless, because wisdom is light, and all who fail from the contemplation of it are in darkness, it is necessary that even mortal man, so far as his capacity supplies, apply his zeal to the seeking and searching out of Wisdom. [0197B] For this is the wisdom of man in this life: to seek and to search out Wisdom. For to find wisdom and perfectly to lay hold of the truth is not granted to this life, but laid up for the life to come. Yet this very inquiry after Wisdom has now its own light, by which it distinguishes those who love and seek Wisdom from those who love folly and walk in darkness. But the carnal mind, loving the pleasantness of visible light, counts vain the labor for the inner light to be sought; because it either doubts or is wholly ignorant that its brightness, after this light has been taken away, remains inextinguishable in holy minds. For because it discerns that the wise and fools, by an equal lot and like condition, suffer to be withdrawn from this visible light after the death of the flesh, a doubt arises for it also concerning the light [0197C] of Wisdom, whether it can be preserved inextinguishable in holy minds after the death of the flesh. Therefore, although it considers the pursuit of Wisdom itself to be good and praiseworthy, yet it doubts whether it is to be procured with so great a labor, since as to whether its fruit can be perpetual, no undoubted reason as yet makes anything manifest to it. This wavering of the human heart, then, this man, both seeing it in himself through the contemplation of truth and feeling it through the affection of the common infirmity, takes up also in a sentiment, showing how, wisdom having been sought and seen, that very consideration of mortal life was calling him back from the pursuit of wisdom, and that he therefore judged it wholly vain that others should advance in wisdom, because in paying the debt of death [0197D] he recognized himself to be equal with the rest. For this is what, after the praise of Wisdom and the commendation of the pursuit of it, he now suddenly brings in, turned to the consideration of the common infirmity, saying:

*I learned that the destruction of both was one.* For because he saw that both, that is, both the wise man and the fool, are withdrawn from this life by one destruction of death, he began to doubt this also: whether after this life diverse rewards of merits ought to be found according to this same diverse manner of life. And if it stands firm that this is true, why do they go out from this life by one way, who after this life do not attain to one reward? But if, just as the passage is one for all, so also there comes to be one arrival for all: why should they run before death by laboring unlike one another, [0198A] who, going out by a like death, would not come after death to an unlike reward? For this is what follows: *And I said in my heart: If the fall of the fool and my own shall be one, what does it profit me that I have given greater labor to wisdom?* For by those who believe this life alone to be, the pursuit of Wisdom is judged wholly vain: for this reason, that its labor belongs to the present life, but the reward and fruit of the labor to the life to come. Therefore, because they see the labor, they quickly grow weary of the labor itself, and easily turn to those things which, even though wisdom teaches that they are by no means to be sought after, yet, because their fruit is present, they judge more convenient. But because Wisdom does not allow her labor to be wholly fruitless even in this life, and cherishes those who follow after her with a great inward consolation, [0198B] and through the illumination of truth persuades them to have confidence, in this misery of mortality, concerning the reward of eternity, this man, immediately after he had begun, because of the failing of the carnal life, to doubt concerning the fruit of the perpetual life, accuses himself out of his inmost consideration for this same doubt of his, saying:

*And speaking with my own mind, I perceived that this also was vanity.* And at once, adding the reason why he testifies that the aforesaid doubt is a vain thing, he brings in also the vanity itself in respect of which the truth could have come into doubt for him, saying:

*For there shall not be remembrance of the wise man in like manner as of the fool for ever.* For Wisdom, which does not take away mortality from the present life, grants [0198C] eternity to the life to come: and although the condition of the wise man and of the fool is alike at the going out of this life, yet in the life to come the remembrance will not be alike. For as here an unlike manner of living divides them, so there too, when they shall have come into remembrance so that he may be brought to judgment, an unlike requital according to their own merits shall separate them. For future times shall not cover all things with oblivion, but all things that have been done shall come into recollection in their own time, so that every work, whether it be good or evil, may be called into judgment. Therefore the memory of the wise man shall not for ever not be in like manner as that of the fool, and future times shall not cover all things with oblivion, because, when the time shall have come, the one shall receive glory for the merit of his virtue, and the other shall receive punishment for the excess of his folly. [0198D] This, then, is that for which it is not vain to shun folly, and to give greater labor to wisdom; because, when the reward of requital is received, it is made manifest how great is the fruit of just labor. Yet this very consideration of our mortality has a certain just weariness in it; because it is fitting that a man should despise what he sees to be transitory even before it comes to an end? and that he should not afflict himself with empty labor for the attaining of that which cannot long stand. On this account he again redoubles the sentiment concerning the same equal condition of mortality, saying:

*The learned dieth in like manner as the unlearned: and therefore my life became wearisome to me.* And deservedly indeed does such a life come into weariness, which, being wholly liable to confusion, neither in its goods while it seems to stand, nor in its evils while [0199A] it comes to an end, separates the good from the evil or the worthy from the unworthy. For its goods come without discernment to the unworthy equally as to the worthy, and its evils afflict the good and the evil together by an equal lot and with the same outcome. Whence the goods also of this life rightly come into contempt with the just: goods which both afflict with various sorrows those who labor for them, and often, sought with much labor, pass over without profit to those who possess them, from the good to the wicked, and from their own to strangers. Considering which, this man, setting all things in one part — not only those which seem the evils of this life, but those also which put forward the appearance of good, while in real truth they are evils — and adjudging them by a like estimation, gives one sentiment concerning them all, saying:

*Seeing that all things under the sun are evil, and all vanity, [0199B] and affliction of spirit, again I detested all my industry.* And lest perchance you should think that he here detests that industry by which he gave greater labor to wisdom, and not rather that by which he was distended by the occupation of those things which are vain under the sun: presently he sets forth what industry he judges is to be detested, saying: And what [qua] under the sun I most studiously labored at. "I detested" is understood. And immediately he opens the reason why he detests both these things and equally the industry spent on them, when he subjoins:

*Since I am to have an heir after me, whom I know not whether he will be wise or foolish: and he shall have dominion over my labors, in which I have toiled and been anxious.* And lastly, commending his judgment concerning this, he brings in:

[0199C] *And is there anything so vain?* As if he were to say: I judge nothing so vain as when one man, greedily gathering, is worn away with fruitless labor, and another, living both idly and luxuriously, has dominion over the labors of another. For manifold is the vanity where one man is afflicted without cause, and another is unlawfully delighted. For the first vanity is to seek after things that will not profit; the second, to gather things that pass away; the third, to leave the things gotten by our own labor to be possessed by others, and above all by those of whom we do not know what sort they will be. For if all these things were vain even when sought and kept for our own uses, what will they be when handed over to the pleasure of fools? Whence he says:

*I ceased, and my heart renounced to labor any more under the sun.* Redoubling also the reason why he ceased from labor, [0199D] he subjoins, saying:

## HOMILY XII. *On that passage, according to another translation: The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth; where our copy has: The fool walketh in darkness, and on the remainder of the second chapter.* (cont.)

*For when one man labors in wisdom, and doctrine, and carefulness, he leaves what he has gotten to a man that is idle.* This befell Solomon himself, who, laboring in wisdom and doctrine and carefulness, gathered riches and heaped up wealth, and at last left all to be possessed by a foolish heir. For he left the folly of his own stock, his son Rehoboam, who, succeeding to his father's wealth, scattered all, and left the kingdom of his father — which he had received ample enough and magnificent — torn and troubled by a diminishing of sense and a surfeit of heart. But many also labor in wisdom and doctrine and carefulness, searching out with great labor and zeal the secrets of nature and the hidden things of truth, and handing on what they have found to the memory [0200A] of posterity, by word alike and by writing, for the commending of their own studies; and often they leave what they have gotten to idle men, because sometimes the negligence of those who come after refuses to take up for use this thing prepared, which the keen diligence of the earlier men acquired not without great labor and care.

*This then is vanity, a great evil.* It is therefore vain to labor in the knowledge of truth in order that we may come to the notice of those who neither wish to receive truth for its own sake, nor know how to approve it in others. Fruit, then, does not follow upon labor of this kind, because it neither gathers things that will profit itself, nor are those to whom it leaves what has been gathered stirred by any emulation of virtue to the pursuit of the good. For if there is labor for the one who seeks, and there is no profit for the one who receives, what does such labor profit? [0200B] But it is also a great evil, that from what one man is worn away with labor, another should abuse idly and unlawfully. For it is a great evil, because both the one gathers to his own harm and the other receives to his own harm. Therefore this is vanity and a great evil.

*For what does it profit a man of all his labor, and affliction of spirit, wherewith he has been tormented under the sun?* If it does not profit toward anything else, it profits nothing; nay rather, if it does not profit toward anything else, it does much harm, because the searching after it has great punishment, but the finding has no fruit. For what a punishment it is never to be without punishment?

*All his days are full of sorrows and hardships: nor does he rest in mind by night.* Very wretched is he who cannot have quiet even in that time which is naturally given [0200C] to quiet. By day he is worn away with labor, by night he is tormented with the care and anxiety of labor. For him whom, waking, the distension of labor and its restlessness harasses, it wearies also when he sleeps, being heaped upon his soul through the images and phantasies of dreams. No time, then, is allowed to pass for rest; the whole is taken up with sorrow and labor, and nothing is gained for profit and salvation.

*And is not this vanity?* Truly it is vanity, and utterly a great vanity. But what then? If this is vanity, what then is to be done?

*Is it not better,* he says, *to eat and drink, and to shew his soul good things of his labors?* If those labors are vain which confer no profit on those who labor, [0200D] then it is better to labor and to take the fruit of one's own labors. The reasoning seems plain, but it has many an exception. For it would have been much better if it had been said thus, and it would have stood true everywhere: If those labors are vain from which no fruit comes to those who labor, then labors of this sort are altogether to be set aside, and one must rather labor in those things wherein a fruit both certain and true may come to those who labor. But now by this reasoning vanity has been changed, not dismissed, and one vanity has succeeded another, not every vanity has departed. Vain [sic: *Vena*] carefulness is rebuked, so that a mind harmfully free of care may be loosed through torpor and idleness and incontinence into baseness. For if that man who distends himself with superfluous labor is truly seen to be blameworthy, why on that account is he who dissolves himself into pleasure and incontinence [0201A] thought to please? But the carnal soul finds the middle of truth with difficulty; and therefore it sometimes willingly consents to forsake one vice, since through it it sees a way opened for itself to another which pleases it more. And it pours itself out into the contrary with its whole intention the more boldly, the more certain it holds it that what it forsakes is an evil. For now, in its own evil, it not only judges itself worthy of no rebuke, but even supposes itself praiseworthy; and although it manifestly commits evil, it does not wish to be seen to be doing evil, but rather to be shunning evil. For it does not consider that by turning aside from a vice it has fallen into a vice, and therefore it thinks that by no means is the evil which it does to be marked with ill repute; because in it, as it were, it labors not so much to do evil as to turn aside from it. Whence here too, [0201B] when he had seen that those men are wretched and worthy of rebuke who greedily gather with labor and carefulness riches that will not profit them, and neither use the things they possess, but leave them to others to be possessed and used after them, in order to shun their folly he freely casts himself into the contrary sentiment, saying: Is it not better to eat and drink, and to shew his soul good things of his labors? There is one sentiment of all who are prone to vice. They always rebuke the opposite, that they may commend their own. Let the greedy perish, says the glutton and the spendthrift — and he devours, and gets drunk, and distends himself and fills himself to the point of choking. And his proverb is always: Let the greedy perish. And he thinks himself commended because he is not such a man, lest he be blameworthily such a man as he is. Nay, even for this reason he wishes to be seen to be such [0201C] as he is, lest perchance he be such as he accuses others of being, which he does not wish to be — as though indeed there were no middle ground where both might come to pass; both that he be not such as he accuses others of being, and yet that he be not such as with shameless boasting he exults that he is. It is better to eat and drink, and to shew his soul good things of his labors. How fair are the words, to eat and to drink! Who is there that shudders when he hears "to eat and to drink," or thinks that anything has been said here against modesty or chastity? But a shameless baseness lies hidden, covered with the veil of chastity. Let him therefore say openly: It is better to devour, and to get drunk, and to serve the desires of one's concupiscence with unbridled liberty. For if he had spoken thus, what sort of sentiment would it be? And indeed [0201D] he did speak altogether thus; because he wished to signify this in that which he said: It is better to eat and drink, and to shew his soul good things of his labors.

*And this is from the hand of God.* Men say this, and there is a kind of men who are wont to say this: Let us devour, and let us get drunk, and let us do well by ourselves out of those things which God has given us, because this is from the hand of God; because these things too were given us for this, that we might do well by ourselves. For why were all these things made, save for the uses of men, that men might use them, and that it might be well with them in those things which God gave them? And by saying these things they are blinded, and are carried away without measure and without chastity into their own pleasures, so as to applaud themselves, since God made all these things for use; but they neither know nor consider that although God made all good things for use, [0202A] yet he made nothing for crooked and disordered uses.

*Who shall so devour, and abound with delights, as I?* An evil boast is this. And yet there are those who glory in such things: and these too wisdom ought not to have passed over in the number of the vanities. Such men the prophet rebukes in another place, saying: *Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at mingling drunkenness [n: (Isa. V)]*. Who shall so devour, and abound with delights, as I? What manner of lover of wisdom is this? How far turned backward, nay, how far turned away and perverted from him who a little before saw the light of wisdom, and divided it from the darkness of folly with so subtle a consideration, saying: I saw that wisdom went before folly as much as light differs from darkness. Whence, do you think, was this sense so quickly made worst [0202B] [pessundatus]? Did he not say for his own sake what he said of himself, that he was a lover of wisdom: and this was not what he said; but he wished to signify certain men of that sort, for whose sake he said this which he said of himself? Or was he himself also, in some respect, all this truly, and yet did not on that account cease to be a lover of wisdom; because at once in one man both the sense of the flesh, according to the inborn corruption and the sin that dwells in it, urged wickedness, and yet the spirit, according to the affection of virtue and the judgment of uprightness, loved wisdom? See, nevertheless, what man is, whether in him who said this and was such a man, or in those for whose sake he said what he said of himself: whom he wished to signify to be such. See indeed what man is. Who shall so devour, and abound with delights, [0202C] as I? *Why dost thou glory in malice, thou that art mighty in iniquity? [n: (Psal. LI.)]* If no one can do what thou canst do, it is a great thing if he is able for good. But if thou art able for more in evil, why dost thou glory? For to be able for evil is not power, but weakness. Who shall so devour, and abound with delights, as I? For who is there, he says, to gainsay it, when God commands this? For God created gladness, and willed that those who please him should take joy in it.

## HOMILY XII. *On that passage, according to another translation: The eyes of fools are in the ends of the earth; where our copy has: The fool walketh in darkness, and on the remainder of the second chapter.* (cont.)

*But to the sinner he gave affliction, and superfluous [sic: surperfluam] care, that he may labor, that he may be distended, and gather, and not possess, but hand it over to him who pleases God.* Therefore good things to the good, and evil things to the evil. Consider how great is this perversity. *Iniquity hath lied to itself (Psal. [0202D] XXVI)*. Iniquity has lied both about itself and about God; and yet it has lied to none but itself. Iniquity said: *Good things to the good, and evil things to the evil [n: (Eccli. XXXIX)]*. And where is that word: *Mercy and truth have met each other? [n: (Psal. LXXXIV.)]* Where is that: *All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth? [n: (Psal. CXVIII.)]* Where is that: *Men and beasts thou wilt save, O Lord: how hast thou multiplied thy mercy, O God? [n: (Psal. XXXV.)]* Where, in short, is that which Truth herself and mercy says: *Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful: who maketh his sun to rise upon the good and the bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust? [n: (Matth. V.)]* If good things have been given to the good alone, what is it that Scripture says of the good: *The kiln trieth the potter's vessels, and the furnace of tribulation just men? [n: (Eccli. XXVII.)]* [0203A] And: *All who wish to live godly in Christ must needs suffer persecution [n: (II Tim. III)]*. *They went about in sheepskins, in goatskins, being in want, naked, straitened, afflicted, of whom the world was not worthy [n: (Hebr. XI)]*. *In hunger and thirst, in cold and nakedness? [n: (II Cor. XI.)]* And so iniquity lied about God, when it said: That God gives good things to the good alone, and evil things to the evil alone. For he both gives good things to the good, and gives evil things to the evil; and gives evil things to the good, and good things to the evil. For to the good he both gives good things that they may be cherished, and gives evil things that they may be exercised; and to the evil he gives evil things that they may be chastised, and gives good things that they may be called forth. And so iniquity lied about God, when it said: God gives good things to the good and evil things to the evil. But it would have spoken truth if it had spoken of true goods and of true evils, namely that true goods and true evils are goods to none but the good, and [0203B] evils to none but the evil. For this reason, then, iniquity lied about God. But iniquity has also lied about itself. When did iniquity lie about itself? When it called itself goodness, then did iniquity lie about itself, because iniquity is not goodness. And where did iniquity call itself goodness? When it said: Who shall so devour, and abound with delights, as I? Then it called itself goodness: for iniquity said this, since this saying against goodness and honor belongs to iniquity and impurity. Therefore iniquity said this, and in this it called itself goodness: because it said that this alone belongs to goodness which it said it would do, since it presumed itself to be goodness. For it said:

*To a good man God gave, in his own sight, wisdom and knowledge and gladness.* First he gave wisdom and knowledge, that he might understand and know how to seek gladness [0203C] in his sight: because God made it that those who please him might exult in it. As though indeed it were not wisdom, and much the greater wisdom, to seek and embrace that sadness which is according to God, rather than a foolish gladness, since on the contrary Scripture says: *The heart of [sic: stulterum] is where mirth is, and the heart of the wise where sadness is [n: (Eccle. VII)]*, This indeed is true, that God has prepared gladness for his elect in his sight, and has set wisdom and knowledge in their heart, that they may know and understand how to seek it where it is. But this is not that gladness with which they are glad who do evil: *who rejoice in the worst things [n: (Prov. II)]*. For that gladness is not in his sight, because of those who embrace it Scripture said: [0203D] *Thou shalt set them downward [var: Vulg. dorsum, "the back"], in thy remnants thou shalt prepare their countenance [n: (Psal. XX)]*. Therefore God gave gladness to the good man, but that gladness which is in his sight. Of which it is written: *Let the just feast, and exult in the sight of God: let them be delighted with gladness [n: (Psal. LXVII)]*. And again: *Visit us with thy salvation, that we may see the good of thy elect: that we may be glad in the gladness of thy nation, that thou mayest be praised with thine inheritance [n: (Psal. CV)]*. And again he says: *Thou shalt fill me with gladness with thy countenance: delights at thy right hand even unto the end [n: (Psal. XV)]*. This gladness, then, God gave to the good man in his sight.

*But to the sinner he gave affliction, and superfluous care.* Not by bringing in malice, but by descending to malice into the worst occupation.

[0204A] *That he may add and gather, and hand it over to him who hath pleased God.* Yet for this reason, because the one gathered riches through avarice, and the other, having received them, scattered them to the use of mercy. Otherwise neither is he who gathered rightly rebuked, nor is he who possesses commended. But now all things are said perversely, when it is said that he who devours and abounds with delights is good, and that to him God gave wisdom and knowledge and gladness in his sight — whereas it was said above that they are fools who have their eyes in the ends of the earth, looking to earthly delights and serving the pleasure of the flesh. And so iniquity lied, which said that pleasure is the reward of justice, and that the fruit of wisdom consists in it, and judged that bodily delights contain the sum of happiness. But a false judgment cannot long [0204B] stand in glory. For truth comes forth, and lays falsehood low. He says, in fact.

*But this also is vanity, and an empty carefulness of the mind.* What is this? Not only is this vanity and empty carefulness, that the sinner should add and gather and not possess; but this too is vanity and empty carefulness, that the just man should seek after and covet the riches of the sinner, or, if he has received them, should set his heart upon them. The whole, then, is vanity and empty carefulness, because nothing under the sun can remain, either for him who uses or for him who seeks riches and pleasures and joy and gladness. For all things pass away and flow off, and nothing subsists under the sun, so that the sentiment may be fulfilled: *Vanity of vanities, vanity of vanities, and all things vanity [n: (Eccle. I)]*. For vanity is filled full in this also, [0204C] that the very heart of man does not remain in the same state, but, always other than itself and adverse to itself and a stranger outside itself, always removes far from that which is into that which is not; and it passes over and is snatched away with the greatest vanity, whether from vain things to true or from true things to vain, everywhere vain and unstable, now seeking the highest things, now plunging itself into the lowest. There approving truth; here setting vanity before it. And we now see this greatest wavering of the human mind, contemplating in one man the whole race of men, and we were wondering how quickly the sense of mortals is brought to ruin, and, after so sublime a contemplation of truth, suffers itself to go into the alien things of baseness. From which indeed nothing else is given us to understand, [0204D] except that we should know our own wretched vanity, and that in this, that we reach to high things and approve the better, we should consider what sort of being man was made by nature: but in this, that we seek after things so wretched and abject, we should understand what sort of being man has been made by his own guilt, so that at least in this we may begin to be partakers of truth, that we truly acknowledge our own vanity.

## HOMILY XIII. *How all things have their own time.*

Many are the words of man, because the heart of man is not one. For unless the mind first scattered itself inwardly, away from the fount of truth, through many desires, in no wise would speech derive itself outwardly through so many assertions. But now, because the ruling soul is torn away from [0205A] the love of virtue, through various desires, into the concupiscence of vanity, therefore in the approving of that same vanity the tongue serves it outwardly by word with a various and inconstant judgment. For this reason, then, Solomon, disputing about vanity, so often changes his sentiment in his discourse, namely that he may show his understanding to have been changed in his thinking through the love of vanity. For the human heart, which is not fixed in the desire of eternity, is never able to be stable; since it is shaken from its own stability by the seething of carnal desires as often as it is moved, from those things to which it had clung by love, to the coveting of others. For because it seeks out the fruit of eternity in the use of things that pass away, and thinks that it can find the joy of happiness [0205B] in those things which were made only for the consolation of a time: therefore always, when in the things it has, with experience teaching, it has found either a false pleasantness or a true misery, it straightway turns itself to the seeking of other things, as though better, by which it may either lighten its own sorrow or fill up its pleasantness. Hence, therefore, it always seeks things to come and loathes things present: and it comes about in a certain wondrous way that he who is always deceived in the desire of what is to come is scarcely ever wholly deceived in the experience of things present. For man is his own witness that these very things which he loves are not the true goods; because while he always gapes in mind after things to come, and never acknowledges himself truly happy in the things he enjoys, in this he plainly proves even himself that all these things, although they can be sought after by fools when they are not had, as though for the highest happiness, yet can never, when they are had, be [0205C] possessed unto the highest happiness. And yet the carnal mind, blinded by the darkness of its own concupiscence, cannot plainly see what it also cannot be wholly ignorant of: that although it always sees vanity in the experience of things present, yet it never restrains itself from the appetite of things to come. It disapproves what it has experienced, it praises what is yet to be experienced; and the more immoderately it pours itself out through concupiscence in the desire of the things it does not yet have, the more grievously is it vexed with sorrow in the failing of the things it already has. This wavering of the human mind, then, Ecclesiastes has thus far set forth to us in himself, when in the approving of things, whether from loathing of things present or from appetite for things to come, with a changed mind he so often varied his judgment. For he thought [0205D] to find in those things which are rolled along under time something stable in which his soul might rest: and therefore, approving one thing after another as though by experiment, and disapproving all things once experienced, he acknowledged at last that there is nothing in them all which can either abide perpetually for those who enjoy it, or exhibit, while it is present, the full fruit of pleasantness. Therefore now, reproving his own ignorance, in that he believed himself to possess an abiding gladness in changeable things, he shows that just as all things, not only prosperous but adverse also, are good in their own time to him who uses them well, so to those who with a perverse love love temporal things instead of eternal, and hope that they can become happy in them, not even prosperous things can confer true happiness. He did ill, then, when he chose certain of them, as though better than all, [0206A] for his own pleasantness; because a strong soul, which through temporal things hastens to the state of eternity, not only seeks prosperous things of this world meanwhile for consolation, but also willingly takes adverse things into use, when the time demands, for the exercising of its own virtue. And therefore, all things being proved by experiment, he at last acknowledges the condition of changeable things, and confesses that nothing out of all the things that pass away can stand perpetually, saying:

*[n: (ECCLE. V.)] All things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven.* Why then should you either fear the evils of this world or covet its goods, since all things pass under heaven? Since rather this accords with truth: that in all these things you hold not anything, whether in good or in evil, for the highest; because all things [0206B] pass away. Nor should you think anything is to be cast away in its own time, because all things have been justly ordered. For all things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven. All things have their time, so that nothing is found perpetual and always abiding: but everything that is either follows something else, so that it does not come from the beginning, or runs before something else, so that it does not extend itself even to the end. All things have also a certain and determined time, when they begin and when they end; and likewise how long each subsists, and when each subsists, so that nothing is beside reason; and let the prudent soul study so to fit itself both to times and to temporal things that it neither set its confidence in the things that pass away as though they abided, nor presume to murmur, in the things that have been well ordered, against the disposition [0206C] of the Creator. And in every event, conforming itself to true and abiding goods, let it so despise the variety of changeable things that, although it use each thing for a time while it is present, it never allow its soul, at the passing of that thing, to turn aside from its own state. For that man is most prudent who so knows how to turn passing things to use that nevertheless he does not know how to bend his mind from its own stability at their failing. For all things in their own time are good to him who uses them well, and yet all things whatsoever that lie subject to changeableness, although in misery they afford some sort of consolation, cannot nevertheless confer ease. Nothing therefore is to be cast away in its own time, and nothing is to be chosen not in its own time; but let the soul be so [0206D] prepared for the use of a time that it nevertheless be not changed to the changeableness of the time. All things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven. Why then should any one thing be chosen for every time, since all things have their time? For if some one thing out of them all had every time, all things would not have their time; since, of two things contrary and at odds with each other, if there were a time for the one always to be, there would be a time for the other never to be. And thus this one would have no time, since that one, with which it could not have the same time, would have every time. Now therefore, since all things have their time, no one thing out of them all has every time; but each thing has its own time, when that it should be is good [sic: *es*], and a time when it is good that it should not be. [0207A] When, therefore, it has its time, it is good that it should be, even if that is not good which it is good should be; and when it has not a time to be, it is good that it should not be, even if that is good which it is good should not be. Job knew this, and received good things, praising God in his benefits, and the enemy thought that a holy conscience lay subject to time. He took away riches and goods; he slew the pledges of his house; he smote the flesh, he assailed him with reproaches and injuries, that he might break by adverse things the man whom he could not soften by prosperous ones. But Job, knowing that all things have their time, just as in good things he restrained himself by continence, so in evil things also bravely bore adversities by patience. But his wife, because she was foolish, and did not understand that all things have their time, thought that the rewards of merits were to be weighed by the moments [0207B] of times: and therefore, seeing him smitten and believing him forsaken, she rebuked him for having worshipped God in vain, and mocked him, as though he had deserved the scourges in return for his blessing, saying: *Now bless God, and die [n: (Job II)]*. To whom he answered: *Thou hast spoken like one of the foolish women. If we have received good things from the hand of the Lord, why should we not receive evil? [n: (Ibid.)]* For all things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven. If there is a time for the weak to be cherished with prosperous things, there is a time also for the perfect to be exercised with adverse things; if there is a time for good things to the good and evil things to the evil for the sake of truth, there is a time also for evil things to the good and good things to the evil for the sake of testing. All things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven.

## HOMILY XIII. *How all things have their own time.* (cont.)

[0207C]Why do you plead, all of you under time, about the laws of times? It belongs to time to lie subject to changeableness and to suffer vicissitude. For if all these things do not come to pass in time, when are they to come to pass? For beyond times there will be eternity, and there will be no changeableness: and there will not then be there, "all things have their time"; but everything that will be will so be that it cannot be now one thing and now another according to a time, but what will be will always be. Therefore, so long as you live under time, suffer the laws of time. Suffer them willingly, lest perchance, even if you were unwilling, you should nevertheless suffer them. Suffer the laws of time, that you may pass through time to the state of eternity. For one cannot find eternity in time, because eternity comes only after times: and those find eternity after times who, in the flowing of alternating times, fixed in mind [0207D] upon the desire of eternity, stand unchangeable. All things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven. For heaven itself also measures the spaces of all times, and all things that are under heaven pass away in time, and heaven itself does not pass away, from which time is. For time is, as it were, from heaven itself, and in heaven itself there is no time: and although all things that are under heaven receive their time from heaven, yet in heaven itself eternity stands firm. A great spectacle of wisdom is the visible image, that from the contemplation of visible things we may be roused to the emulation of invisible ones. Look upon heaven. It seems, as it were, to be moved, and it does not seem to be changed. But the things which are under heaven are changed, and thence is the origin of all motion, where [0208A] there is no changeableness. Therefore all things pass away under heaven, because in heaven all things stand firm. And the very things which pass away measure their own being from those things which subsist; because there would be no certain subsistence of things passing away if the state of the things that subsist were not perpetual. For those things which truly are, always are; and always are what they are; and there are other things which truly are not, and those which truly are: in a certain way they emulate them, that they may be something in that which they are; and when they have begun to be what they are, they pass over into that which they are not; and they are not truly this which they are, because they cease to be this, and now are not; nor are they truly this which they begin to be, because they only begin to be this, and are not yet. So these things are wanderers in true being, and in the very passage in which they run they seem to partake of a being [0208B] which they neither take in nor comprehend, although they seem to touch it, lest they be nothing at all. For they appear there, and when they are sought they are not, because they have gone away into the nothing whence they had come, and they were not out of that in which they were. For that alone in which they were truly was; and the whole of what it was, it itself was, nor had it received from elsewhere what it was; and in it all these things were admitted, so that out of that which itself truly was, these too might be something. As much, therefore, as they partake of true being, so much are all these things which do not have true being in themselves: to which this is the whole of being, that they are that very thing which has true being. And although in itself it is one, yet in them it seems to be another according to the capacity of those partaking, since they themselves are others in that which is not another. Each thing, then, has, according to its partaking of that [0208C] which always is, its own spaces of subsisting, some greater and some lesser; according as they are in that which is neither greater nor lesser, but is always the same itself. Therefore from it there is divided and measured out to each its own space and its own time, to one short, to another long; and there are days and months, and years, and lustra, and ages, and short hours, and moments, and instants; and all these are time in the things themselves which pass away and truly are not; and in that from which they are what they are, they are one, and there is found there not time, but eternity. All things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under heaven. For out of all the things that are under heaven nothing is eternal, but all lie subject to time and to changeableness. For all things at some time had a beginning, and at some time will have an end: and between the beginning [0208D] and the end is the space itself of time, which is time to that which has a beginning and an end; and that same space is eternity to that which has neither beginning nor end. For that very thing which began, before it began, was not; and when it ceased to be, it then was no longer; and then to it there was nothing, because that was nothing; and yet even then there was that which always was; and that same thing afterward was when this was; and this which began, began in that; and what was, was in that, so long as it was; and when this was, which was not always, that also was which always was, because this was in that; and what to the one was time, because it was not always, was to the other eternity, because it always was. So out of eternity all things have their time, and all things pass in their own spaces under [0209A] heaven. They have a time when they begin, and they have a time when they end. They have spaces for as long as they are to subsist: for this space is the delay of subsisting between the beginning and the end; and these spaces are like for many, unlike for many; yet all are weighed out by an equal judgment. And when the delay comes to those who live in gladness and joy, and lead their days among good things, it seems a great happiness; and when for those who are in hardships and are wearied by adversities the long spaces run on, it is judged a great misery and a great unhappiness; and yet man does not know his own lot, nor can he search out the judgment of God upon himself: for the long times themselves also have an end; and when they have received their end, those things are now no more which seemed good; and in like manner the things also which were thought evil are now [0209B] no more. And often upon passing goods there follow evils that will abide, and upon passing evils, after their end, goods which have no end: and then past goods can profit nothing in the multitude of evils, and past evils can hurt nothing, in the abundance of goods, to those happily brought to consummation.

Let not a man, therefore, glory on account of his own time, before the time, nor let him who is in tribulation be broken by the adversities of times; because all things pass away, until the time comes when there shall be measured back in eternity whatever was drawn out in the spaces of times, whether greater or lesser. Then the long spaces of times will not please the impious, the happiness of times being spent; and their faults abiding which they contracted through the times, when they shall have seen eternal punishments for temporal [0209C] deeds. But to the just their own long times will then seem even scant, when they shall have seen their temporal merits recompensed with eternal rewards. Before this time, whatever is done in time is hidden, whether it be long or short, so that man may not dare to search out the judgment of God, but may be prepared for every time, whether it be good or evil, so that, being proved through good things and evil, he may pass over to good things, to be glorified. And if meanwhile the spaces of time be long, let him not presume in good things, let him not fall in evil ones; because all things pass in their own spaces under heaven, so that, when the time under heaven passes away, there may succeed the eternity which is in heaven.

*A time to be born, and a time to die.* Now [0209D] he pursues, with examples following one upon another, what he had set forth generally, saying: All things have their time. And here he enumerates both goods and evils: and after goods, evils, and again after evils, goods; nowhere evils alone, or goods alone. For at this time of this life it is not possible to have goods without evils, nor evils without goods; because all things are mingled, so long as it is the time that all things have their time.

## HOMILY XIII. *How all things have their own time.* (cont.)

*A time to be born and a time to die; a time to plant and a time to pluck up; a time to kill and a time to heal; a time to destroy and a time to build.* First good things and evils: a time to be born and a time to die. Afterwards evils and good things: a time to kill and a time to heal. Not good things alone, nor evils alone; but both good things and evils. Nor only after [0210A] good things evils, but also after evils good things: yet first after good things evils, and then after evils good things follow. For there are two lives: one according to the flesh, the other according to the spirit. And we know, on the Apostle's testimony, that *not first that which is spiritual, but that which* is carnal, is first [n: (I Cor. XV)]. There are therefore two lives, the first carnal, the second spiritual. And each life has its own good things and its own evils; because *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth [n: (Psal. XXIV)]*; *for he himself saves men and beasts [n: (Psal. XXXV)]*; *he opens his hand, and fills every living thing with blessing [n: (Psal. CXLIV)]*. For he has set before every man both good things and evils. Good things indeed, by which he may cherish him through mercy; evils, by which through justice, examining his faults, he may condemn him. And every life has [0210B] its own good things and its own evils, so that all things may have their time, and all things under heaven pass away in their own spans; both are given, and both are set forth; the one out of justice, the other out of mercy. All the ways of the Lord are mercy, truth. *Mercy and truth have met one another: justice and peace have kissed [n: (Psal. LXXXIV)]*. If evils alone, there would be no mercy. If good things alone, there would be no justice. God therefore sets forth both good things and evils, and leaves to man the power of choosing which of the two he shall receive first. For it behooves him to taste [sic: *gustaro*] both, but which of them first lies in himself. But the carnal man, hastening as it were to his inheritance and turning aside from judgment, so that he may lack the blessing at the last, chooses good things first; and God gives him temporal goods that have an end, so that evils that shall abide without [0210C] end may follow upon them. But the spiritual man is first tried by adversities that he may be brought through to prosperity, and he too has his own evils and his own good things; but the evils in time, the good things in eternity. Thus every life is led to its consummation by an alternating lot, the one from good things to evils, the other from evils to good things. And all things have their time that they may be, and pass away that they may not be, running forward in their own spans to their end so long as they are. Good things pass away amid evils, and evils amid good things; and while they pass they sometimes make delay, and they have certain spans, each according as they are ordained, until they receive their end. Therefore he enumerates certain of the things that alternate in the world, that he may show the fluctuation of all mutable things. And first he sets down good things and evils, as though describing the state of the carnal life; [0210D] then evils and good things, expressing the condition of the spiritual life. Afterwards he alternates, and changes good things and evils, and evils and good things, that he may show a certain further confusion: because neither to the evil are there good things unto the end, nor to the good evils unto the end. But even before the end, now good things and evils, now evils and good things follow one upon another. Yet this whole variation of the distribution has its beginning from good into evil, when it is said: A time to be born, and a time to die; and its end from evil into good, when it is said, a time of war and a time of peace. Because the first life has good first, and evil last. The second life has evil first, and good last; in the middle of each, with evils and goods fluctuating by an uncertain lot. But among all these things which are enumerated for an example of all things, [0211A] certain are taken from human life itself, certain from those things that belong to human life, so that the whole of what is man's may be shown mutable — man who perhaps would not go wholly into corruption, if he could have stood at least in some measure either in himself or in his own. A time to be born and a time to die, this is from human life itself [sic: *devita humana*]; a time to plant and a time to pluck up what has been planted, this is from those things that belong to human life. For the work of man will perish together with man; because just as in man what is born is born that it may die, so what is planted by man is planted that it may be plucked up. For the time of every thing under heaven is not in the will of man, but in the judgment of the Maker. Since for every thing under heaven there is a time when God wills it, even [0211B] if man, when the time is, does not will what God wills. Therefore the things that God does, he always does when the time is; but the things that man does, he does not always do when the time is, since either by ignorance he does not know what is right, or by a depraved will he desires what is disordered. Therefore the time of every thing lies under the will of the Creator, when it is time that what is to be done in time be done, and everything that is done in time; if it does not accord with his will, there was a time when it was being done, but it was not the time when it ought to have been done. Therefore the works of men alone do not keep their own times, even when they are done in time; because in that part man alone does not follow the appointed time, where, abusing the liberty of choice, he does not govern himself under the will of the Maker.

[0211C]There is therefore one time which is allotted to each thing by the disposition of the Maker; another which is usurped by human presumption against the disposition of the Maker. In that time man, with the rest, submits to the law; but here he alone, beyond the rest, transgresses the law. And therefore there it is rightly done with him, even in that which he himself does not will; but here he often acts against what is right, doing nothing but what he himself wills. A time to be born, and a time to die. No one is born when he wills, even if someone sometimes dies when he wills. And yet many, when they die, by will die not when the time is; and many who are born by necessity are born when the time is. Even those who are born before the time are born when the time is; and [0211D] those who are born after the time are born when the time is: because necessity confers the time of being born, while a depraved will sometimes chooses the time of dying. Therefore no one offends in the time when he is born; and many offend in the time when they die. For even if nature sometimes passes by, yet the will does not offend, because that is not laid to the fault of the sufferer which not his own will concerning himself, but a just disposition from above, governs. Then therefore is there a time for every thing, when it is just that what is to be done be done, whatever that shall have been. Either by God without man, or by man, with God. For that anything should be done by man without God — there is no time for it, just as nothing just can be done by man without God. A time to be born and a time to die. A time to plant and a time [0212A] to pluck up. Here we may attend to a certain summary and universal comprehension of the mutability of all things, so that, as we distinguished at the beginning concerning the whole course of the work, so here too he may first express that mutability to which all things are subject, and then, pursuing more at large that one in which human actions fluctuate, may show it more monstrous than all and more to be feared. For these first four things which are set down seem to look especially to that mutability which is in all things that have a rising and a setting, and all the rest to belong properly to that which is engaged in human actions. For that all things that rise set, and that things increased grow old, was said on account of those things that live and feel: a time to be born and a time to die; on account of those things that live and do not [0212B] feel: a time to plant, and a time to pluck up; or else for those things that have a natural rising he set first a time to be born, and a time to die; and then for those that are fitted for quickening by care and industry he subjoined: a time to plant, and a time to pluck up. This therefore is that great vanity, vanity of vanities, for which it is too little that all things be mutable, unless they be further snatched into their contraries while all things pass away. For how great a thing it is to go far off and to sojourn away from one's own being, and to go and pass over into a contrary being, where you cannot at all be what you begin to be, unless you have utterly ceased to be what you are? There, then, the passage is hard, where by no reasoning can what follows subsist, unless first the whole of what precedes be destroyed. And what do you think, when there is a going from good things to [0212C] evils, when good things are changed into their contrary evils — what a change that is, most of all there where there is no running back, nor can any return be hoped for? For evils too are sometimes changed into good things, and again good things into evils; and often it happens that the two succeed one another by turns. Nor is that altogether grievous which is mutually tempered, so that neither are the evils great upon which good things follow, nor the good things best which are ended by evils following after; and all this can be borne, and whatever it may be, when it has come to pass, has its comparison, that it be not reckoned too much: there is one thing which, when it has befallen, who will be able to bear?

*A time to be silent and a time to speak. A time to gather and a time to lose. A time to mourn and a time [0212D] to laugh.* All these things are bearable: and when some one of them has befallen a man, that one passes and another comes; and this too, when it has stood its own time, passes, and that returns which had passed; and this happens everywhere again and again as long as one lives; and never does any one thing remain so as to be alone always.

## HOMILY XIII. *How all things have their own time.* (cont.)

*A time to be born and a time to die.* These are not like those, nor have they any running back once it has come to pass. For there is one death and one birth: and just as after one birth there is one death, so before one death there is not more than one birth. And no one dies who has not first been born; nor, when someone has once died, can he thereafter be born. Birth is the beginning of life, death the end, and there is a going from birth to death; but after death the way back to birth [0213A] does not lie open. For from birth the time of man begins, and by death it is ended. And therefore these have their time unlike all other things: the one, that in it the time is first, and it itself is no more; the other, that in it there is no more time, and it is always. This therefore is heavier than all, that it so has its time that it is itself without time, because after its time there will be no time in which what its time has taken away and consumed could be restored anew. Therefore the time to be born seems better than the time to die, because in the time of being born life is given, but in the time of dying life is taken away. And yet those who are born die, and those who die are born; since those who are born unto death begin to die from the moment they begin to live under the failing of mortality; [0213B] and those who die unto life begin truly to live from the moment when, after death, they have now ceased to be mortal. Wherefore a good death is more to be wished for than an evil life, because by a good death one proceeds to a good life, and by an evil life one arrives at an evil death. Therefore all things have their time, and nothing is to be cast away in its own time: since there is both a time to be born, that the first life may begin, which is exercised through justice in time; and a time to die, that the second life may follow, which enjoys the reward of justice in eternity. Afterwards he adds what follows:

*A time to plant, and a time to pluck up what has been planted.* This second thing therefore is of the work of the craftsman, together with nature. For the first work was of nature alone, [0213C] and that too was transitory. But now the work of the craftsman together with nature is subjoined; and that too is shown to be transitory, so that nothing may remain under the sun, the gladness which springs up from birth or from planting be tempered by the memory of death and of uprooting. Then there follow the works of the craftsman alone without the work of nature, and these too are enumerated in great number, and all are shown to be transitory, so that vanity may increase by its degrees; and yet all these things, just as by their mutability they are vain, so in their time they become fitting, so that in all these things man, even if he cannot hold the state of eternity, may yet study to keep the order of reason.

*A time to kill and a time to heal. A time to destroy and a time to build. A time to weep and a time to laugh. A time to mourn and a time to dance.* [0213D]And many other things which are enumerated, and many others which cannot be enumerated. And in all these human life suffers vicissitude and lies subject to mutability. For all these things pass over it, and run in by turns, one after another; and those that had gone before follow after, and again those that had followed go before; and without intermission this is done in the waves of great fluctuations. After weeping comes laughter, and after laughter weeping succeeds; and when joy has succeeded grief, again joys are changed into grief. And all these things have their time, when the will of man conforms itself through justice, according to the time, to the divine will, either willingly for the doing of them, or submits itself for the suffering of them. For all things have their time when man either does them according to God or suffers them for God, because for the man who walks according to [0214A] God all things in their own time, if prosperous things befall, cherish him; if adverse things happen, exercise him. Therefore all things have their time which man can justly do or justly suffer. But what cannot be done without injustice never has a time that it be done, because man has received no time for doing evil — man, to whom his time has been given for this alone, that he may either correct the evils he has done, or supply the good things he has not yet done. Therefore sins have no time; and all things have their time, because in their own time all things are to be well done; and things are good when all are well done, and out of all things sins are not among those that are to be well done, nor are sins good, although it is good that sins themselves should be. Therefore sins have no time, and sins are permitted to be done in time; [0214B] and they are not justly done when they are done, and they are justly permitted to be done when they are done; and when they have been done, they are justly ordered; and there comes a time that they be permitted to be done, and there comes no time that they be done, because they are not well done, and they are well permitted, that they may be justly ordered. A time to plant, a time to mourn, a time to dance, *a time to acquire.* Where is a time to be wanton and a time to get drunk? But those things can be well done in their own time: therefore they have their time. These have no time, because they are never to be well done. But perhaps it may seem to be the contrary that there has been set down a time to kill, a time of war, a time of hatred. But all these can be well done; and therefore they have their time, since they are to be justly done. For there is also a sword of justice, [0214C] with which kings and princes punish criminals out of zeal for equity, and put to death men condemned for their crimes, serving God in this very thing by a power received according to the precepts of the divine law. And these wage wars for the defense of the fatherland and the peace of the Churches, and fight down the enemies of peace, lest they oppress the innocent. There is also a holy hatred by which crimes are hated, not men; and this sometimes, for a wholesome terror, inflicts a strict severity outwardly for the correcting of vices, and inwardly preserves inviolate the sweetness of love, by which it thirsts for the salvation of men. Therefore there is a time of hatred, and a time of war: and all things have their time, when they are to be justly done. It is permitted me to confess what I confessed also at the beginning: that for these high and lofty matters I am too small in understanding to tell what is fitting, because [0214D] as for what is not fitting and does not agree, it is enough to have turned aside from this, if it be granted. For many are the secrets hidden in the deep of wisdom, and man is not able to search out her mysteries; and the words of wisdom, surpassing all understanding, scatter some light concerning the things that lie hidden, and that light is small in comparison with the whole. Therefore man labors when he sees it, and thinks to enter in that he may contemplate; and he is not able, unless wisdom be with him, and show him within the secrets of her ways in that part in which he has been made acceptable to her. And when he has drunk much, this much is much to him, and it is itself scant in comparison with her overflowing fullness. Therefore we have said many things about the waves of things and about the contrary agitation of those things that are under heaven; and all this is still little in comparison with the whole; and there will perhaps be those who will reckon us too lavish [0215A] in speaking, because they do not attend to the multitude of things to be said, and to the profundity of the things that have been said. We have spoken this briefly, that we may bring back again a fresh utterance to the beginning of the narrative to come, and may have our minds more eager.

## HOMILY XIV. *A declaration of the remaining things that have their own time, and a repetition of what has been said.*

*All things have their time, and all things under heaven pass away in their own spans.* Ecclesiastes had sought above some one thing in the world in which he might have rested in mind; and he did not find it among all things, whether because each one was imperfect, or because all were transitory. Therefore he began to loathe [0215B] and to reject all things; and yet he did not cease always to seek in them a full joy, and he could not find it. At length therefore, coming at last to know the condition of mutable things, he saw that he had erred in both: whether in that he charged those things which in their own kind were good with being evil, or in that he supposed that those things which were transitory could stand forever. Now therefore, correcting himself for his past estimate, he professes that all things under heaven are at once both passing away with time and good in their own time. And that the mutability and fluctuation of all these may be the better understood, how great it is, he shows that all these things not only pass away with time, but also with time go over into their contraries, saying: All things have their time, and all things under heaven pass away in their own spans. And [0215C] he then enumerates them all, distinguishing them in their own kind: *A time to be born and a time to die.* First he describes the course of mutable things according to its beginning and its end, that afterwards he may pursue more carefully the mutability and vicissitude of the things that turn in the middle. Now there are four works, by which all temporal things and all things passing away with time are unfolded. The first is the work of God; the second is the work of nature; the third is the work of the craftsman together with nature; the fourth is the work of the craftsman alone, without nature. The work of God is to create the essence of things out of nothing, to dispose the matter of things into form, and to temper the motion of things under a fixed order. Therefore these three belong to the work of God, [0215D] that is, the essence of things, their form, and their order. And these three, as the author himself afterwards testifies concerning the works of God, are stable, and do not admit the mutability of time; because the essences of things never cease to be what they are, and the forms of things, according to the first institution of their Maker, keep in their kinds a perpetual identity, and the motions of things never overstep the law of the first order. For neither could the essences of things be nothing, nor the forms of things be otherwise, nor the order and disposition of things from the beginning be otherwise than they are; but all things keep the norm of the first law and the covenant of the ancient institution; never running otherwise, they all still guard them. Therefore then let the works of God abide, because that which God made is stable in [0216A] all things, so that it may remain always. The work of God, therefore, is to create, to form, to dispose all things. The work of nature is to bring forth the seeds of things out of the hidden bosom by increase, and again, when the same wither and fall through failure, to call them back to the hidden bosom whence they had come forth. The work of the craftsman together with nature is to help by care and industry the things that rise from the earth. The work of the craftsman alone is to work upon the underlying matter of things, either by composing what is disjoined or by separating what is joined; so that it can neither create with God, that there be what was not, nor with nature bestow increase upon the offspring of things, so that greater be that which was less [sic: *crat*]

There are therefore three workers in this world: God, nature, and the craftsman who imitates nature. But these three [0216B] bring about what they produce to effect with very unequal power. For God in his work needs neither the work of nature nor that of the craftsman who imitates nature. For God sometimes works without nature, sometimes in nature, sometimes above nature. For without nature he first made nature itself. For when he made nature, he had no nature working with him. For that which was not yet could not itself work together with him who alone was. Thus therefore he first made nature without nature, so that afterwards, in nature, he might make some things with nature, others above nature. For with nature he makes those things which he brings forth from nature according to nature; above nature he makes, when in nature, beyond nature's accustomed course and first power, by a greater power added, [0216C] he brings something forth to effect. When therefore God works nature, and when he works above nature, nature does not work together with God; because there nature only receives that it should be what it was not, but here it receives that it should be able to do what it could not do out of what it had received. God therefore can work without nature; nature cannot work without God, because what nature does, it does out of that which God does, and together with that which God does. For God made the first power of nature; and that it may come forth to effect, he again himself does it together with that very nature which he makes. Everything therefore that nature does, God does; but not everything that God does, nature also does: he who without nature makes nature. In the third place there follow the works of the craftsman [0216D] who imitates nature; and he indeed sometimes works with God without nature, sometimes with nature without God, sometimes with God and with nature together, sometimes without God and equally without nature. With God he works when he works the works of justice, because God works together with a right will, one ordered according to justice. Without God he works when he works the works of iniquity, since sins are not from God, nor does that which is done against his will come to be through his cooperation. With nature the craftsman works when he applies outwardly his industry and care to the propagating of the seeds and offspring of things, to which nature supplies the increase. Without nature he works when, besides the things that look to the propagation of seeds, and to the tending of things being born [0217A] and of those things that have the power of growth and of sense, he unfolds his effort upon the underlying matter, so as to advance something, whatever it be, to effect; in which nature only suffers, and does not work, because it furnishes the matter to the worker, and does not exercise the effecting of the work. Such are all the works of men that are done upon the earth, of which many the necessity of mortal life compels, many desire urges, many vanity works. And in all these, because nothing stable is found, and all things pass away that are done under the sun — those which either nature brings forth, or the craftsman imitating [sic: *imitant*] nature fashions — the contemplator of wisdom subjects all things to vanity, proving that the works of God alone abide; since neither is a created essence ever consumed, nor is the reason of the disposition [0217B] or order of things changed. Therefore he shows first the works of nature made subject to vanity, whether in those things which nature alone works, because things that rise set; or in those things which the craftsman does together with nature, because things increased grow old. Afterwards he enumerates many and diverse works of the craftsman who imitates nature: some of necessity, some of desire, some of vanity; and he subjects all to vanity, because he shows them liable to mutability. The work of nature alone is told when it is said: A time to be born and a time to die.

Then the work of the craftsman working together with nature is brought in, when it is said: *A time to plant and a time to pluck up.* Last of all the work of man without the work of nature is added, when it is brought in: *A time to kill and a time to heal; a time to destroy and [0217C] a time to build.* And this is then set forth more manifoldly, with more things numbered up, that it may be plainly shown in how many things the vanity of the human heart is entangled and how widely it is scattered. For this pertained most of all to the matter: that the vanity of human minds, which follows the uncertainty of mortal life — because he had undertaken to reprove it — he should both set forth more diligently in the narrative, and set before the rest in the comparison; so that all the others might seem to have been recalled for this alone, that by comparison with them it might be recognized how great this one is. A time to be born and a time to die. It is a time to be born, when man is to be led into this life. It is a time to die, when he is to be called forth from this life. But meanwhile, after [0217D] birth and before death, while he lives in this mortal life, which needs sustenance and is nourished with food, that it may subsist. It is a time to plant and a time to pluck up, that man may till the earth from which he was taken, and sow, and reap, and plant, and gather. Now these two following things can also be compared with the two preceding by a distinction, in this way: A time to be born and a time to plant; a time to die and a time to pluck up. For when a man is born it is a time to plant, that earthly life may be fed with earthly fruits. But when a man dies, it is a time to pluck up; because when mortal life is destroyed, those things also which had been established for the sake of mortal life are taken away. And because to human infirmity, after the fruits of the earth, the use of flesh [0218A] is also granted, therefore after the time to plant and the time to pluck up there is fittingly brought in also a time to kill. And because in this eating a measure is necessary, lest the flesh take for an incitement to vices what it has received for the sustaining of its infirmity, immediately after the time to kill he adds a time to heal: namely, that in all other times we may study with careful concern to nourish and preserve the life of those very animals which we have received to be killed at the opportune time — that is, when necessity demands — for the sustaining of our infirmity. For this is, as it were, to heal the ailing, by coming to their aid in those things wherein they are not sufficient for themselves, and to repair what is failing. Whence perhaps, fittingly, when he had said, A time to kill, he did not add, a time to heal [0218B] what has been killed. As before, after he had said a time to plant, he immediately added, *and a time to pluck up what has been planted.* Namely because things planted can be plucked up, but things killed cannot be healed. Thus perhaps, if we follow the sense of the letter, we prejudge nothing of the spiritual understanding (which is to be traced out afterwards).

*A time to destroy, and a time to build.* When man ought to destroy and when to build, someone may reckon is by no means to be asked; since he may think that here this alone is shown: that man, if by chance he is subjected to various things by the events of the times, suffers these things unequally, even unwilling. But we, applying to an easier understanding these things which have been [0218C] said, can say that it is a time to kill when God, willing to punish the sins of men, brings the sword of slaughter for chastisement; but a time to heal when, cherishing again the afflicted and those wounded by the strokes of tribulations, he restores them with his wonted compassion. And plainly this may seem more consonant with truth, that here we ought to take the times of things not as those which serve the human will, but as those which obey the divine disposition. For neither is it the time of anything when man wills and God does not will. Because man often wills when it is not the time, and when God wills it is always the time. Therefore all times are referred to the divine ordinance; and it is said to be then the time of every thing, when it is justly disposed by God, [0218D] whether for the chastisement and correction of a crime, or for the consolation of infirmity. A time to kill and a time to heal. A time to destroy and a time to build.

*A time to weep and a time to laugh. A time to mourn and a time to dance.* Everywhere evils are enumerated first, afterwards good things are added; because first we are justly afflicted for our sins, afterwards we are kindly cherished again by God's compassion. And it is manifest in what way human life daily suffers the vicissitude of all these things, as often as by a hidden dispensation God either instructs us with scourges or consoles us with gifts. Then there follows:

## HOMILY XIV. *A declaration of the remaining things that have their own time, and a repetition of what has been said.* (cont.)

*A time to scatter stones and a time to gather.* But what this means according to the letter is rightly [0219A] asked, since such a thing, if it be thought to have a time among human actions, seems altogether idle and unfitting. Unless perhaps it is to be understood thus: that, because he is going to say in what follows, *A time of war and a time of peace,* he fittingly sets before it here a time to scatter stones and a time to gather; namely, that when a time of war is at hand the stones may be gathered for building fortifications and the ramparts of walls against sieges; but in a time of peace, because no perils of wars are threatening, the mounds of the fortifications may be scattered, so that access may lie open to all without hindrance. Nor ought it to seem superfluous, on the ground that he had said above, A time to destroy and a time to build, as though the same thing were repeated a second time; because that is taken as more fittingly said of the buildings [0219B] of houses and the dwellings of men, whereas this refers more properly to the defenses of walls. Yet perhaps another sense, more suitable, may be understood under these words. For because he had set before, A time to kill and a time to heal, lest perhaps it should be thought that only the evil, and those who are to be punished for their sins, are exposed to slaughter, he now shows that the just also are sometimes, by God's permitting, for an example and chastisement of the evil, subjected together with the impious and with sinners to deaths as well, and scattered by exiles and proscriptions, as is said through Peter: *It is time that judgment begin at the house of God [n: (I Petr. IV)]*. And that by the name of stones the just are signified is manifestly shown through Jeremiah, [0219C] when he says: *The stones of the sanctuary are scattered at the head of all the streets [n: (Thren. IV)]*. And Isaiah again: *I will make all thy walls of graven stones, all thy sons taught of the Lord [n: (Isa. LIV)]* [var: Vulg. *omnes terminos tuos in lapides desiderabiles*, "all thy borders of desirable stones"]. Therefore it is a time to scatter stones, that the just may understand from the very labor of their scattering and shaking that there is no true rest in this life. And again it is a time to gather stones, that after the wearing down of bodily exile, lest they fail in mind, when peace has been restored they may again grow strong by a temporal benefit unto things eternal. Thus what is hidden can with difficulty be judged toward any one side: since the divine word for this reason dissembles itself from us in certain places, that even there where it was thought to be manifest it may show itself worthy [0219D] of searching out.

## HOMILY XV. *On time and on the things subject to time, according to another interpretation.*

Let it not therefore irk us to attempt once again the hardness of these parables, until perhaps, the bark being worn away by the use of speech, the inward parts of its word may lie open. For we are in times, and our discourse rolls along with us, until we be made stable in that which is not changed by time; and this is, that we should contemplate above all human actions, because in them is the whole of vanity, over which we groan.

*A time to kill and a time to heal.* What were the times of killing and the times of healing? A pitiable beginning of human actions, from slaying and [0220A] slaughter. So must the work of a life given over to death have begun, so as to follow the sentiment of its author: *Accursed, raging unto its own slaughter.* Let us run over in mind the times past, and see the wars and slaughters made from the beginning until now, of nation upon nation and of innumerable peoples. And God bore with the human race raging against its own bowels; and in all these things he wrought his judgments, twisting the furies of men to the vindication of his justice, so that some justly suffered what others unjustly willed. And others rose up, and many were slain and were damned; and many were slain and were saved; and some were freed from the death of slaughter and were kept for damnation; and others were freed lest they be damned if they were slain. In all these he fulfilled his just judgment [0220B] upon them, so as to chastise and to spare according to the governance of that equity by which God disposes all things. Therefore there is a time to kill and a time to heal; and some do what he willed, others suffer what they do not will, and the just Arbiter sits above, doing what he wills and disposing all things that he may be feared. A time to kill and a time to heal: *A time to destroy and a time to build.* How great things from the beginning have the lovers of this world built, and have called their own name upon their own land, that they might have a glorious fame among those who come after. For they labored with heavy labor in their works, that the monuments of their boasting might stand after them; and they prevailed to a certain point, leaving to posterity great signs of their industry; and there still appear certain traces of ruins among them, of ages [0220C] gone by; and we marvel at those very men whom we do not see, that they could do such things, and we groan the more over them, because, though they themselves were men created for eternity, they loved vain things and vanished away, because they were made vain in themselves. For they themselves perished, and after them their works fell, and others came in their place; and these too did great works, and after these went into nothing; and all that they had made was destroyed together with them. And again others rose up and built, and did not understand where the former generation was, and its works, so as to see the vanity which is under the sun. And God permitted them to labor in vain, and to build things that would perish, that man might understand his own vanity; that what has been [0220D] built be destroyed, and again that what has been destroyed be built; and that the work of man upon the earth be not stable. Therefore *all things have their time,* that man may be instructed concerning his own vanity, and concerning the uncertainty of the mortal life through which he walks.

*A time to weep and a time to laugh: a time to mourn and a time to dance.* Weeping and laughter pertain to the mind. But mourning — or, to speak more properly, wailing — and dancing pertain to the body. By weeping, then, and by laughter, the grief and gladness of the mind are expressed; but wailing and dancing signify these same things, only when they are shown forth by the motion of the body. A time to weep, and a time to laugh: [sic: *templus*] to wail, and a time to dance. All these things have their time among men, while this mortal life runs on; and God permits, by a varying lot and by unequal outcome, [0221A] according to the height of his judgments and the depth of his counsel by which he disposes us, that these things should run and be varied over us, alternating prosperity with adversity, and changing adversity into prosperity in due time. And glad times come, and men laugh and dance and think it is well with them; and they often forget their Creator, and do not consider that they are to die. For they look upon present things alone, and rejoice in them as though they were to abide always; nor do they attend to their own condition and to the doubtfulness of mortal life, nor do they think of the perils that are to come upon them. And therefore they sin securely, and pour themselves out into harmful pleasures, and walk after the desires of their heart in the gaze of their eyes, so as to do what is not fitting, and to multiply wrath and indignation. And God sees this, and sows over them [0221B] griefs and bitternesses upon the wantonness of ill-sweet pleasures; and he calls back and restrains them as they flow forth, that they may not go into utter estrangement. Then comes a time to weep, and a time to wail; and men grieve, and often lay the blame upon God when it is dealt well with them. But he dissembles their depravity, and after a time mingles prosperity again with adversity, lest they fail; and again, when it is time, adversity with prosperity, lest they presume; and this he often does, nourishing and exercising, chastising and cherishing man, that he may learn to be fearful, and may know that with the Lord is the power of life and of death. Therefore there is a time to weep, and a time to laugh: a time to wail, and a time to dance. And upon these there follows a time to scatter stones, and a time to gather. This time is enumerated after those, but [0221C] is ordered among them: because in time there are often together causes that lead to one reckoning of time. *A time to scatter stones, and a time to gather.* The whole world is an exile to those for whom heaven ought to have been the fatherland: yet the minds of mortals grow together with it by use, and men begin to love their own places, and their own lands in which they were born or reared; and a great forgetfulness of things eternal succeeds, for the sake of affection for things temporal; and unless God wiped away these ingrown sweetnesses of the passions, there was no way by which desire for him might enter in to us. Therefore he gives his judgments, and there come commotions and shakings of nations and migrations of peoples; and some rise up to snatch what is not their own, and others are plundered and scattered; and again the stronger, to whom the power has been given, when they too have come, [0221D] cast out those who had violently snatched what belonged to others, and possess what is not their own; and the world fluctuates within itself, so that man may see that there is here no stable dwelling, and may accustom himself little by little to draw back his mind and loose it from the bonds of earthly delights. Therefore there comes a time to scatter stones, that there be no stable dwelling upon the earth, and that man may be forced to sigh in his exile for the fatherland, where joys remain unshaken, and the security of peace is troubled by no infestation coming upon it. This, then, is what the scattering of stones does in its own time. But because human infirmity quickly collapses, and cannot long stand unharmed amid adversities, after the time of scattering there comes a time of gathering: that by the quiet of the season it may grow strong, being admonished in this very thing [0222A] to be wise, and to learn by experience how great are the joys of the rest to come; that it may hasten to that place where there is no fear of scattering, nor is the hardship of exile dreaded, to whom eternity of life in the fatherland has been given. A time to scatter stones, and a time to gather. Then again another time follows after that time; and others are named which themselves also have their time — often one time together with those times that have been spoken of, often, apart from those times, another separately in its own time.

*A time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.* A time has been given to chaste embraces, that flesh may be sown for propagation, and that the harvest of the human race, which daily throughout the whole world is reaped by death, may be repaired by the care of generation. For the covenant of the first institution, by which flesh was to be taken from flesh [0222B] without the contagion of the flesh, is after the sin of the first transgression confirmed in the flesh of sin by indulgence, not only for the fulfilling of a duty, but also for the conferring of a remedy: namely, lest the motion of the flesh, now boiling up too immoderately, should flow out more shamefully into every transgression, if it could nowhere be lawfully relaxed. A boundary is therefore prescribed, up to which the affection of the flesh may extend itself without loss of chastity: so that what is done in the chastity of matrimony by concession, even if it belong to infirmity, may yet not be imputed to shamefulness. But lest again the blandishments of pleasure turn the mind aside into forgetfulness of the Maker, by a wholesome dispensation man is sometimes suspended even from what is conceded: lest perhaps, if he gape too immoderately after these things that seem sweet in the present, he should not hasten to those things that are eternal [0222C]. Therefore a time to embrace has been given, and a time to be far from embraces. For a time to embrace has been given, that mortality may be repaired and the infirmity of mortals sustained; a time to be far from embraces has been given, that while the flesh is withdrawn from the delight of the flesh, the mind may be nourished unto spiritual delight. A time to embrace and a time to be far from embraces. For when the stones are gathered, it is a time to embrace; but when they are scattered, a time to be far from embraces: since for this reason the times of [sic: *augustiae*] have been given, that the afflicted flesh may temper itself from its own delights, and that afterwards, in the time of joy and consolation, it may chastise itself with fear and reverence from excess. There are also the embraces of dear ones and the fellowships [0222D] of friendly society, in which, apart from the experience of the flesh, a sweet companionship is bound together by a most welcome consent — and these too are loosed in their own time, lest the heart of man rest in man, until there come that covenant of eternal charity which is not loosed. On account of all these things there is a time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces: so that in time man may not seek what is eternal, and that he who loves the society of a living man may always think of the separation of one who is to die.

*A time to acquire, and a time to lose.* What are the good things that are first acquired and afterwards lost? For certain good things had been lost and were afterwards acquired, so that thenceforth they could not be lost. And there were again other good things unlike the former, [0223A] which nevertheless seemed good: and there was truly something in them toward good, but not as the first good things which were true. And these good things were not the good things of man toward the true good: and man came, after he had lost the true, and acquired false good things, reckoning himself happy in them. For he willed to console himself and to have in time what eternity confers; and he gathered things that would perish, which he could not hold; and God granted this, that he might recognize the distance of the good, and be instructed by his own vanity, so as to turn himself to those things that are true. Therefore, then, God let go his heart, that he might gather together those things that cannot stand; and these very things, in their own time, he now grants to be acquired, now takes away when acquired: testing man in all his works, and showing that all things under heaven are vanity. For this a time is given [0223B] to acquire, and a time to lose: that while man has obtained what he had coveted, he may learn by experience what these joys can confer upon those who greatly esteem things that perish; but when he loses what he had, he may recognize that all things which could be taken from him against his will had been foreign to him even while they were possessed.

*A time to keep, and a time to cast away.* Temporal goods are to be kept in their own time, as much as the necessity of temporal life demands; but because in the death of the flesh everything that belongs to the pleasantness of carnal life is of necessity lost, it is worthy that even before death it be cast away by the will from the love of the heart.

## HOMILY XV. *On time and on the things subject to time, according to another interpretation.* (cont.)

*A time to rend, and a time to sew.* He who rends divides what is united; but he who sews joins together what is divided and [0223C] separated. All these things this man had foreseen to be done without ceasing in the life of men, so long as it lies subject to mutability: in which life the fellowship of human converse is now to be sought after, because it seems to confer something of usefulness; and now to be fled, because often the same brings loss. Social consent, therefore, has its own sewing in its own time; the zeal of a just contradiction has also its own rending in its own time: so that both with those who wish well and with those who do good we may be united in assent and in work; but from those who love depraved things and work iniquities we may be divided in mind and equally in working. But lest perhaps this sentiment seem the same as that in which it was said above, a time to embrace and a time to be far from embraces — since in that place likewise we asserted that the conjunction and separation [0223D] of social love was treated of — the things that were said there can not unfittingly be taken as signifying only love and affection, while the things that are recalled here are referred to the figuring of any fellowship whatever, or of any compact in which there is the same consent and the same pleasure of concord. Thus do the likenesses of things offer themselves for the understanding of wisdom: and wisdom herself uses her own works that she may manifest herself in us. There are many things that are said in parables and worthy of deep searching; but they do not all wish to come out, that they may always be sought within.

*A time to be silent, and a time to speak.* First a time to be silent, afterwards a time to speak. For wisdom goes out from [0224A] the heart, nor has the tongue from anywhere else what it may rightly bring forth, unless understanding first form the word. Therefore first there is a time to be silent, after that a time to speak: so that first, in silence, shrewd thought may gather wisdom into itself, before the tongue afterwards sends it forth by word to the hearing of others. For this reason too there is a time to be silent and a time to speak, since the hearers of the word sometimes receive it with desire and love, but sometimes without reverence despise it by casting it away. Wherefore it is a time to be silent, when we see hearers in every way impatient of admonition; but a time to speak, when we see that they either desire the word or at least are willing to bear it. For this reason also there is a time to be silent, because in those things which we cannot discuss we ought not [0224B] to presume. And likewise a time to speak: because as for other things that we can comprehend, it is necessary, for the instruction of our neighbors, not to keep silent. Whence not only the works of men, but their words also, follow the uncertainty of fleeting life, so that vanity occupies the whole and nothing stable or constant is left: since we can neither always say what we know, nor always retain what we have learned; and now it may be harmful to have kept silent the things that ought to have been said, but now it may be a fault to have said the things that ought to have been kept silent. Likewise we often cannot when we will, and we do not will to be wise when we can; but more often we ought not to do either, when we do it. In this there is great uncertainty, and the gloom of a deep ignorance: so that man is tossed from time to time, and does not understand his own time in all his work [0224C].

*A time of love, and a time of hatred.* Many are the things that are loved in this world, and likewise very many that are hated. And in all the things that are loved, few love truth; and in those that are hated, few hate iniquity. For this reason men love, and often think that they love well, and love ill: because in the things they love they do not love truth, nor do they love them on account of truth. Likewise very many practice hatreds, and boast of their zeal for justice and equity; and within there lurks strife in the heart, and a savage fury feeding itself on unjust hatred. And therefore love and hatred cannot at the first discern their own time: because they do not follow the judgment of justice and truth, but are borne by their own inclination into depraved appetites, so that they do what they will. [0224D] They love and they hate, they cherish and they are zealous, often for things they ought not, often when they ought not; and there comes a great confusion of love and hatred, and the heart is scattered into universal vanity, fleeing the things that are right and coveting the things that are depraved. Therefore a time of love and of hatred has been set before man: that he may understand and discern when, out of those things which according to the time can be good and evil, he ought either to seek after something or to turn aside from it. For outside the times there are certain things which are not changed by time so as to be able to be otherwise: and among these there are good things and evil. And the things that are good are eternal, so that they are always good; and the things that are evil are likewise eternal, so that they are always evil. It is not of those that it is said to thee: A time of love, and a time of hatred. For to those belongs eternal love, and eternal [0225A] hatred: since the things that are to be loved are there always to be loved, and the things that are to be hated are always to be hated. But meanwhile, now in time, while all things are uncertain, the things that meet us as we pass by change themselves according to the time, so that what had stood as fortunate for one gives way into evil for another; and what this man has grieved over as adverse, that man recognizes as having turned out happily for himself. Therefore in all these things that pass away with time there is a time of love and a time of hatred: so that man may not fix his heart upon them either by love or by hatred; things which, when held in hatred, can again be justly loved, and, when loved, can again be justly held in hatred.

*A time of war, and a time of peace.* On account of the time to kill, a time of war is ordained; on account of the time to heal, [0225B] a time of peace follows. And that was the first, but this was recalled last of all: so that the beginning and the end may be enclosed with all the labors and perils that lie between; so that the life of man, which passes through only to cease, may never be safe. For man went out that he might withdraw and not stand with God; and he made a covenant of love with the pleasure of this world, that he might rest in it. And God would not endure that covenant, that man should abide in estrangement; and he raised up against him the things he had perversely loved, that they might oppose and afflict him; and there came about for man a war with all things that are in the world, that he might find grief and affliction in them until he return to peace with God. Then all things will compose themselves to peace with him, so that the things that had been adverse to the exalted may be subject [0225C] to the humble. For at the first all things had been at peace, just as at the last all things will be pacified: so that in the middle the things that pass may run their course by an uncertain lot; until they come to this, that either, for one falling under judgment, all things be adverse forever, or, happily, consummation, all things be made subject. For where hatred will be eternal, there will also be perpetual war; and where there will be eternal love, there everlasting peace will stand fast. Nor will it be said there, a time of peace and a time of war, just as it will not be said, a time of love and a time of hatred: but there will be war, and peace; war without end, and without end peace. Let not man therefore reckon that war greatly to be feared to which peace can succeed; nor that peace true which a war following after can disturb: because all things that pass away are to be reckoned vain in this very thing, that in [0225D] good, and likewise in evil, they cannot always remain.

*What more has man from his labor?* Therefore the labor of man runs in uncertainty: because he cannot have more from his labor, lest man be content with those things that consist in his own labor; because all things are vanity, and pass away with time, to be ended with time.

## HOMILY XVI. *On the spiritual understanding of those things which have been said concerning time.*

But now it is time that, after the running through of the times according to the things that roll outwardly in time, we should also call to mind the spiritual understanding. For little by little [0226A] the discourse of wisdom advances toward the touching of spiritual things, that it may draw the exercised mind to inward things. We distinguished above, then, two lives: one according to the flesh, the other according to the spirit. Now the carnal life is prior in time, in that every man is born in the flesh before he is reborn in the spirit; and everyone who lives in the flesh either walks according to the flesh and has not yet attained the spiritual life, or walks according to the spirit and has renounced the carnal life. Wherefore every spiritual man has been made spiritual out of a carnal man; but not every carnal man has been made carnal out of a spiritual man. For the carnal life is always either alone or first, so that every man either holds it alone, so as never to begin the spiritual life, or, having had it first, exchanges it by a following pursuit of the spiritual life [0226B]. Each of these two lives has its own followers: the carnal indeed those who love the joys of the present life; the spiritual those who seek out the pleasantness of the life to come. Of these, the former cherish the flesh with the blandishments of earthly delights, while the latter exercise the spirit by the pursuit of virtues in the hope and desire of things to come. With these two peoples the world runs down to its end through the mutability of the times, until it come that by the appointed covenant of justice the judgment of both be made. For it pleased God, that he might show the riches of the glory to come upon the vessels of mercy, to lead along also the vessels of wrath in forbearance through a temporal mercy; and likewise to exercise those same vessels of mercy, that justice and truth may be fulfilled, meanwhile now with the troubles of temptations: so that every life may have [0226C] both what it may receive freely of mercy, lest goodness be left unknown, and what it may feel as strict of justice, that truth may be made manifest. Therefore God set before every man both good things and evils, that he might show forth both, namely mercy and truth: the one, by which without merit he freely bestows a benefit; the other, by which for evil merit he repays a worthy punishment. Therefore he disposed that man should receive both; and he left it in man's power which he would first receive. But he set a condition of choosing upon both, lest perhaps depraved concupiscence be excusable: so that if man chose temporal goods in this life for his pleasure, he should not be able to obtain the eternal; and if he willingly submitted himself here to the scourge of chastisement in the judgment of truth, in the [0226D] life to come he should not feel the torments of damnation. Now the reprobate, who love the temporal life and set its pleasantness before the joys of the everlasting life, embrace present goods with all their desire, and set all their happiness in them; but the elect patiently endure temporal griefs, that they may be able to come to the joys of eternity that have been promised; and in regard to those joys, whatever is transitory, if it seem bitter, they do not fear; if sweet, they do not covet. Whence it comes about that the lovers of the carnal life have good things first and afterwards receive evils; but the spiritual are first exercised with adversities and afterwards attain to good things. To the former the first things are good, the last evil; to the latter the first things evil, the last good. But because [0227A] again all things that pass away in time are confused and mingled, so that they keep no order, whether from good into evil or from evil into good, therefore now meanwhile between the beginning and the end a manifold vicissitude runs in: namely, that now after good things evils, now after evils good things, should befall by an uncertain lot both the evil and the good alike. All these things, while Ecclesiastes was setting forth a certain distinction concerning the rolling of the times and the vicissitude of the things that are varied in time, he carefully expressed for an example of all things, that he might show the lot of both the good and the evil together, and their advance running into contraries. For when he had said that all things that are under heaven are varied by the turning of time and are borne into contraries, he subjoined examples, and enumerated many things out of all, that [0227B] the nature of all might lie open. And among those things which he enumerated, there are certain in which good things and evils are recalled - which indeed in which evils and good things, so that the state and condition both of the carnal and of the spiritual may alike be recognized. For there are seven in which good things are first recalled, afterwards evils; and again seven in which evils are first spoken of, afterwards good things, so that the whole may run down on either side unto the end. For by the number seven this whole present life is expressed, which rolls on by the course of seven days unto its own end. The evil, therefore, have their sevenfold number, and the good likewise have their own sevenfold number; because this whole life of the evil is from good into evil, and the whole life of the good from evil into good, of those going [sic: *cuntium*]. Of which [0227C] life the beginning of the evil is in good and the end in evil; but of the good the beginning is in evil and the end in good, with the middle things fluctuating by turns. For the middle things are uncertain: and for this reason also that which has been set in the middle has been pronounced doubtfully, whether from good into evil or from evil into good. For the middle was a time to scatter stones and a time to gather: and this itself has received an ambiguous exposition, signifying either of war or of peace, so that the middle things may be left uncertain. For if in this the thing that is said first is evil, and what comes afterwards good, then there will be eight of those in which evils are named first and good things afterwards, and six in which good things are recalled first and evils afterwards; because the life of the good rightly passes over to the number of beatitude, while the intention of the evil, together with their life, does not exceed the labor of temporality. Thus the truth is [0227D] one, whithersoever you may twist the sentiment by interpretation. There are many other things which perhaps might fittingly have been said in this enumeration or distinction. But we, avoiding weariness as far as is possible, let us come to the setting forth spiritually of the things that have been said.

*All things have their time, and all things under heaven pass away in their own spans.* If man had persisted in obedience to the commandment, he would not be of the number of those things which have their time under heaven and pass away. For if he had not flowed down in mind through iniquity, he would have remained stable in body also through immortality. Nor would he then be under heaven, so as to be rolled about with the things that pass away with time; but cleaving to the highest and true good, he would not be subjected [0228A] to the moments of the times, being fixed by contemplation in the solidity of things eternal. For eternity itself was the heaven, where, fixed in mind, he could not be changed by time; because, lifted above the times, he looked down upon all things gliding away beneath him. But after he turned aside his heart, so as to subject it through concupiscence to mutable things, then, as though fallen from heaven, he began to flow downward together with the things to which he clung, and, led through the rollings of his own mutability, to feel the moments of the times. Hence the human mind was made liable to times, so that in it now evils have their turn along with good things — the mind which good things alone before possessed, quiet and unshaken, without vicissitude. Therefore all things have their time, and all things under heaven pass away in their own spans, so that he too who through love subjected himself [0228B] to mutable things, agitated by the law of others with the waves of his own mutability, cannot stand at rest. Thus therefore the times came into the human heart, when many desires entered [sic: *introicrunt*] into it, and mutability began to hold sway there; and some came and others departed, and there arose a great fluctuation and inconstancy. For now the invisible world was rolling along with the visible world, and the moments of the times began to run their course within it, and there began to be years, and months, days and nights, sowings and harvests, rains and droughts, fruitfulnesses and barrennesses. For all these things are carried out in the nature of spiritual beings, the likeness of corruptible things having been brought in by the harm of sin, so that a nature made for eternity, wrongly associated with that which passes away temporally, likewise fails into alteration. For the shoots [0228C] of the virtues rise from the first root, and go on to grow and to come to the effect of consummation. And against them come the risings of vices and the cockle sown over them; and they lift themselves up to choke the things that are right, that they may not prosper; and there comes a great expectation, and a heavy peril mingled with hope and with fear. For if God pour out the rain of grace and the droppings of his truth upon a thirsting soul, there rises a harvest of virtues with manifold increase; and years of fruitfulness come, and calm seasons shine out, the cloud of ignorance being driven away. But if in anger he take away his benefits, and hold back his blessing that he may exercise his judgments, then sad seasons follow, and the good [sic: *genimima*] wither in the drought, and the thistles and thorns of vices are multiplied for labor and grief to sinful [0228D] man. And in all these things the sinful soul suffers its own times, looking out upon the heaven above, which it has lost, unmoved in its eternity, while it itself is rolled downward, temporal; and in it all things which cannot stand pass through by their own spans and measures. And therefore all things have their time, and all things under heaven pass away in their own spans.

*A time to be born and a time to die.* This is the lot of sinners in time: that if by chance any good things are born in them, afterwards they die, and do not persevere unto the end. For sometimes even in the evil some good things are born, and begin as it were to rise and put forth a shoot; but once born they soon dry up, because they have no moisture. For they believe for a time, and in the time [0229A] of temptation they fall away, so that they have a time and do not come through to eternity. A time to be born and a time to die. For the depraved there is a time to be born in good, when through a sudden fervor of mind they begin some right things; but there follows them straightway a time to die, because, not having perseverance in the good, by the same lightness of mind with which they had begun, in the time of impending pressure they abandon the good things begun.

*A time to plant and a time to pluck up.* Good things are planted in the evil, when through exhortation or right admonition they sometimes take up good things; but they are plucked up afterwards, when, shaken by a depraved suggestion, they lose the good things they had begun. They are born, therefore, by their own will; they are planted by another's admonition; but they die when by their own desires [0229B] they grow lukewarm toward the good; they are plucked up when they fall by another's supplanting. And in all these things the evil have their own times, in which by a just judgment they are disposed, whether to this or to that; and everywhere good things go before, and evils follow after for those foreseen unto evil. Then follows the life of the good, in which evils go before that good things may follow after, and those very evils that run before work together unto good.

*A time to kill, a time to heal.* In the elect the old man is first killed, and the carnal life which lives according to the affection of the flesh; then he is healed who according to the spirit is the new man, that he may live unto God.

*A time to destroy and a time to build.* Every man first makes an evil building, when [0229C] he works in the flesh, and daily adds evils to evils, so that a depraved building rises; and this must be destroyed and overthrown in those who are saved, that justice may be built in them.

*A time to weep and a time to laugh.* First a man ought to weep for the depraved things he himself has committed, that afterwards he may laugh securely in the good things he has received from God. For unless a preceding weeping wash the conscience in contrition, in vain does laughter exult over the things that are glad outwardly, without inward pleasantness.

## HOMILY XVI. *On the spiritual understanding of those things which have been said concerning time.* (cont.)

*A time to mourn, or to wail, and a time to dance.* First the flesh ought in penitence to be afflicted with torments for its depraved delight, afterwards to be exercised in good works in the pursuit of virtues. Thus assuredly the life of the just is instructed by griefs, and is prepared by punishments for joys, that [0229D] it may come clean to its own fruit; and its evils always go before that they may pass away, and its good things are deferred to the end that they may remain without end. And we can consider in this narrative a certain order of the correcting and amending of a soul that is to be justified. For the first of all is that in him who is corrected the depraved will be slain, and then the good, either infirm, be healed [sic: *sanctur*], or dead, be made alive. For what lives ill is well killed; and what is ill infirm is well healed. After the will has been changed, the ill-built mass of depraved works is destroyed, and the pursuits of good works, scattered by long negligence, are rebuilt. Then, for past fault, weeping follows, which, when it has cleansed the conscience with a fountain of tears, [0230A] is at last changed into the laughter of consolation and into joy. There follow also in penitence wailings, or mournings, when the grief of the mind is carried on even to the affliction of the flesh, so that afterwards, with the exultation of the mind, the flesh also, though worn down, may be gladdened by its own consolation

*A time to scatter stones and a time to gather.* If by stones we understand the strong works of the virtues, what else ought we to understand in the scattering of stones but the multiplication of good works? For to scatter stones is to offer far and wide, to the knowledge of many, the examples of strong works. But to gather stones is, after the pursuit of labor, to receive the fruit of good works. It is therefore a time to scatter stones, and again a time to gather stones; because a man ought first to exercise himself in good works in the pursuits of the active life [0230B], that he may be able afterwards to receive the fruit of his own work in the taste of contemplation. And because that taste is most pleasant to those who enjoy it and full of the highest delight, so that it seems to excel all the things that can be loved, there is fittingly subjoined at once:

*A time to embrace.* For there are certain embraces of wisdom and delightful bonds of inward love: when the mind, admitted within, lays hold of the joy of its own love, and, binding it fast with certain arms of its desires, makes a covenant and demands a compact of perpetual abiding. But because mortal life is quickly cut off and driven back from the sight of the inward light by the gloom of its own darkness, and by the mutability of its own condition is separated from the fellowship of eternal stability, [0230C] there is fittingly subjoined:

*A time to be far from embraces.* For after the time to embrace there follows a time to be far from embraces; because the human mind, although sometimes, lifted up by grace, it is admitted to the touch of inward [sic: *dulcedidinis*], yet, soon pressed by the weight of its own infirmity, slips back again to earthly things and to its accustomed thoughts. Although this sentiment may seem to belong particularly to the evil, in that it recalls as it were prosperous and good things at its beginning, but adverse things at its end, yet let it suffice to have observed this distinction in the preceding six which we have expounded, so that we may apply the rest that follow rather to a general signification. For one thing is noted by the disposition, and another is expressed by the signification; because the disposition [0230D] of the order suggests as it were a distinction of persons, whereas the signification shows by the sentiment of things only the truth. Therefore what is told of the evil only, or of the good, with the order of speaking changed, is not unfittingly taken without distinction of the good and the evil alike, so that sometimes this even belongs rather to the good according to the signification, which, so far as pertains to the order of the narrative, shows forth the life of the reprobate. Yet we can also take this very thing as not unfittingly said of any of the reprobate: who, even if they sometimes seem to draw near, as it were, to the embrace of wisdom, by the love of the good according to a certain affection having the appearance of virtue, yet because they do not divide their mind from carnal [0231A] desires and earthly cupidities, quickly slipping back to their accustomed ways, in that very thing wherein they seemed to have drawn near, they are made far off. As therefore the elect are for a time held back from the embrace of the highest truth, that by the very deferring of it they may burn the more with desire of it, and at last may more fully grasp what they have desired, so the reprobate too are for a time in a certain manner permitted — that they may see whereby they are confounded, and that malice may not be excused — to approach to the touching of it by some knowledge. But this is the difference: that the just and the elect, after they have tasted the sweetness of the inward good, are for this reason for a time driven back, that they may burn the more with desire; whereas the reprobate, after they have recognized the truth, are cast away, that from that very knowledge they may take against themselves the testimony of their own damnation. The former, then, are admitted [0231B] and driven back that they may be provoked; the latter are admitted and cast away that they may be confounded. Thus the philosophers of the gentiles were admitted in very great part; but they did not touch wisdom from near at hand, nor did they draw her to themselves that they might fully enjoy her sweetness. For they saw and knew, and thought that they loved; but it was a foreign love from far off, commending her appearance, but not drinking in her sweetness. From afar, as with arms stretched out and hands spread wide, they wished to make an embrace; and the beloved was not between the breasts, that he might be strongly held fast, and make delay, and abide; and therefore quickly and swiftly he fled from them, nor could he be held back by a love that was a stranger. The beloved fled, then. But the beloved does not flee that he may escape; rather he only hides himself, and conceals himself for the provoking of love, [0231C] that he may be sought in desire and not found, until he be most ardently loved. And often he returns again as though about to abide, and offers himself to be experienced; and after a little he slips away again, reserving the fruit for hereafter. And in all these things there is a time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.

*A time to acquire, and a time to lose.* When is it a time to acquire, save when it is a time to embrace? And again, when is a time to lose, save when it is a time to be far from embraces? For when the beloved is present, the increase of all the virtues is multiplied, and the inner house is filled with abundance and richness. Then barren things bear [0231D] fruit, and the things that had withered are fattened with fruitfulness, and the soul itself marvels at the riches it possesses. Holy affections blaze, and chaste desires, while adverse motions are lulled to sleep; and whatever had been wont to fight back, or to stand in the way importunately, is made far off, so that all things are at peace and quiet. The power of doing well is supplied according to one's wish, and the abundance of a rich will overflows even to the multiplication of holy works. This therefore is a time to acquire, when holy merits are heaped up, and the wages of good works are multiplied in the treasuries of eternal riches. But lest perhaps continual increase should in some measure cast down the human heart through elation, there follows a time to lose: that while by a wholesome dispensation the increase of the virtues is taken from him for a time, he may be the better [0232A] made solid in virtue through humility. And thus the holy mind, resting within in the embrace of wisdom, is increased with the riches of the virtues; but outwardly, scattered through occupation, it is pinched with want and worn thin by poverty: just as, on the contrary, carnal men gather by their labor riches that will perish, and when they have begun to be at leisure for the embraces of pleasures, they soon consume the same by living idly and luxuriously. We can also fittingly take the times of acquiring and the times of losing in another understanding. For there are two lives, namely the active and the contemplative: of which the one, that is the active, in the pursuit of good works gathers by laborious exercise the gains of holy merits; but the other, that is the contemplative, in the knowledge of truth [sic: *peccata*] rests by love. Which lives indeed we rightly understand to have been signified by [0232B] the two wives of Jacob, namely Leah and Rachel: of whom the one, that is Leah, is said to have been of bleared eyes indeed, but fruitful; whereas the other, that is Rachel, is reported to have been of beautiful eyes, but barren. For the active life is fruitful in the offspring of good work, but the contemplative is clear-sighted in the knowledge of truth. And because in each life the virtue of the saints is exercised by turns, and is turned about by a kind of alternating change — namely, that now its patience is proved in the labor of work, now its desire is refreshed in the sweetness of contemplation — rightly is it now said: A time to acquire, and a time to lose. For it is a time to acquire when the devout mind multiplies in the pursuit of good work the gains of merits, and then as it were a time to lose follows, [0232C] when for love of inmost quiet it willingly bears the losses of working. For as it were willingly it sets aside the riches of good work, that it may be able to rest, even with little, in the sweetness of contemplation. Yet from this nothing of its merits is diminished, which it earns more by the very desire and love of the highest good than by the pursuit of work. A time to acquire, and a time to lose. Concerning any of the perverse it is a settled thing: that if at any time they acquire something of good by acting rightly, they quickly lose it, because they have no perseverance in the good begun. To whom assuredly the time of acquiring could profit nothing, because for them there followed the time of losing the things acquired. And these a greater loss often follows in this very thing, because for the things they have acquired they swell up, but for the things they lose they are not humbled.

[0232D] *A time to keep and a time to cast away.* There is a time that God should keep his elect from temptation, because perhaps they might have been broken by adversities; and again there is a time to cast away, that when they are to be exercised with troubles he may, as though angry, wholesomely expose them for a time to temptation. But God also often keeps the evil safe and quiet in this life from the troubles that press upon others, that afterwards in [sic: *judicie*] he may cast them away the more heavily, the more patiently he bears them here also, while he protects his adversaries. But man himself too ought to keep many things for a time, which afterwards in their own time he should cast away: things which, kept in their own time, can bring aid to him who keeps them; and again, unless in their own [0233A] time they be cast away, can make a hindrance. For earthly substance is rightly to be kept for a time and for the sustaining of the flesh; and again in its own time, if peril to the soul is known to stand in it, it is without doubt to be cast away. There are also many things in spiritual discipline and in the pursuit of virtues which for a time one must now keep, now cast away: lest perhaps, if a work of virtue be done without discretion, that very thing be reckoned to fault which might have been counted for merit. For all things are changed with time, and there is not anything that always remains the same; and therefore he who lives under time ought to weigh the causes and outcomes of all things against their times.

## HOMILY XVI. *On the spiritual understanding of those things which have been said concerning time.* (cont.)

*A time of rending, and a time of sewing.* Everyone who lives in the flesh according to the flesh is, through the affection of the flesh, [0233B] as it were one with those things which the flesh covets. It is necessary therefore that the man who is turned from carnal things to spiritual should first be torn away in mind from those things to which he had clung by affection. For then indeed he freely glues himself to spiritual things by love, when nothing is left over of earthly affections to turn his mind aside into alien desires. And so it is a time of rending, that first a man may tear his mind away from earthly desires; afterward a time of sewing, that in mind, through spiritual love, he may begin to cleave to eternal and abiding goods. Nor does this seem to be passed over, that the things which are rent are substantially one; whereas the things which are sewn are indeed essentially diverse, but by the mediating bond of the thread become as it were accidentally one. For so every [0233C] man is united to corruptible and perishable things by nature, but is made a partaker of eternal things by grace. For thus human things and divine are sewn into one, so that what had been two by nature become one by grace. Compunction indeed is the needle itself, and love the thread; and the needle makes the way, and pierces both, that the thread may hold both together. For the sewing could not have been made otherwise, unless both were bored through and both held together, since the one would depart from the other, and would easily divide itself from unity, if the bond did not hold both. For this reason the needle of compunction pierces both, and the thread of love binds both together, that they may stand together and not depart from one another. For the needle of compunction pierces human things [0233D] when it pursues fault; it pierces divine things when it searches out the hidden things of eternal things. For thus compunction stands twofold, and there is an upper watering and a lower watering *(Josue, XV)*. Through the upper watering divine things are pierced, and through the lower watering human things are pierced. For through the compunction which rises from fault the sinful conscience is transfixed; and through the compunction which rises from the desire of eternal things the hidden things are penetrated. The one subtly penetrates the conscience, that it may drive out harmful things; the other by deep consideration searches out invisible things, that it may lay hold of the things it loves. So both are bored through, and both are transfixed: the one by grief, by which guilt is rooted out, the other by desire, by which the things coveted are sought out. After these follows the thread of love: [0234A] by which on both sides the bond of unity is effected, so that things thenceforth joined may not be separated from one another. For love rises on both sides, and the bond of love runs together into one, because the human mind, looking back, sees there how great things have been entrusted to it through mercy; but considering divine things, it contemplates in them how great things have been promised it unto glory. And it loves both, and the knot of charity is made in both, because mercy is sweet unto glory, and glory pleasant unto mercy. And the love of these cannot be separated, because the sewing has been made, and the bonds of eternal charity stand firm. The time of rending therefore was then, but now is the time of sewing.

*A time of keeping silence, and a time of speaking. He that heareth,* saith the Scripture, *let him say: Come [n: (Apoc. XXII)]*. For he who [0234B] first opens the ear of the heart by obedience to the word of God, he afterward rightly looses his tongue to speak to his neighbor. For he who has not first learned by obedience to keep silence before another in the word of edification is convicted of lying under blame, if he himself presumes to teach others. Therefore first is the time of keeping silence, that a man may learn what he is to teach; and then the time of speaking, that he who has now known the truth may not blush to speak it in its own time. For each is a fault: namely, both when a man rashly presumes what he ought not, and when through negligence he is sluggish about that which he ought. And therefore we must first beware lest we commit unlawful things, and afterward take pains lest we neglect what is due. A time of keeping silence, and a time of speaking. Times succeed one another, and a time comes after times.

[0234C] *A time of love, and a time of hatred.* If anyone shall say that in the time of love there is a time of speaking, and that in the time of hatred there is a time of keeping silence, so that what is holy be not given to dogs, nor pearls cast before swine [n: (Matth. VII)], but that the just man set his finger upon his mouth when the days are evil, and be dumb when the sinner stands against him: has not justice therefore come upon the earth, that sinners may be reproved, and that the wicked may be converted, lest they perish? For this reason times are ambiguous, since it belongs to them to run their course into uncertainty. Yet nothing is without a time, whether it be love or hatred. For love has its time, and hatred its time. For to him who is commanded to love his neighbor as himself, to the same it is said that he should hate himself. [0234D] Whence it stands that he who loves God as himself, when in God he loves his neighbor: so, against God, he does not know how to love even himself. There is therefore a time of love, and a time of hatred, so that we who for God's sake strive to love our enemies, when God's cause is injured, may not presume to love even our friends. There is yet another love, and another hatred: that each man both love his own flesh, and that in those things which are necessary for sustaining its weakness, and hate it in those things which demand depraved desires. And so there is a time of love, and a time of hatred, since it behooves us, so long as we live under the defect of this mortality and carry the contradiction of sin in our flesh, to weigh with great discretion applied, when we ought by compassion to cherish our failing nature, lest it fall away, and when again [0235A] to press down by afflicting it the motion of vices rising up in the flesh, lest it grow strong. For it is written: *No man ever hated his own flesh [n: (Ephes. V)]*. And again it is said: *Make not provision for the flesh in its desires [n: (Rom. XIII)]*. Whence it is plainly shown that the flesh is both to be loved, so far as pertains to compassion for nature, and again, so far as regards the chastisement of fault, to be hated. And because in this there is need of a great governance of discretion, a time of love and of hatred is prescribed, so that walking along the middle boundary we may neither smother nature while we pursue fault, nor nourish fault when we cherish nature. But because this cannot be done without great toil and heavy wrestling, there is subjoined: A time of war, and a time of peace, that a man may at once acknowledge both that no one without a fight [0235B] comes through to victory, and that he who lawfully strives rests in peace after victory is obtained. For the time of peace is set after the time of war for this reason, that he who could be broken by the weight of the struggle may be consoled by the gift of peace. A time of war, and a time of peace. There are three who stir up war against us: namely the devil, and the world, and our flesh. For Paul knew that he had all these as enemies, who asserted that he had undertaken a fight against them all. For he testified that the fight against demons was continual for him, equally with all the faithful, when he said: *For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood: but against the powers and principalities; against the rulers of these darknesses, against the spiritual things of wickedness in the heavenly places [n: (Eph. VI)]*. Again against the world, that [0235C] is, perverse men, lovers of the world, he asserted that there had been a fight for him, who related that he had fought against beasts at Ephesus [n: (I Cor. XV)]. Likewise he testifies that against his own flesh there is for him a ceaseless fight, saying: *So I fight, not as one beating the air; but I chastise my body, and bring it into servitude: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself become a reprobate [n: (I Cor. IX)]*. There are therefore three tyrants who lead forth their armies into battle against us: and each has his own battle lines drawn up for making war upon the soul. The devil indeed draws up columns of suggestions against the faithful soul; the world brings forth prosperity and adversity to overcome us; but the flesh, stirring up crowds of carnal desires, rises up into battle against us. But against all these [0235D] the faithful soul must contend manfully, and, fortified by God's protection, must ply the javelins of the virtues to war down the forces of the adverse power. For we conquer the devil, if with perseverance we refuse to receive his suggestions. We conquer the world, if we both steadfastly despise its prosperity and patiently endure its adversities. And we conquer the flesh, if we do not consent to its depraved desires. But enemies once conquered do not at once cease, so that there might be peace continually; but they attempt again, and again they contrive, and try how they can: and often, as if daring, though they are timid, they themselves make an assault with terror, that they may test what spirit is in us; often they lay ambushes, and advance secretly to explore, [0236A] and hide themselves, and wish to be hidden, until they come upon us unforeseen. And in all these things many perils arise, and daily circumspection, and fear on every side: and there comes to be a great war, and a long-lasting struggle, until our side grows strong in every way, and they, despairing utterly, cease and depart from their hope; so that they may either be frightened away from us, or be subjected to our dominion. For this also will come to pass without doubt, if we have not failed from our hope and from good patience, that at length a full and entire peace may be restored after the labor of the struggle is completed. For then the devil shall be put to flight from us by divine power, so that he dare not presume against us; but terrified he shall flee, and depart into confusion. The world too itself, which was wont to rage in its commotions, [0236B] shall be pacified, and the desires of the flesh, the spirit being strengthened, shall be lulled asleep. Then in the time of our peace we shall remember the ancient times, when there was war, and we shall not then repent: but we shall be glad, and shall exult for the days in which we saw evils; and there shall be sweet peace in thanksgiving for past labors. For this reason there is a time of war, and a time of peace

*What hath a man more of his labor?* What has he more than war and peace, love and hatred, and all the other things which the wheel of its own turning brings forth as the outcome of times? He has therefore no more of his labor than war and peace: since by this labor of his he cannot bring it about that he have peace [0236C] alone. Therefore neither by his labor does he have peace, just as by his will he does not have war. For all things follow the nod of the supernal disposition: nor are the moments of times subject to human choice, that this or that should come to pass; but man suffers the law in all things, whether willing, unto merit, or unwilling, unto torment. Man ought not therefore to trust in his labor, nor to place hope in his own deeds, as though he could himself either effect what has not been ordained from above, or hinder what has been disposed. For the labor of man can add nothing to the sum of things, that there should be anything more: because the just moderation of the Artificer has so disposed all things in equity, that everything which strives without his co-operation, deserting the order of the universe, is moved rather toward not-being.

## HOMILY XVII. *On the confusion of minds arising from the passing of times.*

[0236D]

Just now we have come out from the times, but would that we had come through to eternity! For many things still remain, and very many are rolled about us: and again the times repeat their circuit on every side, so that there is no end until all things shall have been consummated. For upon the mutability of things there follows a grievous confusion of minds: since hearts go along upon the rollings and passings of times, so that they do not stand in truth, but flow away with the things which go that they may pass. Therefore he ceases from all these things which totter without, and fluctuate, as though all these were small and not working greatly unto peril: and he turns himself inward, and there redoubles his complaint concerning the vanity [0237A] which is hidden: and he examines that one with grievous expostulation over the one which appears without as alien. For the mutability of things would not have harmed, if the mutability of minds had not been: since this very thing was good, that transitory things should change their appearance for a time, but it was not good that the judgments of human minds should desert truth. And so we do not lay the blame that times are various, since it is good: but we lay the blame that human judgments are various: since this is not good. For truth cannot of itself be other: because what is good in truth is not evil: and what is not good in truth, is evil. Why therefore is it judged that this is good, and this is evil; and is it judged that this is evil, and this is good: when in truth either [0237B] it is not good, if it is evil, or it is not evil, if it is good. One says, It is good, and another says, It is evil: and he who says, This is good, says That is evil: and he who says This is evil, says That is good: and all speak ill, because the whole is good. But this alone is not good, that they speak ill of that which is good. Wherefore all things are good: and those alone are evil who beyond all the rest ought to have been good. For all the rest are what they ought to have been, and they alone are not what they ought to have been: because they are not truthful, and are not in truth; and therefore all things are good in that which they are, but they themselves are not good in that which they are, because they are not what they ought to have been. This therefore, among the other vanities, is itself also reckoned for a great vanity, [0237C] and alone is set before all vanities by comparison. And he says:

*I saw the affliction which God gave to the sons of men, that they should be distended in it.* For what is that affliction?

## HOMILY XVII. *On the confusion of minds arising from the passing of times.* (cont.)

*He hath made all things good in their time: and he hath delivered the world to their disputation; that man may not find the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end.* Therefore the mutability of things does not afflict man, but his own disputation afflicts him. And rightly: because disputation always signifies restlessness and struggle. And therefore the mutability of things is not man's labor; but that he himself has been made restless, this is his labor. And that restlessness itself is the great disputation [0237D] which man has in his own instability, so that he does not feel the same thing: since he is divided, and made another, so that he is not one whole. Consider now the great disputation which man carries on upon the earth. For it is much, and long, and exceedingly involved: so that it cannot easily have an end, until man himself receives his end. And now, that you may believe, see how many sentiments concerning the works of God those curious of wisdom have formed from the beginning: and there has been no one until now who could impose an end upon this so great business. And they wrangle still daily, and fight with struggles as they dispute: and one says This is so, and another says It is not, but it is otherwise; and many things are said, and lies of opinions are feigned as though wrought by craft concerning the judgment of things. And very many assert [0238A] that there is nothing except that very thing which is seen, and others come, and testify that nothing truly is except that very thing which is not seen. And in all these things they heap up and multiply their arguments, and weave reasons, and as it were reasons: and each man's reason is his own estimation. For God has set forth his work before the eyes of men, that he may question their hearts concerning it: and he himself lies hidden behind, until they may make trial of our exercise in it. And they draw with sense, and judge with heart, and bring forth very many things out of the treasury of their judgments, and out of the deep abyss of their fantasies, and of their false opinions and empty thoughts. And some say that nature alone is, and there is nothing else; and God is nothing, but empty fear has devised all things; and so it always was, [0238B] what is from the beginning, and before the beginning without beginning. And the ages revolve, and nature works itself, and renews itself, and cannot be other than it always was. Others on the contrary cry out and wrangle for the wrong done to the Creator, and think that they defend him whom they themselves assail with their lies. They say that there is a craftsman who from matter co-eternal with himself has fashioned all things, that he might give a better form; and these men do not know the power of the Creator, but deny that anything has been made from nothing: and they deny that any of these things which are can slip back into nothing: but that the Founder's work consists only in the alterations of things. After these others follow, wrangling and disputing, and they promise to take away error and to make truth manifest; and these themselves confess that all things were made from nothing, and that he was not made [0238C] through whom all things were made; and that there was once a time when nothing was created, and that then he was who always was. And these men have in their teachings as it were a good beginning, but an evil end follows. For those who think as it were truly concerning the creation of things, lie exceedingly concerning the subsistence of things, and there is no end of the disputations and inventions of men. They feign essences, and forms, and atoms, and ideas of the principal constitutions, and very many elements, and infinite births, and invisible motions and procreative efficiencies. And in all these things the likenesses of reasons are multiplied, and very many disputations are made, and truth is not in them all. For likewise he who speaks, speaks falsely, and he who contradicts, [0238D] speaks falsely, because by disputing and by lying they have all by one vanity gone far away from truth. For neither shall man be able to find the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. Out of all the things which have been made from the beginning and which are to be made unto the end, man will not be able to find any one thing so as to comprehend it, and know the whole of what it is. For even if certain men seem to have found very many things, all things had been set forth, and the things which were hidden could in no way be found. For God delivered the world to their disputation, *and set before them his works, that they might see them and judge.* And in these he manifested many things which he willed to be known, and the things which he willed to be hidden could not be found. Therefore God manifested in them all the things which are known; and man did not find them [0239A] by his own sense, until they were revealed in him so far as God willed. For certain things were set forth without, and certain things were revealed within, and man found nothing, so as to go by his own sense to those things which were hidden, until they were made manifest in him. And if he should wish to contend that he himself found some things, could he nevertheless find all the things which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end? And in the very things which he found, could he find the whole of what was, and did there not remain over something hidden and secret to which his sense was not admitted, so that he might find the whole? For if man had found the whole, there would be no disputation at all, nor would opinions run in opposite directions concerning all those things which are in the world. For we all alike see this world: and it is placed before our eyes, [0239B] that it might be delivered to our disputation; and we see this whole before us, and we do not know whence it came hither. For he who made it lies hid, and stretches his work out before himself, that he may be hidden, and be made manifest in it. For the image that has been made, receiving human contemplation from near at hand, brings it about that one can neither see his Creator manifestly, nor likewise be wholly ignorant of him. Therefore the understanding of man, exercised by the appearance of things, rises up, and from that which offers itself to manifestation strives, according to its emulation of truth, to search out inward things; and it has in the works of God the beginning of first contemplation, but it does not come through unto the end of the works of God, so as to grasp the whole of what is hidden. For if it had been able to come through to the end, it would assuredly have found God, since from him from whom [0239C] all things are, there do all things have their end and consummation. It does not therefore come to the end, since it could not find God, until he himself should manifest himself in us; and they that search searchings have been confounded, since they have failed [n: (Psal. LXIII)], and have not availed to comprehend and to make an end of their disputations. Therefore *God hath made foolish the wisdom of the world [n: (I Cor. V)]*, because he placed the world in their disputation, himself remaining hidden until the disputers and those seeking empty things should fail. And man shall not find every work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. After these things God revealed himself and came forth that he might be found, when man could no longer glory as though he himself by his own sense and wisdom had known God, who had failed in [0239D] searching out the work of God. To this end therefore it profited that the world was for a time delivered to their disputation, that man might not find [sic: *invenirit*] every work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. These are the disputations of men seeking with vain curiosity the hidden things of the works of God, which they multiply for themselves by fabricating lies concerning the things they do not know, and they fortify their errors with [sic: *concortationibus*]. And there are yet certain other disputations in the desires of men, exceedingly manifold and various, and out of them arise the pursuits of many vanities. For every man prefers what he himself loves, and the hearts of all are drawn into infinite rendings, so that they never agree in one. Some follow wantonness and luxury and pleasure: to be drunken and to play and to laugh and to dance, and [0240A] they reckon this to be the happiness of man and the sweetest delight. Others court honors, and dignities, and great fame among the peoples, and commend their own pursuits, and dispute with grievous struggle, that this portion is better in the life of man. Others heap up moneys and pile up wealth, and think to procure security, and great confidence against oncoming want in the time of straitness. And these men praise foresight and say that solicitude is better, though they wish nevertheless to be secure themselves. And thus indeed all are carried away into their own appetites, each one apart with contrary approval; and they dispute by quarreling, and by dissenting with importunate desires. And the world is delivered to their disputation, that in its affluence each one may make trial of his own pleasures and prove them, and [0240B] see, and consume them into arguments one against the other about themselves out of its plenty, each man of that thing which he himself shall have chosen in the approval of his own desires. And each one snatches with great obstinacy what he has chosen for himself; and each praises his own part, and there comes to be a great disputation and altercation of wills in the various estimations which many desires bring forth. And in all these things man does not find the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. For the beginning of the works of God is the use of temporal things; but the end and consummation, the fruit of eternal things. Therefore he who establishes his disputation in the things of the world, and seeks out the approval of his own desires, cannot find in the works which God hath wrought anything from the beginning unto the end; since, [0240C] although he is allowed to make trial how great delight there can be in the goods of this world, yet that ineffable pleasantness which confers consummated happiness he does not lay hold of in the contemplation of God. For this reason the world has been delivered to the lovers of the world, to whom it is not given to deserve to find the works of God from the beginning unto the end; because to those from whom the sweetness of eternal goods is taken away, carnal delights have been given, and the joys of the world set forth unto the dissipation of their evil desires. We find yet other disputations in the judgments of men, grievous and manifold, and horrendous stirring up quarrels [sic: *rigas coacitantes*], so that they grow even into blasphemy of the Creator, and men say the things they ought not. For men violently seize the place [0240D] of God, and set themselves up as judges of the world, and dispute concerning the world and concerning the works of God, and his providence, and the judgments by which he disposes the whole world. And some say, God has done this well; and others murmur, and say, That was not well done. For these are the complaints of men, and the presumptions by which they provoke the wrath of God; because they will not be subjected to his laws, but dispute concerning his works, and reprehend his judgments. Someone has perished by a cruel death or by grievous loss, and has been crushed by a miserable chance; and his enemy comes and says: God has done well; he has judged an impious and sinful man according to his malice; and his friend murmurs, and raises a complaint against God, why he permitted an innocent man to perish, and did not guard the just man. And that man is condemned [0241A] for his malice; and this one is judged for his rashness. And yet men do not cease to dispute concerning the works of God, and to weigh his judgments by their own estimation; and God is reprehended by the thoughts of malignant men. For men say that God ought not to have created harmful things, nor to have placed among his works the things which are hostile and do harm; and they curse the good creatures of God, and blaspheme their Creator. Frogs, and flies, and serpents, and all venomous things, and all adverse and pestilential things — why did God make them? For he would have done better, if he had made all things good. For evil things are very many, and all evil things are not good. And he indeed made all things good in their time; but man alone is evil, not understanding goodness nor retaining the judgment [0241B] of truth, and with an evil will disagrees with goodness: and when that comes to pass which he himself evilly does not will, he says that it is ill done; whereas it is well done, and he himself evilly wills. Therefore evil wills and wicked concupiscences blind the hearts of men, so that they do not understand what is right, because they do not love nor will what is good. And they reprehend God because he made harmful things; and yet no one reprehends when his own enemy is hurt, though they themselves all are enemies of God, and adversaries of truth. For this reason man does not understand the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. For *the carnal man perceiveth not the things that are of God [n: (I Cor. II)]*. For he follows his own concupiscence, and praises the delight of his own desires, and when what he loves is given him, he thinks that it goes well with him. when rather this comes to pass [0241C] unto his harm; and when his desires are withstood, he murmurs and raises a complaint; and he lays blame, as though it were ill done when it is justly ordained; and he does not understand the works which God works from the beginning unto the end. From the time when he is brought forth out of the earth, until he is called back into the earth: he does not understand the works which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. For God works many things about man from his beginning and unto the end of him, and man does not find to what end all these things are done, until he himself receives his end. But then he shall understand, and then he shall find the things which God hath wrought in him from his own beginning unto his own end, whether in mercy or in judgment, that he might lead him to such an end as he approved by his works from the beginning unto the end, that [0241D] he should come into consummation. But meanwhile, until the end comes, from the beginning unto the end all things lie hidden, so that man does not find the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. Therefore he can dispute concerning the works of God, which God works from the beginning unto the end; but he cannot find the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. But if man cannot find the work which God works from his own beginning unto his own end, so as to understand at least this which he himself has seen, how then shall he find the works which God hath wrought from the beginning of the world unto the end of the age, which he himself could not see? Let man therefore cease to dispute concerning the judgments of God, by which he governs and disposes the whole world from the beginning unto the end; because man was placed by God neither as ruler [0242A] nor as judge of the world, but as possessor; nor that by his own strength or power he should rule the elements of the world or dispense the outcomes of times at his own choice, but that he should receive the fruits of the world, and the changes of times, according to the Creator's dispensation, for the use of nourishing his own weakness. Therefore he added and said:

## HOMILY XVII. *On the confusion of minds arising from the passing of times.* (cont.)

*I have known that there was nothing better than to be glad and to do well in one's life. For every man that eateth and drinketh, and seeth good of his labor, this is the gift of God.* For every man who contends and disputes concerning the works of God, and lays blame on the judgments of God, and accuses his dispositions in the world: this is not the gift of God, nor is it from God, but against God; and he does better who lawfully uses in this world the gifts of God acquired by just labor, [0242B] than he who quarrels against God over those things which in this world come to pass contrary to his own will or estimation. For man cannot by quarreling and murmuring against God change his disposition: and therefore it is better to receive his judgments with fear, than to murmur, in wrong done to him, over our own hurt. For to this end also God hides his judgments from us, that, while we can neither penetrate them by our own understanding nor change them at our own choice, we may fear the more. Therefore he goes on and says:

*I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. We cannot add anything to them nor take away the things which God hath made, that he may be feared.* Not only of the works of God by which he created the essences of things, [0242C] and imposed upon the things created, through their several genera and species, form and measure, is this true, that the works of God continue for ever: in that his disposition in them is not changed, and each thing keeps to being what he appointed it to be: and if they pass away, this is not from him, since what they are they are from him; but that they cease to be, they have from themselves: just as this also, that before they were, they were nothing, they had from themselves. And so not only is this true of the works of God by which he disposes the creation of the world, that they remain for ever without change and confusion of order; but also of the disposition and predestination of his judgments, by which he examines the deeds of men, this is true, that they [0242D] remain for ever, and he himself does not change the law of his own providence, and the decree of his own thought. And just as to his works, to the genera of things, we can neither add by creating, so that there should be what was not, nor take away by destroying and demolishing, so that what was something should be nothing at all: so neither can we change his judgments, either by adding, so that what he himself has not disposed should come to pass, or by taking away, so that what he himself has ordained to be done should not come to pass. For that he alone might be feared, and that at all times the regard of the human conscience might be toward him in mercy, therefore he has reserved to himself alone the power of his works and of his judgments, that no one may change what he himself has fixed by eternal laws, to be fulfilled. For this reason let not man dispute in all the things which come upon him, but let him receive the judgments of God with [0243A] reverence and fear: and when indeed God bestows prosperity and grants pleasant things, let him be glad with chaste exultation in his benefits; but when adverse things come forth, and troublesome things meet him, confessing his own evil deserts, let him commend God's justice and truth. But if at any time, when troubles press upon him, he has seen his own patience giving way, let him set against the vice of murmuring and impatience the gifts of his Creator's munificence: so that the mind which is pressed by the weight of temptation may, lest it break out in any degree into blasphemy, be softened by the remembrance of God's benefits. For then he will begin to do well, and to be glad in his life, and to see good things of his labor: not only when with thanksgiving he enjoys the goods of this world acquired by his own industry; but then also when, set [0243B] in adversities, he is glad, for the labor of his patience, in the hope of consolation to come. For he shall eat and shall be glad in the gifts of God, when in prosperity he shall exult over the gift, and in adversity shall be gladdened over the recompense. Thus at all times he will compose himself unto peace with God, so that he may see and understand that he makes all things good in their time, so that he may not justly be accused by man in all the things that shall have befallen. For his judgments are established: and of his laws, standing for ever, nothing great or small can be changed. For just as in all the genera of things which seem to be diminished or to perish, in those things which pass away, they are restored in the things that come upon them and succeed, so that the disposition of the universe may keep its own order established and immovable; and the ordinance of the first disposition may remain always [0243C] inviolable, so that the sure moderation of the works of God neither passes beyond nor remains short: so also his judgments run according to a sure providence, so that nothing can be added to them or diminished from them. And if at any time he himself seems to do otherwise, and to judge otherwise, there is a hidden dispensation by which the counsel is not changed, but the work is varied and the judgment exercised. For this very thing also is a judgment: that judgment is sometimes deferred, that in its own time it may be restored, so that nothing may perish of all the things which have been made, but that they may remain always. For this is always so, that fault has its punishment, and justice obtains its reward. But there is a hidden punishment, and a manifest punishment. Likewise there is a hidden reward, and a manifest reward. And often God tolerates the evil, and defers their manifest punishment: [0243D] and yet all malice has its hidden punishment. And God judges, and seems to defer judgment, or not to attend at all to the deeds of men, in the eyes of those who see nothing but the things which are without. Likewise God sometimes proves the just, exercises them with adversities and tribulations, and justice seems not to have its reward with him: and yet it never lacks its own hidden recompense: and the manifest one is sometimes deferred, that the consciences of men might be questioned concerning their perseverance. And because the things which are in the open run dissimilarly, the [sic: *eorda*] of men fluctuate, and they wonder where the judgment of truth is; when in this world innocence is oppressed, and malice prospers; for this reason he subjoined and said:

## HOMILY XVIII. *On the perverse morals of men: and what Ecclesiastes judged concerning them.*

[0244A]

*I saw under the sun in the place of judgment impiety, and in the place of justice iniquity. And I said in my heart: The just and the impious shall the Lord judge, and then shall be the time of every thing.* But because in human minds a grievous disputation has arisen concerning the judgments of God and concerning the contrary outcome of all things, and because the reasons must now be set forth why the hearts of men are moved against him, and rise up into murmuring, we shall briefly repeat what went before, so that of the things which are to be said we may speak the sentiment out of those very things as though from the beginning. Above, Ecclesiastes had shown that nothing in this world can stand perpetually in the same state; but that the changes [0244B] of times are hurried along without ceasing by contraries going their way: which mutability of things, although it be rightly ordered by the Creator of all things, nevertheless the human heart is through impatience shaken into murmuring and blasphemy against him. And therefore, after the times of things had been enumerated, he subjoined and said: *I saw the affliction which God gave to the sons of men, that they should be distended in it. He hath made all things good in their time, and hath delivered the world to their disputation.* This therefore is the affliction of men, their disputation against God; because, in that they will not be humbly subjected to the judgments of God, and contumaciously reprehend his disposition, which is good in all things, when anything is done contrary to their depraved will, not only does the punishment of adversity and the trouble of tribulation [0244C] wear them down outwardly, but much more does fury within, and the impatience of murmuring, afflict them. Which affliction God is said to have given them, not by corrupting their mind with depravity, but by withdrawing his judgments justly from their knowledge, that they themselves may be proved to be evil; so that, when they cannot see by what justice that is done which is done concerning them, they may the more, through the vice of their own impatience, be blinded away from the knowledge of truth. Therefore he gave them affliction when he gave disputation by concealing his judgments, that man might not find every work which God works from the beginning unto the end. For sometimes certain manifest causes go before the judgments of God in this world, when God, by a recompense that follows in the present life, either rewards the good deeds of men or punishes the evil. And in these alone [0244D] the judgments of God avail to be discerned in some degree, so that man may have some judgment of the hidden truth, in so far as he may venerate even those things which he cannot penetrate.

But when the preceding causes are hidden, or those which follow lie concealed, very many disputations and contradictions arise, and the depraved minds of men afflict themselves by quarreling and murmuring against God, since they cannot penetrate his judgments, nor find the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. For they cannot penetrate, in so great a darkness, to what end anything is done, even if certain causes seem to stand forth at the beginning, but all things are hidden because of the end. Therefore man does not find every work of God from the beginning unto the end; since, [0245A] even if he seems to see certain things, he does not penetrate the whole, and the whole becomes doubtful, because the whole is not made manifest; therefore, lest man quarrel against God in doubtful things, and murmur when set in adversities, by the gift of God many prosperous things are granted, and very many pleasant ones, that man may lawfully use goods acquired by just labor, and rejoice, and be glad, and soften his own conscience toward God. And let him think well of him, and not dispute nor contend against him, as though God were adverse who has bestowed good things. For this is what is meant by that which is subjoined, saying: *And I have known that there was nothing better than to be glad, and to do good things in one's life.* For he who does good to himself in his life out of those things which by the gift of God have been granted to men to enjoy, that he may be glad and rejoice in his God, does better than he who [0245B] disputes and contends against God. *For every man that eateth, and drinketh, and seeth good of his labor, this is the gift of God.* Therefore, because this is the gift of God, and lawfully granted by God, it is better than to dispute, and contend, and murmur: which is not the gift of God, nor granted to men by God; because it is evil and a great affliction. For he is much afflicted who can neither love nor approve [sic: *approhare*] what he endures; nor change what he hates. Therefore he is much afflicted who disputes and quarrels against God, blaspheming his judgments and detesting his works, since man can by no means [sic: *mullatenus*] change the things which God works.

Therefore that which follows, and he says: *I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever.* [0245C] For just as the works of creation in their own genera do not pass beyond the order of the divine institution, so also the works of his judgments, by which he disposes the deeds of men and the whole world, do not confound the sentence of his predestination and providence fixed for ever. *For neither can we add anything to them,* that there should be more than has been provided; *nor take away,* that the things which have been made should be less, that God may be feared. For for this reason the disposition of visible things does not confound its order in the course of things passing away and in the vicissitude of things succeeding, so that man may know and understand that providence is eternal, which from the beginning disposed all things, by the established and constant examination of its own precept, in what manner their outcomes should follow [0245D] in their own times. And that he may also learn to fear in his own deeds him whose omnipotence he discerns in all his works, and in his judgments a constancy that remains unchangeable. For the established disposition of the work, and the sure moderation by which God brings all things to effect in their own times, manifestly demonstrates that, just as his wisdom is not deceived in discerning, so also his counsel is not changed in judging. *What is done, the same remaineth.* Just as in this whole body of created things what is done remains, because the order of the disposition is not confounded, even if mutable nature be varied, so also in his judgments what is done remains, because even in that which, according to his ineffable dispensation, he ordains dissimilarly for the variation of times, [0246A] he does not change the sentence of his own providence. Therefore what is done remains, both in the universe of things, so far as pertains to the order of the disposition, and in the exhibition of his judgment, so far as regards the sentence of predestination. The things which are to come have already been. For in both, the things which are to come have already been; because both in the genera of all things, what those things were which now are not, this same thing, according to the likeness of nature and the identity of the course, are the several things in their own kind to be, which are not yet. And in the divine judgments, the truth which we have heard was kept in things past, the same we expect to be exhibited in things that come after. For God everywhere restores what has gone away; because just as he repairs the failing of things that pass away by the multiplication of those that succeed in their own genera, [0246B] so, by judging daily the deeds of men, he demonstrates that he has held entire the ancient truth of his judgments, which he exercised from the beginning, although it seemed to have been interrupted unto the temple. For with him malice always has its punishment, and virtue its reward. But because of punishments one is hidden, another manifest: while God through patience tolerates the impious and sinners, and does not straightway inflict upon them a manifest punishment, human folly thinks that he either does not know or does not care about the deeds of men, or even, what is worse, that he approves the depravity of the malignant. Thence therefore the heart of man is shaken against God, whence God is shown to be the more to be loved and praised by men. Man complains that an evil man is tolerated by God, [0246C] when it is manifest that no man would have been good, if no evil man had ever been tolerated. And yet the hearts of the weak are scandalized, while they see in this world the impious prospering and the innocent oppressed; because they look only to those things which are without in the open, and do not attend to those which either lie hidden within, or are kept to be exhibited manifest in the future. From what cause their complaint arises is opened when it is added:

*I saw under the sun in the place of judgment impiety and in the place of justice iniquity.* He saw indeed that in this world God permits the impious to be judges, and to obtain power so that they lord it over and oppress the innocent, and that the deeds of men are iniquitous which ought to have been just, [0246D] and that in all these things there is great confusion under the sun. For because God grants power in this world to the perverse, therefore there is impiety in the place of judgment, and in the place of justice iniquity: so that there is impiety where judgment ought to be, and there iniquity where justice ought to be. For, because those set over are impious, therefore the subjects are iniquitous, because unless those oppressed innocence through impiety, these would not assail justice through iniquity. For inferiors are bold to perpetrate iniquity for this reason, that superiors are not dutiful to protect innocence; because if those did judgment for them that suffer wrong, these would not have been so ready to inflict wrong. But in this too under the sun there is impiety in the place of judgment, and in the place of justice iniquity: that every [0247A] man pursues without mercy the evils of his neighbor, but each one strives, even against justice, as far as he can, to defend his own evils. For in his neighbor's cause every judge is impious, and in his own cause against his neighbor iniquitous, because when his neighbor's evils are to be judged, he does not remember mercy; but when his own acts against his neighbor are to be examined, he does not keep justice. And in this manner all judgments under the sun are perverse, and the minds of men totter, and they wonder where is the judgment of God who endures these things.

## HOMILY XVIII. *On the perverse morals of men: and what Ecclesiastes judged concerning them.* (cont.)

We can still, with another and perhaps more convenient understanding, consider impiety under the sun in the place of judgment, and iniquity in the place of justice. For there is under the sun impiety in the place of judgment, and iniquity in the place of justice, [0247B] when in this world both the just man endures the punishment of the iniquitous, and the iniquitous receives the reward of the just. For the good are judged in this life only, that here they may receive the scourges of God for their own excesses, and may pass more purified to the reward to come. But the evil, because they are kept for the judgment to come, often in this world not only endure no adverse things, but are also permitted to fulfill their own desires, so that all things fall out for them according to their wish, unto the pleasantness and happiness of the present life. And recompenses seem to run dissimilarly, so that the good receive evils and the evil goods, and the judgment of the just seems to be impious, so that the innocent are oppressed and endure the punishment of the iniquitous, and so that the iniquitous take away the reward of the just: and all things confused and mingled, because God does not straightway exercise judgment so as [0247C] to rescue the innocent, and the just from the oppression of the impious, and to punish those who work iniquitous things. Thence arises a grievous shaking of minds, and the pusillanimous who see nothing but what is without alone are kindled with zeal, and think as though God did not care for human things, and had committed all things to fortune, and that nothing came to pass by judgment. And, what is more cruel, often men go into such perversity that God is blasphemed, and it is said as though he approved iniquity, and as though impiety were with him, and he did not know true judgment. And all this arises from this, that under the sun impiety is in the place of judgment, and in the place of justice iniquity, and that, as it were in the vanity which is under the sun, all things are confused, and all come forth dissimilarly. And yet, when man considers the works [0247D] of God, and sees in what manner he disposes all things with established and constant moderation, he understands that God is the inspector and moderator of all: and that his judgments cannot be made void, and that the deeds of men which he does not judge in this life he keeps to be examined hereafter. For if, as has been proved from the disposition of his works, God is a just judge, it remains that what is not done in the present in judging the deeds of men be without doubt believed to be brought to completion in the future. Therefore, in order to set forth the complaint of the weak in that God, in the fickleness and passing of this life, leaves all things as it were undiscussed, and disposes the deeds of men with a recompense unlike their merits, he said: I saw under the sun impiety in the place of judgment and in the place of justice iniquity. But straightway, [0248A] considering that the just judgments of God could not at all be made void, he understood that judgment was only deferred, not taken away, and he said:

*I said in my heart: The just and the impious shall the Lord judge, and then shall be the time of every thing under heaven.*

Then, when the Lord shall judge the just and the impious, there shall be the time of every thing under heaven: because everything which is done in life, whether it be good or evil, shall then be brought to judgment. And even now indeed in this life the Lord judges the just and the impious, but those recompenses are hidden, and those which shall be manifest are deferred unto the future. And therefore the small-hearted murmur, and complain, and think that the judgment is not just; because they do not see the recompenses. Yet even now just judgment is done: and each one [0248B] is judged according to his own merits. But all this is within, whither the eye of the flesh does not reach. And the things which are manifest are deferred until their judgment comes; and then all hidden things also shall be made manifest, and all things shall be judged according to just judgment. And then the Lord shall judge the just and the impious; and then shall be the time of every thing under heaven. But meanwhile all things are obscure, and run mingled toward their end. And the just are wrapped up in one lot with the impious, so long as they run together on the way, so that, when they shall have gone forth together, they may be distinguished and set in order unlike. For up to that point there is no distinction in all the things which appear without under the sun. But just as all things arise together, so they live together, and all things pass away together. And all this comes to pass, that the hearts of men may be proved: [0248C] whether there live in them anything of the knowledge of truth, and of the affection for the good which is hidden, if perchance out of that they may begin to take an argument of faith that they are something more than that alone which is seen. For outside there is nothing whence this can be known, and all arguments are taken away without, that what is within may begin to work, and be proved how great it is. For, if a man shall have known himself out of that, it is a great thing, and it stands to his merit that he seeks God through faith, whom he does not see through sight. For he first withdrew, and turned himself away when he was contemplating him present: and it was a great guilt and a grievous fault to have hated the light that was present; and it has been appointed for man as a remedy of propitiation, if he shall seek him who is absent and shall desire him who is hidden; [0248D] and that he may know that to be which is not seen, that it may be made manifest in its own time. Therefore now all things are withdrawn, and the things which are invisible are hidden, and man is left outside alone with things not his own, so that he may see nothing of his own, that it may be proved whether perchance any remembrance remains in him for turning to the seeking of him. Therefore now this man, considering more deeply the profundity of the judgments of God, sees that it is no wonder if in the cloud of this life no distinction is made between the just and the impious, since our mortality is wrapped in so great a darkness that in it man may even seem like to the beasts. Therefore he infers and says:

*I said in my heart concerning the sons of men, that God might prove them, and show them to be like the beasts. Therefore there is one destruction of man and of the beasts, and equally [0249A] the condition of both.* For man was made mortal for this reason, and therefore the sons of men die in like manner as beasts, that they may be proved and shown to be like the beasts. For two things had been made in man, one to the likeness of God, the other to the likeness of a beast. And that indeed which was created to the likeness of God was made immortal by nature, as God was immortal, to whose likeness it was made. But that which had been made to the likeness of a beast was corruptible by nature, as were those things to whose likeness it had been made. For both were taken from earth, and earth was the matter of both; and that earth was corruptible by nature, as were the things which were made of earth. So then two things were made in man, one earthly, the other heavenly; one by nature [0249B] corruptible, the other immortal; one the likeness of a beast, the other of God. And the body indeed was earthly, by nature corruptible, made to the likeness of a beast; but the soul was heavenly, by nature immortal, founded to the image of God. And body and soul were joined in man, two into one: and to the body was given the benefit of the fellowship, that it might share of the immortality of the soul unto incorruption: and all this was done for the glory of the soul, because it was pleasing to God, standing in justice and truth, so that its garment might not be worn away if its obedience persevered. And that which was the likeness of a beast in man was covered with the glory of incorruption, so that it might as it were be dissembled; nor might it see it unto the confusion of love, but might behold wholly the form of that which it loved, [0249C] and might not go far off anywhere. Afterward the soul turned itself away into the estrangement of love, and forgot that which was better, its own, and gazed without upon an alien beauty. And it bent itself upon the dye of its own cloak, that it might delight itself there; and it began to commit fornication with bodily enticements, and spiritual love was withdrawn from its eyes. And God was angry, and this turning away did not please him, and he willed to call man back within to that which was true, so that the gaze of the deceiver might not always cleave upon painted images. And he drew away the glory of its garment, that it might go into corruption, and commanded the soul to turn back, lest it should quicken it and bear it to eternity; and he cut down its garment, that he might show man that his glory was not in that wherein he should see himself like to the beasts. And man fell, and that slipped away [0249D] which was earthly and corruptible, and it began to flow so as to return whence it had come. And it came to pass that man was proved, whether he remembered his own good, and whether he knew how to seek it while he is compelled to leave the vain appearance, and to go out from that to which he had perversely clung.

*Therefore, that God might prove the sons of men, and show them to be like the beasts. Therefore there is one destruction of man and of the beasts, and the condition of both equal; as man dieth, so also they die.* In death therefore the condition of man and of the beast is one; because as man dies, so also they die. But nevertheless the condition of mortality is for man from judgment, for the beast from nature. And what they have alike they do not have from a like cause; because man had it from [0250A] fault that he should die, but the beast received it from nature that it should die. Nevertheless man is proved, and is shown to be like the beasts; because there is one destruction of man and of the beasts, and the condition of both alike: and so man dies as they die.

*And all things breathe alike.* That is, both the one and the other have a like life, and a like breath of quickening. And in all these things:

*Man hath nothing more than the beast.* Because common to both is both their rising, since they were alike made of earth; and their course, since together:

*All things are subject to vanity and to mutability.* And all things pass away, and the consummation of the end the same, they die similar, and they return to the earth of which they were first taken. So also formerly man had with the beasts one origin in the body, which was taken from earth, and one [0250B] condition of living with the beasts, so that the earthly body should likewise be nourished from the earth; but man did not have one end with the beasts, because man had been made that he should not die, nor return into the earth of which he was made. So then through the incorruption of the body his lowly origin was covered, and it was dissembled through immortality, lest it should come into reproach that man was like the beasts; nor did God will to show man whence his ignobility was, so as to expose him wholly in his own condition. But he clothed him with the beauty of immortality, and set him apart outside his own kind into another lot. But when man had sinned against God, he deprived him of his glory, and sent him back to his origin, so that by that whither he was going [0250C] he might know whence he had come. Therefore there is one destruction of man and of the beasts, and the condition of both equal; because as man dies, so also they die: and all things breathe alike, and in all these things man has nothing more than the beast, but all alike lie subject to vanity.

*And all things go to one place.* That is, to the earth their mother, and the beginning of their origin, because:

## HOMILY XVIII. *On the perverse morals of men: and what Ecclesiastes judged concerning them.* (cont.)

*They were made of earth, and into earth they alike return.* And if anyone should wish to say: that man has this more than the beast, that the spirit of the sons of Adam goes upward, so that, the body falling into death, it remains surviving in life; and that the spirit of the beasts descends downward, that is, together with the death of the body [0250D] flows away into corruption: who knows this? Yet not because it is not true, but because it is hidden: therefore:

*Who knoweth this?* For he did not say, This is false, but, Who knows this? No one knows this. For this cannot be known by man, and yet it can be believed. And it is true, because it is believed: and what is believed is true, and that belief itself is not doubtful but firm knowledge; and yet no man knows this in the manner in which those things are known which are seen, and heard, and touched, and perceived by the other senses; and in the manner in which those things are known concerning which one naturally cannot doubt, and which are demonstrated by indubitable reason even to unbelievers who doubt. For by faith alone is this perceived, and therefore there is great doubt for those who do not have faith concerning [0251A] this, because they do not know it, nor can it be demonstrated to them by those who lay hold of it by faith, because they themselves do not lay hold of faith. Therefore they themselves think that man has nothing at all more than the beast, because they do not know that the spirit of the sons of Adam goes upward, and the spirit of the beasts downward. And when it is said to them that man has more than the beast, because the spirit of man goes upward to life, and the spirit of the beasts downward to death, they say: Who knows this? For they do not think that anything can be known unless it be seen with the eye of the flesh, and touched by sense, and therefore they do not receive the knowledge of faith, by which alone man is called back to that in which he has more than the beast. And because they cannot see that, nor touch it in the open so as to comprehend what this is which man has more than the beast: [0251B] they despair utterly of perpetual life, and become unbelieving toward the things which are said, and cast themselves with their whole intent into the delights of the present life, as though this alone were their portion, and they were to receive nothing more afterward. For they do not know that for this reason it is hidden, that it may be believed that man has more than the beast, and that man himself may be proved by God in faith through his own ignorance. For if it were seen it would not be believed, but known; nor would there be merit, nor would man be proved, nor would the iniquitous be convicted, nor the good exercised. Therefore it is hidden that it may not be seen, that which man has more than the beast, so that faith may have merit, and unbelief its place. And there are many unbelievers, and they say: Who knows this? And they prove that things certain are not to be forsaken for things uncertain; and they begin to embrace present things, [0251C] and to snatch the things which are seen, that they may hold what is certain; and they are mocked in the uncertain, because these pass away, and slip out while they are thought to be held; and the things which are certain follow after, which were thought uncertain. All these things this man demonstrates, and he shapes his narrative this way and that, so as to follow the minds of men, since in this manner they themselves totter, and fluctuate in the uncertainty of a darkened life. For he told of the doubt of men concerning their own life, since they do not know whether man has more than the beast, and they do not find who has known whether after the death of the body the spirit of man remains surviving in life; now he takes up their own voice in approval of present delights, in accordance with this very doubt of theirs and despair of the life to come, saying:

*I have found out: that there is nothing better than that a man be glad [0251D] in his own work: and that this is his portion.* For those who do not believe that a life to come exists, these think that this alone is man's portion, that he be glad in his own work, and in this life enjoy his own labor; since those who do not reckon that a wage will follow after the work is completed, these judge that the profit of the work is to be taken not after the work, but in the work, and that he alone is happy who prepares the fruit of his own labor for use in the present, not he who reserves the wage of his own work to be taken hereafter.

*For who shall bring him, that he may know the things to come after him?* From the time when man has once gone out from this life, he is no more brought back, nor called back again into this life, that he may make trial and feel again the things which [0252A] are done in this world, so that he may anew enjoy its delights, and perceive the pleasantness of that which is to come after him. Therefore, as long as he lives, let him take as much as he can, and use this world before he departs, and is led forth from it; because he shall not return any more, nor be brought back, that he may know the things to come after him. And it can come to pass that another after him may abuse the things which he himself was unwilling to use, and a stranger rejoice and exult in his goods, and they can no more be brought back to his own use, once he has been taken away. For this reason, and for reasons of this kind, men think that this is their portion, that they should enjoy the pleasure of the world while they live; and for this alone they reckon that they were made, and that they will be nothing after these things, when this life shall have received its end. And they multiply reasonings and arguments, and heap up the things which are reasons to them, one [0252B] after another, that they may deceive themselves, and that their hearts may be confirmed in evil, and that they may believe what is false. And they build with lies a wall between themselves and truth, that they may not see it; and they set forth all things, and diligently search out all things by which they may plausibly demonstrate that there is no other life, and that this alone is good: and that man was made for this life only, and that there will be no other after it. And all this shaking rises up out of the darkness of the judgments of God; because he placed man in doubt that he might prove him, and that he might not see what man has more than the beast. And yet he himself again pursues that error with other judgments, and shows that this life is not good, in which very many evils reign; nor can true delight or tranquil rest be found in it. And therefore he sows over it [0252C] adverse things, and turns himself back, and goes far off, so that he does not free the oppressed, that they may be greatly afflicted, and that by grief and sadness the evil sweetness and the iniquitous delight may be wiped away. And therefore those who wish to be gladdened in this life, and make a covenant of love with the world, and iniquitously purpose not to seek the truth, are compelled by true judgments to see the evils which are under the sun, so that they may not please themselves overmuch in their turning away. Therefore this man, when he had said that it was good for man to be glad in his own work, and that this was his portion, and had given a definition for resting in these things, is moved by another consideration, that this life is not so, that rest can be in it. Therefore he adds and says:

[0252D] *I turned me to other things [n: (Eccles. IV)]*. He is rightly said to have turned to other things, because by those things which he is now about to see he is admonished to believe something other than what he had before reckoned. For all these things, which shall then be seen, may teach that the true good of man is elsewhere than in this life, which is subject to so great miseries and griefs, in which innocence is oppressed, and grief does not deserve consolation: this thing therefore other, and far other than that which before was seen and thought, was this man considering, and he said:

## HOMILY XIX. *On the oppression and abandonment of the innocent: and on the various and foolish judgment of the impious concerning this life.*

*I turned me to other things. and I saw the calumnies (Eccles, IV)*, *which are wrought under the sun, and the tears of the innocent, and [0253A] no comforter; nor that they could withstand their violence, being destitute of the help of all.* Therefore do not think that here is the fatherland. But consider and acknowledge that you are under the sun, where all things are rolled about and all are confused, since this was done for this reason, that you might acknowledge your exile, and seek another fatherland. Therefore calumnies happen here, and unjust oppressions, so that some assail others without cause, and the stronger oppress the weak without mercy; and God does not bring consolation here to the innocent, because he reserves his consolations for them elsewhere, and now meanwhile leaves them destitute of the help of all, lest they be consoled in another's help, which they do not have as their own, and less groan, and sigh, and desire his consolation, which they do not yet have. But the mind of the perverse, impatient of correction on either [0253B] side, is neither roused by prosperity, nor chastened by adversity. For when they look upon the sweet things of this life, they cleave to them in mind, and say: This is enough, and there is no other good of man besides this to be hereafter. But when they attend to adverse things, they are blunted, and fall down in mind, and fall down in distrust, and despair of themselves, because they have no other hope. And they choose rather not to be, than to be in evil; because it is evil, that which they are, and they have not known a good which they might choose, so as to transfer themselves to it; since in the time of their pleasure they were unwilling to learn it, that in the evil time they might rest in it. And therefore they do that which alone they have known: when they are in evil, they wish to be nothing, because they have not known another way by which to escape being in evil, unless they pass over [0253C] to not-being. Therefore, the evils which are under the sun having been seen, straightway in their voice it is subjoined, when it is said:

*And I praised the dead rather than the living; and I judged him happier than both, who is not yet born; nor hath seen the evils which are done under the sun.* This indeed is the voice of those who have not known the true good, nor think that there is anything for man unto good or unto evil, except what is present in its entirety. Therefore in good things they exult beyond measure, in evil things they despair; and where their hope is, there their despair stands. For this reason, the evils of this world having been seen, they say that the dead are happier than the living, and that than both, those not yet born are happier. For because they reckon that this alone is, which is seen, [0253D] the misery which is in it having been seen, they will not now seek happiness in another being, because they have not known a being other than this; but they set it in not-being alone; since in this whole which alone they think to be, they have found unhappiness. Therefore they praise rather those who have been, and are not, than those who still are, and they proclaim more blessed than both those who are not yet. For if, as it seems to them, it is evil to be at all, it is good not to be, and better not to have been. For if it is evil to be in evil, it is good not to be in evil, and better not to have been. For that which is further from evil in good, is itself the greater good. Just as that which is further from good in evil, is itself the greater evil. If therefore it is evil to be, it is assuredly good also not to be, and much better than both, never to have been. And so such [0254A] perversities do the minds of men bring forth of themselves under the sun, that this also is added to the confusion of all, that man himself grows dark as to his own living. For if man saw what man is and why man was made, he would assuredly recognize his own good, and would no longer say that those who are nothing are happier than those who are something. For the mind bound by the desire of so great a good, although, afflicted by temporal evils, it might loathe the present life, yet in the hope of the consolation to come it would altogether love to be rather than not to be. But now a great perversity grows up in the minds of men who are ignorant of their own good, and a vanity at its consummation, than which none can be greater. For man, flowing away from true essence by the vanity of his own mutability, without ceasing at all times ceases to be that [0254B] which he is; and passes always into that which is not; and so, in a manner accustomed to his own evil, at last casts himself headlong into such perversity that he now covets to be nothing at all. But many, desiring to avoid this madness as though set forth in the open, and such as cannot be hidden, turn themselves about, that they may guard their own being, and they apply great carefulness and industry of their labors, that they may make their life secure from the evils which are under the sun; and gathering wealth, and multiplying riches, and all the other things which can be for the solace of life, they seek out with much foresight and carefulness. And they do many things, and work very many things worthy of memory; and not seldom by their own industry and labor [0254C] they escape another's violence, but another's envy they cannot evade. Wherefore concerning these also, after the impatience of those who despair, he subjoins a sentiment, saying:

*Again I contemplated all the labors of men, and I observed that their industries lie open to the envy of a neighbor.* For when he considered the labors of men, he saw that the industries of the good lay open to the envy of neighbors; since the perverse also, just as they are bound by sloth so that they do not exercise in themselves the works of the virtues, so are they goaded by envy that they may carp at them in their neighbors

*And in this therefore is vanity, and superfluous care.* Either this is vanity, that a man, by envying another's good works, brings care upon his own mind, and the anguish of malice, [0254D] since by envying he harms not him whom he envies, but himself; or else this too is vanity, that a man labors too much for these temporal goods, and is anxious, and afflicts himself with superfluous care, since the acquiring of them sooner stirs a neighbor to envy than draws him to love. For while the industry by which a man is exercised is good, the superfluous care and solicitude by which he is afflicted is evil. Likewise also vain confidence, and the hope by which true security is expected in the multitude of riches; whereas the acquiring of them rather takes away security, when it inflames to envy of us those neighbors who in poverty might perhaps have been able to love us, by reason of their own rivalry. Rightly therefore is industry approved, and vain solicitude reproved. But there comes again another kind of men from [0255A] the flock of vanity, seeking an occasion for their own torpor. And these reprehend those who work, and seem as it were to reprove them as anxious, that they themselves may be dissolute. For thus vanity runs, that it never finds the middle boundary of virtue.

*And therefore the fool foldeth his hands together, and eateth his own flesh, saying: Better is a handful with rest, than both hands full with labor, and affliction of mind.* The fool folds his hands together. For he is a fool who does not know how to provide for himself hereafter. He is a fool who thinks that hands folded in idleness are filled with riches. He folds his hands together: he folds the one to the other, lest they be stretched out to work. He folds his hands together, as though making a covenant with idleness. And he eats his own flesh. He thinks he spares his own body, [0255B] because he does not afflict it with labors, but thence his flesh is consumed by want, whence it is nourished by idleness. He eats his own flesh. For he feeds with his own folly, and his [sic: *otiocitas*] fattens him. But nevertheless his flesh, as much as it is fed in profitable leisure, so much is it wasted by the hunger that follows. Therefore he eats his own flesh, saying: Better is a handful with rest, than both hands full with labor, and affliction of mind. It is true that a handful is better, if it knew not how to fail, and if the blessing of the widow of Sarepta had been given to all [n: (III Reg. XVII)]. But Elias was not sent to all. Why therefore do you foolishly say that a handful with rest is better than both hands full with labor? Perhaps you consider when you have a handful, and have rest; but you do not attend to when you shall not have even that [0255C] handful, what you will then do, and what rest you will then be going to have. Therefore now you eat your handful in rest, and your idleness pleases you; nor do you care meanwhile now to seek with labor another handful, which you may eat when this one has failed. Therefore you eat your own flesh now, because it will be beaten after this importunate idleness, and afterward by its own wasting will pay back what ill-advised rest has spent. And perhaps you may think that now all the kinds of vanities [0256A] have been told, and that there is no other kind of vanity which the watcher may find under the sun. Therefore there follows:

*Considering, I found another vanity under the sun. There is one, and he hath not a second, not a son, not a brother, and yet he ceaseth not to labor; neither are his eyes satisfied with riches, neither doth he reflect, saying: For whom do I labor, and defraud my soul of good things?* For he who is one, and alone has no other successor, neither a son whom he has begotten, nor a brother with whom he himself was begotten: for of his father he himself is the successor. He therefore who has not a second, whom he may leave after him as successor in his own goods: and yet does not cease to gather, nor enjoys the things which he possesses; but keeps avariciously what he has greedily gathered: what can be more vain than this? For he who labors and enjoys his own labor, [0256B] takes some fruit; and he who labors, and does not use the things which he acquires by his labor, and yet leaves them to be possessed by those whom he loves, takes some profit of his labor, the desire and the wish of his own love. But he who labors, and labors neither for himself, nor for another whom he loves: for what does he labor, unless for his own vice alone, which he serves? For this man serves his vice alone, and there is no other affection which might excuse his vain solicitude, to which pardon could be given, save that one alone which vice has begotten. Many are the labors of men, which are left to strangers, and those who do them take no fruit from them. And many also labor in wisdom, and give effort, and study to know many things, and to say very many, and commit their thoughts to writing, that they may be handed on to posterity; nor do they take fruit from [0256C] all these things, so that it should be better for them, but they remain empty of truth and void of the sweetness of wisdom. And all their labor is vanity, even if it seem to draw near to truth. For men of this kind do not know for whom they labor, and defraud their own soul of good things; because, while they intend only upon the greatness of the work, taking no fruit from it, they see also that no usefulness comes to them from it, and they do not know whether these very things will profit others after them.

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