source_edition: Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 196, coll. 665A–684A

source_text:
## Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli

[0665A]Si ea quae de lege ab Apostolo diversis in locis dicuntur ad invicem conferantur, multa eis contrarietas inesse videtur. Videtur namque esse contrarius [0665B] sibi ipsi, contrarius rationi, contrarius veritati, et quod his omnibus amplius est, sententiae ipsius Domini. Audi itaque clamantem atque protestantem: *Quia ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis homo [n: (Rom. III)]*. Quomodo non est in hoc contrarius sibi, cum ipse protestetur alibi, quoniam: *Non auditores, sed factores legis justificabuntur [n: (Rom. II)]*. Item alio loco: *Lex,* inquit, *sancta est, et mandatum sanctum, et justum, et bonum [n: (Rom. VII)]*. Iterum alias ab eodem dicitur: *Lex iram operatur [n: (Rom. IV)]*. Quid magis contra rationem videtur, quam quod mandatum quod sanctum, justum et bonum dicitur apud justum et pium Dominum, iram, non gratiam potius operetur? Alias autem dicit, quod: *Lex neminem [0665C] ad perfectum adducit [n: (Hebr. VII)]*. Quomodo, quaeso, id veraciter dici potuit, vel quomodo in hoc veritati contrarius non fuit, cum tempus legis tot justos, et tam perfectos habuerit? Nunquid Elias perfectus non fuit, in cujus spiritu et virtute, juxta Dominicum testimonium, venit quo inter natos mulierum major nemo surrexit? [n: (Matth. XI.)] Quid de caeteris prophetis, quid de justis et regibus dicturi sumus, qui quod apostoli viderunt, videre voluerunt, nec potuerunt? Si legis praevaricatores erant, nunquid justi esse poterant? si observatores, nunquid inde justi non erant? Sententiae vero Domini contraria sentire videtur in eo quod alias loquitur: *Si enim lex data esset quae justificare posset, vere ex lege esset justitia [n: (Galat. III)]*. Legisperito autem [0665D] quaerenti quid faciendo vitam aeternam possideret, et ad illius interrogationem Domino prima et maxima legis mandata proferenti Dominus respondit: *Hoc fac, et vives [n: (Luc. X)]*. Quid ergo? Nunquid non potest obtineri justitia unde obtinetur vita aeterna? an vita aeterna poterit haberi sine justitia? Quis quid horum dicat, vel dicere praesumat? *Hoc,* inquit, *fac, et vives.* Vives haud dubio diligendo ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente Deum tuum, et proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Sunt qui dicant opera legis esse quae fiunt ex timore, opera vero Evangelii quae fiunt ex amore. Servire autem sine dilectione non potest hominem justificare. Unde et secundum eos dicitur merito quia ex operibus legis non justicabitur omnis homo. In testimonium vero [0666A] assertionis suae adducunt quod alias in Apostolo legunt: *Non enim accepistis iterum spiritum servitutis in timore, sed accepistis spiritum adoptionis in quo [0666B] clamamus: Abba (Pater* ) [n: (Rom. VIII)]. Constat itaque, inquiunt, quia sub timore serviebant qui spiritum timoris, non amoris acceperant. Hinc est quod adhuc addunt, quod lex sit mandatum sine gratia, Evangelium vero mandatum cum gratia. Fateor, non me recolo legisse ubi lex praecipiat servire ex solo timore, ubi prohibeat implere mandata ex vera dilectione. Nunquid, quaeso, legis opera non erunt quae ipsa injungit, et ejus opera erunt quae ipsa non tradit? Sed dicunt quia spiritum servitutis acceperunt qui sub lege fuerunt. Audacter dico, et indubitanter affirmo, quoniam eorum qui tempore legis, et eorum qui tempore Evangelii hucusque fuerunt, alii spiritum timoris, alii vero spiritum dilectionis acceperunt. [0666C] Nunquid soli illi legem non tenuerunt, qui, abundante charitate et timorem foras mittente, ex sola dilectione observaverunt? Legis certe est, et Evangelii doctrinam exhibere: Domini vero gratiam dare, vel subtrahere, et spiritum pro beneplacito infundere. Quid ergo sibi volunt qui dicunt legem esse mandatum sine gratia, Evangelium vero mandatum cum gratia? Quam saepe videmus temporibus nostris habere majorem gratiam in exsequendis mandatis imperitos auditores, quam quosdam peritissimos Evangelii praedicatores. Nunquidnam Evangelium non est quod docent qui apostolicam doctrinam eruditissime praedicant, sed implendi gratiam nec ipsi habent, nec aliis dare valent? Nunquid antiqui illi sine lege vivebant qui legis doctrinam simul [0666D] et gratiam acceperant?

Sunt item qui dicunt sola illa recte dici legis opera quae cum lege sunt inchoata, et cum lege terminata. Sed dico interim quod sentio, et ad haec succincta brevitate respondeo. Opera illa legis quae cum lege sunt inchoata, et cum lege terminata, aut justificabant impleta, aut non. Si itaque justificare potuit eorum impletio, quomodo verum erit quia ex operibus legis non justificabitur? Sunt forte qui dicunt, et si non dicunt, non inepte dicere potuerunt, quod merito distinguendum sit inter opera naturalia, legalia atque evangelica. Merito namque opera illa specialiter Evangelio conscribenda sunt quae ex Evangelio institutionem acceperunt, quemadmodum sunt regeneratio, confirmatio et Dominici corporis [0667A] et sanguinis communio, et nova quorumlibet institutio. Legalia vero sola illa modo quodam speciali sunt dicenda, quae, uti jam dictum est, cum lege sunt inchoata, et cum lege terminata. Naturalia vero illa merito dici debent, quae ab hominibus per legem naturalem intelligi potuissent, etiamsi lex et Evangelium nunquam instituta fuissent. Juxta hanc utique distinctionem forte dicturus est aliquis, quia per legis opera debemus intelligere illa sola legalia instituta de quibus tenemus pro certo quoniam ex sola illorum impletione non justificabitur omnis caro. Legis autem nomine, ut alicui forte videbitur, oportet intelligi tam naturalia decreta, quam legalia instituta, quantum utraque in lege sunt scripta. Dicit enim Apostolus: *Factores legis,* non factores [0667B] operum legalium justificari. Sed quod de lege affirmat, de operibus legis negat. *Ex operibus legis,* inquit, *non justificabitur omnis homo.* Non dicit ex lege, sed ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro. Et item alio loco: *Arbitramur hominem justificari per fidem sine operibus legis [n: (Rom. III)]*. Ibi dicit quoniam ex legis operibus homo justificari non potest. Hic dicit, quantum sine legis operibus justificari potest. Si quis Apostolum sic sensisse existimat, quaero ut super hoc mihi respondeat, utrum Apostolus hoc dicat de statu praesenti, an potius de statu priori? Si hoc dixit de tempore prioris status, videbitur adversari testimonio legis et prophetarum textus sermonis illius. Nonne quotidie lex clamabat ut peccator, et poenitens juxta modum [0667C] quantitatemque peccati hoc vel illud tum pro peccato, tum pro delicto offerat, et remittetur, inquit, ei, et propitius ei erit Dominus [n: (Num. XXX)]? Quomodo, quaeso, homo inde non justificatur unde ei peccatum dimittitur, et Dominus propitiatur? Si vero hoc quod de operibus legis dixit pro statu hujus temporis intelligi voluit, quid, quaeso, magnum dixit? Nam, si adhuc animalia sacrificamus, procul dubio aut judaizamus, aut gentium more idololatriae ritus praetendimus. Dico itaque pro istis quod Apostolus dicit de sacramento circumcisionis; quoniam, si adhuc sacrificiis et caeteris legis caeremoniis insistimus, Christus nihil proderit nobis. Vultis autem apertius nosse quae dico? Certe quae in lege ad expiationem [0667D] peccati immolabantur, in figura futurorum sacrificabantur. Nam Christi passionem et mortem in redemptionem peccatorum futuram praefigurabant, et eo ipso virtutem expiationis et sanctificationis habebant. Si igitur adhuc in figura futurorum sacrificamus, falsitati non veritati deservimus. Nam, *Christus resurgens ex mortuis jam non moritur, mors illi ultra non dominabitur [n: (I Cor. XV)]*. Si absque redemptionis nostrae figura sacrificamus, idololatriae, ut dictum est, formam praetendimus, et in eo ipso animalium sacrificia Christo conferimus, et (quod sceleratius est!) ipsi praeferimus. Nam si sola illa contempto divino sacrificio offerimus, Christo procul dubio ea praeferimus. Si cum divina hostia, et illa (velut ex utrisque salutem quaerentes) offerimus, [0668A] procul dubio ea Christo conferimus, et Christi hostiam velut minus sufficientem judicamus. Quid ergo magnum est Apostolo dicere quod ex legalibus operibus nemo justificabitur, cum ex eorum exercitiis quilibet reprobabitur, potius quam justificabitur?

Sed ad ista fortasse respondes, et dicis: Propter quosdam legiszelatores, quos lucrifacere potius quam scandalizare cupiebat, parcius quidem dicebat, sed tamen vera dicebat. Nam quantum ad praesentem statum, legalia instituta inquinant potius quam sanctificant. Quantum vero ad priorem statum sine naturalibus decretis, sola legalia hominum ad salutem sufficere non valebant. Hinc est quod non dicit ex lege, sed *exoperibus legis non justificabitur omnis [0668B] caro.* Et iterum: *Arbitramur enim justificari hominem per fidem sine operibus legis.* Sine operibus legis, inquit, non sine lege, sub nomine operum intelligere volens sola legalia, sub nomine legis tam legalia quam naturalia, utpote quae continebat ista et illa. Hinc est quod dicit, quia *factores legis* justificabuntur. Quid enim sanctius, quid justius, quid denique perfectius esse potest, quam diligere Deum ex toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, et proximum sicut seipsum? Conferre itaque lex potuit justitiam, nec qualemcunque, sed plenam atque perfectam. Ad haec breviter ipse respondeo et dico: Si Apostolus ita sensit quod lex perfectam justitiam conferre potuit, quid alias dicit quod *lex neminem ad perfectum adduxit?* Si ex lege justitia confertur, [0668C] quomodo *iram operatur?* Nunquid conferendo justitiam operatur iram, et iram operando conferre potest justitiam? Quantum mihi videtur, aliam ab antedictis expositionem quaerere oportebit qui sensum apostolicum intelligere voluerit. Quantum mihi videtur, in his omnibus necdum perierunt illae quaestiones, in quibus aliquando, ut Augustinus scribit, sibi visus est adversari testimoniis legis et prophetarum textus apostolici sermonis. Qui enim dicit ex legalibus operibus hominem non posse justificari, nonne adversari videtur Moysi scribenti, imo Domino jubenti: Homo qui cognoverit peccatum suum offerat hoc vel illud et remittetur ei, et propitius erit ei Dominus.

## Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli (cont.)

[0668D]Compellit me importuna vestra petitio super his quae proposita sunt dicere quae sentio, et fidenter spero ubi Joannes quaerit, gratia non deerit, tam ad veraciter sentiendum quam ad utiliter proferendum. Non est nostri moris maxime in rebus magnis, et multum profundis, aliquid de nostro sensu praesumere, vel quasi auctoritate nostra aliquid statuere, vel affirmare. Itaque de ipsius sacrae Scripturae testimoniis, in quantum dederit Dominus, eliciamus unde dubitationis nostrae nodos dissolvere possimus. Illud autem certissimum est, et de quo nemo dubitare potest, quia lex aut talis erat quae impleta justificare poterat, aut talis quae nec impleta quidem justificare poterat. Sed, si impleta justificare non posset, nullo modo Apostolus diceret, [0669A] quod factores legis justificarentur. In eamdem sententiam currit quod Dominus de duobus maximis mandatis legisperito dixit: *Hoc fac et vives.* Ecce quomodo certa auctoritas probat quod lex impleta justificat. Iterum dico quod lex aut talis erat quae ab illis quibus data est impleri poterat, aut talis quae ab eis impleri non poterat. Sed hoc ipsum quod quaerimus apostolico iterum testimonio comprobemus: *Quod impossibile erat,* inquit, *legi, in quo infirmabatur per carnem, Deus Filium suum mittens, in similitudinem carnis peccati, et de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne, ut justitia legis impleretur in nobis qui non secundum carnem ambulamus, sed secundum spiritum [n: (Rom. VIII)]*. Perpendis, ut arbitror, ex his quam impossibile fuit legi justificare, quamque necessarium nobis erat [0669B] pro tali remedio ut Deus Filium suum mitteret, ut Dei Filius seipsum exinaniret, et in similitudinem carnis peccati veniret, et de peccato peccatum damnaret, ut vel sic justitia legis impleretur in nobis. Sed nunquid totum quod legis erat, etiam impossibile erat? Minime, sed in ea parte qua lex infirmabatur per carnem. Vultis et illud audire, quomodo infirmabatur ex carne: *Caro,* inquit, *concupiscit adversus spiritum [n: (Galat. V)]*; et alibi: *Scio quia non habitat in me* (hoc est in carne mea) *bonum. Nam velle adjacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio [n: (Rom. VII)]*. Si itaque prolata testimonia diligenter discutimus, absque dubio inveniemus quod quaedam praecepta legis talia erant quae impleta justificabant; quaedam autem, quamvis impleta, minime [0669C] justificabant. Nihilominus vero quaedam talia erant quae impleri poterant, et quaedam, quae procul dubio impleri non poterant. Sed quae impleri poterant absque dubio justificare non poterant, et e converso quae justificare poterant impleri non poterant. Merito ergo clamat Apostolus: *Quia ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro.* Si nulla caro, nullus homo, quantum omnis homo caro; quia carnalis venundatus sub peccato. Quomodo, quaeso, caro factus et carnalis effectus justificari potest, vel ex eo quod facere potest, et justificare non potest, vel ex eo quod justificare potest et facere non potest? Lex namque docet quid homo debeat facere, sed non aeque docet quomodo quod praecipitur [0669D] possit implere. Ex sola itaque lege sola cognitio, non autem et impletio. Hinc est quod cum praemissum sit ab Apostolo quod ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro, statim subjungit et adnectit: *Per legem enim cognitio peccati [n: (Rom. III)]*. Ecce habes utrumque et quid non sit ex lege, et quid sit ex lege. Per legem peccati cognitio, utinam et abolitio. Si enim abolitio, procul dubio et justificatio. Dico itaque: Si nemo justificatur ex lege, ergo aliunde. Nam quod nemo justus sit vel fuerit quis audeat dicere. Audi quid Dominus dicat apostolis: *Multi justi et prophetae voluerunt videre quae videtis, et non viderunt [n: (Luc. X)]*. Si justi, utique et justificati. *Omnes enim peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei. Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius [n: (Rom. III)]*. Ipse est enim *qui justificat [0670A] circumcisionem ex fide, et praeputium per fidem (ibid)*. Ecce ex his aperte cognoscitur unde homo justificatur. Procul dubio per fidem, non autem per legem. *Justitia* enim *Dei per fidem Jesu Christi [n: (ibid.)]*. Ecce aperte habes quod ex fide est justitia.

Sed restat quaerendum utrum semper ex fide sola, an aliquando ex sola fide sine operibus, et aliquando ex fide simul et operibus. Quaeramus, si placet, super hoc ipsum ipsius Apostoli testimonium: *Arbitramur,* inquit, *justificari hominem per fidem sine operibus legis.* Ecce iterum habes aperte quod possit homo aliquando justificari ex sola fide absque legis opere. Sed nunquid semper ex sola fide, et sine omni legis opere? Minime. Nam si tempus operandi habet, *fides sine operibus mortua est* [0670B] [n: (Jac. II)]. Non enim auditores legis, sed factores justificabuntur. Absque dubio quandiu homini tempus operandi conceditur, ab eo, nec immerito, divinitus exigitur fides quae per dilectionem operetur. Ex prolatis itaque testimoniis manifeste colligitur quod homo quidem justificetur quandoque ex sola fide, quandoque ex fide simul et legis opere, nunquam vero ex sola lege. Ex his itaque, ut arbitror, perpendi potest quod Apostolus in suis dictis sibi contrarius non est. In eo siquidem quod dicit uno loco, quoniam ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro, aperte dat intelligere quod humanae industriae omnino non sufficit sola legis doctrina sine fide Christi et gratia: *Gratia,* inquit, *Dei sum in quod sum [n: (I Cor. XV)]*. Sed item, ne lex [0670C] talis esse putetur quae impleta justificare non possit, ideo de eadem alio loco dicit: *Non enim auditores, sed factores legis justificabuntur.* Nam sive concedatur, sive non concedatur quod alicui homini tanta gratia data, vel danda sit, quod eam implere possit, nihilominus tamen verum est quod ejus impletio sit hominum justificatio. Docet ergo Apostolus quod lex per se sola nunquam homini confert justitiam, imo quod adhuc gravius est, operatur et iram. Sed unde hoc utique contingat, Apostolus ipse subjungendo manifestat: *Ubi enim non est lex, nec praevaricatio [n: (Rom. IV)]*. Inde enim iram operatur, quoniam ex sola legis doctrina sine adjuncta gratia auditores legis non tam factores quam praevaricatores [0670D] efficiuntur. Nam, ne legis mandata inepta potius quam impossibilia putarentur, ideo ab Apostolo alio loco dicitur: *Lex quidem sancta et mandatum sanctum, et justum et bonum.* Putas fortassis de solis moralibus mandatis hoc dictum. Ego audacter dico de quolibet legis instituto quod tempore suo fuerit sanctum, et justum et bonum utpote a Deo institutum, et homini divinitus injunctum.

Quid, quaeso, fuerunt sacrificia, nisi passionis Christi et mortis figura, eo ipso ejusdem sacramenta? Erat itaque in uno eodemque opere et redemptionis nostrae figura et debita obedientia. Certe si Abraham filium suum sine divino praecepto mactare voluisset, summa impietas et horrendum flagitium esset. Si ergo sanctum, et justum, et pium [0671A] fuit filium suum ad Domini mandatum sacrificare, cur non eodem modo dicatur sanctum, et justum, et bonum pecus quod sine peccato occidi potest, ad Domini mandatum Domino offerre et immolare? Quod igitur lex iram operabatur, non fuit ex legis imperfectione, vel inordinatione, sed ex hominis infirmitate et imperfectione. Vultis et hoc ipsum non ex me, sed ab ipso Apostolo audire: *Scimus,* inquit, *quod lex spiritualis, ego autem carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato. Quod enim operor non intelligo. Non enim quod volo hoc ago, sed quod odi illud facio [n: (Rom. VII)]*. Ecce jam habes unde praevaricatio, ecce jam tenes quod non sit ex legis, sed hominis vitio. Nihil igitur contra rationem dicitur in eo quod clamat quod mandatum sanctum et justum iram operatur. [0671B] Juxta Dominicum testimonium verum est, nec possumus negare quod ante adventum Christi multi justi fuerunt et prophetae, non tamen veritati contrarium fuit quod Apostolus dixit, quia lex neminem ad perfectum adduxit. Quod enim justi fuerunt, et quidquid perfectionis habere potuerunt, hoc eis contulit non nuda legis doctrina, sed adjuncta gratia divina. *Non* enim *est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei [n: (Rom. IX)]*. Nam nequaquam sunt justificati sine fide et gratia Christi. Nam, nisi Christum venturum crederent atque sperarent, nullo modo ejus adventum tanto tempore desiderarent. Quid enim aliud sonat quod Dominus apostolis dicit: *Multi reges, et prophetae voluerunt videre quae [0671C] vos videtis, et non viderunt, et audire quae auditis, et non audierunt? [n: (Luc. X.)]* Eorum itaque justificatio non tam ascribitur legi quam fidei, et gratiae Christi. Nunc illud consideremus, quomodo Dominicae sententiae non sit contrarium hoc quod Apostolus de lege sentit cum dicit: *Si enim data esset lex quae posset justificare, vere ex lege esset justitia.* Vides quia secundum Apostolum lex nec vivificare, nec justificare potest; sed ut quid hoc, nisi quia impleri non potest? Non enim potest homo non concupiscere, sicut nec toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligere, quo tamen nihil est sanctius, nihil utique est justius. Certe si ignaris, sed sanis, et ad perficiendum robustis talis lex data fuisset, absque dubio obedire volentes et justificare et eo ipso sanctificare [0671D] potuisset. Sed data est pro certo infirmis, et multum imperitis, et ad implendum minus idoneis. Item si doceret ignaros quid eos oportet facere, et infirmos similiter quomodo possent imperata perficere, procul dubio quod fateri oportet et justificare et vivificare potuisset. Docet autem lex tantum quid debeat fieri, sed non docet quomodo ab infirmis posset impleri. Negat autem Apostolus quod ex sola cognitione sive doctrina perficiendi; negat, inquam, et merito, hominem non posse vivificari. Sed quod Apostolus negat de sola mandati cognitione, Dominus affirmat de mandati impletione: *Hoc,* inquit, *fac, et vives.* Non dicit, si hoc scis, vives: sed, hoc fac, et vives. Quod igitur Dominus affirmat, Apostolus non negat; et quod Apostolus [0672A] negat, Dominus non affirmat. Nam, ut dictum est, Apostolus loquitur de sola mandati cognitione, Dominus autem de ipsius impletione.

## Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli (cont.)

Hic non immerito quaeritur qua ratione illis imputetur, vel quomodo in eis iram operetur quod legem non impleverunt qui eam implere non potuerunt, vel quid eis profuit talem legem accepisse quam nullo modo potuerunt implere? Talem certe, nec immerito, legem accipere debebant, qui omnia de propriis viribus, non de divino adjutorio praesumebant, juxta quod ad Moysen fiducialiter dicebant: *Omnia quae locutus est Dominus faciemus [n: (Exod. XXIV)]*. Quid tibi videtur, qui post tantam et tam constantem promissionem omnino neglexerunt? Nunquid eos excusare poterit tanta negligentia, vel [0672B] qui fortiter insistentes, sed deficientes per proprium defectum et multiplex experimentum humiliari non potuerunt, nunquid eos excusare potest tanta superbia? An illos, quaeso, qui per multam experientiam infirmitatem suam agnoverunt, sed ad impetrandam adjutricem gratiam desides fuerunt, poterit excusare tanta desidia? Quis hoc dicat, vel dicere audeat? Ex his itaque facile perpendere potes acceptae legis praevaricatores quam sint inexcusabiles. Nam illi quidem qui pro viribus satagentes, et deficientes tum per proprium, tum per alienum defectum suam infirmitatem et impossibilitatem agnoverunt, et in divino adjutorio de caetero totam spem suam posuerunt, impetrata et accepta divinitus gratia, justificari [0672C] meruerunt. Data itaque lex aliis profuit, et aliis omnino non profuit. Sane profuit viventibus bene, obfuit autem utentibus male. Ubi vero obfuit, non fuit vitium legis, sed vitium abutentis. Ad hoc namque lex data erat, quae impleri debuerat, et impleri non poterat ut satagentes et deficientes intelligerent quam frustra de suis viribus praesumerent, quod sine gratia divina implere non possent.

Adhuc fortassis insistitis, et dicitis quia quidquid de lege dictum est, etiam de Evangelio dici potest. Nam, sicut non sufficit ad justitiam legis doctrina sine gratia divina, sic procul dubio nec doctrina evangelica sine gratia divina, neutra impleri potest, neutra justificare potest. Cur ergo quod de lege dicitur non dicatur de Evangelio, quod ex operibus [0672D] Evangelii non justificabitur omnis caro? Nunquid et ipsum neminem ad perfectum adducit de quo constat quod sine gratia impleri non possit? Juxta eamdem considerationem possumus aestimare quod omnino non possit aliquem vivificare, sicut nec justificare. Ad haec autem respondeo, et dico quod doctrina legis est simplex, evangelica triplex. Evangelium siquidem docet quid debeat fieri, quomodo possit impleri, et quod impletum non fuerit quomodo possit suppleri. Docet autem solummodo lex, ut dictum est, quid homo debeat facere, nec addit quomodo possit implere, et ea propter neminem potest justificare. Evangelica autem doctrina ut sit usquequaque perfecta, docet tria illa jam dicta. Quid facere debeas doceris cum a Domino audis: [0673A] *Hoc est praeceptum meum ut diligatis invicem sicut dilexi vos [n: (Joan. XVIII)]*. Sed, ne quis idipsum de suis viribus praesumat, ab eodem magistro docetur, cum alias ab eodem dicitur: *Sine me nihil potestis facere. Sicut palmes non potest fructus facere nisi manserit in vite, sic et vos sine me nihil potestis facere [n: (Joan. XV)]*. In acquirenda igitur gratia per quam possimus implere quod volumus, quis, quaeso, erit obtinendi modus? *Si quid petieritis patrem in nomine meo dabit vobis [n: (Joan. XIV)]*. Si gratia egetis, petite secundum quod debetis, et accipietis. Sed quomodo in ejus nomine petimus si in ipsum credimus? Hoc est quod te docere voluit, cum dicit: *Creditis in Deum, et in me credite [n: (ibid.)]*. Qui igitur quod debet implere non potest, in Christum credat, [0673B] in Christo petat Patrem qui omnia potest. Postulet itaque Spiritum illum qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate. Spiritum, inquam, qui operatur omnia in omnibus, dividens singulis prout vult. Si fide qua oportet hunc petitis, procul dubio accipietis. Si enim nostis cum sitis mali bona data dare filiis vestris, quanto magis Pater vester coelestis dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se? [n: (Luc. XI.)] Ecce aperte habes, ut arbitror, quod a te debet fieri, quomodo, vel qua ratione possit impleri.

Sed adhuc tibi quaeris ostendi unde hoc quod per negligentiam, vel alio quolibet modo impletum non fuerit, possit suppleri. Dic tu prius quantum debes Domino tuo. An forte centum cados olei? Debitum [0673C] grande, et ad solvendum difficile. Debitum grande diligere Deum ex toto corde, tota mente, tota anima. Ecce debitum decem millium talentorum. Non mirum, si multum times et trepidas, sed breviter audi quid facias. Dimitte denarios centum qui debentur tibi, et omne debitum dimittetur tibi, et cum fiducia pro te tuique similibus orare poteris, dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos, etc. Quid, inquis, si mihi nil debetur, quomodo quod ipse debeo mihi dimittetur? Eodem ordine, ex eodem fonte unde hausisti in exsequendis gratiam, hauri et in miserendis miserationis indulgentiam. Videre potes ex his certe ad perfectionem doctrinae Evangelio nihil deesse. Habes in eo unde possis justificari, habes ex eo unde possis vivificari. *Qui manducat,* inquit, *carnem [0673D] meam et bibit meum sanguinem, habet vitam aeternam [n: (Joan. VI)]*.

Quid adhuc amplius quaeris? Nunquid tale aliquid potuit agnus ille legalis? Ecce Evangelium exhibet unde homo justificari possit, quod legalis doctrina omnino non potest. Sane sub lege multi fuerunt perfecti, certe sub tempore Evangelii multi sunt imperfecti. Legi tamen non ascribitur illorum perfectio, sic nec Evangelio istorum imperfectio. Nam hoc illis contulit gratia divina, non autem legis doctrina.

*Ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro [n: (Galat. II)]*. Aliud est esse justum et aliud est esse justificatum. Siquidem Deus est justus, nec tamen [0674A] justificatus. Constat autem quoniam peccatum facit hominem injustum. Quid itaque est peccatorem justificari, nisi a peccato liberari? Ex peccato namque fit homo tam obnoxius vitio quam supplicio. In uno obligatur ad culpam; in alio obligatur ad poenam. In uno incurrit debitum servitutis, in alio vero debitum aeternae damnationis: *Qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati [n: (Joan. III)]*. Qui autem servus est, eget redemptione ut possit liber exire. Lex autem nec docet unde homo redimi debeat, nex exhibet unde liberari valeat. Legis itaque doctrina non liberat a peccato, et (quod consequens est) ex ea non justificabitur omnis caro. Quid tamen lex facit? Docet quid homo debeat facere, docet quid debeat cavere, sed non docet quomodo possit implere. [0674B] Prohibet concupiscere, praecipit Deum ex toto corde diligere; praecipit amorem ordinatum, prohibet inordinatum. Audistis quid facit, audite quid efficit. Quod prohibet a carne omni hora agitur; quod praecipit vero nunquam a carne impletur. Unde et ex ejus operibus nemo justificatur. Quidquid enim docet aut tale est quod facere non potest, aut tale quod justificare non potest. Ex his, ut arbitror intellexisti quae sit frequentia peccandi. Attende nunc quae sit violentia peccati. Praecipitur in lege pro certis quibusdam peccatis ut praevaricatorum alius lapidetur, alius comburatur, alius alia quacunque morte moriatur. Verumtamen multa ejusmodi crimina a legis auditoribus committebantur. Facile itaque perpendi potest quanta violentia peccati, [0674C] quae in quibusdam nec ipso mortis periculo potuit coerceri. Data itaque lege et sequente frequenti et multiformi praevaricatione, manifeste innotuit quanta sit frequentia peccandi, quantave violentia peccati. Hinc est quod cum praemissum sit ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro, statim subjungitur ab Apostolo: *Per legem enim cognitio peccati [n: (Rom. III)]*. Aperte itaque datur intelligi vel dat intelligere, quoniam per legem est sola cognitio peccati, non autem et abolitio. Nam, si abolitio, utique justificatio. Mirabitur fortassis aliquis cur non dicatur potius cognitio mandati, quam cognitio peccati; nam et illud aeque veraciter potuit dici. Nam, sicut per legem sola peccati cognitio, non [0674D] autem abolitio; ita per legem sola mandati cognitio, non autem ejus impletio. Sed quantum mihi videtur, si praemisisset quod ex operibus legis nemo justus esset, vel justitiam haberet, convenientius subjungeret: Per legem enim cognitio mandati, quam si diceret, per legem enim cognitio peccati. Quid enim rectius dicitur justitia quam divini mandati observantia? Hominis justificatio idem est quod ejus liberatio a peccato. Cum igitur de hominis justificatione praemiserit, facile est videre quam convenienter subjungit: Per legem cognitio peccati, potius quam cognitio mandati.

*Scimus enim quod lex spiritualis est, ego autem carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato [n: (Rom. VII)]*. Merito quaeritur in quorum persona Apostolus haec dicat, [0675A] maxime propter illa, quae consequenter adjunguntur.

## Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli (cont.)

Quaeritur ergo utrum dicatur an in persona infirmorum vel imperfectorum, an potius in persona tam istorum quam illorum. Nam quantum mihi videtur, luce clarius constat quid de criminosis, haec nec exponi debeant, nec recte omnino intelligi valeant. Quis enim deinceps poterit criminosum quemlibet de suo crimine rationabiliter arguere, si potest in sui excusationem apostolicum testimonium adducere, et arguenti audacter respondere: Non ego operor illud, sed quod habebat in me peccatum? Quid est enim haec apostolica verba sic exponere ut possint etiam impiis convenire? Quid, inquam, aliud est quam operarios iniquitatis docere declinare cor suum in verba malitiae ad excusandas excusationes [0675B] in peccatis? Sed illud in his Apostoli verbis videtur esse quaerendum, utrum sit dictum sub forma perfectorum, an imperfectorum? Sed quomodo potest convenire Apostolo, vel cuilibet perfecto viro, ego autem carnalis sum, venundatus sub peccato? Qui namque merito dicerentur spirituales, si Paulus, vel Pauli similes creduntur esse carnales? Si solis infirmioribus convenit quod hoc loco Apostolus disserit, procul dubio non efficit quod ex his verbis probare contendit. Dixerat namque de lege quod non possit conferre justitiam, quin potius quod operetur iram. Sed ne hoc crederetur esse ex vitio legis, non hominis, ideo consequenter adjungit et dicit, quoniam lex quidem sancta est, et mandatum sanctum, et justum, et bonum. Hic autem Apostolus [0675C] manifeste ostendit quod ex vitio hominis sit quod ex lege justificari non possit, quoniam ad ejus impletionem omnino non sufficit. Sciendum itaque in primis quod secundum diversos respectus positiones verborum diversis modis accipimus. Aliter ergo de homine secundum praesentem statum judicamus, aliter vero secundum illum qui fuit ante peccatum. Secundum praesentem statum alii dicuntur spirituales, alii vero carnales. Sed procul dubio respectu primae conditionis quantumlibet religiosus non immerito dicitur carnalis. Quantum autem ad praesentem statum, carnales dicuntur qui post concupiscentias suas eunt, et carnalibus desideriis deserviunt. Spirituales qui carnis desideriis fortiter resistunt, [0675D] et spiritualibus studiis vehementer insistunt. Carnalium est carnis concupiscentias sentire et consentire. Spiritualium sentire, nec consentire; sed resistere, sed repugnare, sed mortificare. Sed, si ad primae conditionis statum respicimus, in eo ipso carnales sumus quod carnis concupiscentias, et foedas, et inordinatas delectationes sentimus. Si enim homo non peccasset, nec carnalia magis quam liceret, nec spiritualia minus diligeret quam deceret; sed in utrisque diligendis et modestiae metas, et aequitatis mensuram, et agnoscere simul et observare potuisset. Sed postquam status sui rectitudinem homo sponte deseruit, jam semel sub peccato venundatus, et carnalis effectus ad neutrum sufficit: nam multiformiter quidem et errat judicio, et effrenatur [0676A] desiderio. Quam vera itaque est illa prophetica sententia: *Non justificabitur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens [n: (Psal. CXLII)]*, quam verum est et illud apostolicum: *Si dixerimus quod peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est [n: (I Joan. I)]*. Tam vere potest intelligi de quolibet religioso, ego autem carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato, unde autem et in quibus carnalis sit ostendit, cum subjungit: Quod enim operor, non intelligo. Non quod volo hoc ago, sed quod odi illud facio. Ecce tria mala in quibus consistit carnalitas nostra. Quod facimus non intelligimus; non facimus quod volumus, facimus quod nolumus. Sed duo posteriora Apostolus conjungit, quoniam utrumque ex uno vitio descendit. Ex vitio namque concupiscentiae [0676B] descendit utrumque et quod tepidi sumus ad bonum, et fervidi ad malum: *Quod operor,* inquit, *non intelligo [n: (Rom. VII)]*, et hoc illi utique ex ignorantiae vitio. Non, inquit, quod volo hoc ago, sed quod odi illud facio. Ex hoc utique gemino vitio accipimus, ut carnales simus quandiu in carne vivimus.

Notandum autem quod Apostolus ad unum quod praemisit duo subsequenter adjungit. Praemisit quod carnalis fuerit, et unde hoc ei inesset ex duobus subjunctis ostendit. Repetenda itaque est prima sententia, et ad utrumque subjectum in hunc modum conjungenda. Carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato. Quod enim operor non intelligo. Carnalis, inquam, [0676C] sum venundatus sub peccato, non enim quod volo hoc ago, sed quod odi illud facio. Quisque potest experiri in semetipso quam veraciter dicatur, quod operor non intelligo. Nunquid quid operabatur intelligebat qui Domino in oratione dicebat: *Gratias ago tibi, Domine, quia non sum sicut caeteri hominum? [n: (Luc. XVIII.)]* Nunquid et illi quid dicerent bene intelligebant: *Omnia quae locutus est Dominus faciemus? [n: (Exod. XLII.)]* Verba enim videntur magnae devotionis, et sunt vere verba magnae praesumptionis. Saepe unde homo putat excitare devotionem, nutrit elationem, pascit praesumptionem. Sed unde hoc, quaeso, nisi quia quod agit non intelligit? Saepe superbit homo, et nescit. Saepe praesumit, et interim non intelligit. Pro utraque [0676D] ignorantia solet subtrahi gratia divina. Nam, dum praesumptuose agit et nescit, subtrahitur gratia ne efficiat quod cupit. Dum superbit et nescit, permittitur saepe in id cadere quod erubescit et odit, et potest dicere qui ejusmodi est: Non enim quod volo hoc ago, sed quod odi illud facio. Errat autem non solum in discernendo, verum etiam in deliberando quantumlibet homo spiritualis, dum quod putat cooperari sibi in bonum, cooperatur sibi in malum, et quod sibi credit cooperari in malum, cooperatur in bonum. Sed unde hoc bonum accidit, nisi quia quod operatur non intelligit? Sed quid mirum si quod operamur non intelligimus, qui quid oremus, prout oportet, nescimus. Quis enim in orando decipi non [0677A] possit si apostolus Paulus in hoc ipso decipi potuit? Nam illud a se auferri ter postulavit, quod illi ob humilitatis custodiam tam misericorditer quam utiliter inflictum fuit.

*Ut sapiens architectus fundamentum posui. Si quis autem superaedificaverit supra fundamentum hoc aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos, ligna, fenum, stipulam, uniuscujusque opus manifestum erit [n: (I Cor. III)]*. Sunt qui diffiniunt hoc loco fundamentum esse fidem ex dilectione operantem. Fidenter dico quod fundamentum tale nemo hominum in corde humano potest ponere. Quid credendum sit homo hominem docere potest. Sed dilectionem homo homini infundere non potest. Charitas siquidem Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris, non per hominem, sed per Spiritum [0677B] sanctum qui datus est nobis. Ut sapiens, inquit, architectus fundamentum posui. Quod, quaeso, est illud fundamentum quod Paulus posuit, et a Paulo poni potuit? Certe quomodo in Christum credi oporteat Paulus docere potuit, et absque ambiguo docuit. Hoc fidei nostrae documentum constat pro certo spiritualis aedificii fore fundamentum. Primo omnium est ut sciat homo quid debeat credere, vel facere, et hoc potest homo per hominem nosse. Debet itaque praedicator veritatis diligenter edocere quid oporteat credere, quibus operibus debeat homo insistere, vel quomodo perpetrata mala per veram poenitentiam possit delere, et hoc erit ei fundamentum ponere. Quam multi sunt qui hoc catholicae [0677C] doctrinae fundamentum et habent, et memoriter tenent, sed multum diversa superaedificant! Nam alii bona actitant, alii in spe resipiscendi peccant. Utrique ergo verae fidei fundamentum habent, sed diversa superaedificant. Alii aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos; alii ligna, fenum, stipulam. Aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosi non possunt igne consumi. Ista sane possunt per ignem transire, et post incendium manere: *Si cujus,* inquit, *opus manserit, quod superaedificavit mercedem accipiet.* Si igitur per hujusmodi mercedem acquirimus, quid aliud per aurum, argentum, et lapides pretiosos quam bona opera intelligere debemus. In lignis autem, feno et stipula quid, quaeso, intelligi oportet, bona opera an mala? Ligna vero, fenum et stipulam solet [0677D] ignis consumere, et velut in nihilum redigere. Sed absit ut ignis ille futurus bona opera consumere, et annihilare possit. In lignis itaque, feno et stipula non recte intelliguntur, nisi opera concrematione digna, et ad consumendum, non ad remanendum idonea. Quae sunt ergo ista arsura et igne consumenda, nisi opera mala? *Si cujus,* inquit, *opus arserit, detrimentum patietur, ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem.* Qui, quaeso, sunt isti operarii qui salvantur quidem non quasi per bonam operationem, sed sic utique quasi per ignem? Illud pro certo tenemus quod quilibet malus operarius per ignem purgatorium purgari non possit, nisi de perpetratis malis veraciter poenituerit. Sola siquidem vera poenitentia facit ut malorum perpetratio [0678A] purgatorio igne consumi atque deleri possit. Nulla autem crimina sunt adeo detestanda quae vera poenitentia non faciat solubilia. Videntur itaque esse duo genera operum insolubilium, unum autem genus operum solubilium, vera perseverantium bona, perseverantia non poenitentium mala, et nullo termino delenda. Mala autem vere poenitentium absque dubio solubilia sunt, et quae absque dubio igne purgatorio deleri possunt. In lignis itaque, feno et stipula intelligimus quaelibet mala solubilia. Sed quoniam igne consumi nequeant, sed in aeternum maneant, non solum bona permansura, verum etiam mala insolubilia, quid est quod dicit, cujus opus manserit quod superaedificat mercedem accipiet? Sed ad illos solummodo operarios de quibus jam antea [0678B] praemisit referendum est quod subjungit, si cujus opus manserit. Eorum itaque operariorum qui aedificant non ferrum, plumbum et stagnum, sed aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos, ligna, fenum, stipulam; ejusmodi, inquam, operariorum si cujus opus manserit mercedem accipiet. si cujus opus arserit, detrimentum patietur; ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem. Per aurum itaque, argentum et lapides pretiosos intelligimus, ut diximus, bona perseverantia. Per ligna, fenum et stipulam mala solubilia. In auro recte satis intelligitur speculatio veritatis; in argento verbum praedicationis; in lapidibus pretiosis exercitia virtutis; in lignis, feno et stipula intellige perversitatis, superfluitatis et vanitatis [0678C] opera, per veram poenitentiam facta remissibilia.

## Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli (cont.)

Mirandum fortassis videtur quibusdam quomodo Apostolus judicat flagitiosum illum qui patris sui uxorem habebat tradere Satanae in interitum carnis, ut spiritus salvus sit in diem Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Illud vero non potest in dubium venire, quod virtute, qua potuit daemoniacum a daemonio liberare, eadem etiam posset (ubi ratio hoc exigeret) daemoniacae vexationi tradere. Sed, si flagitiosus aliquis Satanae traditur et daemoniacus efficitur, non ei in hoc via salutis aperiri, sed intercludi videtur. Commissa siquidem crimina non possunt deleri sine vera poenitentia. Daemoniacus autem, cui sensus deest, quomodo veram poenitentiam habere potest? Quomodo ergo flagitiosum illum Satanae [0678D] tradendum Apostolus judicat, ut spiritus salvus fiat? Sciendum itaque quod vexatio daemoniaca alia continua, alia interpolata. Continuam vexationem patitur qui nunquam quiescere sinitur, sed continuis furiis agitatur. Interpolatam autem vexationem incurrit, qui pro diversis temporibus sensum quandoque amittit, quandoque recipit, et inter multiplices fatigationes animus fatigati aliquoties ad semetipsum redit. Qui igitur interpolatae infamiae traditus fuerit, pro certo habet quomodo poenitere, et eo ipso quomodo salvari possit. Quis enim poterit tam obduratae, tam obstinatae mentis esse, ut in ipsa suae vexationis interpolatione, cum animus redierit ad se non doleat, et intime poeniteat illud commisisse; unde contingit et daemoniacam vexationem incurrisse, [0679A] et omni ludibrio patere. Vide ergo quomodo ex vexationis interpolatione saepe agitur ut ipsa vexatio fiat ei in poenitudinem, et ex poenitudine ipsa efficitur ut ipsa vexatio sit ei ad purgationem. Dat ergo Apostolus patenter intelligi cujusmodi vexationi criminosum illum tradi voluerit in eo quod dicit, ut spiritus salvus sit. Nam, sicut ex continua daemonis vexatione via salutis potuit intercludi potius quam aperiri, sic e converso ex interpolata vexatione videbatur oportere aperiri, potius quam intercludi.

Notandum autem quod tradi in interitum carnis, pro certo quando homo moritur de caetero spiritus ipse carnis obsequiis pro voto non utitur. Caro itaque daemoniaci suo quodammodo spiritui moritur, [0679B] quando spiritus malignus ejus obsequiis violenter abutitur, et spiritus proprius debito sibi corporis famulatu privatur.

Mirum tibi videtur quod ab Apostolo dicitur: *Omnia mihi,* inquit, *licent [n: (I Cor. VI)]*. Multa siquidem sunt licita, non tamen omnia. Nam multa sunt omni homini omnino illicita. Sed quod dicimus licere, duobus modis solemus accipere. Eamdem enim positionem quandoque strictius, quandoque largius accipimus. Dicimus licere quod potest fieri ordinate. Aliquando dicimus licere quod est nobis liberum facere, sive possit, sive non possit fieri ordinate. Hinc est quod de facinoroso dici solet, hoc vel illud facinus libenter fecisset, si ei hoc facere [0679C] licuisset; quod est dicere, si facultatem vel opportunitatem faciendi habuisset. Hinc est quod B. Gregorius in suo Dialogo de quibusdam minus religiosis fratribus dicit, qui beatum Benedictum in abbatem elegerant, sed jam eos propter arctioris vitae disciplinam elegisse poenitebat, unde et eum veneno exstinguere parabant, quia videbant sibi sub eo illicita non licere. Quid est, quod dicit eis illicita non licere, nisi eos ad illicita facienda nullam sub eo licentiam, vel libertatem habere? Scimus quoniam Deus in hominis posuit libertate utrum velit bona an mala eligere. Hinc est illud Sapientis de Domino dictum: *Apposuit tibi ignem et aquam, ad quod volueris porrige manum tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum, quod placuerit dabitur ei* [0679D] [n: (Eccli. XV)]. Hinc est quod Apostolus enumeratis tot malis, subjungit, et dicit: *Omnia mihi licent,* licent utique non secundum concessionem, sed secundum solum permissionem. Secundum concessionem licent sola ordinata, secundum solam permissionem etiam inordinata. Multa enim Dominus fieri permittit, quae tamen nulli facere concedit. Omnia, inquit, mihi licent procul dubio quantum ad permissionem, sed non omnia expediunt, nec eorum quidem quae fiunt secundum concessionem. Omnia mihi licent, sed ego sub nullius redigar potestate, sub nullius videlicet eorum quae fiunt ex sola permissione. Quod enim dicit non omnia expediunt, respicit ad illam licentiam quae est secundum concessionem. Quod vero dicit, sed ego sub nullius [0680A] redigar potestate, respicit ad eam licentiam quae est secundum solam permissionem. Multa namque eorum quae concessa sunt majora bona impediunt, et idcirco non expediunt, nec tamen utentem servituti addicunt. Sed qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Si ergo volumus hanc servitutem vitare, et sub nullius redigi potestate, caute declinanda sunt quae licent ex sola permissione. Quod autem non omnia expediunt quae secundum concessionem licita sunt, evidenter ostendit, cum subjungit: *Esca ventri, et venter escis; Deus autem et hunc, et has destruet [n: (I Cor. VI)]*. Escae utique ad ventris refectionem sunt factae, et idcirco secundum concessionem licitae, nec tamen expedit eis nimis indulgere, et studia necessariora omittere. Nimia namque eorum [0680B] indulgentia ad quid valet, cum veraciter constet quod Deus hunc et has destruet. Quod autem non omnia quae licent secundum permissionem, liceant secundum concessionem, subsequenter ostendit cum protinus adjungit: *Corpus autem non fornicationi sed Domino, et Dominus corpori [n: (ibid.)]*. Escae quidem ad vescendum, venter autem ad utendum. Sed corpus non ad fornicandum, sed suo Domino ad serviendum. Quod enim fornicari possumus saepe cum volumus, non est indulgentia concedentis, sed probatio, vel desertio permittentis. Superius dixerat quod fornicarii regnum Dei non possidebunt, sed quia praevidebat multos fore qui hoc difficile crederent, et qui fornicationis malum non [0680C] adeo damnabile putarent, ideo consequenter ostendit in duobus quid de hoc malo sentire debemus. Ostendit namque hujusmodi malum quam sit profundum, et quam sit prae omnibus intimum. Ex opere siquidem fornicationis tolluntur membra Christi, et fiunt membra meretricis. Hinc est videre hujusmodi malum quam sit profundum, quod de tanta sublimitate dejicit in hoc imum et foedum. Audi et hoc ipsum quam sit prae omnibus intimum: *Omne,* inquit, *peccatum quodcunque fecerit homo extra corpus est, qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat [n: (I Cor. VI)]*. Sed, si volumus jura apostolicae sententiae plenius intelligere, oportet nos considerationem nostram altius attollere. Homo, ut in commune novimus, consistit ex gemina substantia, una [0680D] corporea, alia incorporea. Corporea mori potest: incorporea non potest. Incorporea sine alimento subsistere potest, corporea vero omnino non potest. Sed corporea quidem substantia, quae naturam suam de seipsa servare non potest, de seipsa instaurare, imo et multiplicare potest, quod spiritualis substantia omnino non potest. Vides certe quia alia est praerogativa corporeae substantiae, alia est praerogativa substantiae incorporeae. Praerogativa incorporeae substantiae, quod potest in aeternum, et sine subsidio subsistere. Praerogativa corporeae substantiae, quod potest de sua substantia conformem sibi substantiam producere, et sui generis naturam seminando multiplicare. Hanc autem conformitatem substantiae non possumus de nobis producere sine [0681A] distractione, ut sic dicam, propriae substantiae. Generatio namque prolis non fit sine quadam decisione generantis. In quo et illud notandum quod haec parentis in hoc opus decisio non fit, sed nec fieri potest de quolibet corporis membro, sed eruitur ab intimo et velut de quodam sui generis thesauro in intimis misso, et in id officii recondito. Sed cum nihil excellentius datum videatur corporeae substantiae hac dote naturae, gloriosius tamen est ab hoc officio cessare, quam exercere, eo quod post corruptionem naturae impleri non possit sine libidine, et foeda delectatione. Nam quod licet hoc exercere in propria conjuge, et causa tantum prolis generandae, hoc ipsum si bene attendas, indulgentiae est potius quam pudicitiae. Est autem in potu et cibo [0681B] non modica delectatio, nec tamen est vitiosa, nisi cui nimia fuerit, et in crapulam, vel ebrietatem transit. In crapula autem et ebrietate est quaedam distractio alienae substantiae. In opere vero libidinis est quaedam distractio et decisio propriae substantiae. Ibi quidem vitiositatis exactio fit in corpore alieno. Hic autem in corpore proprio, imo ab ipsius corporis intimo. Bene itaque de reliquis dictum est, quoniam omne peccatum extra corpus est. Peccat autem non modo in intimo sui, sed et in ipsum corpus suum qui fornicatur, quoniam in turpitudinis usus corpus suum exinanire videtur et divini muneris praerogativa tam in suas quam in alienas sordes abutitur.

## Explicatio aliquorum passuum difficilium Apostoli (cont.)

*Si quis se existimat scire aliquid, nondum cognovit [0681C] quomodo oporteat eum scire [n: (I Cor. VIII)]*. Quid, quaeso, ad ista dicemus? Ut de caeteris taceamus, quid de ipso Apostolo dicturi sumus? Si Apostolus se aliquid scire non aestimabat, qua fronte caeteros praedicando, scribendo, docere satagebat? Et si verum esse non existimat quod ex verbis praemissis denuntiat, quid, quaeso, idipsum tam constanter affirmat? Si se aliquid scire non existimavit, quid est quod superius praemisit, cum dicit: De his autem quae idolis sacrificantur, scimus quia omnes scientiam habemus? Sed hoc ipsum quod hoc loco videtur dicere in sequentibus videtur contradicere. Sed non in omnibus, inquit, est scientia. Quomodo, quaeso, omnes scientiam habent, si in omnibus scientia non est, et eam habentibus quomodo deesse potest? [0681D] Sciendum itaque est quod alia est illa scientia quam habent omnes. Alia autem quam quidam non habent, sed habere valent. Alia vero quam in hac vita nemo habet, sed nec habere valet. Omnes scientiam habemus, ecce de prima. Non in omnibus est scientia, ecce de secunda. Ad tertiam autem respicit Apostolus in eo quod dicit: *Si quis autem se existimat aliquid scire, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire [n: (Rom. II)]*. Scientiam discernendi inter verum et falsum, bonum et malum, justum et injustum, quamvis alii perfectius, alii imperfectius, omnes tamen in commune habemus Judaei, Graeci, Barbari et Latini. Nam si ista scientia fidelibus et infidelibus communis non esset, nullo modo Apostolus [0682A] dixisset: *Cum enim gentes quae legem non habent naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt, ejusmodi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex, qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis [n: (ibid.)]*. Ecce de scientia quam omnes habent. Sed scientiam quae cum accepta gratia cuique sufficiat ad salutem multi non habent, adhuc tamen habere valent. De ejusmodi scientia intelligitur quod rectum ab Apostolo dicitur: *Sed non in omnibus est scientia [n: (I Cor. VIII)]*. Quam ejusmodi scientiam ibi intelligi voluit, ostenditur in eo quod praemisit. Nam, etsi sunt qui dicantur dii, sive in coelo, sive in terra, nobis tamen unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia, et nos in illo; et unus Dominus Jesus Christus per quem omnia, et nos per ipsum. Ad hoc autem [0682B] illam quae omnibus est communis accipimus, ut illam quae sufficiat ad salutem quaerere et invenire possimus. Hanc autem vere salutis scientiam, alii habent majorem, alii minorem, et contingit saepe salvari eos qui habent minorem, et perire eos qui habent majorem. Magnitudo namque scientiae quibusdam est fomes superbiae, et eo ipso causa ruinae. Hoc ipsum innuit qui dicit: *Ne magnitudo revelationum extollat me, datus est mihi angelus Satanas stimulus carnis meae qui me colaphizet [n: (II Cor. XII)]*. Nemo autem qui est in hac vita ad plenum potest scire utrum jam cum accepta gratia, scientia quam habet possit sibi ad salutem sufficere. Haec est scientia quam in hac vita nemo habet, nemo apprehendere valet: *Et si simplex,* inquit [0682C] Job, *fuero, hoc ipsum ignorabit anima mea [n: (Job IX)]*. In eamdem sententiam currit quod Salomon dicit: *Nescit homo utrum amore an odio dignus sit [n: (Eccle. IX)]*. Habemus ex ejus sententia quod ignoret homo quid conducat sibi in vita sua. Habemus secundum eumdem: *Quia nescit homo finem suum, sed sicut pisces capiuntur hamo, et sicut aves comprehenduntur laqueo sic,* etc. [n: (Ibid.)] Ex his itaque verbis pro certo intelligimus quod certe securitatis scientiam in hac vita habere non possumus. Si igitur secundum Salomonem omnia in futuro incerta servantur, vide quid tibi sentiendum sit de scientia tua. Certe etsi magnum quid videatur secundum quantitatem, nescis si vel modicum quid sit, nescis si vel aliquid sit omnino tibi ad utilitatem. Qualis, quaeso, dicenda [0682D] illa existimatio rei de qua nescis quantum ad te, utrum sit aliquanti vel nihili. Debemus itaque quantum possumus ad scientiam proficere, quantumcunque tamen profecerimus pro nihilo reputare, quandiu non possumus de ejus fine certum judicium habere. Juxta hanc itaque considerationem recte intelligitur quod per Apostolum dicitur: *Si quis se existimat scire aliquid, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire.*

Omnis amor aut est solum gratuitus, aut solum debitus, aut debitus simul et gratuitus. Modis autem duobus intelligi potest amor gratuitus. Recte dicimus dilectionem gratuitam quae est secundum solam gratiam. Plenitudo veri et summi amoris est [0683A] quando tantus et talis est quo major vel melior esse non potest. Ubi non est summa perfectio, non valet, sed nec debet esse summa dilectio. Secundum solam gratiam est quod pro beneplacito tribuentis juste impendi, vel non impendi potest. Sed a divina excellentia [0684A] omnino alienum est quidquid secundum solam gratiam dici potest. Item amor gratuitus non incongrue dicitur, ubi tribuenti omnia nil nisi amor retribuitur.

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## An Explanation of Certain Difficult Passages of the Apostle

[0665A]If the things that are said about the law by the Apostle in various places are compared with one another, much contradiction seems to be in them. For he seems to be contrary [0665B] to himself, contrary to reason, contrary to truth, and — what is greater than all these — contrary to the judgment of the Lord himself. Hear him then crying out and protesting: *That by the works of the law no man shall be justified [n: (Rom. III)]*. How is he not in this contrary to himself, when he himself protests elsewhere that: *Not the hearers, but the doers of the law shall be justified [n: (Rom. II)]*. Again in another place: *The law,* he says, *is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good [n: (Rom. VII)]*. Again elsewhere it is said by the same man: *The law worketh wrath [n: (Rom. IV)]*. What seems more against reason than that a commandment which is called holy, just and good should, with a just and merciful Lord, work wrath rather than grace? But elsewhere he says that: *The law leads no one [0665C] to perfection [n: (Hebr. VII)]*. How, I ask, could this be truly said, or how was he in this not contrary to the truth, since the time of the law had so many just men, and men so perfect? Was Elijah not perfect, in whose spirit and power, according to the Lord's testimony, there came he than whom none greater has arisen among those born of women? [n: (Matth. XI.)] What shall we say of the other prophets, what of the just men and the kings, who wished to see what the apostles saw, and could not? If they were transgressors of the law, could they be just? If they were observers of it, were they not just thereby? But he seems to hold what is contrary to the judgment of the Lord in that he says elsewhere: *For if a law had been given which could justify, truly justice would be from the law [n: (Galat. III)]*. But to the lawyer [0665D] asking what he should do to possess eternal life, and, at the Lord's questioning, putting forth to the Lord the first and greatest commandments of the law, the Lord answered: *Do this, and thou shalt live [n: (Luc. X)]*. What then? Can justice not be obtained from that whence eternal life is obtained? Or can eternal life be had without justice? Who would say either of these, or presume to say it? *Do this,* he says, *and thou shalt live.* Thou shalt live, without doubt, by loving thy God with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind, and thy neighbor as thyself. There are those who say that the works of the law are those that are done out of fear, but the works of the Gospel those that are done out of love. And to serve without love cannot justify a man. Whence also, according to them, it is rightly said that by the works of the law no man shall be justified [sic: *justicabitur*]. And in testimony [0666A] of their assertion they bring forward what they read elsewhere in the Apostle: *For you have not received again the spirit of bondage in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption, wherein [0666B] we cry: Abba (Father* ) [n: (Rom. VIII)]. It is agreed then, they say, that those served under fear who had received the spirit of fear, not of love. Hence it is that they further add that the law is a commandment without grace, but the Gospel a commandment with grace. I confess, I do not recall having read where the law enjoins that one serve out of fear alone, where it forbids that the commandments be fulfilled out of true love. Shall the works, I ask, which the law itself enjoins not be works of the law, while the works it does not deliver shall be its works? But they say that those who were under the law received the spirit of bondage. I say boldly, and affirm without hesitation, that of those who lived in the time of the law and of those who have lived in the time of the Gospel until now, some received the spirit of fear, but others the spirit of love. [0666C] Did those alone not keep the law who, with charity abounding and casting fear out of doors, observed it out of love alone? It belongs certainly to the law, and to the Gospel, to set forth teaching; but to the Lord, to give grace or to withdraw it, and to pour in the spirit according to his good pleasure. What then do they mean who say that the law is a commandment without grace, but the Gospel a commandment with grace? How often do we see in our own times that unskilled hearers have greater grace in carrying out the commandments than certain most skilled preachers of the Gospel! Is it not the Gospel that they teach who most learnedly preach the apostolic doctrine, and yet neither have themselves the grace of fulfilling it nor are able to give it to others? Were those men of old living without the law who had received the teaching of the law together [0666D] with grace?

There are likewise those who say that those alone are rightly called works of the law which were begun with the law and ended with the law. But I say meanwhile what I think, and answer these things with a brief succinctness. Those works of the law which were begun with the law and ended with the law either justified when fulfilled, or they did not. If therefore their fulfillment could justify, how will it be true that no one shall be justified by the works of the law? There are perhaps those who say — and if they do not say it, they could not unfittingly have said it — that a distinction ought rightly to be drawn between natural, legal and evangelical works. For rightly are those works to be ascribed especially to the Gospel which received their institution from the Gospel, such as regeneration, confirmation and the communion of the Lord's body [0667A] and blood, and the new institution of whatever else. But those alone are to be called legal in a certain special way which, as has already been said, were begun with the law and ended with the law. And those ought rightly to be called natural which could have been understood by men through the natural law, even if the law and the Gospel had never been instituted. According to this distinction, at all events, someone will perhaps say that by the works of the law we ought to understand those legal institutions alone of which we hold for certain that by their fulfillment alone no flesh shall be justified. But by the name of the law, as it will perhaps seem to someone, we must understand both natural decrees and legal institutions, inasmuch as both are written in the law. For the Apostle says that *the doers of the law*, not the doers [0667B] of legal works, are justified. But what he affirms of the law, he denies of the works of the law. *By the works of the law,* he says, *no man shall be justified.* He does not say from the law, but from the works of the law no flesh shall be justified. And likewise in another place: *We account a man to be justified by faith, without the works of the law [n: (Rom. III)]*. There he says that a man cannot be justified by the works of the law. Here he says how far he can be justified without the works of the law. If anyone thinks that the Apostle meant it thus, I ask that he answer me upon this: whether the Apostle says this of the present state, or rather of the former state? If he said this of the time of the former state, the text of that discourse will seem to be at odds with the testimony of the law and the prophets. Did not the law cry out daily that a sinner, and one repenting, should according to the manner and [0667C] the magnitude of the sin offer this or that, now for a sin, now for a trespass, and it shall be forgiven him, it says, and the Lord will be merciful to him [n: (Num. XXX)]? How, I ask, is a man not justified by that whereby his sin is remitted to him and the Lord is made merciful? But if he wished what he said of the works of the law to be understood of the state of this present time, what great thing, I ask, did he say? For if we still sacrifice animals, without doubt we either judaize, or after the manner of the nations we put forward the rites of idolatry. And so I say concerning these men what the Apostle says of the sacrament of circumcision: that if we still persist in sacrifices and the other ceremonies of the law, Christ will profit us nothing. But do you wish to know more plainly what I say? Certainly the things which were immolated in the law for the expiation [0667D] of sin were sacrificed as a figure of things to come. For they prefigured the passion and death of Christ that was to come for the redemption of sins, and by that very fact they had the power of expiation and sanctification. If therefore we still sacrifice in a figure of things to come, we serve falsehood and not truth. For, *Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more, death shall no more have dominion over him [n: (I Cor. XV)]*. If we sacrifice apart from the figure of our redemption, we put forward, as has been said, the form of idolatry, and in that very act we set the sacrifices of animals beside Christ, and (what is more wicked!) prefer them to him. For if we offer those alone, the divine sacrifice being despised, we without doubt prefer them to Christ. If we offer them together with the divine victim (as though seeking salvation from both), [0668A] we without doubt set them beside Christ, and judge the victim of Christ to be as it were less than sufficient. What great thing therefore is it for the Apostle to say that no one shall be justified by legal works, when by the practice of them anyone will be reproved rather than justified?

But to these things perhaps you answer, and say: On account of certain [sic: *legiszelatores*], whom he desired to win rather than to scandalize, he spoke indeed more sparingly, but nevertheless he spoke true things. For as regards the present state, legal institutions defile rather than sanctify. But as regards the former state, without the natural decrees the legal enactments alone were not able to suffice for men's salvation. Hence it is that he does not say from the law, but *from the works [sic: exoperibus] of the law shall no [0668B] flesh be justified.* And again: *For we account that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law.* Without the works of the law, he says, not without the law — wishing under the name of works to understand the legal enactments alone, and under the name of the law both the legal and the natural, inasmuch as it contained these and those. Hence it is that he says that *the doers of the law* shall be justified. For what can be holier, what juster, what finally more perfect, than to love God with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and one's neighbor as oneself? The law therefore could confer justice, and not any sort whatever, but full and perfect. To these things I myself briefly reply and say: If the Apostle so thought, that the law could confer perfect justice, why does he say elsewhere that *the law brought no one to perfection?* If justice is conferred from the law, [0668C] how does it *work wrath?* Does it work wrath by conferring justice, and can it confer justice by working wrath? As far as it seems to me, whoever wishes to understand the apostolic sense will have to seek an exposition other than those aforesaid. As far as it seems to me, in all these matters those questions have not yet perished in which, as Augustine writes, the text of the apostolic discourse once seemed to him to be at odds with the testimonies of the law and the prophets. For he who says that a man cannot be justified by legal works — does he not seem to be at odds with Moses writing, nay rather with the Lord commanding: Let the man who has come to know his sin offer this or that, and it shall be forgiven him, and the Lord will be merciful to him.

## An Explanation of Certain Difficult Passages of the Apostle (cont.)

[0668D]Your importunate request compels me to say what I think about the matters that have been set forth, and I confidently hope that where John seeks, grace will not be wanting, both for thinking truly and for setting it forth usefully. It is not our custom, most of all in great and very deep matters, to presume anything out of our own understanding, or as it were to establish or affirm anything on our own authority. And so, so far as the Lord shall grant, let us draw out from the testimonies of Holy Scripture itself that whereby we may be able to loose the knots of our doubt. But this is most certain, and no one can doubt it: that the law was either such as could justify when fulfilled, or such as could not justify even when fulfilled. But if it could not justify when fulfilled, in no way would the Apostle say [0669A] that the doers of the law would be justified. To the same judgment runs what the Lord said to the lawyer concerning the two greatest commandments: *Do this and thou shalt live.* See how a sure authority proves that the law, when fulfilled, justifies. Again I say that the law was either such as could be fulfilled by those to whom it was given, or such as could not be fulfilled by them. But let us prove this very thing that we are seeking, again by apostolic testimony: *What was impossible,* he says, *to the law, in that it was weakened by the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and of sin condemned sin in the flesh, that the justice of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit [n: (Rom. VIII)]*. You weigh, as I judge, from these things how impossible it was for the law to justify, and how necessary it was for us [0669B] to have such a remedy — that God should send his own Son, that the Son of God should empty himself, and come in the likeness of sinful flesh, and condemn sin of sin, so that at least in this way the justice of the law might be fulfilled in us. But was everything that belonged to the law also impossible? By no means, but in that part in which the law was weakened by the flesh. Do you wish to hear this too, how it was weakened by the flesh: *The flesh,* he says, *lusteth against the spirit [n: (Galat. V)]*; and elsewhere: *I know that there dwelleth not in me* (that is, in my flesh) *good. For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I find not [n: (Rom. VII)]*. If therefore we diligently examine the testimonies brought forward, we shall find beyond doubt that certain precepts of the law were such as justified when fulfilled; but certain others, though fulfilled, in no way [0669C] justified. Nonetheless certain of them were such as could be fulfilled, and certain others such as without doubt could not be fulfilled. But those that could be fulfilled without doubt could not justify, and conversely those that could justify could not be fulfilled. Rightly therefore does the Apostle cry out: *That by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified.* If no flesh, then no man, inasmuch as every man is flesh; because he is carnal, sold under sin. How, I ask, can one who has been made flesh and become carnal be justified, either from what he can do and which cannot justify, or from what can justify and which he cannot do? For the law teaches what a man ought to do, but it does not equally teach how he may be able to fulfill [0669D] what is commanded. From the law alone, therefore, there is knowledge alone, and not fulfillment as well. Hence it is that, when the Apostle has first set down that by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified, he at once adds and joins to it: *For by the law is the knowledge of sin [n: (Rom. III)]*. See, you have both what is not from the law, and what is from the law. By the law the knowledge of sin — would that there were the abolition of it too. For if abolition, then without doubt justification too. And so I say: If no one is justified from the law, then he is justified from elsewhere. For who would dare to say that no one is or has been just? Hear what the Lord says to the apostles: *Many just men and prophets have desired to see the things that you see, and have not seen them [n: (Luc. X)]*. If just, then certainly justified as well. *For all have sinned, and do need the glory of God. Being justified freely by his grace [n: (Rom. III)]*. For he it is *who justifieth [0670A] the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith (ibid)*. See, from these things it is plainly known whence a man is justified. Without doubt through faith, and not through the law. For *the justice of God is through the faith of Jesus Christ [n: (ibid.)]*. See, you plainly have it that justice is from faith.

But it remains to be asked whether it is always from faith alone, or sometimes from faith alone without works, and sometimes from faith together with works. Let us seek, if you please, upon this very point the testimony of the Apostle himself: *We account,* he says, *that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law.* See, again you plainly have it that a man can sometimes be justified from faith alone apart from the work of the law. But is it always from faith alone, and without every work of the law? By no means. For if he has time for working, *faith without works is dead* [0670B] [n: (Jac. II)]. For not the hearers of the law, but the doers shall be justified. Without doubt, so long as time for working is granted to a man, there is required of him by God, and not undeservedly, a faith that works through love. From the testimonies brought forward, therefore, it is plainly gathered that a man is indeed justified sometimes from faith alone, sometimes from faith together with the work of the law, but never from the law alone. From these things, therefore, as I judge, it can be weighed that the Apostle is not contrary to himself in his sayings. For in that he says in one place that by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified, he plainly gives us to understand that for human diligence the teaching of the law alone, without the faith of Christ and grace, does not at all suffice: *By the grace,* he says, *of God I am in what I am [n: (I Cor. XV)]*. But again, lest the law [0670C] be thought to be such that it cannot justify when fulfilled, therefore he says of the same law in another place: *For not the hearers, but the doers of the law shall be justified.* For whether it be granted or not granted that to any man such grace has been given, or is to be given, that he can fulfill it, nonetheless it is true that the fulfilling of it is the justification of men. The Apostle therefore teaches that the law by itself alone never confers justice upon a man, nay — what is heavier still — that it also works wrath. But whence this comes about the Apostle himself makes plain by adding: *For where there is no law, neither is there transgression [n: (Rom. IV)]*. For it works wrath from this, that from the teaching of the law alone, without grace joined to it, the hearers of the law are made not so much doers as transgressors. [0670D] For, lest the commandments of the law should be thought foolish rather than impossible, therefore it is said by the Apostle in another place: *The law indeed is holy and the commandment holy, and just and good.* Perhaps you think this was said of the moral commandments alone. I boldly say it of any institution whatever of the law, that in its own time it was holy, and just and good, as being instituted by God, and divinely enjoined upon man.

What, I ask, were the sacrifices, if not a figure of the passion and death of Christ, and by that very fact sacraments of the same? There was therefore in one and the same work both a figure of our redemption and a due obedience. Certainly, if Abraham had wished to slay his son without a divine precept, it would have been the utmost impiety and a horrible outrage. If therefore it was holy, and just, and dutiful [0671A] to sacrifice his son at the Lord's command, why should it not in the same way be called holy, and just, and good to offer and immolate to the Lord, at the Lord's command, a beast that can be killed without sin? That the law therefore worked wrath came not from the law's imperfection or disorder, but from man's weakness and imperfection. Do you wish to hear this very thing not from me, but from the Apostle himself: *We know,* he says, *that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I work, I understand not. For I do not that good which I will, but the evil which I hate, that I do [n: (Rom. VII)]*. See, now you have whence transgression comes; see, now you hold that it is not from a fault of the law, but of man. Nothing therefore is said against reason in that he cries out that the holy and just commandment works wrath. [0671B] According to the Lord's testimony it is true, nor can we deny, that before the coming of Christ there were many just men and prophets; nevertheless what the Apostle said was not contrary to the truth, that the law brought no one to perfection. For that they were just, and whatever of perfection they were able to have, this was conferred on them not by the bare teaching of the law, but by divine grace joined to it. For *it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy [n: (Rom. IX)]*. For they were by no means justified without the faith and grace of Christ. For unless they believed and hoped that Christ would come, in no way would they have desired his coming for so long a time. For what else does it mean that the Lord says to the apostles: *Many kings and prophets have desired to see the things that [0671C] you see, and have not seen them, and to hear the things that you hear, and have not heard them? [n: (Luc. X.)]* Their justification, therefore, is ascribed not so much to the law as to the faith and grace of Christ. Now let us consider this, how what the Apostle thinks of the law is not contrary to the Lord's judgment when he says: *For if a law had been given which could justify, truly justice would be from the law.* You see that, according to the Apostle, the law can neither give life nor justify; but why is this, if not because it cannot be fulfilled? For a man cannot refrain from coveting, just as he cannot love with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind — than which nevertheless nothing is holier, nothing at all is juster. Certainly, if such a law had been given to men ignorant but sound, and strong for accomplishing it, it could without doubt have both justified those willing to obey and by that very fact sanctified [0671D] them. But it was given, for certain, to the weak, and to the very unskilled, and to those less fit for fulfilling it. Likewise, if it taught the ignorant what they ought to do, and the weak in like manner how they could accomplish what was commanded, without doubt — as must be confessed — it could have both justified and given life. But the law teaches only what ought to be done, and does not teach how it can be fulfilled by the weak. But the Apostle denies that from knowledge alone, or the teaching, of what is to be accomplished; he denies, I say, and rightly, that a man cannot be given life. But what the Apostle denies of the knowledge of the commandment alone, the Lord affirms of the fulfilling of the commandment: *Do this,* he says, *and thou shalt live.* He does not say, if thou knowest this, thou shalt live; but, do this, and thou shalt live. What therefore the Lord affirms, the Apostle does not deny; and what the Apostle [0672A] denies, the Lord does not affirm. For, as has been said, the Apostle speaks of the knowledge of the commandment alone, but the Lord of the fulfilling of it.

## An Explanation of Certain Difficult Passages of the Apostle (cont.)

Here it is not undeservedly asked by what reasoning it is imputed to them, or how it works wrath in them, that they did not fulfill the law who could not fulfill it; or what it profited them to have received such a law as they could in no way fulfill. Certainly, and not undeservedly, they ought to receive such a law who presumed everything upon their own strength and not upon divine help, according to what they confidently said to Moses: *All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do [n: (Exod. XXIV)]*. What seems right to you concerning those who, after so great and so steadfast a promise, utterly neglected it? Can so great a negligence excuse them? Or [0672B] those who, pressing on strongly but failing through their own defect and through manifold experience, could not be humbled — can so great a pride excuse them? Or those, I ask, who through much experience acknowledged their own weakness, but were slothful in obtaining the grace that helps — can so great a sloth excuse them? Who would say this, or dare to say it? From these things, therefore, you can easily weigh how inexcusable the transgressors of the law they received are. For those indeed who, striving according to their strength and failing now through their own defect, now through another's, acknowledged their own weakness and impossibility, and thereafter placed their whole hope in divine help, deserved to be justified, [0672C] grace having been obtained and received from God. The law that was given, therefore, profited some, and to others profited nothing at all. It certainly profited those living well, but harmed those using it ill. But where it harmed, it was not a fault of the law, but a fault of the one abusing it. For to this end the law had been given, which ought to have been fulfilled and could not be fulfilled: that those striving and failing might understand how vainly they presumed upon their own strength for what they could not fulfill without divine grace.

Perhaps you still press on, and say that whatever has been said of the law can also be said of the Gospel. For as the teaching of the law does not suffice for justice without divine grace, so without doubt neither does evangelical teaching without divine grace; neither can be fulfilled, neither can justify. Why then should not what is said of the law be said of the Gospel, that by the works [0672D] of the Gospel no flesh shall be justified? Does not that also bring no one to perfection, of which it is agreed that it cannot be fulfilled without grace? By the same consideration we can reckon that it cannot at all give life to anyone, just as it cannot justify. But to these things I reply and say that the teaching of the law is single, the evangelical threefold. For the Gospel teaches what ought to be done, how it can be fulfilled, and how what has not been fulfilled can be made good. But the law teaches only, as has been said, what a man ought to do, and does not add how he can fulfill it, and for that reason it can justify no one. But evangelical teaching, that it may be perfect in every respect, teaches those three things already named. What you ought to do you are taught when you hear from the Lord: [0673A] *This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you [n: (Joan. XVIII)]*. But lest anyone presume the same upon his own strength, he is taught by the same master, when it is said elsewhere by the same: *Without me you can do nothing. As the branch cannot bear fruit unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in me [n: (Joan. XV)]*. In obtaining grace, therefore, whereby we may be able to fulfill what we will — what, I ask, will be the manner of obtaining it? *If you shall ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you [n: (Joan. XIV)]*. If you lack grace, ask as you ought, and you shall receive. But how do we ask in his name if we believe in him? This is what he wished to teach you, when he says: *You believe in God, believe also in me [n: (ibid.)]*. Let him therefore who cannot fulfill what he ought believe in Christ, [0673B] and in Christ ask the Father who can do all things. Let him then ask for that Spirit who works in us to will and to accomplish according to good will; that Spirit, I say, who works all things in all, dividing to every one according as he will. If you ask him with the faith that is required, without doubt you shall receive. For if you, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give a good spirit to them that ask him? [n: (Luc. XI.)] See, you plainly have, as I judge, what ought to be done by you, and how, or by what reasoning, it can be fulfilled.

But you still ask to be shown whence what has not been fulfilled — through negligence, or in any other way whatever — can be made good. Say first how much you owe your Lord. A hundred measures of oil, perhaps? A great debt, [0673C] and hard to pay. It is a great debt to love God with the whole heart, the whole mind, the whole soul. See, a debt of ten thousand talents. No wonder if you greatly fear and tremble; but hear briefly what you should do. Forgive the hundred pence that are owed to you, and every debt shall be forgiven you; and with confidence you will be able to pray for yourself and those like you: forgive us our debts as we also, and so forth. What, you say, if nothing is owed to me — how shall what I myself owe be forgiven me? By the same order, from the same fountain from which you drew grace in performing, draw also the indulgence of compassion in showing mercy. From these things you can certainly see that nothing is wanting to the Gospel for the perfection of teaching. You have in it whereby you may be justified, you have from it whereby you may be given life. *He that eateth,* he says, *my [0673D] flesh and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life [n: (Joan. VI)]*.

What more do you still seek? Could that lamb of the law do any such thing? See, the Gospel sets forth that whereby a man can be justified, which legal teaching cannot do at all. Certainly under the law many were perfect; certainly in the time of the Gospel many are imperfect. Yet the perfection of the former is not ascribed to the law, just as neither is the imperfection of the latter to the Gospel. For divine grace conferred this on them, and not the teaching of the law.

*By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified [n: (Galat. II)]*. It is one thing to be just and another to be justified. Since God indeed is just, and yet not [0674A] justified. But it is agreed that sin makes a man unjust. What therefore is it for a sinner to be justified, if not to be freed from sin? For from sin a man becomes liable both to vice and to punishment. In the one he is bound to guilt; in the other he is bound to penalty. In the one he incurs the debt of servitude, but in the other the debt of eternal damnation: *He that committeth sin is the servant of sin [n: (Joan. III)]*. But he who is a servant needs redemption that he may be able to go out free. But the law neither teaches whence a man ought to be redeemed, nor [sic: *nex*] does it set forth whence he may be able to be freed. The teaching of the law, therefore, does not free from sin, and (as follows from this) by it no flesh shall be justified. What then does the law do? It teaches what a man ought to do, it teaches what he ought to beware of, but it does not teach how he can fulfill it. [0674B] It forbids coveting, it commands loving God with the whole heart; it commands ordered love, it forbids disordered love. You have heard what it does; hear what it effects. What it forbids is done by the flesh at every hour; but what it commands is never fulfilled by the flesh. Whence also by its works no one is justified. For whatever it teaches is either such as he cannot do, or such as cannot justify. From these things, as I judge, you have understood what the frequency of sinning is. Now attend to what the violence of sin is. It is commanded in the law, for certain sins, that of the transgressors one be stoned, another burned, another die by any other death whatever. And yet many crimes of this kind were committed by the hearers of the law. It can therefore easily be weighed how great the violence of sin is, [0674C] which in some could not be restrained even by the peril of death itself. The law having been given, therefore, and frequent and manifold transgression following, it became plainly known how great is the frequency of sinning, and how great the violence of sin. Hence it is that, when it has first been set down that by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified, it is at once added by the Apostle: *For by the law is the knowledge of sin [n: (Rom. III)]*. It is plainly given to be understood, therefore, or he gives it to be understood, that by the law there is only the knowledge of sin, and not the abolition of it as well. For if abolition, then certainly justification. Someone will perhaps wonder why it is not said rather the knowledge of the commandment than the knowledge of sin; for that too could equally truly have been said. For as by the law there is only the knowledge of sin, and not [0674D] the abolition of it, so by the law there is only the knowledge of the commandment, and not the fulfilling of it. But as far as it seems to me, if he had first set down that by the works of the law no one was just, or had justice, he would more fittingly add: For by the law is the knowledge of the commandment, than if he said, For by the law is the knowledge of sin. For what is more rightly called justice than the observance of the divine commandment? A man's justification is the same as his liberation from sin. Since therefore he has first spoken of a man's justification, it is easy to see how fittingly he adds: By the law is the knowledge of sin, rather than the knowledge of the commandment.

*For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin [n: (Rom. VII)]*. It is rightly asked in whose person the Apostle says these things, [0675A] most of all on account of those things which are subsequently joined to them.

## An Explanation of Certain Difficult Passages of the Apostle (cont.)

It is asked, therefore, whether it is said in the person of the weak or of the imperfect, or rather in the person both of these and of those. For as far as it seems to me, it stands clearer than light what, concerning the criminal, these things ought neither to be expounded, nor can they at all be rightly understood. For who thereafter will be able reasonably to convict any criminal of his crime, if he can bring forward the apostolic testimony in his own excuse, and boldly answer the one convicting him: It is not I who work it, but the sin that was in me? For what is it to expound these apostolic words in such a way that they can also fit the impious? What, I say, is this other than to teach the workers of iniquity to incline their heart to words of malice, to make excuses in [0675B] sins? But this seems to be the thing to be asked in these words of the Apostle: whether it is said under the form of the perfect, or of the imperfect? But how can it fit the Apostle, or any perfect man whatever: but I am carnal, sold under sin? For who would deservedly be called spiritual, if Paul, or men like Paul, are believed to be carnal? If what the Apostle sets out in this place fits only the weaker sort, without doubt it does not accomplish what he strives to prove by these words. For he had said of the law that it cannot confer justice, but rather that it works wrath. But lest this be believed to be from a fault of the law and not of man, therefore he consequently adds and says that the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. But here the Apostle [0675C] plainly shows that it is from a fault of man that he cannot be justified by the law, since he is by no means sufficient for the fulfilling of it. It must therefore be known first of all that according to different respects we take the placing of words in different ways. We judge otherwise, therefore, concerning man according to the present state, and otherwise according to that state which was before sin. According to the present state some are called spiritual, others carnal. But without doubt, in respect of the first condition, however religious a man may be, he is not undeservedly called carnal. But as regards the present state, those are called carnal who go after their own concupiscences and are slaves to carnal desires; and spiritual, those who strongly resist the desires of the flesh, [0675D] and vehemently press on with spiritual pursuits. It belongs to the carnal to feel the concupiscences of the flesh and to consent to them. It belongs to the spiritual to feel them and not to consent, but to resist, but to fight back, but to mortify them. But if we look back to the state of the first condition, in this very thing we are carnal, that we feel the concupiscences of the flesh, and foul and disordered delights. For if man had not sinned, he would neither have loved carnal things more than was lawful, nor spiritual things less than was fitting; but in loving both he could have both known and observed the bounds of moderation and the measure of equity. But after man of his own accord deserted the uprightness of his state, being now once sold under sin and made carnal, he is sufficient for neither: for in manifold ways he both errs in judgment and is unbridled [0676A] in desire. How true therefore is that prophetic saying: *In thy sight no living man shall be justified [n: (Psal. CXLII)]*; how true also is that apostolic one: *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us [n: (I Joan. I)]*. Just as truly can it be understood of any religious man, but I am carnal, sold under sin; and whence and in what respects he is carnal he shows when he adds: For that which I work, I understand not. I do not that which I will, but the evil which I hate, that I do. See, three evils in which our carnality consists. What we do we do not understand; we do not do what we will; we do what we do not will. But the Apostle joins the two latter, since both descend from one fault. For from the fault of concupiscence [0676B] both descend: both that we are lukewarm toward the good, and fervent toward the evil: *That which I work,* he says, *I understand not [n: (Rom. VII)]*, and this in him certainly from the fault of ignorance. I do not, he says, that which I will, but the evil which I hate, that I do. From this twofold fault, certainly, it comes to us that we are carnal so long as we live in the flesh.

But it is to be noted that the Apostle adds two things subsequently to the one thing he set down first. He set down first that he was carnal, and by the two things joined he shows whence this was in him. The first sentence must therefore be repeated, and joined to each of the two clauses in this manner. I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I work, I understand not. I am carnal, I say, [0676C] sold under sin, for I do not that which I will, but the evil which I hate, that I do. Anyone can prove in himself how truly it is said, that which I work I understand not. Did he understand what he was working who said to the Lord in prayer: *I give thee thanks, O Lord, because I am not as the rest of men? [n: (Luc. XVIII.)]* Did those also well understand what they said: *All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do? [n: (Exod. XLII.)]* For the words seem to be words of great devotion, and they are truly words of great presumption. Often, from that whereby a man thinks to stir up devotion, he nourishes elation and feeds presumption. But whence is this, I ask, if not because he does not understand what he does? Often a man is proud, and knows it not. Often he presumes, and meanwhile does not understand it. For both kinds of [0676D] ignorance divine grace is wont to be withdrawn. For while he acts presumptuously and knows it not, grace is withdrawn lest he accomplish what he desires. While he is proud and knows it not, he is often permitted to fall into that which he blushes at and hates, and he who is of this sort can say: For I do not that which I will, but the evil which I hate, that I do. But however spiritual a man may be, he errs not only in discerning but also in deliberating, when what he thinks works together with him unto good works together with him unto evil, and what he believes works together with him unto evil works together unto good. But whence does this good come about, if not because he does not understand what he works? But what wonder is it if we do not understand what we work, we who know not what we should pray for as we ought? For who could not be deceived in praying, if [0677A] the apostle Paul could be deceived in this very thing? For he thrice asked that that be taken from him which had been inflicted upon him as mercifully as it was usefully, for the keeping of humility.

*As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation. But if any man build upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, every man's work shall be made manifest [n: (I Cor. III)]*. There are those who define the foundation in this place to be faith working through love. I confidently say that no man can lay such a foundation in a human heart. What is to be believed, a man can teach a man. But love a man cannot pour into a man. For the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not by man, but by the Holy [0677B] Spirit who has been given to us. As a wise architect, he says, I have laid the foundation. What, I ask, is that foundation which Paul laid, and which could be laid by Paul? Certainly Paul could teach how one ought to believe in Christ, and taught it without ambiguity. This document of our faith is agreed for certain to be the foundation of the spiritual building. First of all it is that a man should know what he ought to believe, or to do, and this a man can know through a man. The preacher of truth ought therefore diligently to teach what one must believe, in what works a man ought to press on, or how by true penance he can blot out the evils he has committed; and this will be for him to lay the foundation. How many there are who both have this foundation of catholic [0677C] teaching, and hold it by memory, but build upon it very different things! For some do good deeds, others sin in the hope of coming to their senses. Both, therefore, have the foundation of true faith, but build different things upon it. Some gold, silver, precious stones; others wood, hay, stubble. Gold, silver, precious stones cannot be consumed by fire. These indeed can pass through the fire, and remain after the burning: *If any man's work,* he says, *abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward.* If therefore by such things we acquire a reward, what else ought we to understand by gold, silver, and precious stones than good works. But in wood, hay and stubble what, I ask, ought to be understood — good works or evil? Wood, hay and stubble the fire is wont [0677D] to consume, and as it were to reduce to nothing. But far be it that that future fire should be able to consume and annihilate good works. In wood, therefore, and hay and stubble nothing is rightly understood except works worthy of burning, and fit for being consumed, not for remaining. What then are these things that are to be burned and consumed by fire, if not evil works? *If any man's work,* he says, *burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire.* Who, I ask, are these workmen who are saved indeed not as it were by good working, but so, certainly, as by fire? This we hold for certain, that no evil workman whatever can be purged by purgatorial fire unless he has truly repented of the evils he has committed. For true penance alone brings it about that the perpetration of evils [0678A] can be consumed and blotted out by purgatorial fire. But no crimes are so detestable that true penance does not make them soluble. There seem therefore to be two kinds of insoluble works, but one kind of soluble works: the true goods of those persevering, the persevering evils of those not repenting, and to be blotted out by no term. But the evils of those truly repenting are without doubt soluble, and can without doubt be blotted out by purgatorial fire. In wood, therefore, and hay and stubble we understand any soluble evils whatever. But since they cannot be consumed by fire, but remain forever — not only the goods that are to endure, but also the insoluble evils — what is it that he says, whose work shall abide that he builds thereupon shall receive a reward? But what he adds, if any man's work abide, is to be referred only to those workmen of whom he has already [0678B] spoken before. Of those workmen, therefore, who build not iron, lead and tin, but gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble — of workmen of this sort, I say, if any man's work abide he shall receive a reward. if any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. By gold, therefore, and silver and precious stones we understand, as we have said, enduring goods. By wood, hay and stubble, soluble evils. In gold there is rightly enough understood the contemplation of truth; in silver the word of preaching; in precious stones the exercises of virtue; in wood, hay and stubble understand the works of perversity, superfluity and vanity, [0678C] made remissible through true penance.

## An Explanation of Certain Difficult Passages of the Apostle (cont.)

It seems perhaps a thing to be wondered at by some, how the Apostle judges that that shameful man who had his father's wife should be delivered to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ. But this cannot come into doubt: that by the same power whereby he could free a man possessed from a demon, he could also (where reason required it) deliver a man to demonic vexation. But if some shameful man is delivered to Satan and is made possessed by a demon, the way of salvation seems in this not to be opened to him but shut off. For the crimes he has committed cannot be blotted out without true penance. But how can one possessed by a demon, who lacks his senses, have true penance? How therefore does the Apostle judge that that shameful man is to be delivered [0678D] to Satan, that the spirit may be saved? It must therefore be known that demonic vexation is of one kind continual, of another intermittent. He suffers continual vexation who is never allowed to rest, but is driven by unceasing furies. But he incurs intermittent vexation who at different times now loses his senses, now recovers them, and amid manifold torments the mind of the tormented man sometimes returns to itself. He therefore who has been delivered over to intermittent infamy has for certain the means of repenting, and by that very fact the means whereby he can be saved. For who could be of a mind so hardened, so obstinate, that in the very intermission of his vexation, when his mind has returned to itself, he does not grieve and inwardly repent of having committed that whence it has befallen him both to incur demonic vexation [0679A] and to lie open to every mockery. See therefore how from the intermission of the vexation it often comes about that the vexation itself becomes for him a cause of repentance, and from that repentance it is brought about that the vexation itself is for him unto purgation. The Apostle therefore plainly gives it to be understood to what kind of vexation he wished that criminal to be delivered, in that he says, that the spirit may be saved. For as by the continual vexation of the demon the way of salvation could be shut off rather than opened, so conversely by intermittent vexation it seemed that it ought to be opened rather than shut off.

But it is to be noted that to be delivered unto the destruction of the flesh — for certain, when a man dies the spirit itself thereafter does not use the services of the flesh at its wish. The flesh of one possessed by a demon therefore dies in a certain way to its own spirit, [0679B] when the malign spirit violently abuses its services, and his own spirit is deprived of the bodily service owed to it.

It seems a wonder to you that it is said by the Apostle: *All things,* he says, *are lawful to me [n: (I Cor. VI)]*. Many things indeed are lawful, yet not all. For many things are utterly unlawful for every man. But what we call lawful we are wont to take in two ways. For we take the same expression sometimes more strictly, sometimes more broadly. We say that is lawful which can be done in an ordered way. Sometimes we say that is lawful which we are free to do, whether or not it can be done in an ordered way. Hence it is that it is wont to be said of a man of crime that he would gladly have done this or that crime, if it had been lawful [0679C] for him to do it; which is to say, if he had had the ability or the opportunity of doing it. Hence it is that blessed Gregory in his *Dialogue* says of certain less religious brothers, who had chosen blessed Benedict as abbot, but now repented of having chosen him because of the discipline of a stricter life — whence they were preparing to do away with him by poison, because they saw that unlawful things were not lawful for them under him. What is it that he says, that unlawful things were not lawful for them, if not that under him they had no license or liberty for doing unlawful things? We know that God has placed it in man's liberty whether he wishes to choose good things or evil. Hence is that saying of the Wise Man about the Lord: *He hath set before thee fire and water; stretch forth thy hand unto which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which shall please him shall be given him* [0679D] [n: (Eccli. XV)]. Hence it is that the Apostle, having enumerated so many evils, adds and says: *All things are lawful to me,* lawful certainly not according to concession, but according to permission alone. According to concession only ordered things are lawful; according to permission alone even disordered things. For the Lord permits many things to be done which nevertheless he concedes to no one to do. All things, he says, are lawful to me — without doubt as regards permission; but all things are not expedient, not even of those that are done according to concession. All things are lawful to me, but I will not be brought under the power of any — namely of any of those things which are done from permission alone. For what he says, all things are not expedient, looks to that license which is according to concession. But what he says, but I will not be brought [0680A] under the power of any, looks to that license which is according to permission alone. For many of the things that are conceded hinder greater goods, and therefore are not expedient, yet do not consign the user to servitude. But he who commits sin is the servant of sin. If therefore we wish to avoid this servitude, and not to be brought under the power of any, those things which are lawful from permission alone must be carefully shunned. But that not all things are expedient which are lawful according to concession he evidently shows when he adds: *Meat for the belly, and the belly for meats; but God shall destroy both it and them [n: (I Cor. VI)]*. Meats certainly were made for the refreshment of the belly, and are therefore lawful according to concession; yet it is not expedient to indulge them overmuch, and to omit more necessary pursuits. For what does too great an indulgence [0680B] in them avail, when it stands truly agreed that God shall destroy both it and them. But that not all things which are lawful according to permission are lawful according to concession, he shows subsequently when he immediately adds: *But the body is not for fornication, but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body [n: (ibid.)]*. Meats indeed are for eating, and the belly for using. But the body is not for fornicating, but for serving its own Lord. For that we can fornicate often when we will is not the indulgence of one conceding, but the testing, or the desertion, of one permitting. He had said above that fornicators shall not possess the kingdom of God; but because he foresaw that there would be many who would find this hard to believe, and who would not think the evil of fornication so [0680C] damnable, therefore he consequently shows in two things what we ought to think of this evil. For he shows how deep this kind of evil is, and how it is beyond all others inward. For by the work of fornication the members of Christ are taken away, and are made the members of a harlot. Hence one may see how deep this kind of evil is, which casts down from so great a height into this lowest and foul thing. Hear also how it is beyond all others inward: *Every sin,* he says, *whatsoever a man doth is without the body; but he that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body [n: (I Cor. VI)]*. But if we wish more fully to understand the rights of the apostolic judgment, we must raise our consideration higher. Man, as we commonly know, consists of a twofold substance, one [0680D] corporeal, the other incorporeal. The corporeal can die; the incorporeal cannot. The incorporeal can subsist without nourishment, but the corporeal cannot at all. But the corporeal substance, which cannot preserve its own nature of itself, can of itself restore and even multiply it — which the spiritual substance cannot do at all. You certainly see that the prerogative of the corporeal substance is one thing, the prerogative of the incorporeal substance another. The prerogative of the incorporeal substance is that it can subsist forever, and without support. The prerogative of the corporeal substance is that it can produce from its own substance a substance conformed to itself, and by sowing multiply the nature of its own kind. But this conformity of substance we cannot produce from ourselves without [0681A] a drawing away, so to speak, of our own substance. For the begetting of offspring does not take place without a certain cutting off from the begetter. In which this too is to be noted, that this cutting off of the parent for this work is not made, nor indeed can be made, from any member of the body whatever, but is drawn out from the inmost part and as it were from a certain treasury of its own kind placed in the inward parts, and stored away for that office. But although nothing more excellent seems to have been given to corporeal substance than this dowry of nature, it is nevertheless more glorious to cease from this office than to exercise it, in that after the corruption of nature it cannot be fulfilled without lust and foul delight. For that it is lawful to exercise this with one's own spouse, and only for the sake of begetting offspring — this very thing, if you attend well, is a matter of indulgence rather than of chastity. But there is in drink and food [0681B] no small delight, and yet it is not vicious, except for him for whom it has been excessive and passes into surfeit or drunkenness. But in surfeit and drunkenness there is a certain drawing away of another's substance. But in the work of lust there is a certain drawing away and cutting off of one's own substance. There indeed the exaction of viciousness is made upon another's body. But here upon one's own body, nay from the very inmost part of the body itself. Well therefore was it said of the rest, that every sin is without the body. But he who commits fornication sins not only in his own inmost part, but also against his very own body, since he seems to empty out his own body into the uses of foulness, and abuses the prerogative of a divine gift for filth both his own and another's.

## An Explanation of Certain Difficult Passages of the Apostle (cont.)

*If any man think that he knoweth anything, he hath not yet known [0681C] how he ought to know [n: (I Cor. VIII)]*. What, I ask, shall we say to these things? To say nothing of the rest, what are we to say of the Apostle himself? If the Apostle did not think that he knew anything, with what face did he busy himself with teaching the rest by preaching and by writing? And if he does not think that to be true which he declares from the words set down before, why, I ask, does he so steadfastly affirm that very thing? If he did not think that he knew anything, what is it that he set down above, when he says: But concerning those things that are sacrificed to idols, we know that we all have knowledge? But this very thing which he seems to say in this place he seems to contradict in what follows. But knowledge, he says, is not in all. How, I ask, do all have knowledge, if knowledge is not in all, and how can it be wanting to those who have it? [0681D] It must therefore be known that one knowledge is that which all have. Another is that which certain men do not have, but are able to have. But another is that which in this life no one has, nor is able to have. We all have knowledge — behold, of the first. Knowledge is not in all — behold, of the second. But to the third the Apostle looks in what he says: *But if any man think that he knoweth anything, he hath not yet known in what manner he ought to know [n: (Rom. II)]*. The knowledge of discerning between true and false, good and evil, just and unjust — although some more perfectly, others more imperfectly — we all nevertheless have in common: Jews, Greeks, barbarians and Latins. For if that knowledge were not common to the faithful and the unfaithful, in no way would the Apostle [0682A] have said: *For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these, having not the law, are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts [n: (ibid.)]*. Behold, of the knowledge which all have. But the knowledge which, with grace received, would suffice each man unto salvation, many do not have, and yet are still able to have. Of knowledge of this sort is understood what is rightly said by the Apostle: *But knowledge is not in all [n: (I Cor. VIII)]*. That he wished knowledge of this sort to be understood there is shown by what he had set down before. For, although there are those who are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, yet for us there is one God the Father, from whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things, and we through him. And to this end [0682B] we receive that knowledge which is common to all, that we may be able to seek and to find that which suffices unto salvation. But of this knowledge which is truly of salvation, some have more, others less; and it often happens that those who have less are saved, and those who have more perish. For the greatness of knowledge is for some the kindling of pride, and by that very fact the cause of ruin. This very thing he intimates who says: *Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me an angel Satan, a sting of my flesh, to buffet me [n: (II Cor. XII)]*. But no one who is in this life can fully know whether the knowledge he has, with grace received, can suffice him unto salvation. This is the knowledge which in this life no one has, no one is able to grasp: *Even if I shall be simple,* says [0682C] Job, *this very thing shall my soul be ignorant of [n: (Job IX)]*. To the same judgment runs what Solomon says: *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred [n: (Eccle. IX)]*. We have from his judgment that man is ignorant of what profits him in his life. We have according to the same: *That man knoweth not his own end, but as fishes are taken with the hook, and as birds are caught with the snare, so,* and so forth. [n: (Ibid.)] From these words, therefore, we understand for certain that we cannot have in this life the knowledge of sure security. If therefore, according to Solomon, all things are kept uncertain for the future, see what you ought to think of your own knowledge. Certainly, even if it seems something great as regards quantity, you do not know whether it be even a little thing, you do not know whether it be anything at all unto your profit. Of what sort, I ask, must that [0682D] estimation of a thing be called, of which you do not know, as far as concerns you, whether it be of some worth or of none. We ought therefore, so far as we can, to advance in knowledge, and yet, however much we shall have advanced, to reckon it as nothing, so long as we cannot have a sure judgment of its end. According to this consideration, therefore, what is said by the Apostle is rightly understood: *If any man think that he knoweth anything, he hath not yet known in what manner he ought to know.*

Every love is either only gratuitous, or only owed, or owed and gratuitous at once. And gratuitous love can be understood in two ways. We rightly call that love gratuitous which is according to grace alone. The fullness of true and highest love is [0683A] when it is so great and of such a kind that no greater or better can be. Where there is not the highest perfection, the highest love is not of avail, nor indeed ought it to be. That is according to grace alone which, at the good pleasure of the one bestowing it, can justly be bestowed or not bestowed. But from the divine excellence [0684A] whatever can be said to be according to grace alone is utterly foreign. Likewise love is not incongruously called gratuitous where to him who bestows all things nothing but love is rendered in return.