title: De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo

source_edition: Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 176, coll. 841B–846C

source_text:
## De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo

[0841B]Quaeris de voluntate Dei, et de voluntate hominis similiter. Christus Deus fuit, et ideo voluntas divina in illo fuit. Et quia etiam homo fuit, similiter voluntas humana in illo fuit. Non dico humanam quam culpa et vitium hominis facit, sed quam natura hominis requirit. Ergo in Christo divina voluntas fuit in quantum Christus Deus fuit; et similiter humana voluntas in ipso fuit in quantum ipse homo fuit. Humana autem voluntas tripliciter consideratur; secundum rationem, secundum pietatem, secundum carnem. Ergo in Christo voluntas fuit divinitatis et voluntas rationis, et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis. Voluntas divinitatis per justitiam sententiam dictabat; voluntas rationis per obedientiam, veritatem approbat; voluntas pietatis per compassionem [0841C] in malo alieno suspirabat; voluntas carnis per passionem in malo proprio murmurabat. Vide an non omnia haec in Christo. Ille leprosus qui sanitatem precabatur et majestatem confitebatur, potentiam voluntatis divinae confessus est, dicens: *Domine, si vis, potes me mundare [n: (Luc. V)]*. Et Dominus ut ejusdem voluntatis divinae et sententiam et potentiam ostenderet propter sententiam ait: *Volo,* propter potentiam subjunxit *mundare [n: (ibid.)]*. Hoc est exemplum voluntatis divinae in Christo. Propter voluntatem rationis, quae voluntati divinae per obedientiam subjiciebatur, dixit: *Spiritus quidem promptus est [n: (Matth. XXVI)]*. Propter voluntatem carnis, quae poenam horrendo per infirmitatem passioni [0841D] renitebatur dixit: *Caro autem infirma [n: (ibid.)]*. Spiritus promptus erat per voluntatem rationis dispositionem divinae voluntatis in passione carnis suae sequendo. Caro autem infirma, per naturalem providentiam qua malum suum odire acceperat, passioni renitendo. Secundum voluntatem itaque deitatis in dispositione praecedentem, et secundum voluntatem rationis divinam dispositionem approbantem et subsequentem Christus pati voluit. Secundum autem voluntatem carnis, secundum quam naturaliter in quantum homo fuit, eamdem carnem suam quia odio non habuit, pati noluit. Neque in hoc tamen divinae voluntati contrarius fuit; quia et hoc ipsum quod noluit eum nolle divinae voluntatis fuit.

[0842B]Erat adhuc alia voluntas in Christo, voluntas pietatis sive humanitatis. Nam ipsa pietas humanitas vocatur, et dicuntur humani qui pii sunt, et facile alienis miseriis compatiuntur. Proprium est enim humanitatis compati et moveri pietate in miseria aliena. Bestia pati potest, compati autem humanitatatis est proprium. Idcirco voluntas pietatis, voluntas humanitatis vocatur, quia hominis est pietate moveri. Et haec similiter secundum naturam humanitatis in Christo invenitur. Cum appropinquaret Jerusalem *videns civitatem flevit super eam [n: (Luc. XIX)]*. Quare flebat si non dolebat? Ergo noluit quod doluit. Quid doluit? perditionem. Si doluit de perditione illorum, noluit perditionem illorum. Quomodo noluit? Secundum voluntatem utique divinam quod [0842C] justum futurum erat, voluit. Secundum voluntatem rationis, justitiae consensit, et justitiam approbavit. Porro secundum voluntatem pietatis sine odio justitiae condoluit miseriae, quemadmodum secundum voluntatem carnis justitiam non accusabat, sed poenam recusabat. Unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat operabatur, et quod ad se pertinebat sequebatur. Voluntas divina justitiam, voluntas rationalis obedientiam, voluntas humanitatis misericordiam, voluntas carnis naturam. Neque alia alii contraria erat, sed unaquaeque quod suum erat appetiit, ut quamvis ad aliud esset, alii tamen contraria non esset. Hoc est ut licet ad aliud velle haberet, ad aliam tamen nolle non haberet. Sicut enim divinitati [0842D] natura erat justitiam non deserere, sic carni justum erat naturam servare; et pietati alienam miseriam non amare. Sic itaque in Christo voluntas fuit divinitatis, justitiam dictans; voluntas rationis, justitiam approbans; voluntas humanitatis, per quam nulli malum voluit; voluntas carnis, per quam sibi poenam noluit. Justum itaque carni erat, quod passionem suam noluit, quia hoc erat secundum naturam, et justum Deo erat, quod passionem illius voluit; quia hoc erat secundum justitiam. Neque enim idcirco caro noluit, quia Deus voluit, sicut et Deus idcirco non voluit, quia caro noluit. Similiter et pietas quod secundum affectum compassionis in poena vel perditione miserorum misericorditer noluit, nequaquam contra Deum id juste volentem noluit; [0843A] sed quod suum erat amavit misericordiam, et tamen quod suum non erat non improbavit justitiam. Sane sciendum quod id quod caro mortalis timore passionis uritur, et pietas amore compassionis passibiliter movetur, praesenti tantum vitae debitum est, in qua et malis compassio debetur, quandiu corrigi possunt; et bonis passio non tollitur quandiu meliores esse possunt. *Cum autem mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, et corruptibile hoc incorruptionem [n: (I Cor. XV)]*; tunc utique sicut carnem nec passio neque timor passionis ullius affliget; sic mens nullam ex compassione alieni doloris poenam suscipiet. Illic quippe et caro habebit contra passionem securitatem, et anima habebit in pietate puritatem. Securitas carnis erit ex impassibilitate, [0843B] puritas mentis ex veritate. Intellige quae dico. Pati et compati utrumque poena est. Pati datum est homini pro iniquitate; compati autem praeceptum est pro bonitate. Justum est enim et aequum coram Deo, ut qui patitur compatiatur, ut per passionem deleatur iniquitas, per compassionem exerceatur bonitas. Hoc siquidem ad bonitatem pertinet vitae mortalis, ut se in aliis conditioni suae accommodet, et alienae passionis per compassionem particeps efficiatur, ut sicut id quod patitur necessitatis est, ita id quod compatitur opus sit bonitatis. Ubi autem pati non erit, compati non erit. Non tamen quia crudelitas erit in poena aliena, sed quia cruciatus non inerit ex aliena miseria. Hic compati virtutis est; illic non compati, felicitatis. [0843C] Hic compateris voluntate, moveris pietate, condoles bonitate. Illic non compateris felicitate, non moveris aeternitate, non condoles impassibilitate. Sic itaque compati esse non potest, nisi illic tantum ubi pati esse potest, quoniam et ipsum compati, pati est. Sane qui illic pati non exuunt compati non deponunt; quia sicut pro sua iniquitate corruptibiliter patiuntur, ita pro aliena infelicitate secundum vitae mortalis affectum carnaliter compatiuntur. Hinc est quod dives ille in tormentis positus pro fratribus sollicitatur, ut ei ad miseriae cumulum accederet, quod eum in sua poena etiam aliena miseria cruciaret. Abraham autem etiam cruciatum vidit, et tamen sive compassionis dolore in certitudine felicitatis persistens [n: (Luc. XVI)], eum per justitiam [0843D] repulit dicens: *Fili, recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala [n: (ibid.)]*. Hinc est etiam quod Psalmista praevidens quemadmodum in illo aeternitatis gaudio corda justorum divinae justitiae per veritatis amorem immutabiliter inhaerentia, non aliud appetere vel approbare poterunt, nisi hoc solum quod secundum illam esse cognoscunt ait: *Introibo in potentiam Domini; Domine, memorabor justitiae tuae solius [n: (Psal. LXX)]*. In hac autem vita ubi ejusdem divinae justitiae sententiam perfecte nec scire nec praescire possumus, quaedam etiam quae secundum ipsam justa non sunt sine injustitia velle possumus; quia hoc solum ad nos pertinet ut ubi nescimus quid potius Deo placeat, hoc potissimum eligamus quod [0844A] pietati concordat. Ubi autem divinae justitiae sententia immutabiliter praefixa ostenditur, contra eam deinceps pietati locus non debetur. Quia si quid nos illic ex compassione tetigerit, vel ex vitio est affectui dominante, vel ex infirmitate corruptibilis naturae passioni resistere non valente. Triplex enim compassionis modus est. Est quippe compassio, alia ex vitio alia ex natura, alia ex virtute. Compassio ex vitio est quando affectus illic reprehensibili dolore tangitur, ubi illicito prius amore tenebatur. Compassio ex natura est quando ex insito sibi pietatis affectu animus alienis aerumnis condolet, quoties contra pietatis vel humanitatis mensuram naturam opprimi sive affligi videt. Compassio ex virtute est quando propter Deum alienis doloribus compatimur, [0844B] cum scilicet vel justitiam premi vel innocentiam affligi videmus. Compassio ex vitio, culpabilis est? compassio ex natura, irreprehensibilis; compassio ex virtute laudabilis, prima reprehenditur, tertia laudatur. Secunda autem nec culpam habet, quia ex natura est; nec praemium, quia ex virtute non est. In hac ergo vita quandiu caro mortalis laedi potest passione, tandiu etiam animus mutabilis tangi potest compassione. Ubi autem utrumque veraciter impassibile erit, tunc profecto neque passio carni, neque compassio menti ulla inesse poterit. Nunc ergo mutabilitate sua bene utrumque utitur, si et caro in passione patientiam non deserit, et animus in compassione justitiae mensuram non transcendit. Si igitur tempus compassionis quaeris, quandiu pati [0844C] possumus compati debemus. Si locum quaeris, illic compassionis miseria exhibenda est, ubi adhuc passionis misericordia desperanda non est.

## De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo (cont.)

David, aegrotante filio, lacrymas fudit; mortuo faciem lavit [n: (II Reg. XII)], ut ostenderet quod tandiu compassionis miseria portanda est quandiu passionis misericordia desperanda non est. Est tamen quidam compassionis affectus qui naturam etiam perditam miseratione prosequitur, secundum quem in nostri generis similitudine sicut culpae non corrigendae irascimur ita naturae non exstinguendae miseremur. Nunc autem vita mortalis et mutabilitati subdita, interim pro parte miseriae sustinet; sed postea ad incorruptionem translata deponet. Nunc [0844D] infirma in utroque et passione videlicet in carne, et compassione in mente, tunc in utroque sanabitur, ut per immortalitatem carnis contra passionem, et per immutabilitatem mentis contra compassionem confirmetur. Sicut enim aegritudo carnis est pati, ita aegritudo mentis est compati. Propterea Deus homo, qui utrumque tollere venit utrumque toleravit. Suscepit passionem in carne; suscepit compassionem in mente. In utroque aegrotare voluit propter nos, ut in utroque nos aegrotantes sanaret. Infirmatus est passione in poena sua; infirmatus est compassione in miseria aliena. Eousque passionem sustinuit, ut pro morituris moreretur, eousque compassionem suscepit, ut pro perituris lacrymaretur. Propter miseriam carnem suam tradidit ad passionem, [0845A] propter misericordiam animam suam turbavit ad compassionem. In carne sua doluit pro nobis patiendo, in mente sua condoluit nobis compatiendo, et quemadmodum carnis infirmitas in ipso secundum affectum naturae noluit poenam suam, sic mentis pietas secundum affectum misericordiae noluit miseriam alienam. Sicut enim calicem passionis secundum carnis voluntatem a se transferri postulabat, quem non transferendum praesciebat, sic sententiam condemnationis secundum pietatem aliis mitigari orabat, quam immutabiliter praevidebat. Pietas enim quod suum erat operabatur miserando, et ratio quod suum erat sequebatur divinae dispositioni obediendo. Propterea nihil contrarietatis erat. Si Christus homo secundum affectum pietatis quam [0845B] in humanitate sua assumpserat, aliquid volebat quod tamen secundum voluntatem divinam in qua cum Patre omnia disponebat futurum non esse praesciebat; quia et hoc ad veram humanitatem pertinebat, ut pietate moveretur, et hoc ad veram divinitatem pertinebat, ut a sua dispositione non moveretur. Itaque secundum utrumque fecit quod debuit. Neque ideo sibi contrarius fuit si secundum pietatem humanitati congruam voluit, quod secundum justitiam divinitati debitam noluit; quia et hoc velle, et illud nolle utrumque voluit. Scriptum est: *Jesus* autem *infremuit spiritu et turbavit semetipsum [n: (Joan. XI)]*. Hic intendite: *Turbavit semetipsum [n: (ibid.)]*. Quomodo turbavit? Quae fuit ista turbatio qua semetipsum turbavit [0845C] Jesus? Pietas ipsa, miseratio ipsa fuit turbatio. Bona turbatio, bene turbabatur qui pietate movebatur? Turbavit seipsum. Miseratio turbavit eum, et ipse semetipsum turbavit, qui miserationem sponte [0846A] suscepit. Sicut tradidit semetipsum, quando Judas tradidit eum: sic turbavit semetipsum quando miseratio turbavit eum. Notum est hoc et frequenti usu probatum. Dicitur homini quando aliquid patitur: Tu teipsum turbasti; tu tibi fecisti malum hoc. Sic Jesus semetipsum turbavit, quando miseratio turbavit eum quam sponte susceperat; et semetipsum tradidit, quando ille tradidit cui ad tradendum potestatem concesserat. Sic itaque Jesus in humanitate assumpta quandiu eam passibilem portare voluit secundum proprietatem humanitatis et passionem in carne et compassionem in mente portavit. In qua tamen modo ad immutabilitatem translata nec pati potest ad corruptionem, nec compati ad turbationem. Quoniam Christum secundum [0846B] hominem novimus et patientem et compatientem novimus [n: (II Cor. V)]. *Defecerunt,* inquit, *sicut fumus dies mei, et ossa mea sicut cremium aruerunt [n: (Psal. CI)]*. Dies defecerunt propter passionem; ossa aruerunt propter compassionem, propter passionem mortua est caro, propter compassionem arefacta est anima. Dolor compassionis quasi frixura quaedam animae fuit, qua urebatur miseratione, premebatur compassione, siccabatur desperatione; desperatione dico non propter se, sed propter illos, qui nec in malo corrigendi, neque a malo erant liberandi. In his omnibus Christum secundum carnem novimus quando veram humanitatem et in vera humanitate veram portavit mortalitatem [n: (II Cor. V)]. Nunc autem eam secundum carnem non novimus, postquam [0846C] *resurgens a mortuis jam non moritur, mors illi ultra non dominabitur. Quod autem vivit, vivit Deo [n: (Rom. VI)]*.

english:
## On the Four Wills in Christ

[0841B]You ask concerning the will of God, and likewise concerning the will of man. Christ was God, and therefore the divine will was in him. And because he was also man, likewise the human will was in him. I do not mean the human will which the fault and vice of man makes, but that which the nature of man requires. Therefore in Christ there was a divine will inasmuch as Christ was God; and likewise a human will was in him inasmuch as he was man. But the human will is considered in three ways: according to reason, according to piety, according to the flesh. Therefore in Christ there was a will of the divinity, and a will of reason, and a will of piety, and a will of the flesh. The will of the divinity dictated the sentence through justice; the will of reason approved the truth through obedience; the will of piety sighed through compassion [0841C] at another's ill; the will of the flesh murmured through suffering at its own ill. See whether all these were not in Christ. That leper who prayed for health and confessed the majesty confessed the power of the divine will, saying: *Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean [n: (Luc. V)]*. And the Lord, that he might show both the sentence and the power of the same divine will, for the sentence said: *I will,* and for the power added *be made clean [n: (ibid.)]*. This is an example of the divine will in Christ. On account of the will of reason, which was subjected to the divine will through obedience, he said: *The spirit indeed is willing [n: (Matth. XXVI)]*. On account of the will of the flesh, which, dreading the penalty, struggled against suffering through weakness, [0841D] he said: *But the flesh is weak [n: (ibid.)]*. The spirit was willing through the will of reason, by following the disposition of the divine will in the suffering of his flesh. But the flesh was weak, by the natural providence whereby it had received to hate its own ill, by struggling against suffering. And so, according to the will of the deity going before in disposition, and according to the will of reason approving and following upon the divine disposition, Christ willed to suffer. But according to the will of the flesh, according to which naturally, inasmuch as he was man, he did not hold his own flesh in hatred, he willed not to suffer. Nor yet in this was he contrary to the divine will; because this very thing — that he willed it not — his very not-willing was of the divine will.

[0842B]There was yet another will in Christ, the will of piety or of humanity. For piety itself is called humanity, and those are called humane who are compassionate, and who readily have compassion on others' miseries. For it is proper to humanity to have compassion and to be moved with piety at another's misery. A beast can suffer, but to have compassion is proper to humanity. Therefore the will of piety is called the will of humanity, because it belongs to man to be moved with piety. And this likewise is found in Christ according to the nature of his humanity. When he drew near to Jerusalem, *seeing the city he wept over it [n: (Luc. XIX)]*. Why did he weep, if he did not grieve? Therefore he willed not that which he grieved over. What did he grieve over? Their destruction. If he grieved over their destruction, he willed not their destruction. How did he not will it? According to the divine will, assuredly, he willed that which [0842C] was to be just. According to the will of reason, he consented to justice, and approved justice. Further, according to the will of piety, without hatred of justice, he grieved together with their misery, just as, according to the will of the flesh, he did not accuse justice, but refused the penalty. Each will wrought what was its own, and followed what pertained to itself. The divine will followed justice, the rational will obedience, the will of humanity mercy, the will of the flesh nature. Nor was one contrary to another, but each sought what was its own, so that although it tended to one thing, it was nevertheless not contrary to another. That is, so that although it had a willing toward one thing, it did not have a not-willing toward the other. For just as it was natural to the divinity [0842D] not to forsake justice, so it was just for the flesh to preserve nature; and for piety not to love another's misery. And so in Christ there was a will of the divinity, dictating justice; a will of reason, approving justice; a will of humanity, through which he willed evil to no one; a will of the flesh, through which he willed not the penalty for himself. And so it was just for the flesh that he willed not his own suffering, because this was according to nature; and it was just for God that he willed his suffering, because this was according to justice. For the flesh did not refuse because God willed, just as God likewise did not will because the flesh refused. Likewise piety too, in that according to the affection of compassion it mercifully willed not the penalty or destruction of the wretched, in no way willed it against God, who justly willed it; [0843A] but it loved what was its own, mercy, and yet did not disapprove what was not its own, justice. Indeed it must be known that the fact that the mortal flesh is scorched with the fear of suffering, and that piety is moved with a passible movement by the love of compassion, is owed only to the present life, in which compassion is owed even to the evil, so long as they can be corrected; and suffering is not taken away from the good, so long as they can become better. *But when this mortal shall have put on immortality, and this corruptible incorruption [n: (I Cor. XV)]*, then assuredly, just as neither suffering nor the fear of any suffering shall afflict the flesh, so the mind shall take no penalty from compassion of another's grief. For there the flesh will have security against suffering, and the soul will have purity in piety. The security of the flesh will be from impassibility, [0843B] the purity of the mind from truth. Understand what I say. To suffer and to have compassion are both a penalty. To suffer was given to man for iniquity; but to have compassion was commanded for goodness. For it is just and equitable before God that he who suffers should have compassion, that through suffering iniquity may be blotted out, and through compassion goodness may be exercised. For this pertains to the goodness of mortal life: that one accommodate himself in others to his own condition, and be made a partaker of another's suffering through compassion, so that, as that which one suffers is of necessity, so that which one compassionates may be a work of goodness. But where there will be no suffering, there will be no compassion. Not, however, because there will be cruelty at another's penalty, but because there will be no torment arising from another's misery. Here to have compassion belongs to virtue; there not to have compassion belongs to happiness. [0843C] Here you have compassion by will, you are moved by piety, you grieve together by goodness. There you have no compassion by reason of happiness, you are not moved by reason of eternity, you grieve not together by reason of impassibility. And so compassion cannot be, save only there where suffering can be, since compassion itself too is a suffering. Indeed, those who there do not put off suffering do not lay aside compassion; because, just as for their own iniquity they suffer corruptibly, so for another's unhappiness they have compassion carnally, according to the affection of mortal life. Hence it is that that rich man, set in torments, is anxious for his brothers, so that it added to the heap of his misery that in his own penalty another's misery too tormented him. But Abraham saw him even tormented, and yet, persisting without any grief of compassion in the certitude of happiness [n: (Luc. XVI)], repulsed him through justice, [0843D] saying: *Son, thou hast received good things in thy life, and Lazarus likewise evil [n: (ibid.)]*. Hence it is also that the Psalmist, foreseeing how in that joy of eternity the hearts of the just, immutably cleaving to the divine justice through the love of truth, will be able to seek or approve nothing else, save only this which they know to be according to it, says: *I will enter into the power of the Lord; O Lord, I will be mindful of thy justice alone [n: (Psal. LXX)]*. But in this life, where we can neither perfectly know nor foreknow the sentence of that same divine justice, we can, without injustice, will even certain things which according to it are not just; because this alone pertains to us: that where we do not know what may rather please God, we should above all choose that which [0844A] accords with piety. But where the sentence of divine justice is shown to be immutably fixed beforehand, thereafter no place is owed to piety against it. Because if anything there should touch us out of compassion, it is either from a vice, the affection being dominant, or from the weakness of a corruptible nature unable to resist passion. For there is a threefold mode of compassion. For there is compassion: one from vice, another from nature, another from virtue. Compassion from vice is when the affection is touched with a reprehensible grief there where it was formerly held by an unlawful love. Compassion from nature is when, from an affection of piety implanted in it, the mind grieves together with another's afflictions, as often as it sees nature oppressed or afflicted beyond the measure of piety or humanity. Compassion from virtue is when for God's sake we have compassion on another's griefs, [0844B] namely when we see either justice pressed down or innocence afflicted. Compassion from vice is culpable? compassion from nature is irreprehensible; compassion from virtue is praiseworthy: the first is reprehended, the third is praised. But the second has neither fault, because it is from nature, nor reward, because it is not from virtue. In this life, therefore, so long as the mortal flesh can be hurt by suffering, so long too can the mutable soul be touched by compassion. But where both will be truly impassible, then assuredly neither any suffering can be present to the flesh, nor any compassion to the mind. Now, therefore, each uses its mutability well, if both the flesh in suffering does not forsake patience, and the soul in compassion does not overstep the measure of justice. If, therefore, you seek the time of compassion: so long as we can suffer, [0844C] we ought to have compassion. If you seek the place: there the misery of compassion is to be exhibited, where the mercy of suffering is not yet to be despaired of.

## On the Four Wills in Christ (cont.)

David, when his son was sick, poured out tears; when he was dead, he washed his face [n: (II Reg. XII)], to show that the misery of compassion is to be borne so long as the mercy of suffering is not to be despaired of. There is, however, a certain affection of compassion which pursues with commiseration even a nature that is lost, according to which, in the likeness of our own kind, just as we are angry at a fault not to be corrected, so we have pity on a nature not to be extinguished. But now mortal life, subject to mutability, for the meanwhile bears its share of misery; but afterward, translated to incorruption, it will lay it aside. Now [0844D] weak in both — namely in suffering in the flesh, and in compassion in the mind — then in both it will be healed, so that it may be strengthened against suffering through the immortality of the flesh, and against compassion through the immutability of the mind. For just as the sickness of the flesh is to suffer, so the sickness of the mind is to have compassion. Therefore the God-man, who came to take away both, endured both. He took up suffering in the flesh; he took up compassion in the mind. In both he willed to be sick for our sake, that in both he might heal us who were sick. He was made weak by suffering in his own penalty; he was made weak by compassion in another's misery. So far did he bear suffering, that he died for those about to die; so far did he take up compassion, that he wept for those about to perish. On account of misery he delivered his flesh to suffering; [0845A] on account of mercy he troubled his soul to compassion. In his flesh he grieved for us by suffering, in his mind he grieved together with us by having compassion; and just as the weakness of the flesh in him, according to the affection of nature, willed not its own penalty, so the piety of the mind, according to the affection of mercy, willed not another's misery. For just as, according to the will of the flesh, he asked that the cup of suffering be carried away from him, which he foreknew was not to be carried away, so, according to piety, he prayed that the sentence of condemnation be mitigated for others, which he immutably foresaw. For piety wrought what was its own by showing mercy, and reason followed what was its own by obeying the divine disposition. Therefore there was nothing of contrariety. If Christ as man, according to the affection of piety which [0845B] he had assumed in his humanity, willed something which nevertheless, according to the divine will in which he disposed all things with the Father, he foreknew was not going to be; because both this pertained to true humanity, that he should be moved with piety, and this pertained to true divinity, that he should not be moved from his own disposition. And so according to both he did what he ought. Nor for that reason was he contrary to himself, if according to piety befitting his humanity he willed what according to justice due to his divinity he willed not; because both this willing and that not-willing he willed, both of them. It is written: *Jesus* however *groaned in spirit and troubled himself [n: (Joan. XI)]*. Here give heed: *He troubled himself [n: (ibid.)]*. How did he trouble himself? What was that trouble wherewith Jesus troubled [0845C] himself? Piety itself, commiseration itself was the trouble. A good trouble: was he well troubled who was moved with piety? He troubled himself. Commiseration troubled him, and he himself troubled himself, who of his own accord took up [0846A] commiseration. Just as he delivered himself up, when Judas delivered him, so he troubled himself, when commiseration troubled him. This is well known and proved by frequent usage. It is said to a man when he suffers something: You have troubled yourself; you have done this evil to yourself. So Jesus troubled himself, when commiseration, which he had of his own accord taken up, troubled him; and he delivered himself up, when that man delivered him up to whom he had granted the power to deliver him. And so Jesus, in the assumed humanity, so long as he willed to bear it as passible, bore, according to the property of humanity, both suffering in the flesh and compassion in the mind. In which, however, now translated to immutability, he can neither suffer unto corruption, nor have compassion unto trouble. Since we have known Christ according to [0846B] the man, we have known him both as suffering and as compassionating [n: (II Cor. V)]. *My days,* he says, *have failed like smoke, and my bones have dried up like a dry stick [n: (Psal. CI)]*. The days failed on account of suffering; the bones dried up on account of compassion; on account of suffering the flesh died, on account of compassion the soul was dried up. The grief of compassion was like a kind of frying of the soul, whereby it was burned with commiseration, pressed with compassion, dried with desperation — desperation, I say, not on its own account, but on account of those who were neither to be corrected in their evil, nor to be freed from evil. In all these things we have known Christ according to the flesh, when he bore a true humanity, and in true humanity a true mortality [n: (II Cor. V)]. But now we no longer know it according to the flesh, after that [0846C] *rising from the dead he dies no more; death shall no longer have dominion over him. But in that he lives, he lives unto God [n: (Rom. VI)]*.