Dialogi de processione Spiritus Sancti (dial. I + fragments II–VI)
by Nicetas of Maroneia
Source text: Public Domain. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://migne.app/pg/139/dialogi-de-processione-spiritus-sancti/
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[0169] PROEM. The aim of the discourse is an inquiry and joint examination concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, and a resolution of the ambiguity between us and the Latins over this question, looking toward the removal of the estrangement between the two that has arisen from it. Its character is dialogic, befitting the fine-grained treatment of questions that require more exact joint consideration, and most fitted of all to the joint examination of ecclesiastical doctrines, and for the finding of the truth most useful and most necessary to those who have no wish to wrangle; wherefore some of the great teachers also made use of this form of discourse. The persons of the dialogue are the Latin and the Greek; and the speech of each of the two is fashioned equally poised and equally matched: partly on account of the underlying subject matter, since the question has never before been examined and decided synodically, and hence has no small force on either side; and partly [0172] because it belongs to the character of the Latin not to endure seeming to have the weaker argument, but to yearn, as it were, to conquer, and where victory is not easy for him, to carry his neck high even so, as one exulting in his speech; and because he is lavish in ambitiously displaying his prowess in argument, lest he seem to fall short of the Greek in wisdom; and partly because the Greek in his turn, for a display of modesty, willingly yields on many points, ordering his words with the more equitable judgment and discernment, and showing that his discourse is not aimed at strife, but that his zeal is for truth; and he imitates those skilled in the wrestling-schools, who have often defeated their opponents by feigning to sink at the knees and to be on the very point of falling, and, by pretending to be entangled, have rather entangled and thrown them.

Yet at the first each sets out his own principles: and the Greek attempts to lead the Latin's argument into absurdity, and through many seeming absurdities undertakes to show that his opinion is absurd; while the other hastens to dissolve the absurdities, and shows either that the things alleged are not absurd, or that they do not follow from his own doctrine. Then both plunge into the picturing of the matter through examples; for this manner of discourse too is customary with the theologians: and the one from images and analogy points toward the things of the Spirit's procession; the other finds fault with some of the images and sets against them others supposedly more apposite; and the Latin in his turn imitates the Greek, and finds fault with some, and shows his own rather to be the more natural. Upon this they make their discourse still more aporetic, and pose difficulties to one another in return, being unable to resolve the impasses, and showing that the difficulties on either side arise not through any absurdity or implausibility or impossibility in the problem (for then they would not arise on both sides), but through the surpassing nature of the thing theologized; and at the last they grapple with one another through testimonies, the one bringing forward these and the other those, as though they were in conflict, and they present the contrary voices of the holy teachers as the cause of their strife and estrangement from one another. Then they bring the testimonies into accord; and so they too themselves, as now minding one and the same thing, are thereafter persuaded each by the other: the one having learned from the holy Fathers that it must of necessity be that "from the Son" no longer be pronounced with the holy creed; the other persuaded no longer to call him heterodox, since the preposition ἐξ among the Latins and the διά among us holds no difference in respect of the Son.

[0173] [ed: The plate here carries a centered heading across both columns — ΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ, "First Discourse" (the Latin column: DIALOGUS PRIMUS) — which our Greek source omits.]

1. GR. Come then, O Latin: casting far from ourselves the contentious and quarrelsome spirit as a hindrance to the finding of the truth, let us take counsel together, with the Holy Spirit, upon the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit, over which we are also divided. For it is needful, if we would be true worshippers and adorers of the Holy Spirit, both in all other things to call upon the Holy Spirit itself and to have it as guide toward the finding and grasping of the truth, and most of all in the discourses that concern this very One — both because the difficulty is greater in inquiries concerning God, and the Spirit is true God, worshipped together with Father and Son as of one nature with them and glorified with them; and because, knowing the things that are its own — itself, and it alone, with Father and Son — and searching the depths of God, it knows how to unveil them to whom, and when, and in what measure is needful. But this shall not be for those who choose to gainsay contentiously; for far from contentious gainsayings is the illumination that comes from the Spirit.

LAT. Come, O Greek — in love of truth, which is the same as to say, in love of God; for God is true, and God is truth, and from God is the truth for all. For I long for the inquiry into these things, and have long been in travail with this joint examination. And may the Paraclete come to us, the Spirit of truth, and prosper the discourse, turning the crooked into straight, as an upright Spirit being renewed in the inward parts of the faithful and filling up the wanting ravines of knowledge, and making the rough ways smooth for us.

GR. Common now to us both is the prayer, and one the aim: the seeking and finding of the truth in the consideration set before us. It remains to begin the undertaking.

LAT. But first let us treat briefly, as in a preliminary survey, of the things held and spoken as doctrine among us concerning the holy Trinity; for these will perhaps carry no small weight toward the prospering of the discourse, and the more so if they should be confessed by us in common; for in this way both what accords with our common confessions and what is discordant will be the more easily discerned in the discourses that follow. For what is said must agree with the principles; and what agrees, this [0176] is to be reckoned genuine, but what is discordant, to be dismissed as spurious and contrary.

GR. You say well; for this belongs to the best order, and contributes not a little to the discernment of the truth. For what follows from true principles and premises is assuredly itself also true; but what conflicts with them and opposes them is, on the contrary, false. And so let it be done.

2. LAT. Tell me, then: do you say that there are certain essential and natural things in the Trinity?

GR. I do; for there are both essence and nature, even though its being is above essence and nature.

LAT. And do you hold essence and nature to be the same, or different?

GR. The same altogether; for so the holy Fathers teach.

LAT. And what then? Do you not say that certain hypostatic and personal things also exist in the Trinity?

GR. These too I affirm; for there are both hypostases and persons, even though the holy Trinity is nameless and beyond name; for above every thing and every thought and every name is the existence above all existence of the super-divine Godhead — or, to speak more properly, super-existence; yet nonetheless the one and selfsame and unvarying Godhead of the holy Trinity is called both essence and nature; and again, the Father and the Son and the Spirit are hypostases and persons of the Godhead.

LAT. And do you say that these and those are the same, or different?

GR. Which do you mean? Say on.

LAT. Are essence and hypostasis the same, or different? And are nature and person the same, or not the same?

GR. Nature is one thing beside person, and essence another beside hypostasis. For so it has seemed good, even if sometimes among some men essence — that is to say, nature — and hypostasis, being different names, are taken one for the other, that is, of one and the same thing. But hypostasis and person are the same, just as again essence and nature are the same. And consequently with these, the things called essential and natural are the same, while other beside these are the hypostatic and personal, these too being the same as each other. For the essential and natural are one set of things and the hypostatic and personal another, even if neither are the essential and natural apart from the hypostatic and personal, nor these apart from those. For indeed essence and nature are, as I said, one thing beside hypostasis and person, but neither of them is apart from the others; for neither is essence without hypostasis, nor hypostasis without essence.

[0177] LAT. Next, what do you take these to be — I mean essence and nature, or the essential and natural things — and what the others, hypostasis and person, or the hypostatic and personal things?

GR. What is common and one and the same to Father and Son and Spirit, this I hold to be essence and nature; and the things that belong to these in common and unitedly and identically, essential and natural; but each of the three, hypostasis and person; and whatever is proper to each single one, this hypostatic and personal.

LAT. Perhaps you say these things well; only make plain by examples too what you have said.

GR. The supernatural and superessential Godhead we are accustomed to call the nature of the holy Trinity, one and the same, and an essence both simple and unvarying, holding itself the same and in the same way in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit. But natural and essential — even if, strictly, those things are so called which belong to some subjects according to essence, yet now in the case of the Trinity we so call, catachrestically, the things contemplated about the essence in common and identically and undividedly, since the things that are according to essence have altogether the hidden and the unknowable, and are nameless and above name. For to us both the knowledge of God and the naming of him, and every name and every thought, comes not from the things according to him, but from the things about him.

We say, then, that these are natural and essential in the case of the holy Trinity: the supergood and all-good goodness; the superpowerful and all-powerful power; the superwise and all-wise wisdom; the all-working, the creative, the demiurgic, the providential, the sustaining of all creation; the everlasting; the timeless and above time; the eternal and above the age; that which is without beginning in respect of time; the uncreated; the ingenerate (written with a single ν); the unending; the incomprehensible; the ungraspable; the uncircumscribed; the invisible; the infinite; that which is above all sense-perception and all thought — simply, all things whatsoever that are common and the same to Father and Son and Holy Spirit we call essential and natural, not strictly, as belonging to them according to essence, but catachrestically, as contemplated about the essence in common and identically and undividedly.

And hypostasis and person we call each of the three, the Father, the Son, the Spirit; and hypostatic and personal, the things that belong distinctively to each of these: paternity, sonship, the property of the Holy Spirit — according to which, namely, the Spirit is named proceeding; the unbegotten (written with two ν), the begotten likewise, and the proceeding; unbegottenness, generation, and procession. And these do not shift about, but each is the characteristic property and mark of each hypostasis, unmovably and unalterably: of the Father, unbegottenness, because he is not from anyone, and it is neither the Son's nor the Spirit's; of the Son, generation, and it is neither the Father's nor the Spirit's — for he alone is begotten from the Father, wherefore also Only-begotten; [0180] of the Spirit, procession, and it is neither the Father's nor the Son's; for the Spirit alone is proceeding.

3. LAT. What then? Since the Father is unbegotten, because he is not from anyone, and this is proper to him, shall nothing on that account be from him either?

GR. Truly the Father is both unbegotten and not from anyone; but from him have come forth the Son and the Spirit.

LAT. And what then? Since there is a certain going-forth from him, is this one in mode and without difference?

GR. It is not. For the mode of the going-forth is different, and is manifestative of different persons. For one is the mode of the going-forth according to which the Son is from him, and it is called generation; and another the mode according to which the Spirit is said to come forth from him, and this is called procession. But both are according to essence — not that they introduce a difference of essence, far from it, but because from the essence of the Father is both the Son, yet by way of begetting, and the Spirit, yet by way of procession, and not from outside, out of that which is not, as the creatures are. And the Father is said to beget the Son, but to put forth or to send forth the Spirit, or I know not how I shall say it more fittingly. And each mode has obtained its own name, which the Holy Spirit appointed; but to us it is unknown and incomprehensible; and that the one is this and the other that, we know from the things said differently about each. But what and of what sort each is, and what the difference is, is known to the Trinity alone; for nothing further concerning these things has been disclosed to us out of the divine oracles. Or do you not yourself say so too?

LAT. I do say so; for in these things I am of one mind with you and of the same opinion. But now let us enter upon what is in doubt and under inquiry, and about which the difference between us lies, and on account of which perhaps we are also divided. Let this, then, be inquired: whether one must say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or also from the Son.

GR. That, namely, which the Holy Spirit itself unveiled through the divinely inspired Scriptures, and which the holy Fathers and teachers of the Church, initiated through the Holy Spirit into the doctrines of the evangelical and apostolic faith, handed down in their own divinely inspired teachings; and it is in nothing contrary in any way to right and pious reason, nor indeed does it have any absurdity following upon it.

LAT. But tell me at least one thing, that I too may know.

[0181] 4. GR. If the Spirit that proceeds from the Father proceeds also from the Son, the things pertaining to the properties are confounded — either as passing over from one hypostasis into another, or as the same hypostasis taking on one property from another; which is not far from the opinion of Sabellius. For if the Father and the Son are one and the same according to Sabellius, it follows altogether that the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceeds also from the Son; and perhaps even from itself.

LAT. But among us the paltry opinion of Sabellius has no place; for neither do we confound the hypostases and the persons, nor do we transpose the properties, nor do we transfer the one and the same hypostasis into one property and another; nor do we hold the three to be one person, or one hypostasis to be three-personed; but we say that the hypostases of the Godhead are three, and we keep each hypostasis in its unmoved property. For we lay it down that the unbegotten is proper to the Father, the begotten to the Son, and the proceeding to the Holy Spirit. But just as of the Father there is not the unbegotten only, but also the generative and the putting-forth, that is, *προεκτικόν*, if one must so speak, so also of the Son there is not the begotten only, but also the putting-forth; and of the Spirit, the proceeding indeed, yet not simply, but thus from the Father and thus from the Son — that is, immediately from the Son, but mediately from the Father, because from the Father indeed through the Son, but from the Son through no other.

For the Father, being unbegotten, begets the Son; and in begetting the Son, through the mediation of the Son he at the same time also puts forth the Spirit; and the Son, being begotten, also puts forth the Spirit; and the Spirit again, proceeding mediately from the Father — inasmuch as the Son mediates in the procession — at the same time proceeds also from the Son, no longer through any other mediating. So that we lay down as proper to the Father the unbegotten, the generative, and the mediately putting-forth: the unbegotten, because he is not from anyone; the generative, because he begets the Son; the mediately putting-forth, because through the mediation of the Son he puts forth the Spirit also. And to the Son, the begotten and the immediately putting-forth: the one because he himself is begotten from the Father, the other because immediately from himself he sends forth the Spirit, being himself intermediate between the Father and the Spirit. And to the Spirit, the proceeding mediately from the Father, and proceeding immediately also from the Son, inasmuch as the Son is contemplated between the Father and the Spirit, but between the Son and the Spirit no one, at least as regards the going-forth. And these are the properties of each of the three, holding untransposably and unmovably and unalterably [0184] and unchangeably.

As, then, it is not because the Father has not been begotten that he therefore neither begets nor puts forth — but both those things and these belong to him, and he is both unbegotten and also begetter and putter-forth, the one immediately from himself, the other mediately through the Son — so also the Son: it is not because he has been begotten that he therefore does not also put forth the Spirit. And the Spirit: it is not because it proceeds from the Father that it therefore does not also proceed of the Son; but its procession is immediate from the Son, and mediate from the Father. At all events the property is kept for each person unmoved and unconfounded; thus is the Trinity in a Monad, and undivided the Monad in a Trinity. For the Father and the Son and the Spirit are both a Monad and a Trinity: the one according to the nature of the Godhead, which is one and the same and undivided and unalterable; the other on account of the properties, which hold unmovably, as we said just above.

But the properties being kept unchangeable for each, the Spirit could not be said to proceed from itself, because this is not a property of the Spirit; but proceeding from the Father through the Son, it proceeds also from the Son, yet not through any other. And where is the confusion of Sabellius? For if we said, after him, that the Father and the Son, or the Spirit as well, are one, as one hypostasis or person, then in asserting that what proceeds from the Father proceeds also from the Son we should be of one mind with Sabellius, or altogether half-Sabellians, just as certain others are half-Arians. For in saying that the three are one hypostasis and one, thus after Sabellius, we should be making the Spirit proceed from the Father and from the Son no more than from itself; but also the Father as begetting and being begotten and proceeding, and each of these no more from another than from himself; and the Son not only as begotten but also as proceeding, and besides these as begetting too; and the Spirit again not only as proceeding, but also as begetting and being begotten. For such are the drivellings of Sabellius, who assigns to one and the same person different names and different properties.

And if we asserted that the Father and the Son alone are one person, and laid it down as doctrine that from this one the Spirit comes forth, in this way too we should be half-Sabellians, saying that what proceeds proceeds from the Father and from the Son. But as it is, we, holding the Father to be one hypostasis of the Godhead and the Son another — of the same nature, that is — and the Spirit likewise another, and then laying down that what proceeds from the Father proceeds also from the Son, say it otherwise.

Those, then, who say that the Father and the Son are one person, and then assert that the Spirit is proceeding from the Father and from the Son, have the absurdity following upon them: not because they say simply "from the Father and from the Son," but because they say it as of one from both; and because they lay down that both, the Father and the Son, are one, not according to the force of the Lord's utterance, but otherwise than as he says: I and the Father are one. But we, saying that the Spirit is both from the Father and from the Son, do not say this [0185] as from one, but as coming forth, of one nature, from two persons of one nature, in a certain manner unknown and unspeakable. To say, then, that the Spirit is from both as from one is impious, for it is Sabellian; but to say that it is from both, which have not their difference in essence nor their distinction in a doubleness of names, but in hypostatic properties, is far from the Sabellian impiety. So that, since such a doctrine is other than the opinion of Sabellius, do not account it Sabellian and to be cast away. But rather prove that the absurdity stands otherwise.

5. GR. Let these things be, and let it not be Sabellian to say that the procession of the all-holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; but that at any rate is absurd. For if it is from both, then the property of its hypostasis is henceforth composite and not simple, and the hypostasis is composite, because it proceeds both immediately and mediately, the one from the Father, the other from the Son. And thus the property of the Son too is found composite, having not only the being begotten from the Father, but also the putting forth of the Spirit from himself immediately, as being intermediate.

LAT. By this reasoning there would be composition in the Father also, and the more so, because he is not unbegotten only, but also begetter and putter-forth. But if in the Father's case these things did not introduce composition, neither then will those in the case of the Son and of the Spirit. Or what is this arbitrary allotment, that the Father is not composite out of the unbegotten and the generative and the putting-forth, while the Son is composite because of the begotten and the putting-forth, and the Spirit because of proceeding from two sources and in two ways — that is, from the Father and from the Son, mediately, namely, and immediately? And yet even if we grant each a simple property, by your reasoning in this way too, as you say, a doubleness will be brought in, and composition will follow, and each will be composite. For indeed in the Father there is both the essence of the Godhead and the property of begetting; and in the Son, together with the essence, there is also the property of being begotten; and in the Spirit, together with the same essence, the property of the procession. But there is no composition there, but simplicity above all simplicity, because these are parts of the Godhead [lat: the Latin column reads *quia nec partes Divinitatis ista sunt*, "because these are not parts of the Divinity"] (for it is partless above all partlessness), but properties contemplated about the one essence and about the hypostases of the one essence, and each of them characterizing each hypostasis.

Therefore neither when I say that the Spirit has its procession immediately and mediately, or that the Son is both begotten from the Father and puts forth the Spirit, do I bring in any doubleness and composition. For just as the different going-forth from the Father — as you too say — shows his relation to be different, [0188] the one toward the Son as of a Father, the other toward the Spirit as of one who puts forth according to a proper mode, and yet does not indicate the paternal hypostasis to be composite, so neither does the Spirit's proceeding from the Father and from the Son give one to conceive composition, either in the case of the Son or in the case of the Spirit. And yet in the Father's case the begetting and the putting forth are not the same, nor in the same way; whereas in the Spirit's case the proceeding is one and the same, even if from the one mediately — that is, from the Father through the Son — and from the other immediately, because from the Son, and no longer through any other.

The Son, then, is not composite, because he is not begotten only but also puts forth the Spirit; nor the Spirit, because it proceeds not from the Father alone but also from the Son; for neither is the Father, because he is not unbegotten only but also begetter of a Son, nor because he is not begetter only but also putter-forth of the Spirit. For indeed not even on the common opinion of ourselves and of you are the Son and the Spirit composite, because each of them has, together with the essence, the proper mark of its hypostasis — the one the begotten only, the other the proceeding from the Father.

For if each hypostasis were composite on account of its own properties, then the essence of the three hypostases would also be composite on account of the marks common to the three that are about it — the good, I mean, the wise, the powerful, the creative, the all-working, the demiurgic, the providential, the sustaining, the encompassing and comprehending of all things, the uncreated, the unoriginate, the immortal, the unending, the infinite, the eternal, the timeless, the above-time, and whatever else of this kind is said of God, whether by position or by abstraction, whether according to cause or according to eminence and transcendence. But these are not the essence, but things contemplated about the essence, even if they are somehow called essential and natural; nor are they parts of the essence, for the Godhead is partless. So too there belong to fire both lightness and upward tendency, and the illuminative and the combustive — different powers — yet fire is not on that account composite, but simple, so far as it can be in natural and elemental bodies, according to the last, so to speak, echo of simplicity. And yet here these things are essential to fire, whereas there some are contemplated about the essence, and others severally about each hypostasis; wherefore much more will the simplicity suffer no harm, neither that of the essence nor that of each of the hypostases.

Nor yet, in all cases in which some variety and distinction is contemplated, is composition thereupon also brought in. For every essence has both power and activity, even if it be a simple one, and we shall not on that account call the simple one composite in every case. For it must be either that the simple too is composite — and then none will be simple — or that the simple is without activity and power, which is plainly false. For neither is there activity apart from the power out of which it comes forth, nor power without the essence, nor indeed essence apart from the power of acting. But if these things are impossible, then the absolutely simplest essence too exists together with the power inherent in it, [0189] having also the activity that comes forth from the power. And for these reasons there is no composition about it, in that about the same and one thing, the essence, the power is one thing and the activity another; and in that one and the same thing is out of essence and power and activity, if one must so speak; and in that the power is distinguished from the essence in account, and the activity from the power. For thus too the essence is one and simple.

How could anyone dare to say, of the truly simple and uncomposite nature — that is, of each of the unitary hypostases of the super-divine Godhead — that composition is introduced out of the natural or hypostatic properties? What is simpler than the monad among numbers? And yet its being is one thing, its power another, and its activity another. For it makes all things the same and keeps them unaltered; yet it slips into well-nigh infinite relations, being added and subtracted and generating all the species of numbers: now becoming the half and the subduple, now a third and the subtriple, now a fourth and the subquadruple [lat: the Latin column gives *dimidium et duplum … tertium et triplum … quartum et quadruplum*, "the half and the double … a third and the triple … a fourth and the quadruple" — the reciprocals of the Greek's ὑπο- compounds], and at another time something else, and all of them in the same respect, and this to infinity; now conceived as figureless, now as figured, and at one time triangular, at another square, at another pentagonal, and one thing and another and all at once, and this to infinity; and now plane, now solid; and now without relation, now having relation, and that in manifold ways. And though it appears manifold on account of its powers and its activities, it is nevertheless most simple, and this very variety does not harm the simplicity of the essence — I mean the essence that belongs to it. For what being is to each thing, this is also its essence.

If, then, among things at our own level the things contemplated about each simple thing do not bring in doubleness and composition, much more is no doubleness and no composition brought in, among the hypostases of the divine principle, out of the interweaving of certain properties. Neither, then, is the Son composite, if he is not only begotten from the Father but also putter-forth of the Spirit; nor the Spirit, if it proceeds not from the Father only but also from the Son. For neither indeed is the Father, being unbegotten and begetter of the Son and putter-forth of the Spirit. For just as the unbegotten and the begotten and the proceeding, contemplated simply, are different hypostatic properties, each of the three marked off to each of the three persons, and yet do not divide their one nature, so also, even if the properties about each of the three hypostases be more than one, not even so do they cut or divide any hypostasis of them, nor indeed do they show any of them to be composite.

And as the Father is not divisible because from him are the Son and the Spirit (for these are not parts of the Father, nor is the going-forth of each of them known by way of any cutting or flowing), so neither is the Spirit divisible because it is from Father and Son; nor does it have the one part from the Father and the other from the Son, but the simple and one thing which it is, is from the Father and from the Son: partless from the partless, and simple from the simple. And if you say, How? — the mode is unutterable [0192] and inexpressible.

for it is beyond the how. Or tell me: how does the Father beget the Son? How does the Spirit proceed from the Father? What is the difference between these? And I too will tell you how it proceeds from the Father and from the Son. But if you wish, learn this: that it is from the Father not as from the Son, and from the Son not as from the Father. For from the Father the procession is mediate (for it is through the Son), but from the Son immediate, because no longer through any other. Thus, then, there is no composition either about the Son or about the Spirit, even if the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceed also from the Son; and neither has this absurdity, as you yourself said, followed upon the doctrine.

6. GR. But if it proceeds from the Father and from the Son, as you say, its procession will be double. And if the procession is double, that which proceeds is also double. But the double is not simple; therefore the Spirit is not simple, according to you. But what is not simple is composite and divisible; and what is such is not God. But the Spirit is God; therefore it is not double. And if it is not double, nor composite, neither is the procession double; and if the procession is not double, there will not be one from the Father and another from the Son, but either from the Father or from the Son. And since it is from the Father (for this is what both the Fathers and the Gospel say), it remains that it is not from the Son.

LAT. Not even so does your argument carry necessity, most wise Greek. For in the first place we do not say that the procession is double, but one and the same and simple, the Spirit also being simple as God; for there is no doubleness or composition in God. For it is not double because it is from two, but simple because that which proceeds is simple — the same procession having one relation and another in the same respect, and being mediate as from the Father, immediate as from the Son. For just as the flashing forth of light in the air, coming forth from the sun and from the sun's rays — immediately from the rays, but mediately from the sun (for it is through the rays) — nevertheless neither has itself any doubleness in respect of its own existence (for the light in the air is simple and uncomposite: what is its composition? and out of what elements, tell me, is light compounded?), nor yet is its [0193] going-forth double, although the things from which the going-forth comes are two, the sun and the ray: so also the procession from the Father and from the Son is simple in itself, even if the persons from which it comes are two, and the Spirit is simple.

Besides, if some composition were contemplated about the Father and the Son, from whom the procession comes, then what is from them would also be double and composite, and there would be doubleness about the procession too. But since the Father and the Son, being one according to essence and existing in one another according to the word I am in the Father and the Father in me, are understood to have no composition toward one another (for their unity is above composition), the conjoining of the Father and the Son is not composition (for otherwise the conjoining of the whole Trinity would be composition); nor is the going-forth of the Spirit, which we say to be from both, composite; nor will the Spirit thence have any composition. So too the activity of the simple essences that come after God is not composite because it comes forth from the essence and from the essence's own power; nor is the going-forth of the activity from both composite. For neither is the coexistence of essence and power a composition; otherwise no essence would be simple, since none is without power — for nothing whatever among the things that are is without power, according to the wise Dionysius. But if among the things after God the going-forth from two is neither itself composite, nor shows that which comes forth to be composite, how much more in God's case?

But let us grant, if you like, that we do lay down a double procession, the one from the Father and the other from the Son, the one mediate and the other immediate: not even so is there doubleness about the Spirit, nor will the Spirit's procession be composite on that account. For these things are about the essence, not according to the essence — unbegottenness, generation and procession — and they are distinctive of hypostases, not divisive of nature; and there is no absurdity in the simple having two properties. For indeed the Father is both father and putter-forth, and there is no composition in him. And besides, the mediate and the immediate are certain relations, and a different relation does not work composition. For if three monads be set out one after another, let us say, the one between the extremes has, in relation to the first, the second place, but in relation to the third, the first; and because the same one is both first and second, it is not on that account composite. And in relation to the first it is perhaps conceived as holding the right-hand part, but in relation to the second the left-hand; and because the same one is both right and left, it does not on that account lose its own simplicity. Again, each of the three monads is not simply a monad but has an order as well; wherefore the one monad might be called first, another middle, another last; yet composition is said to be about none of them.

For if composition is judged from the things contemplated about the essence, then the essence conceived as simple, even apart from the activity that belongs to it and from the power inherent in it — that which it is — would appear composite, in that it is both essence and simple. But it is not composite. For [0196] simplicity is not the essence for simple things, because neither is composition the essence for composite ones, but it is about the essence. And the things about the essence, even if they be more than one for a single thing, do not make the essence composite. So that whether the procession be simple or not simple, the Spirit is simple, and that which proceeds is not composite; for the procession is not essence but is about the essence, the proper characteristic mark of the hypostasis.

7. GR. Next: if you say that it proceeds from the Father and proceeds also from the Son, and that on this account the procession is the one from the Father and the other from the Son, how is not each of the two imperfect, or one of them superfluous? For either the one from the Father is perfect, and the one from the Son superfluous; or the one from the Son is perfect, and the one from the Father superfluous. For the one of them, whichever it be, being perfect, what need is there of the other? Or else each is imperfect when contemplated apart from the other; but in that way the Father too, conceived by himself, would be imperfect. But in fact each person is perfect and productive of perfect activity, contemplated both by itself and together with that which is of one nature with it.

But if the one is perfect and the other imperfect, which of the two would you say to be either this or that? First, that one person is imperfect from which the imperfect procession comes. Then, what need has the perfect of the imperfect? But if the procession is simple: if it is perfect from the Father, why also from the Son? And if from the Son, why also from the Father? For in this way it seems superfluous that the Spirit should come forth from the other as well.

LAT. But perhaps someone says that the procession is not one and another — the one from the Father, the other from the Son — but one and the same and simple from the Father and from the Son, the Father putting forth the Spirit through the Son as intermediate. For from the Father is the Son, and from the Son the Spirit, wherefore also from the Father; so that the same procession is immediately from the Son, but mediately from the Father. And I say "mediately" not as though some time intervened (for he does not first beget the Son and then through the Son put forth the Spirit), but because [0197] in begetting the Son he puts forth the Spirit also through him, and the putting-forth of the Spirit is not without the Son.

GR. By this reasoning one might say that he begets the Son also through the Spirit which proceeds, and that the generation of the Son is not without the procession of the Spirit; and the Son too would be begotten from the Father and from the Spirit.

LAT. But there is also a certain order in the Trinity which we must keep — not one that alters nature, but one that displays the difference of hypostases and presents the property of each hypostasis as unfailing. The Father, then, in begetting the Son puts forth the Spirit also through him; and the Son, being begotten from the Father, puts forth the Spirit also from himself; and the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceeds also from the Son, as through the Son; but it is said to proceed from the Father also, in that, proceeding immediately from the Son, it proceeds from him who is begotten from the Father. And accordingly the one and the same procession belongs to the Spirit, mediate from the Father and immediate from the Son, as we have often said. Yet whether you wish to call it simple or not, it is perfect from either side or from both, that is, from the Father through the Son; because it is both from perfect ones, and perfect, and perfectly; and there is nothing superfluous in the perfect Trinity.

And if you inquire for what cause the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceeds also from the Son, and what the need is, I too will ask you: what need has the Father to beget the Son or to put forth the Spirit, and why does he not either beget both or put forth both, and what is the reason of the Word's generation or of the Spirit's procession? For there was no word higher than the Word, nor than the Spirit. Neither, then, do I tell you what the reason is of the procession from the Father and from the Son, nor why or how the procession is from both. For the existence of the holy Trinity lies above the how and the why, and above such inquiries.

And just as neither the generation is imperfect because it is not without the procession — even if it is distinguished by the difference of mode — nor the procession, because it is not apart from the generation, but each of the two is perfect, and each is other than the other, and neither of them is apart from the other: for as the Father does not first beget the Son and then, as you say, the Spirit proceeds from the Father, but both are always at once, both the generation and the procession, and each is perfect both by itself and together with the other, so also the proceeding from the Father and from the Son, even if it should not say one and the same and simple thing but one thing and another, still each of the two is perfect both by itself and together with the other, and not apart from the other. For it is not because in the same fire there is always both heat and light that on that account the one of them is imperfect, [0200] but because each is with the other, and on that account it is perfect. For fire is perfect, both as perfectly illuminating and as perfectly heating, that is, burning; for it has each in the highest degree. And it is perfect because it also works both at once and altogether. For the perfect is twofold: the one according to each property, the other according to the connaturality with the other. So also in the Trinity. For the Trinity is perfect both in that it is a Trinity, not a personal monad or a dyad; and it is perfect in that each hypostasis also, contemplated by itself — even if they are not separated from one another — has the perfect and above-perfect in every way.

And according to these same things the procession too is perfect from the Father, and perfect from the Son, and perfect from either, and from both; and each of them is above reason, even if you should call it neither simple nor one and the same. And in this way the difficulty has been resolved for you, and no absurdity follows upon the argument. And if you should even call it one, there is nothing to the contrary. For just as if someone should ask, Why does the Father beget? Why is the Son begotten? Why does the Spirit proceed? — we should have nothing else to say than that each of these is a property of each of the divine hypostases: so also if you yourself ask, Why does the Father beget the Son and put forth the Spirit with the Son mediating, while the Son himself also is begotten from the Father and puts forth the Spirit with no other any longer mediating, and the Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, and from the one mediately and from the other immediately? — you will hear nothing else than that the matters of the properties stand thus. You see that the things you say follow upon the argument as absurdities are shown either not to follow, or not to be absurdities, but only to appear absurd.

8. GR. And yet I see another absurdity following upon the procession of the Spirit from the Father and from the Son.

LAT. Say this too. For perhaps I shall be furnished with some argument against it as well, if the Holy Spirit should grant it.

GR. If the Spirit is from the Son, the Son would be father of the Spirit, and the Spirit son of the Son and grandson of the Father, and the Father grandfather of the Spirit; but these things are ridiculous and alien to truth and to piety.

LAT. Against this argument it was open to reply that the following of these ridiculous and impious things does not attach to our doctrine; since one would have said — were he not scrupulous, in discourses concerning God, about uttering whatever comes to hand and things which the divinely inspired oracles do not grant, as you yourself say — that if the Spirit also is from the Father, it would be son of the Father and brother of the Son…

[0201] GR. Let what has been said stand as it has been said; and against those things we shall say nothing in reply. But other absurdities, and not a few, we shall show to follow upon your doctrine. Yet on account of the length of the discourse, and its being wearisome to the ears, and the labor of it, let us for now bring to an end here the things being said; and next, taking up the discourse as from another beginning, let us in love of truth uncover those things too.

[ed: The plate here carries a centered heading across both columns — ΛΟΓΟΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ, "Second Discourse" (the Latin column: DIALOGUS SECUNDUS) — which our Greek source omits, along with the section mark that follows it.]

1. LAT. You promised not long ago, O Greek, to show many absurdities attending our doctrine concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit.…

GR. I would not deny my promise; but see, I am ready to add what is still lacking. And you, O Latin, do not weary of setting objections, if you have anything sound and strong.

LAT. Say on, then.

GR. If the Son is from the Father by generation, and the Spirit from the Son by procession, but from the Spirit nothing either by generation or by procession, then both the Father and the Son will have the greater in relation to the Spirit, and a diminution will follow for the Spirit: because the Son is immediately from the Father, but the Spirit not immediately from the Father; and because the Spirit sends forth nothing else from itself, while the Father and the Son have that which is productive of another hypostasis. And there will be room hereafter for Eunomius and Macedonius and Apollinaris, who bring in the Spirit as lessened in relation to the Father and the Son.

LAT. But it is not according to essence, my good sir, that the Father and the Son have the greater in relation to the Spirit, but rather according to the property: because the Spirit is from the Father and from the Son, but the Father or the Son is not from the Spirit; and because the property of the Spirit is not to beget or to put forth, but to proceed. And in this way the greater belongs to the Father also in relation to the Son; for the Father is greater than the Son, as the Lord himself says: "My Father is greater than I" [var: Gk. ὁ πατὴρ μείζων μού ἐστιν, "the Father is greater than I" — the received text carries no "my" with "Father"]; but by that same account, or by some other, not by essence.

[0204] The greater, then, according to your own argument, the Father has obtained in both respects; and you have brought this absurdity not upon us the more, but upon yourselves, if indeed you call the greater according to property an absurdity. But if this is not an absurdity, neither declare that one an absurdity in us.

[ed: Between the last speech and this one our Greek source drops the editor's Latin bridge, which the plate carries: a long treatment of this argument follows in the manuscript, and the Latin's words resume from Vat. cod. 1115, f. 11b (col. 0203, Latin column).]

2. GR. What then? Do you not make two principles, if indeed you say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son?

LAT. I for my part do not think so. For to speak of two principles is absurd — the sort of thing the children of the heretics assert, positing the one good and the other evil, and the one the fountain of every good, the other the cause of every evil, contrary to one another and of contrary things.

GR. And yet it is far more absurd to posit two principles of the same and one thing than to speak of contrary principles of contrary things and to assign the two to two, each to each. For it is more reasonable to posit the one as principle of the two than the two of the one.

LAT. But we do not say two principles, my good sir, since, while we say that the one is from both, we again refer the one of the two to the other, so that in this way too the one is one principle of the two.… Say, then, if you have another absurdity following upon our doctrine; since the things already spoken of have been shown either not to be absurd or not to follow. And it is sophistical to call things that do not follow consequences, and to set down as absurd things that are not absurd.

3. GR. But if the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and proceeds also from the Son, and if the Father is putter-forth of the Spirit and the Son putter-forth as well, what is the difference between putter-forth and putter-forth, between the procession that is from the Father and the procession that is from the Son?

LAT. Tell me first, you yourself, what is the difference between generation and procession, and I too will tell you what is the difference between the procession that is from the Father and the procession that is from the Son. For the present I will say only this much: that no time divides the procession from the Father and that from the Son. For it does not proceed first from the Father and afterward from the Son, or [0205] the reverse; but proceeding from the Father it proceeds through the Son, and proceeding from the Son, as through the Son as middle, and from the Father, as from the fountain of the Son, it proceeds. And there is no difference of this procession, unless one should allege the mediate and the immediate and should wish on this account to make the procession twofold; since in any other respect it is not possible to conceive any difference of it at all.

4. GR. If, then, the Father, putting forth the Spirit through the Son as middle, puts it forth mediately, but the Son immediately sends forth the same, since it is not through some other, the Son would be the proximate cause of the Spirit, and the Father not proximate; and thus the Father will be first cause and the Son after him, and thus again a diminution will follow for the Son in relation to the Father and for the Spirit in relation to the Son, and thus there will be room for Arius and Eunomius and Macedonius and Apollinaris.

LAT. But take heart, my good man: there will be room with us neither for Arius nor for Eunomius nor for Macedonius or Apollinaris. For all these either cut up the Godhead into different godheads, and set down the one as greater, another as lesser, and another as holding a middle place; or they estrange it from the uncreated nature of the Father; or, making the Son and the Spirit natures subordinate one to another — so to call them — and setting down this one as a creature of that and that of the other; or they bring the Spirit down altogether into the rank of creatures. With them the first is not reverent and the proximate is impious and the middle is nearly-like, and the greater and the lesser and order simply and the before this and the after that and what follows and such names are understood in a way answering to their own impiety. But with us both the order, if it be spoken of, is taken up in the case of the holy Trinity according to reverent reckonings, and the first and the prior…

[ed: Our Greek source loses the rest of this clause and the editor's Latin bridge that follows it; the plate (leaf 100) carries them, and reports that among much else the speaker adduces Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus and explains at greater length what order is, and first, and second.]

But that the discourse may become more searching, beginning again from another point we speak concerning each of the names mentioned, in how many ways it is said and how it is taken up in the case of the holy Trinity; and first concerning order.

5. Order, then, is contemplated either in essences, or in quantities, or in qualities, or in relatives, or in the things called acting and being acted upon, or in the where, or in the when, or in the having and being had, or in all these in relation to one another: in all of them, as essence, quantity, quality, relative and the rest; for essence is conceived in addition as underlying all the others, then quantity is contemplated, after which quality, and next in order the relative and the rest;

and in essences, as God, mind, souls, bodies; and in quantities, in the continuous ones as point, line, surface, body; but in the [0208] discrete ones, in number as monad, dyad, triad, tetrad and so on, and in speech as elements, syllables, nouns, verbs and discourse; and in qualities as passion, disposition, habit; and in the figures, as circle, triangle, square, and so on; and in the things receptive of qualities that are contemplated according to the more and the less, such as the less white and the more, and the still whiter and the most, and the less hot and the more, and the still hotter and the most, and things of that kind. Whence the sons of the physicians also say that some of the drugs are of the first order, others of the second, others of the third, and others of the fourth. And likewise also in the acting and the being acted upon; for the more and the less are in these too, and the most. But also in place; for the above or below, or to the right or to the left, or in front or behind or round about or in the middle, has a certain order. And in time: the yesterday and the today and the tomorrow and the earlier and the now and the later belong to order. But also in the relatives; for whether the earlier and the later, or also the simultaneous, be in them, these too belong to order. And in the same way in all cases.

And simply, in each of the things contemplated singly and by themselves there would be no order; but where some number is contemplated, or a relation to another, there order also is, whether the thing be treated as of nature, or more logically, or contemplated mathematically, or even theologically. I mean something of this sort. The monad, when it is contemplated by itself, is both without relation and alone and above order; but when it is contemplated in relation to the dyad and the triad and the numbers that follow, it is not called monad simply, but also first and principle of numbers. The element likewise: such as earth, water and the rest, when they are thus contemplated and spoken of by themselves; but in relation to the whole world and to the things that come from them, they are both elements and principles. The twenty-four letters are letters in themselves, but elements as principles of the syllables and of the rest that follow. The day likewise; for it too is one by itself, but first as in relation to those after it. Whence perhaps Moses also, contemplating the first day by itself, as the following days had not yet come to be, named it "one"; but when the following days had come after it, it is possible to call it first also in relation to them. And I am not indeed ignorant of the reasons for which the saints said that day to be one and to be so called; nor, knowing them, do I disown them, but I both know them and heartily accept them.

Again, God is both one and alone; but when he is contemplated in relation to mind and soul and bodies, then he both is and is called first according to order, as principle of all things. But in the divine nature also there is number, the super-numerical Triad; and in the nature of the angel and in that of man the corresponding number, for there are many angels and many men; then order too is contemplated in them, yet not according to essence, but according to certain properties; and the one is as it were a kind of principle, while the other has a different order. Thus there is a ruler among angels and archangels, and among [0209] men Adam is head of the earth-born; and in the Trinity, then, the Father is principle.

But do not conclude to me, from the fact that there are many angels and many men, that there are many gods also. Away with that Hellenic folly! but rather that in Father and Son and Holy Spirit there is order too, yet an order higher than all order. For as the nature transcends all natures (for it is above nature and super-natural), so also the order transcends all orders (for it is above order and super-ordered), and the Father is principle, super-principial. Nor again, from the fact that Adam is head of the earth-born among men and the commander-in-chief Michael is chief of the angels — so to speak — among the angels, conclude that the archangel is some father and begetter of the multitude of the angels, as we said Adam, or those from Adam, was of the multitude of men. And yet as there is fatherhood on earth, so also in the heavens; but the fatherhood is proper to each of the two natures and befitting the nature.

There is, then, a certain order in the case of the Trinity as well; yet one that does not bring in a division of nature (for the nature is one and unvarying for the three), nor a positioning in place (for the Trinity is uncircumscribed and above every place), nor an appearance of temporal motion or of anything else of the things contemplated in what comes after God (for both ages and times are after God), but according to the differences of the properties of each supremely divine hypostasis; and because the Father is without principle and is principle of the Son, while the Son is principle and not without principle, in respect at least of having the Father as principle — since according to time he too is without principle — and the Spirit is itself principle also, together with the principle; for there is principle and principle and principle, yet not three principles, but one and in this way principle, since both the Son and the Spirit are referred, through the Son, to one principle; and so also God and God and God, yet not three Gods, but one God.

If, then, there is order in the Trinity too, as the saints also said, and order is the first and the earlier or second and the simultaneous (for in whatever things this is, some one of these is also present in them), it is necessary that in the Trinity too either the simultaneous be contemplated, or the first and the earlier and the second, or both.

LAT. Let these things also stand as they seem good to you; and let the present discussion have its end here.

[ed: Our Greek source drops this closing speech of the Latin, which the plate carries (leaf 102), and with it the centered heading that follows — ΛΟΓΟΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ, "Third Discourse" (the Latin column: DIALOGUS TERTIUS) — together with the editor's note that the author here brings the dialogue to a close.]

[0212] GR. This beginning we lay down once more, for our joint inquiry with you concerning the Holy Spirit: how it is not absurd to say that it proceeds not from the Father alone, but also from the Son. For it is necessary either that it be proceeding from the essence of the Father, or from the property. But if from the essence, then, since the essence is common and the same to the Father and the Son and the Spirit, the Spirit would proceed not from the Father and the Son only, but also from itself — which is not the case. And if from the property, and the property is not essence but about the essence, how will that which is by itself, namely the Spirit, be proceeding from that which is not by itself but about another, that is, from the property? Either, then, it is not capable of proceeding at all, or, if it is capable of proceeding and proceeds from the Father and from the Son, it will be proceeding from itself also — which never is.

LAT. This argument shows not that it does not proceed from the Son, but that it does not proceed from the Father either, nor is it capable of proceeding at all.… [lat: the Latin column gives *non quod procedit ex Filio*, "not that it proceeds from the Son," without the Greek's negative μή]

GR.

The establishing and the demonstration is either through an argument framed by art, proceeding from true principles, or through examples, or through testimonies, or through certain things that follow upon the testimonies and the scriptural usages; since he who brings in anything apart from these seems to say nothing persuasive nor reasonable, let alone true or reverent; and he seems also to bring in paradoxical notions — not to say heterodox ones — apart from testimonies and establishing.

LAT. This indeed I will do, only tomorrow; but for the present let us here hold our tongue.

[ed: A centered heading across both columns stands here on the plate (leaf 103) — ΛΟΓΟΣ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΣ, "Fourth Discourse" (the Latin column: DIALOGUS QUARTUS) — which our Greek source omits.]

GR. Come now, let us see, O Latin, whether you have any images or examples, either fashioned by yourself or taken from somewhere else, for a plainer demonstration [0213] of the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, as you say; and things through which it is possible to picture clearly what is being laid down as doctrine, if anywhere it is possible to discern how of one and the same thing this is a cause and that also; and principle and principle, and not two principles, nor two causes; so that one who grants that the cause of the Spirit, and likewise the principle, is not the Father alone but the Son also, may not seem to bring in two principles or two causes, but in this way also may guard the doctrine of the monarchy.

LAT. And indeed, O Greek, a plain example is not to be found that displays the relation or the order of the holy Trinity; yet there are many things able to picture dimly what is being said, of which some are gathered from Scripture and others found from the very nature of things and of notions.

GR. Bring these forward to me, then, and let us consider them together; for perhaps we too shall set over against them examples more apposite.

LAT. I speak, then; and do you listen with understanding. Does not every essence have both a power connatural to itself and a natural operation?

GR. I say it does.…

LAT. Consider for me, then, this example also. There is the essence of fire, and its burning power, and the operation of the power, the burning; and the effect, the coal, the ash. So also the Father.…

LAT. There is point and line and surface; these three are one principle of what are called mathematical bodies, as there the essence, the power and the operation are one principle of the things operated; or, if you will, monad, dyad, triad — this arithmetical triad is principle and cause and fountain of every number.… For conceive for me a finger and a whole hand, on which the finger depends, and a whole man, whose the hand and the finger are.… You know an eye and a fountain and a river.… Again another example, and this too of the same thing, taken by the Saint from Scripture: Adam, Eve, Seth.… But I will tell you yet another example, in which there is no such defect.

GR. What is it?

LAT. That of the sun again, and of the ray and of the light, as bearing on what is useful for the doctrine.…

That the διά in Scripture is used indifferently with the ἐκ.

Recapitulation of the examples that have been set forth.

[ed: A centered heading across both columns stands here on the plate (leaf 105) — ΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΕΜΠΤΟΣ, "Fifth Discourse" (the Latin column: DIALOGUS QUINTUS) — which our Greek source omits.]

[0216] GR. For the rest, if you have any other argument for the doctrine, O Latin, declare it; since for us the evangelical saying suffices, which plainly presents the Spirit as proceeding from the Father.…

LAT. Hold back, O Greek, and let us both still reserve the argument from the testimonies, and this as the last one; but for now, tell me: if the generation and the procession are simultaneous, how is that which proceeds not from that which is begotten? If the Son and the Spirit are simultaneously from the Father, how is the Spirit not also from the Son?

GR. I too will tell you: if Father and Son are simultaneous, how is the Son from the Father and not the Father also from the Son? If Spirit and Son are simultaneously from the Father, how is the Spirit from the Son and not the Son also from the Spirit, and that which is begotten from that which proceeds?…

LAT. I say, then, that "to proceed," in whatever cases it is found to be said, signifies a motion of some kind, yet one proper and corresponding to the matter under consideration.…

LAT. I perceive that I am already being pressed to come to the scriptural testimonies; but here, having brought this argument too to its completion and making another beginning from this point, I shall in that way make mention of the testimonies and of the establishing that comes from the teachings of the Fathers. For toward the demonstration of things above nature the argument framed by art is weak, and so is the one that perhaps concludes directly, and the one that leads back to absurdity, and simply every syllogism; and the one that proceeds through certain images and examples is dim and ineffectual — for the matter is above demonstration; since if demonstrations are of the things that are, that which is above the things that are is assuredly above demonstration also.

[ed: A centered heading across both columns stands here on the plate (leaf 105) — ΛΟΓΟΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ, "Sixth Discourse" (the Latin column: DIALOGUS SEXTUS) — which our Greek source omits.]

GR. These things I too say. But what, O Latin, may the testimonies be, both the scriptural and the patristic — it is now time to say — through which it may become [0217] plain that to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son also is not contrary to the teachings of the apostles and to the traditions of the Fathers and to the ecclesiastical and orthodox doctrines from of old. For it is marvelous to us, and beyond expectation.

[ed: The editor's Latin bridge that stands here on the plate (leaf 106) is lost in our Greek source: the Latin thereupon brings forward much testimony for his own opinion, and the Greek then continues as follows. Without it the two speeches of the Greek run together, as though he answered himself.]

GR. You yourselves, then, sounding forth the "and from the Son" in the creed, will be found contrary-minded to us and out of concord for ever, and you will never be able to come together with us into the same things, and you will always be reckoned as uttering things opposed to the wise John. For though he is one, yet he is also the disciple of Cyril and of Athanasius and of the other Fathers, and before these of Christ. And besides this, in sounding forth in the creed the very thing which the Saints did not say, you will be taken altogether not to follow them all, but to speak with another voice; for it is needful to keep the exposition of the faith uninnovated and untampered with, not only in respect of the doctrines and the notions, but in respect of the very words.

Consider, then, how many synods have taken place since the exposition of the creed of the faith, and how many doctrinal ambiguities have been stirred up; yet no synod after the second synod, which made clear the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, either took away or added even a single word, or altered any of the things defined; but rather the greater part of the ambiguities were resolved from the words of the holy creed itself, and the confession of these cast out every suspicion and ambiguity; and the fact that this and that was understood in this way and in that by these men and by those made no innovation in the sayings that are in the creed; but the genuine meaning of the ambiguous matter was handed down through other expositions and definitions, and the spurious was cast out. So it was at the third, so at the fourth, so at those that followed; but the holy creed of religion has been preserved as it was set forth from the beginning. For if it were granted, on account of the ambiguities that fall in the way, to make additions upon additions and subtractions, or exchanges of certain words, we should little by little be shifting the boundaries of the Fathers unawares. Since even in the time of those very holy Fathers who made the exposition, many ambiguities afterward arose concerning the *homoousion*, which is one single [0220] word of the creed (for many who were contrary-minded to the Fathers put forward the same word for the concealment of their own impiety, but had another meaning within themselves), yet they were not willing to add to the creed any determination declaratory of the reverent meaning or exclusory of the impious construction; but privately and by themselves they each contended concerning the word and its signification, and both composed and published an interpretation clear and reverent, plainly setting forth the orthodox meaning and refuting the heretical one, as the great Athanasius also did; but addition or subtraction or alteration of the word they in no way made.

That the Fathers, then, said in the creed "that which proceeds from the Father" and nothing more, the acts themselves of each several synod make plain, and the synodical volumes, that is, the books that treat of these matters; for everywhere they are carried about as having it so, and they have inserted neither the "from the Son" nor the "not from the Son" or "through the Son."

You therefore, O Latin, holding that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son: if you say that it proceeds from the Son in this way, as from a first principle, and not as through the Son, but as also from the Father, then you altogether make two principles, and you abolish the generation of the Son, and you say things contrary to the Damascene and to Athanasius and to Cyril and to all the other Fathers, and to us, whose glory it is to follow the holy Fathers. But if you say the "from the Son" in this way, as from the Father through the Son, and the "from the Father" in this way, as from the Son who is from the Father, then you speak in one voice with John the Damascene also, and with Athanasius and Cyril, and you are of one opinion with the other God-bearing Fathers, and in respect of the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit you are to us as well both friends and of one mind.

It would have been fitting, then, that you, doing what is equal to the Fathers and dear to them, should in the creed sound forth "that which proceeds from the Father," according to the tradition of the Fathers from the beginning; but should make plain the proceeding "from the Son" through other writings that interpret the reverent meaning of these words — whether you wish to say that the procession is through the Son, or from the Son in the same signification — and should bring in no scandal at all into the common midst, and no cause of so great a schism and [0221] division; since the great Athanasius himself and the wise Cyril, understanding the procession from the Father in this way, made the procession of the Spirit clear in their own writings, but added nothing in the creed; and likewise the Damascene also. For in his rendering of the faith [it is] "that which proceeds from the Father, not from the Son"; but privately he notes besides that the Spirit is not said to be from the Son — that is to say, as from a first principle and as from the Father.

Following, therefore, the teachings of these men, we too, sounding forth "that which proceeds from the Father," understand the procession as from the Father as from a first principle, yet through the Son who is proximately from the Father; nevertheless we do not say in the creed, "that which proceeds from the Father through the Son" — and yet it would have been more reasonable to say this, if indeed it holds what is unambiguous both for us and for you, as being held in honor by both and as removing every ambiguity; but that very thing which the Fathers did not do — that occasion might not be given, out of the ambiguities that fall in the way, for devising additions or subtractions or certain alterations to the creed of the faith, and the exposition be innovated in this way — this we too, wishing to keep, hold that neither the "through the Son" nor the "from the Son" or the "not from the Son" ought to be added.

Do you yourselves, then, pass over in silence the addition of this word, and no longer sound forth in the creed "that which proceeds from the Father and from the Son," but say with us, according to the Fathers, "that which proceeds from the Father, which is glorified together with Father and Son" [var: the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed reads τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, "who together with the Father and the Son is worshipped together and glorified together"; Migne's text carries only the second verb]. And the concord of us both into one, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, will suffice for you and for us, since we agree with one another in saying that the procession of the Spirit is from the Father through the Son.
